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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the changing shape of 'knowledge', 'development' and 
global institutions of social and economic governance, within the context of changes 
in discursive practices surrounding the notion of our entering a 'knowledge economy'. 
The work approaches these changes as being relatively new variations upon a 
number of older struggles around sources and understandings of property and 
wealth, the means by which they are produced, and the means by which claims upon 
them are made. The focus within this approach is consequently upon how trends of 
repetition predominate within the re-production of dominant sets of discursive 
practices, but how at the same time within each such moment of reproduction new 
and different spaces can potentially open up, and new contributions potentially be 
heard, opening up possibilities for the production of differences. 
The substantial focus of the study is provided by the World Bank's engagement with 
knowledge economy discourse through a major rhetorical shift in its self-image in 
1995 when it became, officially, the Knowledge Bank. The Bank is argued to have 
been existing in a state of crisis for some years, with calls for its reform or abolition, 
and its own self-administered programmes of reform and renewal, being equally 
frequent and fervent in their advertised intentions of radically changing or shutting 
down the organisation. The Bank is approached as a great story-teller playing a 
number of roles within and housing a range of perspectives upon what development 
is and can be. Yet the organisation is argued to be made both less useful and more 
dangerous through an organisational preoccupation with normalising discursive 
practices around its one official ly-ap proved vision of development. Later chapters 
consider how engagement with the organisation's reproduction as a Knowledge Bank 
could potentially be used in opening it up to other voices and other understandings. 
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'A good story keeps on growing. A good story never dies ... Stories are the wisest surviving parts of a people's stupidities or failings. ' (Ben Okri, Birds 
of Heaven, 1996: 32) 
'[D]evelopment is a tough and complicated business. After 50 years of 
operation, and with new leadership, it is a good time for the Bank Group to 
take stock. The world around us has changed, and its expectations from, 
and demands on, our institution have become ever more complex. I regard 
this as a difficult period, but one of enormous opportunity. ' (James 
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, 1995 Annual Meetings Speech) 
In its broadest sense this thesis is concerned with the changing shape of 'knowledge', 
'development' and global institutions of social and economic governance within the 
context of discourse upon the 'knowledge economy. The study's substantial focus is 
provided by the World Bank, the world's largest development body, in its engagement 
with this discourse through the major rhetorical shift in its self-image in 1995 when it 
became, officially, the Knowledge Bank. The World Bank is a great story-teller of our 
age. However many amongst its audience are unhappy with the stories they hear, or 
find it hard to resolve these stories with the realities they see around them. The Bank 
has been seen as existing in a state of crisis for some years, with calls for its reform 
or abolition being frequent from many within its audience, and programmes of reform 
and renewal being initiated by every new leader who takes the helm of the 
organisation. The Bank's fiftieth birthday in 1994 was reason for a huge number of 
performance assessments, including the Bank's own two-volume critical self- 
reflection (Kapur et al. 1997a, 1997b) and a global campaign by a broad coalition of 
critical organisations based on the call of 'Fifty Years is Enough! ' (see for instance 
www. 50years. org). Again some critics called for its abolition whilst others petitioned 
for reforms, and again both camps included those concerned with its existence as a 
'bank' with an interest in protecting capital interests, as well as those concerned with 
its role as a 'development organisation' and its perceived failures in this regard. 
One year later a new President, James Wolfensohn, took over the Bank and in turn a 
new programme of renewal emerged, this time picking up on trends in contemporary 
social science discourse concerning the social and economic importance of 
knowledge and information. The organisation now declared that it was to become a 
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'Knowledge Bank', engaging knowledge for development and in the process enabling 
development (and thereby producing returns upon capital investments) more 
effectively than it had done before. There would be a New Bank that was ready to 
make sure that all the world's peoples were able to benefit from the world's New 
(Knowledge) Economy. Through a rhetorical turn towards the notion of our entering a 
'knowledge economy' (and the correlating constitution of 'knowledge societies'), the 
World Bank has thus attempted to reposition itself on the development landscape as 
a premier knowledge manager. The Bank is considered both in terms of how it has 
contributed to and helped to shape, as well as how it has reacted to and been 
influenced by, this moment of overlap. Critics have denounced both the knowledge 
economy and the Knowledge Bank as the imperialistic machinations of Northern 
capital interests extending their remit of control, whilst advocates have celebrated 
what they see as overdue, necessary, and promising developments. This thesis 
accepts many criticisms that have been made but draws back from many more 
fatalistic pronouncements that have consequently been passed. It seeks instead to 
assess the situation in its full complexity, and consider how the changes under 
analysis might be engaged with in developing the slim avenues of opportunity that are 
argued to exist within them. 
Several themes run through the work and guide the approach adopted here. Firstly 
there is the matter of repetition, difference, and incremental underdetermined 
changes. In thinking about the economic and social innovations described under the 
banners of the knowledge economy and society, and the new policy directions 
undertaken by the Bank and others, the impression is that we are seeing largely a 
new game played by the same rules. Chapter One outlines important tools as well as 
points upon methodology and terminology, and draws a central distinction on an 
institutional economic understanding between organisations and institutions. 
Understanding institutions as the rules by which society functions, organisations can 
be seen as adapting to new concerns around the importance of knowledge within an 
as yet largely unchanged institutional context. Organisational changes may produce 
adaptations in social institutions, but over the longer term and under the effect of a 
wider range of influences. Hence what we currently see are changes much on the 
basis of a repetition with some more and less significant differences. This highlights 
the need to deflate the rhetoric of change that surrounds knowledge economy and 
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society discourses in order to assess what is actually happening, emphasising that 
the changes occurring are often overstated and do not necessarily cohere in the 
manner discussed. A related element within this theme is the importance of the 
performance of discursive changes. Drama is here used as a metaphoric model for 
thinking about discursive reproduction, repetition, and difference. The metaphor 
emphasises the work's focus upon the public rhetorical and discursive performance of 
the Bank, and so acts as a caution against reductive empiricism in the analysis of 
characters and events. It also brings forth a range of performative typologies, posing 
questions in thinking about who scripts these dramas and defines the actor positions 
therein, and who directs, prompts and sets the stage. 
The second main theme is of a discourse of reform that circulates around, within, and 
through the World Bank. It is stressed that the Bank may be a big player in a 
multitude of relatively smaller situations around the world, but is itself a relatively 
small player in several larger ones, a conclusion indicated by the discussion of 
organisations and institutions and elaborated in the consideration of knowledge and 
development discourses in Chapters Two through to Four. Chapter Two considers 
theoretical explorations of the knowledge economy and society ideas. Points of 
emergence of four discursive streams are noted around perceived changes in 
knowledge and information production, and technological developments that have 
inspired thinking about the 'network' as an effective mode of organisation. The 
dominant trend is observed to focus upon the potential for socio-economic liberation 
and the demise of exploitation through the evolution of new social and economic 
forms. Problems of conceptual isation and measurement are then outlined in arguing 
that the changes observed are often imbued with more significance and optimism 
than they merit. A restricted understanding of the knowledge economy is accepted as 
a potentially useful framework through which to approach certain contemporary socio- 
technical changes, but a more critical and sceptical perspective towards the notion is 
argued to be necessary in seeking to avoid complacency. 
Chapter Three then considers how these trends are being performed as a mode of 
governmental discursive practice. Government institutions are argued to play a 
central role in shaping the construction and performance of any 'new economy' as a 
socio-economic reality, establishing legal infrastructures and heightening awareness 
of the changes under analysis. The role of international knowledge structures in 
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determining whose knowledge 'counts', and likely consequent winning and losing 
positions in the new economy, are also considered. Again optimism is noted to run 
unguardedly strong in the notion of 'leapfrogging. Finally, an alternative conception of 
the knowledge economy is briefly considered in terms of certain advantages it could 
potentially offer with regard to development over the dominant forms of discursive 
practice outlined here, and for its potential to effect changes in the dominant 
discourse. Chapter Four then provides a summary of the state of development 
discourse, illustrating how 'poverty' is produced through statistical commodification 
exercises in articulating a problem that helps to define a project through which it can 
be engaged. It is noted that development as a grand-scale (governmental, industrial) 
project has been continually modified in response to its perceived failings by the 
standards which the discourse itself produces. New concerns (participation, 
environment, women) have been appended and the roles of various actors adjusted 
(including allowing a greater part for the state in regulating the economy and 
providing public goods). Yet the narrative's core objectives and dynamics have 
remained in many ways the same. These three chapters emphasise how the Bank is 
merely one player upon several discursive terrains. Chapter Five then considers the 
Knowledge Bank programme as a belated reaction to changes ongoing in the 
discourses it occupies, and knowledge economy discourse itself is observed to be 
several conversations within the Bank, with contributions from various perspectives. 
The Knowledge Bank programme functions firstly as a focus for reorganisation, 
seeking to apply 'networked' modes of organisation to the Bank, to decentralise and 
partner in producing a Knowledge Management and Networking Bank. It secondly 
functions in emphasising the importance of the Bank's work to all development efforts 
through problematising the positions of other actors and situating a Knowledge for 
Development Bank as being central their achieving their objectives. 
In thinking of the Bank as an organisation which is both big and a small in various 
situations, and within which discussions continue that are similar in nature to those 
that surround it, the question of reform or abolishment appears as an interesting 
question unproductively posed at the wrong level. The question relates ultimately to 
how we might alter the current institutions of capital regulation so as to more 
effectively ensure the provision of scarce resources to peoples according to their 
needs, and within that questions of how needs are to be fairly defined. Many who 
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want to abolish the Bank are aware of the need for some forms of global 
organisations to act as rule-setters and regulators of international trade, investment 
and capital flows. The question can then be reframed as one of gauging the 
potentiality for, and openness to, adaptation within the Bank and its arrangements of 
clients and governors. That is, the discourse of reform that surrounds, and persists 
within, the organisation. The third strong theme within this work, then, considers the 
politics of networks which runs through the discourses considered and the changes 
undertaken at the Bank through its Renewal. A network mentality is becoming 
normalised within the Bank. Through knowledge economy discourse the 'network' has 
gained credibility as a mode of social and economic organisation, and thereby as a 
unit of activity and means of analysis. Throughout the work it is argued that the 
distinction often drawn between hierarchical (bureaucratic) and horizontalised 
(network) modes of organisation is inadequate insofar as it is overly optimistic and 
reductively dichotomous. Drawing upon the work of Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and 
others it is argued that networks need to be thought of as forging connections through 
processes of translation rather than the unmediated transfer of flows (of goods, 
capital, people, information and so forth). 
Chapter Six observes that the Knowledge Bank is not a specific programme or 
agenda but more of an ethos or oeuvre of Renewal, an idea deployed within a 
mushrooming of relatively autonomous initiatives being painted in its colours, and an 
exercise in increasing organisational self-awareness and redefining the dominant 
understanding of the Bank. A changing mode of discursive engagement is becoming 
manifest through the Knowledge Management and Networking Bank, and so new 
forms of practice and a potentially somewhat new Bank. Through the discourse of 
decentralisation and partnership the organisation becomes potentially more dispersed 
and open to influence. The politics of networks is considered through the Bank's 
attempts to reconceive itself, and the development community as a whole, as a series 
of horizontalised networks, and the degree to which relations of power are and are 
not flattened through the reproduction of certain nodes as gateway- points exerting a 
dominant influence over the shape and direction of the network's constitutive flows. 
Chapter Seven considers the normalising effects of such 'networked' discursive 
practices. These help to shape the unfolding of a discursive trend through the 
production of communities or networks wherein the Bank is reproduced as a gateway 
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node, a more central point of connection between other agents as well as a producer 
and manager of development knowledge and the means and standards of 
development knowledge production. Aspects of the potentially enabling and 
constraining effects of such normalisation are explored with regard to a dominant 
Bank understanding of 'knowledge for development' and related conceptions of 
development and governance at a distance. A study of one Bank initiative, the 
Development Gateway, and the interaction between the Bank and certain of its critics 
around this endeavour, indicates how the organisation's discourse of decentralisation 
and partnership is restricted through its tendency to retain hold of core operations, but 
also how this discourse provides tools for critical development organisations to push 
the Bank further in its discursive practice. 
The concluding Chapter Eight then looks at the discourse of Bank reform from the 
perspective of critical organisations and strategies of resistance. Resistance is framed 
as necessary insofar as the organisation is changing, but is still dominated by the 
interests of its Northern government members. Change is happening, but it is slow, 
and so resistance could encourage, and shape the direction of, more difference within 
its repetition, more reform within its discourse. it is argued that the multiplicity of 
perspectives within the Bank harbour small openings onto other ways of being and of 
'developing' economically. What is required is the further development of trans-Bank 
critical networks that strengthen resistance to the organisation's dominant 
economistic voice both inside and outside of it. Rather than dismiss the Bank as a 
tool of US imperialism that needs to be abolished, therefore, it can be engaged with 
through carefully encouraging its own discursive practices, drawing the organisation 
out from the cover of its central Washington hub. The aim would be to pursue 
decentralisation to the degree where local organisations could exert more influence 
over Bank country-bases which would increasingly become the hubs of Bank policy. If 
the Bank could be diffused through decentralisation, this might help defuse the 
economic and intellectual might with which it dominates the development landscape. 
The questions that dominate this work are therefore concerned with how 'discourse 
can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling- 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy, (Foucault 
1990: 101). As will be addressed throughout this thesis, some fifty years after the 
Bank's establishment it is still an organisation dreaming of its ultimate goal (of a world 
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free of poverty). The new economic discourse and the discourses of reform and 
renewal that surround the Bank present an opportunity to encourage changes in how 
the organisation pursues this goal and the institutional context within which it does so. 
This thesis is thus designed with the intention of encouraging shifts in the way all 
those who engage with the Bank think about what the organisation is and what it 
could become, and the means available for engaging with it in order to produce 
changes in its modes and means of operations. It is therefore similarly concerned with 
overcoming the apparent opposition between the two groups of those who wish to 
reform the Bank and those who wish to abolish it. Seeing the Bank in the context that 
will be outlined here allows us to situate 'it' as a space within a series of assemblages 
of resources (people, capital, knowledge and so forth); an organisational entity 
through which various assemblages are defined and redefined, strengthened and 
weakened, and which is in turn affected by the activities of and other influences upon 
that which is assembled. This raises the question of how clearly demarcated the 
space which defines the Bank is, and needs to be, for the various purposes of those 
who engage with it. This thesis contends that one productive strategy of engagement 
with the Bank would use its discourse of decentralisation and partnering to encourage 
further adaptations in its discursive practices such as greater engagement with 
external partners and initiatives and the restriction of Bank involvement wherever 
possible to promote more deliberative and collaborative processes of problem- 
definition and agenda-setting. Such changes could also blur the lines of the space 
demarcating the Bank, enabling greater and more productive interaction between 




The Discursive Apparatuses of the Knowledge Economy 
and Development 
I 
Of Cyberspace, Public Performance, and Research-at-a-Distance 
Introduction 
This opening chapter maps out the terrain the thesis will cover. The conceptual tools 
and the broad methodological approach of the work are laid out, and a number of 
terminological issues are clarified in outlining the relation adopted towards the 
discourses considered. This work considers the politics of and within specific 
networks as well as the politics of thinking in network terms, and so a critical 
understanding of the 'network' is outlined here. It is noted that network thinking needs 
to be engaged with carefully and critically, given the ease with which the term can be 
deployed in an overly simplistic, optimistic and reductive fashion to imply the 
horizontalisation of structures of power and the unimpeded flow of network content 
between nodes (goods, capital, information, people and so forth). The network is 
nonetheless argued to be one useful, if necessarily limited, way of understanding 
certain modes of organisation, as well as the manner in which flows can be structured 
and channelled, enabled, restricted and transformed. 
The tendency towards thinking of networks as open spaces of free and equal 
connections is argued to be an unproductive outcome of the rise to dominance of a 
network model based around an idealised vision of the Internet. This model weakens 
critical thinking upon the processes of translation involved in establishing and 
maintaining connections and flows between 'nodes'within 'networks', and the agency 
involved in producing identifiable and distinct 'nodes' and 'networks'. One aspect of 
this is the analytical elision of both qualitative differences between flows and the 
prevalence of hierarchies or clusters at points within networks. Some indication of the 
flaws within such thinking is given in a brief critical analysis of the Internet as a 
precursor to later engagement with discourse upon the knowledge economy. Finally, 
the nature of the research conducted herein is considered and the use of the Internet 
as my primary research tool is explained as being a way to engage with the Bank's 
public rhetorical face and its efforts to reproduce and shape a space for itself within 
the worlds of development and governance. 
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Methodological and Terminological Considerations 
It is worth articulating here a set of concise and functional definitions for a number of 
conceptual tools which will be used in this thesis. The purpose is not to 'black-box' 
(Latour 1987: 41-44) a theoretical stance but rather to provisionally mark out a 
position that enables full consideration of the outlined changes and is responsive to 
the potentially different eventualities stemming from these. Power and knowledge, 
discourse, and hegemony are all important structuring devices deployed within the 
text, whilst the notions of problematisation and translation (Callon 1986: 197-204) 
work as lenses through which discursive shifts are viewed. This work firstly focuses 
upon the World Bank's 'discursive practice' or discourse in practice (Fairclough 1992), 
those public statements situated between the discursive minutiae of its masses of 
textual production and its practice of granting loans, commissioning projects 
conceived as 'developmental', and producing 'development knowledge'. It is a study 
considering the performative effects of the Bank's serniotic practices, understanding 
serniosis as the realm of the intersubjective production of meaning, and discourse as 
including material practices not reducible to the serniotic alone (Fairclough et al. 
2001, cf. Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 107-9). It is a study furthermore considering how the 
repetition of key terms and phrases, and their issuing from certain positions within a 
discursive frame, can naturalise understandings of the objects and subjects of 
discourse (actor groupings and positions, modes and dynamics of interaction, and 
prioritisation of concerns), and thereby concretise meaning and consolidate specific 
forms of interpretation. 
Utterances practise a form of representation, and effect action through the discursive 
interaction of social actors, producing material effects beyond the statement or text. 
This means that the utterance can function as a political practice working to 
reproduce or disturb idea-sets and so re-establish and consolidate, or delegitimate 
and undermine, relations of power such that 'acceptable' differences in perspective 
come to exist primarily as variations within a normalised framework of understanding 
(cf. Fairclough 1992). Through the changes considered here can be seen shifts in the 
'discursive regime' of development, 'effects of power peculiar to the play of 
statements' (Foucault 1984a: 55). This power is, importantly, productive as well as 
restrictive, enabling new forms of developmental practice and providing a taste of 
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brighter futures as well as justifying the continuation and extension of practices that 
reproduce inequalities and deprivation. Questions consequently run though this thesis 
concerning the means and ends of disturbing the dominant discursive authority that 
the Bank produces, and the potential for integrating this practice with other forms of 
political confrontation. 
Hegemonic practices function by producing a dominant understanding of an operative 
environment. Similarly, in terms of their reproduction, changes are constructed and 
shaped so as to encourage shared understandings of a common situation. The 
economy of utterances constituting hegemonic discursive practice posits new objects, 
new dynamics of interaction, and potential problems therein, that maintain the 
centrality of certain actors and institutions to the pursuit of others' interests (Gramsci 
2000). This can be seen in forms of interaction where, for some moments, meaning 
becomes more closed around a certain language and understanding to the (partial) 
exclusion of alternate possibilities. A relational conception of hegemony stresses that 
these process are at root contingent and inherently potentially unstable, allowing that 
there will always be spaces for rupture. Such hegemonic practices can be multiple, 
simultaneous, competing or complementary and so always unstable, producing 
spaces for resistance (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, cf. Williams 1977). As Foucault (1984c: 
245) insists, 'there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and 
oppositional groupings'. 
Hegemonic relations thus exhibit a fragile and contingent openness to both 
maintenance and disruption through discursive practice. Discourse analysis can 
therefore be seen as a means of critically assessing and engaging in the power 
struggle between different discursive voices (Frow 1985: 193-213). The meaning of 
every utterance and the use to which it is put is always potentially open and multiple, 
and one way of conceiving resistance is as the practice of taking this 'fracturing' and 
using utterances in different ('counter-hegemonic') ways. Every use of discourse is a 
judgement on its relations to dominant forms of power and either an assent or 
resistance to this relation - 'all meaning is, in the fullest sense of the word, political' 
(Frow 1985: 206). Given this much, then 'to intervene discursively is a form of political 
practice' (Dant 1991: 131). How discourses become textured through their adoption 
and adaptation to presently dominant forms of capital formation and regulation, and 
the potentiality for counter-discourses to disrupt dominant practices (through 
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proposing alternative actor-definitions, groupings, modes of interaction and 
differently-prioritised concerns), are considered for their prospects of opening up 
spaces wherein other voices might negotiate variations upon contemporary systems 
of capital regulation and consider alternative futures. 
There is no 'agent' of hegemonic relations and practices in the sense of a cohesive 
and purposive body of actors with a common agenda of domination, but then neither 
is their re/production 'coincidental'. The outcome is rather 'agentive' from a multiplicity 
of different perspectives, that of a variety of groups pursuing sufficiently compatible or 
complementary objectives. We might understand this as an emergent confluence of 
interests brought together through successful processes of 'problematisation' and 
translation (Callon 1986: 197-204). This occurs when one group seeks to consolidate 
allies in its agenda by redefining problems faced by others onto its plane of reference, 
positioning its understanding of an issue and its proposed activities as an 'obligatory 
passage point to others in the pursuit of their interests. In this way the group presents 
its plans as the most effective way for both to achieve their interests, producing one 
solution to two or more problems, and bringing other actors around to thinking and 
producing reality in a certain fashion. 'Hegemony' refers to the various effects that 
stem from, and serve to consolidate, the dominance of one particular form or mode of 
translation (such as the successful framing of various social, economic and political 
institutions through which power flows so as to maintain their perceived legitimacy), 
one framework of understanding within which there exists divergence sufficient but 
restricted enough to maintain the reproduction of the hegemonic form (Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001). Problematisation and translation function as lenses through which the 
shifts in discursive practices considered here are viewed. 
These considerations help to delineate the prospects and limits of this study in 
thinking about knowledge. It is not intended as an analysis of the discourses of 
development, governance and knowledge economies/societies per se, and nor is it 
primarily an assessment of the truth of the truths that the Bank produces in its 
discursive contributions. It is rather situated, in one sense, as an evaluation of the 
adequacy of particular conditions for the production of truths that the Bank seeks to 
establish in its attempts to supplement or even reshape various discourses. 
Questions upon the truth of the Bank's work need to be considered in terms of its 
appropriateness and applicability to the material economic realities to which it refers, 
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given the economically, environmentally and socially harmful effects that many of its 
operations have been accused of bearing out over its more than fifty years. This work 
is therefore not intended to remain a self-contained analysis considering the Bank's 
work merely as text and surrendering notions of truth and reality (cf. Billig 1987, 
Fairclough et al. 2001). Staking a claim to knowledge is strategically useful here in 
enabling a critical engagement with actual and future potential effects of the Bank's 
manoeuvres; charting continuities and disparities, commonalities and disagreements 
in thinking upon the Bank's role within the conjuncture of discourses, and considering 
how these might affect the functioning of its knowledge production and thereby its 
operations as a whole. That is, considering truth as a standard of judgement and a 
tool of criticism, a negotiated consensus of multiple intersubjective spaces that 
attempts to reflexively take into account the play of power between these spaces and 
remain aware of the social conditions of its constitution (those under which 
statements come to be considered as true). A great deal is said by the way in which 
things are said and who gets to say them, and it is this about the Bank's manoeuvres 
that is most interesting. 
The Politics of Networks and the Internet 
The network is another concept that is both conditionally useful as well as 
unavoidable within this analysis -a very popular signifier throughout all the 
discourses considered here, it has become a 'critical term in contemporary political 
and economic life' and a widely-deployed tool of social and economic analysis (Barry 
2001: 84, cf. Jessop 2002, Thompson 2003, Wellman & Berkowitz 1997)1.1 will 
outline a few important points here concerning conceptions of networks and, 
relatedly, understandings of the Internet (hereafter 'the Net'), before engaging with 
the 'network' as a performative rhetorical device as much as an actual organisational 
1 In Between Hieratchies and Markets, Grahame Thompson (2003) outlines three main theories of 
networks in Social Network Analysis (SNA), Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) and Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT), and subjects each to a rigorous critique before going on to perform an analysis of the 
differing logics of networks, markets and hierarchies. My intention here is to use aspects of thinking 
from ANT in criticising the overly simple and optimistic manner in which networks are considered in 
contemporary governmental and World Bank knowledge economy/society discursive practices, not to 
provide a critical overview and analysis of network thinking as a whole, and so the work avoids the 
detailed theoretical form of engagement adopted by Thompson as well as the studies of TCA and SNA 
researchers (for further interesting resources upon the latter, see for instance the Institute for Social 
Network Analysis of the Economy, http: /Mww. isnae. org/sna. html, and the International Network for 
Social Network Analysis, http: /twww. sfu. ca/-insned). 
13 
form in the following chapter. Firstly then, use of the term 'network' within 
contemporary popular discourse has been heavily influenced by what Bruno Latour 
(1999: 15) has called the notion of 'double-click information'. Fostered by the 
predominant understanding of contemporary ICTs, this involves thinking of networks 
as spaces of unmediated and horizontafised resource flows producing 'transport 
without deformation', for instance allowing parcels of information and knowledge to be 
reproduced intact for each user without changing their content (or the users' 
understanding of it or its potential applications). Such thinking characterises much of 
the World Bank's rhetorical and organisational turn towards becoming a Knowledge 
Bank, as well as the broad swathe of contemporary governmental knowledge 
economy discourse. 
The understanding of networks existing and knowledge sharing occurring without any 
necessary processes of translation between participants (unmediated flows) needs to 
be problematised, because it leads to both domineering practices by those who talk 
loudest talking for others without caution, and an easy but ultimately useless tool of 
critical attack upon one who speaks for another and thereby produces an altered 
meaning. As any 'flow' passes through a 'node' within a 'network', if we are to use 
these terms of reference, then it will necessarily undergo some kind of qualitative 
change, some form of translation, as it is consumed, processed, and reproduced. 
Apart from passive transitional nodes in the manner of computer terminals 
transferring a series of O's and I's from one point to another, 'nodal points' are 
predominantly spaces of activity engaged in interpreting, translating and negotiating 
understandingS2 . Because of this agency, a flow within a network might better be 
conceptualised as a 'series of transformations' (Latour 1999: 15). Understanding that 
speaking for another necessarily involves a process of translation entails an 
acceptance that meaning will be changed and an attention to the detail of how it does 
so, which can in turn produce more substantive and constructive critiques of those 
who speak for others. 
It is furthermore important to assess the optimistic interpretation of networking as a 
mode of association and organisation that produces free and horizontalised spaces. 
2 Even with points of passive transition 'noise' can be produced as entropy occurs within the process of 
transferral, O's and i's are missed or repeated, photocopies become blurred and words confused, and 
so forth. 
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This is something often written of with reference to the Information Communications 
Technology (ICT) 'revolution', and the rise of the Net in particular, in hailing the 
dissolution of traditional organisational and informational hierarchies (Castells 2000a, 
2000b) and the advent of new opportunities for 'growth, wealth-creation and 
prosperity' (G8 1999: 1) or else 'opportunity, empowerment and inclusion for all' (DOT 
Force 2001: 3). Manuel Castells (1999: 5), a prominent writer on networked modes of 
organisation who will be considered in more detail in Chapter Three, has elsewhere 
observed that a network 'may have a hierarchy, but it has no centre'. Clustered points 
of activity can frequently recur within networks through processes of problematisation 
producing points through which many other actors pass (for example languages, 
conceptual structures, organisations or technologies), generating effects similar to 
those of hierarchical forms. When this is successful the flows of resources and 
energies in one direction and through one particular point are increased (as well as 
the number of points to which that node connects and thus its perceived usefulness 
as a point to be connected to by others, an access point to a wider constellation of 
actors). 
Other than as a counter to conceptualisations of power as being embodied only within 
established and recognised (central) institutions, Castells' distinction between 
hierarchies and centres is less relevant than the acknowledgement that more central 
(clustered) points of activity can occur, producing more hierarchically-elevated nodes 
within networks. In this work I approach networks and hierarchical, centralised 
structures as not-necessarily-exclusive, not-necessarily-alternative forms that can co- 
exist, contradict and complement each other. Something akin to the three- 
dimensional significance of cartographical mapping techniques might better exposit 
the dual functionality of these modes of analysis. Patterns of network-clustering can 
be sketched out whilst maintaining an awareness of the hierarchical significance of 
such moments of clustering, and the self-perpetuating potential of patterns of agenda- 
setters and agenda-users, order-givers and order-takers stemming from this. 
Understanding how 'nodes' can cluster into hierarchical 'peaks' producing stickiness 
and coagulation in the 'flows' of information and power is relevant to observations 
made in later chapters regarding the World Bank's tendency for producing and 
fostering the development of networks within which it occupies a relatively central 
position, and the significant discursive effects stemming from this. 
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Related to these points, pronouncements upon the potential of the Internet to 
empower and erase distance can similarly tend towards uncritical hyperbole. Distance 
is a subject of concern in a fashion similar to the problem of horizontality. The Internet 
is said in one sense to transcend distance, in that all publications intended for 
external viewing can be made available on the World Wide Web (hereafter 'the 
Web P)3 and one can move between sites on opposite sides of the world with a single 
click. But it also maintains and actuates other experiences of distance in terms of 
proximity to effective access and use through barriers of technology and 
understanding; one has to be empowered to erase distance. Although the Net would 
appear to produce an open horizontalised space promoting cultures of transparency 
and ease of equal information access (the same public websites are in theory open to 
all those with access to the Net and the appropriate software and computer capacity) 
there are several problems mitigating this skin-deep globalism which stress the 
relevance of the question Steve Jones (1999) poses - who is the audience?. It is 
worth making some cautionary comments here upon the matters of accessing, 
negotiating, and producing spaces within the Internet as an introduction to my 
treatment of the developmental potential of the knowledge economy in later chapters. 
In technology terms the first fundamental problem is that of having access to an 
adequate computing and telecommunications technologies. Reasonably functional 
access can be obtained through fairly low-grade computer systems using email and 
text-only websites, but to suggest that the problem is non-existent because of the 
availability of older discount systems to poorer persons and regions risks succumbing 
to an 'ideology of computer cheapness' (Sterne 1999: 280) that ignores the problems 
therein. Compatibility and capacity problems do still limit older machines and their 
users. Web technologies require increasingly advanced computer technologies (such 
as graphics and sound capabilities), and connection speeds can further restrict 
3 The Internet and the Word Wide Web are too often conflated in non-technical texts upon the subject. 
The Net refers to the space of a network of networks allowing inter-networking between dispersed but 
connected computers sharing TCP/IP protocols. To make use of this space various platforms, 
technologies and protocols have been established such as email, Telnet, the Web and File Transfer 
Protocols (Berkeley LIC Library 2002). As such I use the term 'Net' in thinking about the existence of 
and establishment of access to this space, primarily technological and telecommunications 
infrastructures and training in using computer systems, whilst I refer predominantly to the Web 
throughout this work given that my research has been based upon the Bank's Web presence. 
4 Unless organisational or national firewalls have been erected (restrictions put in place on a server 
that bar access to certain destinations such as websites), although even then software developments 
by those committed to overcoming the firewalls mean that a technological game of cat and mouse 
ensues in trying to maintain the wall's effectiveness. 
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access both in terms of the willingness to download larger documents or web-pages, 
and the cost of such downloads if connection payments are on a per-minute basis 
(such problems can particularly affect access to real-time presentations unavailable 
for download, and larger downloads such as Adobe Acrobat PDF files, cf. Taylor 
2001). Capacity can further limit the use of user-friendly devices. Making maximal use 
of older machines will often require the tech-savvy of more advanced users who 
perhaps already have access to more advanced equipment. Newer users will be 
more likely to need more user-friendly devices and interfaces to facilitate access 
(such as Graphic User Interfaces like the Windows system over MS-DOS), whilst 
these will often require higher capacity machines to operate effectively. 
Secondly, having access to training in research and information management skills 
(such as negotiating the Web and filtering the sources of information to be found) can 
be as essential as getting online in the first place with regard to negotiating this new 
space. Some spaces online will be much easier to locate than others because of the 
abundance of hyperlinks provided to them and the high profile they consequently 
develop with those search engines (such as Google) that prioritise sites on the basis 
of how often they are hyperlinked on related sites. Without training many may end up 
hopping between the sites of powerful offline organisations that can pay for 
advertising and ensure they are relatively unmissable to the new user. There is a 
danger of forgetting that an information superhighway will be of little use to all those 
outside of an elite socio-economic set if little regard is taken to consider the provision 
of facilitating services - informational slip roads (cheaper more user-friendly computer 
systems), public transport (community access centres), and driving lessons (public 
demonstrations of the Internefs potential) (Carter 1997: 137-8). 
In terms of negotiating and understanding online sources, language is another 
important issue. The dominance of the English language on the Web has historically 
been structurally embedded through the use of particular programming codes5, as 
well as the user profile having been predominantly English-speaking (Jones 1999, cf. 
Jordan 1999, Mitra & Cohen 1999, Loader 1997, World Bank 1998a: 63, CNN 2000). 
5 Older versions of HTML, the main web-programming language, used coding systems using 128 
(ASCII) and then 256 (ISO-Latin) characters, and which could consequently only represent firstly 
English and then Western European languages. HTML 4.0 now attempts to incorporate a coding 
(Unicode) which allows for around 65,000 characters and so for representation of many more of the 
world's languages (WDG 1998). 
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Many attempts exist to map out the changing composition of (numbers of web-sites) 
and participation in (numbers of users) this area of cyberspace6, and both would 
appear to be continually expanding in terms of the presence and density of different 
cultural groups and languages online, such that English may now be estimated or 
argued to no longer be the majority Web-user language (Pastore 1999, Global Reach 
2003)7. Yet nonetheless, English-speaking industrialised country residents still retain 
greatest access to and influence over shaping the Internet and the Web's profile in 
terms of structure and content8. This historical dominance could lend a trajectory (or 
momentum, or stickiness) to their development through the perceived value of 
learning and using English as an international second language for programmers and 
site-developers (and furthermore gaining access to the proliferation of English-based 
programming educational and training literature and institutions), much in parallel to 
the use of English in the offline world. We might not go so far as Schiller (1995) who 
speaks somewhat reductively of US-led attempts at a colonial initiative to establish a 
'Global Information Infrastructure' which would work to homogenise global culture, but 
we can certainly say that the Internet is still currently dominated by the 
aforementioned global sub-group and so the conceptual-linguistic structuring for 
programmers, content-providers and users exhibits this cultural inheritance. Such 
cultural barriers could be as or more important than economic barriers in inhibiting or 
tailoring the effective widespread use of cyberspace (Jordan 1999: 46,91, cf. 
Sosnoski 1999). 
With regard thirdly to the matter of empowerment and producing and reproducing the 
Net (and the Web), beyond the argument that the openness of a set of signifiers 
leaves any text (hard-copy or hyper-text) open to interpretation by the reader, it has 
been argued that the Web empowers readers to produce their own text, re-authoring 
6 See for example CyberAtlas (hftp: //cyberatlas. intemet. com) and Global Reach 
ýýttp: //www. glreach. com). 
Yet any practise of mapping a terrain will always necessarily constitute a political act - through for 
instance the selection of relevant criteria and choice of cartographical techniques - and with 
cyberspace this is especially evident with the involvement of corporate and governmental interests in 
shaping public impressions of the cyberspatial landscape (Dodge & Kitchin 1999). 
8 For instance ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
hftp: /Avww. icann. org), which manages the Domain Name System and thereby exercises control over 
the creation of top-level domain names (. org, co. uk and so forth) as well as the continuing recognition 
of those already established (ensuring that browsers will continue to recognise and find sites ending in 
. za, fr and so on), exists as a non-profit corporation 
based in California. ICANN was created in 1998 
after an'intemational' meeting organised by the US Department of Commerce, and has been criticised 
for the undemocratically selected nature of its executive committee and for its being accountable only 
to the US Department of Commerce (ICANN Watch 2002). 
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the works they view through the selection and navigation of hyperlinks (Mitra & Cohen 
1999). The intertextuality of the Web is said to be more explicit and immediately 
accessible, it being possible to embed the sources of ideas within text via a direct link 
to the sourceg. The reader can then author their own work by following links according 
to their desire for skimming, researching in-depth, or pursuing tangential thoughts. 
However this presents an overoptimistic reading of online information consumption, 
given that this 're-authoring' through negotiating hyperlinks ultimately functions only in 
the sense of children's 'create-your-own-adventure' books. For as long as the web- 
surfer only reads then they retain a dependence upon the site authors between whom 
they jump in the manner of turning a kaleidoscope to produce a new image. The 
reader may be placed in a slightly more agentive position, but is only ever playing 
with the pieces. They can perhaps produce ornate mosaics, but this is not the same 
as to write. The positions of the article author, and the web-site constructor who 
places the information online, are still more empowered. 
This distinction, and its elision within more optimistic discursive contributions, is 
revisited later in noting how simply getting people or countries online has been hailed 
as a step towards empowerment in itself. My emphasis is that this wider access 
needs to be complemented by wider command of the tools of the Internet infra- and 
super-structure (telecommunication systems, web-servers and the ability to produce, 
maintain and regulate them, and control of regional domain names) if relationships 
within contemporary flows of power and knowledge are to be altered. I am interested 
in how the intertextual functionality of hyperlinks works in guiding users from one site 
to another 'related' site of the page-constructer's choice; how this enables the 
production of truths as assertions become embedded and accepted through 
persistent cross- refere ncin g; and how different forms of knowledge and standards 
and means of information assessment can be prioritised or sidelined in this way1c'. 
9A word may be highlighted in a different colour indicating that it can be clicked to open up a new 
s 
1gace 
where the idea is explored in more depth or a link to a related issue/site is provided. 
1 Issues of hypertext-intertextuality are of lesser direct relevance to large areas of my research 
materials on the World Bank in themselves. Intertextuality is important for me in mapping out areas of 
concern within discourses of governance, development and knowledge; in these areas much of my 
work has been concerned with hard-copy documents and books. With regard to Bank documentation, 
many publications used have been put online in e-book format (Adobe Acrobat'pdf files), and direct 
transcriptions of speeches with no embedded hyperlinks. Standard understandings of intertextuality are 
of course still an issue here in the sense of readings referenced or intimated within the texts. More 
interesting and relevant are questions of where the hyperlink to documents are placed, the text and 
links that surround them, and where else their hyperlinks recur on the Internet. However given that 
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Such selective referentiality can perform in shaping and governing a discourse by 
mapping the terrain and the field of appropriate contributions. The World Bank's web 
complex, for instance, is substantially self-referential but also provides links to a wide 
range of initiatives it has fostered to stand as independents, and the partners thereof, 
giving a sense of diversity and producing a sense of a development community but 
excluding an equally wide range of non-partner groups. 
The freedoms many presume to grow simply from the development of the Internet 
might thus be better approached as the latent possibilities that have to be struggled 
for. As Foucault reminds us, space is a central element in the construction of common 
forms of life and in the exercise of power. As such we need to look to how this new 
space produces new forms of power or reshapes older forms, considering the 
continuities and discontinuities with other power flows and remembering that'liberty is 
a practice ... what must be exercised' (Foucault 1984c: 245-252) rather than 
something embedded within certain forms of interaction. We need to be careful not to 
become caught up in clich6s of cyberspatial revolution and 'millennial imagination' 
(Sterne 1999: 282), transcending technophilic and technophobic approaches to the 
Internet and recognising how in many ways it embodies new tools for the exercise of 
much older forms of power-play. The Internet and the World Wide Web are dynamic 
spaces and both access profiles and online content are continually changing in ways 
that might affect the relevance of some of the comments made above. Aspects of 
such issues are addressed in Chapters Three and beyond in looking at the possibility 
of 'developing' countries 'leapfrogging' stages of industrial development to enter the 
'cyber-economy'. 
A Terminological Mapping 
Consideration of the role and functioning of discourse emphasises the need for a 
reflexive engagement with the terminology used within this work. The deployment of a 
term can perform a politics, and several terminological choices have been important 
to articulating a consistent critical position within this work. A few are dealt with in 
mapping the intertwining of the Bank's sites with its surroundings would be a massive (but interesting) 
project in itself, and that this is not my central concern, it is a matter addressed in this paper only 
according to its relevance to the moment in charting elements in the process of fact and story 
construction. 
20 
later chapters, as indicated in the chapter outlines in the Introduction; one such 
concerns that of the countries most commonly referred to as 'developing' or 'less- 
developed', a matter addressed in Chapter Four; another concerns the many choices 
of terms for information and knowledge economies and societies, dealt with in 
Chapters Two and Three. But others remain, and it is worth clarifying a few of these 
before moving on given that they function as framing devices for the position that is 
articulated through this analysis, and explain why the Bank is here referred to as an 
International Financial Organisation rather than the more commonly and 
interchangeably used referents of International Financial Institution and International 
Governance Organisation. 
On first consideration both institution and organisation simply signify a body 
established for and coordinated towards the achievement of a particular purpose; 
however a useful distinction is elided in this light use of the terms. An institution can 
alternatively be defined in institutional economic terms as 'the rules of the game of a 
society ... the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction', 
including both formal laws and regulations and informal norms and conventions of 
behaviour such as the belief systems and mental models of actors (North 1995: 21- 
22, cf. Hodgson 1994, Granovetter 1994, DiMaggio 1994). Developing the norms to 
support the rules is characterised as a slow process. Organisations can then be 
defined as 'the players: groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives', including political, economic, social and educational bodies (North 1995: 
23). Institutions are said to become stable through the support of organisations with 
an interest in their perpetuation, and so institutional change requires the 
establishment of appropriate organisations that can foster changes in the formal rules 
and informal norms. 
On this understanding the World Bank is an organisation operating within the 
institutional parameters defined by the dominant form of capital regulation. The Bank 
plays a role in performing (and thereby maintaining) the institutional parameters 
through and under which it and other organisations operate in its intellectual 
contributions and policy operations; and can also contribute to gradually changing 
these parameters through adjusting aspects of its practices, creating feedback effects 
within the institutional terrain. But importantly, although the Bank is a large player in 
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various areas of the development terrain, it is only one player in such changes and is 
itself constrained by the stickiness of its institutional context. This captures well one of 
this work's main conclusions with regard to the organisation's discursive practice of 
the 'knowledge economy'. Although the Bank is changing in the ways to be described, 
it operates within a relatively unchanged institutional context leading to the outcomes 
of its endeavours remaining largely similar, a different game being played by roughly 
the same rules. This also pertains to my reading of the discourse of reform that 
surrounds the Bank, for as much as the Bank may be loathed in various circles for its 
operations past and present it is argued that aiming simply to either reform or close 
down the Bank misses the point that within the same institutional context the same 
problems will probably recur. 
Secondly, the Bank and other bodies are again interchangeably referred to as 
'financial' or 'governance' institutions or organisations. Amongst these terms there is 
not so much to be gained from drawing the distinction, except insofar as governance 
is a term that should not be used of the Bank uncritically given that the IBRD's (the 
Bank's primary body) founding Articles of Agreement (its constitution in effect) define 
it as a body that 'shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member' and for 
whose staff '[o]nly economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions' 
(World Bank 1989: Article 4, Section 10). For this reason 'finance' is the preferred and 
more restricted referent used throughout this work, a baseline that could be agreed 
upon by its donors, borrowers and critics to describe the organisation's main function. 
Its governmental activities will be considered in later chapters. The World Bank has 
extended its remit through reconceptualisations of development to include 
governmental issues such as a commitment to 'promote good governance and 
combat corruption' (World Bank 1998f: 11), but the restricted referent acts as a 
reminder of the Bank's designated terrain, that of being a Bank. The Articles of 
Agreement throw some light upon the Bank's efforts to reconstitute development 
discourse in ways that go beyond a narrowly-defined economic understanding to 
include governance and knowledge issues. If the Bank is to engage in a field for 
developmental purposes, then it helps if that field is defined as 'economic', providing 
good reason to broaden the terrain of economic thinking in order to broaden the 
Bank's legitimate mandate. 
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A third important choice of referent concerns the perceived nature and state of so- 
called 'globalisation' as an economic and governmental phenomenon, and so upon 
assessing the role of the World Bank in relation to its member countries. The 
proliferation of supra-state, sub-state and trans-state bodies would on first 
consideration appear to reduce the power and relevance of the state, displacing 
power within a multi-level global governance framework. Yet Paul Hirst and Graeme 
Thompson (1996) articulate a different perspective in arguing that the state retains a 
central position as a form of governance gateway through which power flows, acting 
as its distributor and regulator. By representing a specific geographically-located 
population, it is positioned to legitimise other more and less territorially-specific 
agencies in delegating to them sovereignty over various issues, spaces and flows (cf. 
Fairclough et al. 2001). It thereby occupies a central negotiating position in framing 
how flows of (trade, finance and investment) capital and people are freed or 
restricted, how governmental authority is distributed, and so how economies and 
polities maintain and dissolve boundaries". This approach positions the World Bank 
as an intemational multi-state agency rather than a trans-state global body, and so 
emphasises the importance of assessing the relative role of different state bodies as 
members, and the efficacy of their role in ensuring its democratic functioning and 
governance. This issue will be addressed in later chapters in observing dominant 
trends within the Bank's public narrative; the recurrence of this theme within critical 
responses to the Bank's activities; and thinking about possible options for effecting 
change within the Bank and the institutional context in which it operates. 
Hirst and Thompson (1996: 15-16) state a preference for 'intern ation al ised' over 
'globalised' as a political descriptor, given this dependence upon the state framework, 
and also as an economic signifier because of the ongoing regional concentration of 
capital flows within the more 'developed' countries and the relative exclusion of other 
11 Another important aspect of the globalisation-intemationalisation distinction concerns referTing to 
either multi- or trans-national corporations (MNCs or TNCs); the MNC retaining a distinct national 
economic and bureaucratic organisational base, whilst the TNC moves beyond any single national 
system of regulation. It is the contention here, in agreement with Hirst and Thompson (1996) and 
Saskia Sassen (2000), that most companies retain some dependence upon a national base, with a 
central bureaucratic node and a perhaps international but still regional ly-concentrated (thus 
international not global) base of stockholding interests. Even the most advanced informationally- 
oriented industries tend to have at least partly place-bound production processes because of resources 
and personnel skills requirements (Sassen 2000: 150). So even the largest or most immaterial 
corporations tend still to be dependent upon, and thus potentially hamessable by, national or regional 
governance bodies. MNCs rather than TNCs are thus referred to throughout this work; the distinction is 
a matter of degree, but the bias is towards the former rather than the latter. 
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areas. They contend that levels of economic openness are little different now than at 
the beginning of the 20th century, which saw a period of retraction and then gradual 
reopening rather than a progressive unfolding of the logic of the free-market; 
12 globalisation is treated as 'a myth, unsupported by the evidence' (Hirst 1997: 214) . 
This is in contrast to caricatures of the inexorable progression of increasingly 
unbridled capital flows drawing power away from any form of control other than the 
logic of the market. Such images, although often used in campaign literature as part 
of an attempt to motivate action, can also be disempowering in undermining the 
perceived feasibility of effecting change. Speculative financial-capital flows 
comparatively freely in its present form, but it is not beyond regulation through 
coordinated national government action or delegation to and thus empowerment of an 
intergovernmental body. With the political will restrictions such as the Tobin Tax 13 
could be put in place and enforced. State frameworks still possess (always somewhat 
limited) capacities for monitoring and directing aspects of international finance, and it 
is a matter of priorities that determine action with regard to economic regulation and 
not that the economy has gone beyond any reasonable level of control. 
As JK Gibson-Graham (1996: 120-142) argues, stories of unstoppable globalisation 
perpetuate a 'Politics of fear and subjection' portraying poorer countries in a victim 
role, encouraging the impression that globalisation is simply happening and all they 
can do is batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm (cf. Hirst 1997: 208- 
211). This needs to be queried in seeking to strengthen the space from which 
interventions can be made upon the neoliberal project of dismantling barriers to trade 
in order to produce something approximating a globalised economy, irrespective of 
the costs borne in a more widely-defined economic sense. The contingency of the 
hegemonic relation needs instead to be emphasised in considering 'capitalism' as an 
open and indeterminate signifier reproduced in various modes that co-exist, intersect 
and overlap. Different stories need to be told in order to produce spaces within which 
alternative potentialities can be conceived and developed. The Internet's potential for 
12 See also Immanuel Wallerstein's (2000: 250) perspective upon long Kondratief cycles: 'The 
processes that are usually meant when we speak of globalization are not in fact new at all. They have 
existed for some 500 years. ' 13 A tax proposed by economist James Tobin; a minute tax on every currency conversion designed to 
dampen flows of speculative capital by lessening potential profit margins. Lionel Jospin expressed an 
intention to put the idea forward as a proposal to the next meeting of European finance ministers in 
2001, although nothing became of this following his failed bid for the French Presidential position in 
2002 (Schiffers 2001). 
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rescripting narratives of intellectual property definition is considered in this regard in 
Chapter Three. For the reasons outlined, throughout the work the Bank is therefore 
where appropriate referred to as an International Financial Organisation (IFO). 
Research-at-a-Distance 
With regard to the three discursive threads under consideration, many contributions 
have been made to questions upon the nature of the knowledge economy and its 
implications for the currently dominant modes of both production and governance 
(e. g. Bell 1974, Hodgson 1999, Zuboff 1988, Rose 1999, Castells 2000, Stehr 2001, 
Block 1985); and also with the role of multilateral organisations in promoting certain 
models of governance and development (e. g. Amin 1990, Sen 2000, Strange 1997, 
1994, Woods 2000). Less work has been done on drawing together the discourses of 
development, governance, and the knowledge economy (see Marglin & Marglin 1990, 
Banuri 1990a), and little at all on using this approach to examine the functioning of 
specific elements of the multilateral development machinery (but see for example 
Stone 2000, King & McGrath 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). It is important to critically 
understand this moment of discursive conjuncture, and to understand the Bank 'from 
a distance' as a machinery of knowledge production that can produce significant 
effects within it. This terrain is currently dominated by the contributions of its main 
donor-country member governments, which have tended towards neoliberal practices 
reproducing knowledge as a new'fictitious commodity' (Polanyi 2001: 60-73) and so 
institutionalising modes of appropriation for intellectual property forms. As a large and 
diverse organisation contributions coming from under the Bank name at points 
advocate such an approach, and at others express a concern to protect an intellectual 
commons and encourage notions of knowledge sharing rather than appropriation. 
The potentiality for the Bank's voice to support a form of 'new' economy more likely to 
aid the world's poor, or to the contrary to consolidate the regulatory systems favoured 
by its dominant members (ironing out the creases in the dominant governmental- 
economic narrative) is worthy of exploration. 
Distance in the chapter title refers primarily to the physical distance maintained 
between myself and my object of study. Distance has been used in focussing this 
research upon the Bank's online presence, its most consolidated and well-archived 
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means, of self-promotion, publication and communication. This work presents an 
analytical 'surface scan' of the Bank's public performance within the World Wide Web 
terrain, an analysis of its public statements with a concern for the potential impact of 
its discursive contributions. The Bank's Web presence is, in theory, a universally 
accessible and user-friendly public relations interface encompassing massive 
information archives for framing and substantiating its arguments as well as many 
papers detailing the lineage of its thinking. Its websites are a centrally important 
device for analysing the organisation as a public actor and viewing it as it is seen by 
the vast majority of its interlocutors and analysts. Many people may also have contact 
with personnel within the Bank, but for all those with Internet access the web will be a 
common point of contact with Bank pronouncements and policy statementS14 . The 
Bank's online presence constitutes a live and frequently updated archive upon which 
one can be kept updated through e-newsletters and front page highlighting. On top of 
site-specific content (hundreds of sub-sites represent departments, networks, 
thematic foci, programmes of action and new more and less independent ventures) it 
features the great majority of Bank publications of the past 8 to 10 years 15 as well as 
speeches by the President, the Chief Economist and other key members of its 
hierarchy. My research materials have been drawn almost entirely from the Bank's 
dense network of websites, as well as pieces published by Bank staff in their 
individual capacity; and a wealth of literature placed online by academic and 
government institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). On rare 
occasion I have made use of other materials obtained through email interaction with 
these groups. 
In conducting this research I have thus not sought to approach the World Bank to 
engage in interviews, to investigate and gain an 'insider's view' of its culture, to 
analyse the minutiae of intra-Bank wrangles or the proposed rhetoric-reality gap in 
14 Figures such as 5.5 million hits per month to the BanWs sites have previously been cited (vVilks 
2001 c), but straight measurements of Web activity are inadequate in that they cannot account for the 
nature of that activity (Jones 1999). No publicly available resources exist with which to break this figure 
down to see to what extent it is made up of a smaller number of people making repeated hits, Bank 
staff using the site as an occupational resource, search engine crawlers mapping out changes in site- 
content, and NGO-workers and government officials making use of the information and analysis 
provided by the Bank. Importantly, in relation to distance and empowennent, to say that it is the tool of 
the majority of the Bank's interlocutors is by no means to say that it is a tool available to the majority of 
the world affected by its activities. 
15 The archive is frequently updated as documents previously stored in hard-copy are scanned and 
placed online in Adobe Acrobat (pdf)i format. 
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Bank operations (Centro de Estudios Internacionales 2000). This work is several 
steps removed from the World Bank's applied social-economic practices, such as its 
loans and programmes of structural adjustment, in considering its involvement in the 
intertwining of the three mentioned discursive threads and the potential outcomes of 
this. The intention is to provide an insight into the discursive practices of one specific 
agglomeration of development machinery, analysing the Bank from such a distance in 
order to consider and analyse its position and influence within the discursive terrain of 
development. I have focused upon analysing one particular aspect of the Bank's 
public image and the context within which this is constructed through a series of key 
publications (its performances for a world audience through agenda declarations and 
organisational and programmatic changes). The public face referred to is the 
optimistic face of Western institutional-industrial development represented within its 
rhetoric. My understanding of 'rhetoric' is informed by the work of writers such as 
Dierdre McClosky (1994) and Michael Billig (1987), being concerned with its use as a 
pragmatic device for argument construction. That is, regarding a rhetorical position as 
that of being open to debate, considering the potential for truth within all statements 
and not implying (as the word does in its dominant usage) an emphasis upon style 
over substance intended to persuade audiences through eloquence more than 
substantial argument. I am interested to explore how the Bank's practices and 
discursive contributions are influenced by the rhetoric of its member governments and 
other actors. 
Researching this piece involved establishing a body of texts for analysis (webpages 
and online documents) from those available within the online presence of the World 
Bank and other intergovernmental bodies and government departments, and non- 
governmental organisations. An initial assessment of keynote documents and 
statements of intent was then conducted and recurrent themes and terms of 
reference noted for further analysis throughout the rest of the literature16. The body of 
texts was then analysed with a sensitivity to recurrences and disjunctures in 
discursive texturing, writing styles and terminological preferences (between different 
organisations, different departments within the same organisation, and the same 
16 Documents such as the World Development Report 1998199: Knowledge for Development (Wodd 
Bank 1998a), Europe and the Global Information Society (European Union 1994), the Okinawa Chatter 
on the Global Information Society (G8 2000), The Knowledge-Based Economy (OECD 1996) and The 
New Economy., Beyond the Hype (OECD 2001 a). 
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departments over time as revised editions of publications were produced). The 
outlined tools were then used in analysing how processes of problematisation have 
been engaged in attempting to shape the reproduction of the discourses under 
analysis and the positions of the actors participating therein - to construct and 
maintain sets of hegemonic relations, both within the World Bank and in the 
discursive terrains it occupies. The Bank's public performances, influenced by the 
flows of power that enable and constrain its actions, will in later chapters be seen to 
produce pressure for consensus and so the repression of internal debates and the 
glossing over of contested concepts. Such processes are never complete or entirely 
secured. Moments of counter-hegemonic discursive interventions are also noted in 
considering the discursive changes with regard to how the grip of the dominant set of 
practices might be loosened, so as to produce a more open terrain of discussion. As 
such I am concerned with whether the Bank could usefully be more openly rhetorical 
rather than less so. The 'open palm' of rhetoric (Billig 1987: 95) is suggested as a 
more productive mode of engagement through which the organisation could listen to, 
learn from, react to and address criticism, than the deterministic intellectual certainty 
which it has previously deployed in combination with its economic might. 
Within the literature upon Internet research methodologies which has sprung up in 
recent years (e. g. Stein 1999, Jones 1999, Cooke 2001, Berkeley UC Library 2002, 
Ackermann & Hartman 1998, O'Dochartaigh 2001, Mann & Stewart 2000), four 
themes are strongly emphasised. Much focus is placed firstly upon arguing for the 
relevance of the Net as a research medium and explaining to the newcomer its 
functioning, potentialities and limits. Authors tend to delineate the realms of the Net 
(the World Wide Web, Telnet, intranets, email and so forth), and to highlight useful 
resources such as subject-specific archives and search engines (for instance the 
Web of Science) and more general but well-respected engines such as Google. Such 
texts at times read more as sophisticated beginner's guides than explorations of 
whether the methodological considerations facing researchers have been radically (or 
considerably, or not at all) altered by the introduction of this new medium. At other 
moments these writings concern themselves with the nature (if any) of community 
online, the means and manner of association therein, and the functionality of 
discourse analytic techniques for exploring these points. Thirdly, attempts are made 
to deal with procedures for conducting relevant online searches, referencing sources, 
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and assessing the reliability of unknown websites and the information provided; 
writings upon Internet research techniques frequently address the power of the 
Internet for disseminating information whatever its reliability. Finally, the potential 
transience of Net-based information sources (that sites can be shut down at any time 
due to lack of funding or legal complications) is also dealt with in passing. 
Since this thesis is a study of the publicly available online presence of one institution, 
questions of online community are not of central relevance 17 . Meanwhile concerns 
about the reliability and worth of information provided online by the Bank is a matter 
for the thesis as a whole rather than an introductory exposition of methodological 
principles. Issues of the transience of online information have been relevant to my 
research on the Bank site given that early site-constructions and draft papers put 
online often disappear once an updated version is made available. Increasingly, older 
versions of the Bank's sites are being archived at different servers operated either by 
the Bank or other Internet archive providers, which means that the information 
remains available even if located elsewhere'8. Matters of reliability become more 
relevant when considering critical sources of information upon the Bank which exhibit 
a considerable variety of political perspectives and research capabilities. It is 
important to be able to distinguish between those widely regarded and well-respected 
as established critical policy research groups, such as the Bretton Woods Project 
(BWP, www. brettonwood s project. org), Bank Information Center (BIC, 
www. bicusa. org) and BankWatch (www. bankwatch. org), those considered as 
humorous crank sites like the Whirled Bank and World Bunk, and those perceived as 
more stridently polemical 'anti-capitalist organisations such as Abolish the Bank. 
My approach to the abundance of critical online sources has been to use the 
hyperlinked networking and cross-referencing that structures and textures the Web as 
the basis for an assessment of site credibility, making use of the same forms of nodal 
density that I note the Bank producing through its interventions in the discursive 
practice of development. Reviews, references and hyperlinks from one site to another 
provide an assessment of the receiving site's perceived relevance and credibility to 
17 Although such matters are given some space in considering the construction of critical trans-Bank 
networks between Bank staff and outside organisations in later chapters. 
'a All references to hyperlinks contained herein state the date of downloading for this reason (dates of 
upload or site construction were only inconsistently available and so these have not been included 
except for papers presented online where the date was explicitly given). 
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the link provider with regard to writings on the considered topic. In this way 
hyperlinked references can reflect a site's perceived credibility amongst a 
decentralised self-governing - or at least self-selecting - online development 
'community'. So when groups with well-established records such as BWP and BIC 
make reference to newer sites such as the WhirledBank and RealWorldBank19 as a 
humorous sketch and a budding critical archive respectively, this helps in building up 
an informed perspective upon the community's perception of the nature of content 
provision at these newer start-ups. External referencing by media sources can 
secondly be taken as an indication of the respect a site has developed for its 
information provision and analysis amongst the mainstrearned community of news- 
providing media. Sourcing of BWP documents and commentary by established media 
such as the BBC and the Guardian newspaper give credit to the perceived quality of 
analysis provided. These modes of assessment by networking and referencing have 
functioned as supplementary ingredients to my own analysis of sites' potential 
contributions to this analysis. Partnering initiatives with the Bank have thirdly been 
used as indicators that organisations' evidence, analysis and criticism have been 
accorded respect and consideration even by elements within the Bank structure. I 
return to the establishment of such connections in Chapter Eight in arguing that there 
can be a productive overlap in Bank-critical work between agents inside and outside 
the organisation. Supplementary to these web-based sources are email discussion 
lists with varying degrees of regulation. These critical networks can also be 
reasonably effective at forms of self-regulation, with perceived 'outlandish' 
commentary being critiqued within the same email stream and commentary from 
more 'respected' organisations acting as markers of reliability upon other 
commentary. Because of the ad hoc and mostly unregulated and unverifiable nature 
of list contributions, I have not relied upon them for factual information so much as for 
gauging community opinion upon the World Bank and its activities. 
19 The Rea[WoddBank, a new start-up whose credibility was becoming established at the time of 
writing, folded early in 2002 after a promising start where it received contributions from a number of 
well-respected academic and civil society Bank critics, illustrating how the problem of Internet 
transience can affect smaller, less financially secure sites. 
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Bank Audience, Web-Structure and Front-Page Analysis 
The Bank's sites present an incredibly complex, convoluted set of structures with 
many cross-postings, sites within sites, and seemingly small gateways opening onto 
whole new terrains, producing a challenge for anyone wishing to navigate them and 
glean something of the culture and politics of the organisation represented therein. 
One Bank researcher has referred to it as having impressive 'scope and volume' 
whilst being 'hampered by very mixed styles and designs, complex navigation and a 
lack of links to other sites' (Wilks 2001c, 2002). Complete main-site content is 
provided only in (American) English, 'the working language of the Bank' (World Bank 
2001d); less extensive content is provided in French, Spanish and Russian, with links 
to these provided on the front-page, and Country Websites also provide further 
materials in other languages. This opens the content up to a great number of the 
world's peoples, but by no means makes it accessible to all. So beyond issues of who 
the audience is that could be given the capacity and the inclination to get online,. 
another important question concerns who the audience is intended to be; who is it 
that the Bank seeks to talk to through its online publications, discussions and 
presentations? Or rather, who within the Bank is seeking to talk to whom? 
Eight main groups of actors come to mind: other governance bodies, World Bank 
staff, corporations, financial investors, think-tanks, Non-Governmental or Civil Society 
Organisations (NGOs/CSOs), academics, and the media. Governance bodies - such 
as donor and borrower country-member government officials and research units, 
other inter-governmental organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other regional development banks 
(RDBs) - may not be so often addressed directly through the site; offline discussions, 
meetings and secure intranet postings will predominate, but website content will still 
serve in providing a material archive (publications, policy-documents, programme- 
results, research-findings) as well as updates on activities and priorities. 
Development-programme partners (corporations, NGOs/CSOs, local civil society 
groups) will be in a similar position, using the sites as a supplement to communication 
with relevant Bank staff. 
Meanwhile, because of the size of the organisation, websites are also the easiest and 
most universally-accessible means by which to ensure that all Bank staff themselves 
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can potentially remain aware of ongoing research and development activities, 
programmes, policy discussions and events. Independent research units, academics 
and campaign organisations can find many of the raw materials they require for 
studies and critical reports freely available on the Bank's sites; whilst potential 
financial investors (in both the Bank and its borrower countries) can locate years of 
annual financial reports and future projections of economic performance for both the 
Bank and borrower-member countries within. Finally, the media are often addressed 
through press briefings, but can also trawl Bank-sites for more detail as well as 
consulting the Bank's self-selected media presentation (daily cuttings of references to 
the Bank from the world's press, edited by Bank staff) for both other media 
perspectives and a sense of what stories the Bank is happy to retell in this way. The 
main group that we might consider the Bank as being less concerned to speak to 
through its online presence is that most extensive group of those affected by its 
policies & programmes termed 'the poor'. The Bank's site tends more to speak for 
such groups, or to re-present their opinions through its own programmes. Changing 
constructions of, and attitudes to, this group are observed through the shifts in 
development discourse and the World Bank's discursive practice considered in 
Chapter Four and beyond, but for now at least the poor remain predominantly a 
passive object of its online discourse rather than an active subject. 
The presentation of the Bank's homepage is very much designed with a public- 
relations consciousness to appeal to the passing interested browser as well as to 
reinforce upon all visitors the Bank's advertised mission. The starting point for 
interaction is framed such that we are all (Bank, critic, passer-by) positioned as being 
together in this mission. From October 1999 until a redesign in October 2001 (a large 
part of my period of research) the homepage's headline banner prominently displayed 
the Bank logo, which recurs somewhere on all Bank-sponsored or partnered sites 
ensuring brand recognition (since October 2001 the logo has remained in much 
reduced form, and the Bank's five subsections are now listed underneath the World 
Bank title). Underneath this was inscribed the emotionally inclusive, aspiring slogan 
'our dream is a world free of poverty', which remained on the headline banner until 
August 2002. Alongside the logo and slogan sat a picture of a smiling child of 
'developing' country origin, which changed at least once a month. Although this image 
has now been removed from the front-page, images of smiling children recur 
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frequently throughout the Bank's web domain. The innocence and happiness of these 
children indicates the intended (implied actual) dream/product of the Bank's activities. 
This connects with Bank President James Wolfensohn's (11995) catch-line considered 
further in Chapter Four that the thing that drives him in his work is the thought of 'the 
smile on a child's face'when development projects are successful. The simplicity and 
wholesomeness of this desire, the naYve good intention that it expresses, is 
embracing. A universal 'we' is postulated in the expressed desires. The smile on the 
face of the Bank in these first moments of contact is unguarding - all it wants to do is 
help. 
Beneath this banner we are shown a series of highlighted areas with links to further 
more detailed pages for each, including links to its organisational subsets - IBRD, 
IDA, IFC, MIGA and ICSID. The page here conveys the mixed messages that 
embody the Bank as a whole, which I consider in more detail in Chapter Five; 
financial statements and links to appraisal reports portraying its standing as an 
established institution making a steady and regular profit, with links to information for 
businesses and its bond holders; news sections and e-newsletters suggest an online 
role as an economic analyst and news provider upon the economic state of the world 
and the global potentialities and risks for capital; links to project summaries and 
appraisals establish the Bank as a facilitator of industrialisation and an interest to 
Northern industrial capital interests; Bank 'hot topics', themes and links to latest 
publications and high-profile research findings position it as a respected research 
organisation and intellectual community; whilst development statistics, profiles of 
'Development-in-Action' and educational foci alongside the smiling child remind 
browsers of the hopeful elements of the development project. The World Bank Group 
Web homepage thus provides a first indication of the many roles performed under its 
extensive banner as well as of the standing of its online presence as a major 
assemblage of research materials for evaluating the organisation's potential and 
actual roles within the contemporary (contingent) conjunction of discourses upon 
knowledge economies and societies, governance, and development. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the approach adopted herein of researching the Bank from 
a distance and considering its public performance of a development agenda. A 
number of points have been noted concerning the complexity of the organisation and 
the influence of its more dominant Northern government members, a topic that will be 
returned to in Chapter Five. More importantly, the matter has been given an initial 
address of approaching the Bank as an organisation that operates within, and 
contributes to (but does not determine) the reproduction and adjustment of an 
institutional terrain. This terrain includes topics such as accepted conceptions of 
capital, those elements that are defined as such and thus brought within the sphere of 
economic considerations, and the predominant means of its regulation. Approaching 
the Bank as one organisation involved in the reproduction of such institutional 'rules 
of the game' of social functioning cautions against being too dismissive or 
condemnatory of the Bank in itself without considering the influence of the forces and 
interests that surround it. 
In concluding, it seems significant that the World Bank's slogan is a dream of a world 
free of poverty. This seemingly warm and inclusive sentiment can also be read as an 
acknowledgement of the failure of its development efforts, or of structural flaws in the 
development project more widely conceived; of the need for a 'world free of poverty' 
to remain a dream rather than a real possibility, a mission statement for the Bank with 
a timeline and achievable targets. This provides an indication of the institutional 
constraints within which it operates, and that it reproduces through its practices; many 
such targets have been and are continually re/set, as will be addressed in Chapter 
Four, but some fifty years after the Bank's establishment it is still an organisation 
dreaming of its ultimate goal. Chapters Two and Three will next consider the 
knowledge economy as discursive and governmental practice before returning to this 
problem in Chapter Four in treating changes in the discursive practice of the 




Performing the 'Knowledge Economy'- is it all in the mind? 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the theoretical terrain of knowledge and information economy 
and society discourse. An abundance of terms have been deployed in defining and 
analysing a perceived growth in levels of knowledge and information in contemporary 
economies and societies. The terminological set exists as a somewhat indeterminate 
conceptual soup covering a composite range of developments in knowledge and 
information production and distribution processes, and technologies and 
organisational processes. The discourse plays a performative role in shaping our 
understanding of these changes. Two important distinctions that will be considered 
concern speaking of a growth in information or knowledge, and treating this growth 
with respect to its economic or wider societal effects. This chapter argues that neither 
of these approaches to conceiving of the social and economic changes afoot are 
particularly useful as analytical tools (the knowledge economy is regarded as a 
discursive construct lacking much substantive evidential support), but that they 
function well as contemporary modes of govern mentality, a subject that is then 
pursued further in the following chapter. Problems with the 'new' economy's 
conceptual isatio n and measurement are detailed and the ambiguity and elasticity of 
its underlying concepts and definitions are noted. Certain perceived changes are 
noted to have been based upon weak premises whilst other observed changes have 
at times been exaggerated, overoptimistically interpreted, or otherwise poorly 
analysed in terms of potential outcomes. The dominant discursive trend is observed 
overall to be optimistic and enthusiastic about the potential harboured for socio- 
economic liberation and the demise of exploitation. This optimism promises a vision 
worth struggling for, but to presume that it is inherent within the logic of the changes 
considered is argued to be a recipe for complacency when these changes could 
equally well be regarded as extending the logic and operations of capital to new 
'capital' forms. However the discourse is argued to be complex and still relatively 
35 
open and underdetermined, allowing space for new contributions and explorations of 
alternative understandings and approaches. 
Knowledge Economies and Societies 
One of the most common referents within this discourse has been to the knowledge 
or knowledge-based economy (Machlup 1962, Mquier 1983), whilst 'information', 
'learning' and 'post-industrial' have been frequently employed as alternate prefixes 
(Stonier 1983, OECD 1986, Hodgson 1999, cf. Guinet 1996). Other contributors 
meanwhile have referred to the growth of a knowledge, information, knowledgeable or 
post-industrial society (Lane 1966, Bell 1974, Touraine 1971, Naisbitt 1984, 
Livingstone 1999, Castells 2000a, Stehr 2001), whilst yet others have invoked less 
specific notions such as 'super-industrialism' (Toffler 1970) and 'post-capitalism' 
(Drucker 1993)20. 
With regard firstly to treating the 'economy' and 'society' as objects of knowledge- 
oriented change, the knowledge economy is conceptually the more focussed of the 
two terms, more restricted in its analysis of how information and knowledge are 
increasingly treated as commodifiable forms of capital subject to profit-maximising 
techniques. many writers are willing to concede that we have always lived in a 
'knowledge economy' of one form or another insofar as knowledge has always been a 
central aspect of economic functioning (Castells 1993). On this view economic 
development can be seen as 'primarily an epistemological problem', capital being 
'knowledge imposed on the material world' and machines being 'frozen knowledge' 
(Boulding 1971: 25-6). Even most knowledge economy sceptics would accept that we 
are experiencing, or have experienced, specific alterations in the dominant mode of 
production through the development of new technologies and their effects upon the 
mass distribution of information and knowledge. Debate can then focus on the scale, 
significance and possible outcomes of these changes, such as whether knowledge 
has acceded to the primacy as a factor of production accorded to it by knowledge 
economy enthusiasts. The distinction between past and present tense here reflects 
20 For ease of reference throughout this thesis (and for consistency with an analysis of the World 
BanWs Knowledge Bank discourse), one set of terms will tend to be used throughout in talking of 
knowledge economies and societies, although intbrmation will also be used as a prefix when 
appropriate with regards to cited texts. 
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the relative importance ascribed to the development of modern Information 
Communication Technologies (computers and the Internet, satellite systems and so 
forth). Some argue that these only increase the intensity of developments realised 
through earlier global communications 'revolutions' like the advent of telephones, 
faxes and television (Hirst & Thompson 1996), whilst others contend that radical 
qualitative changes are being realised through these new technologies (Castells 
2000a). 
What is qualitatively different about pronouncements upon the knowledge society is 
the more totalistic, holistic understanding of knowledge-oriented, reflexive and self- 
aware social groups as well as increases in knowledge's creation, reproduction and 
distribution - the production of a knowledge culture. Again, it has been argued from a 
variety of perspectives that all societies are in one sense information or knowledge 
societies (Lane 1966: 650). Firstly insofar as information gathering, storage and 
control are essential elements of state functioning (Giddens 1985), and the production 
of numbers makes the modern governance of large populations possible (Rose 
1991). Secondly insofar as engaging with the production and use of knowledge is 
regarded as a defining characteristic of human existence (Osborne 1998). Knowledge 
society discursive contributions shift the register of discussion onto a new plane by 
ascribing to knowledge the defining role in shaping modern societies. Knowledge 
societies are societies which express greater reflexivity in examining their beliefs and 
aspire to using objective standards in the process, which produce, store and organise 
knowledge to enlighten their goals and help in their pursuit, and so express greater 
agency in constituting the social - defining and shaping the spaces they encapsulate 
(Lane 1966, Stehr 2001). 
Considerable generality and ambiguity are apparent within these brief descriptions, 
there being no obvious way in which they could be substantiated beyond anecdotal 
evidence. Knowledge and information here become 'indeterminate explanandurn' 
(Osborne 1998: 22-3), elastic and indeterminate signifiers open to interpretation in a 
variety of ways to produce the desired analysis. Because of this the knowledge or 
information society has been characterised as a gestural category more than a 
focussed tool of social analysis (Osborne 1998: 22-3), a 'heuristic device' for 
exploring features of our contemporary world (Webster 1995: 24). The notion can also 
further be viewed as a framing device which emphasises the impression that we are 
37 
entering a new era and not just a new economic phase. When the 'knowledge society' 
is deployed as a rhetorical tool of governmental discourse, it stands a greater chance 
of filtering more deeply and effectively into the social consciousness and thereby 
encouraging institutional innovations than would the possibly more 'banal' (in the 
public eye) or restricted discussions of economic changes. The next chapter will 
consider how these discursive practices have been engaged as a mode of 
governmentality producing and governing new types of subject; fostering the 
entrepreneurial culture governments seek under the contemporary dominant 
understanding of what makes economies competitive with regard to, for instance, 
encouraging citizens to accept responsibility for retraining and marketing themselves 
to potential employees. 
What is the Knowledge Economy? 
We can delineate four streams into which most writers cannot be tightly pigeonholed, 
but which nevertheless help in visualising the terrain; the post-i nd ustria lists, the 
networkers, the futurists and the managers. The 'post-industrialists' made first 
exploratory steps in thinking about knowledge's increasing importance as a factor of 
production, and thus the possibility that we could be moving beyond the industrial era. 
'Networkers' are more concerned with the importance of defining networks as a mode 
of organisation affecting the economy and other areas of life. These writings draw 
upon advances in Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their 
proliferation alongside organisational shifts promoting networks as a mode of thinking. 
'Futurists' may reflect aspects of contemporary thinking and influence the public mood 
should their work gain a high profile, but do not provide detailed analysis of trends in 
the economy so much as make hyperbolic declarations of future trends based upon 
anecdotal evidence. 'Managers' refers to those contributors to the knowledge 
management element of this discursive field, underpinned by and in one sense an 
outgrowth of the preoccupations of the first two streams, but driven by the insights 
and priorities of managerial thinking (see for example Davenport & Prusak 1998). 
This form of specific, applied discursive practice assumes the existence of a 
knowledge economy from the outset (an abundance of knowledge that needs to be 
managed for operational efficiency), and so is of lesser interest in considering the 
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establishment and consolidation of definitions of the knowledge economy as a 
discursive event. 
The focus in this work is therefore upon writers who fit more neatly into the post- 
industrialist and networker streams. Whilst there is broad enough agreement between 
these groups to justify drawing loosely upon all writers in articulating and assessing 
the knowledge economy thesis (Kumar 1978), the distinction in emphasis between 
post-industrialist and network-oriented writings is important in analysing the notion's 
contemporary functionality as an analytical and governmental tool. The two streams 
are not opposed, but rather network thinking has developed from elements of the 
post-industrial along with other concerns stemming from discourses of management 
and technology. 
We might usefully begin by asking - what is meant by the 'knowledge economy'? A 
knowledge economy is frequently defined as one where knowledge has become the 
primary form of capital, where the weight of the economy is based in knowledge- 
related activities as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment 
(Bell 1962,1980); one where the dominant mode of production process organisation 
has changed due to technological developments increasing their complexity and a 
focus upon enabling faster information flows throughout organisations in a more 
competitive economic environment (Bell 1962, Castells 2000a, Lash & Urry 1994, 
Hardt & Negri 2000, Toffler 1970, Hodgson 1999, Cohen 1993, Drucker 1993). Within 
both the industrial and service sectors it is argued that knowledge in the new 
economy acts as the primary source of innovation and economic value-added and 
thus competitive advantage. Other forms of capital also tend to depend more upon 
knowledge-related developments such as improving the production and use of the 
fruits of scientific research, producing new designs to capture markets, and engaging 
improved management methods. Castells (2000a: 17) asserts that all of this indicates 
that a new mode of capitalist development is occurring wherein 'the action of 
knowledge upon knowledge itself' becomes the main source of productivity. The 
changes in question affect all economic sectors, producing a distinctive form of socio- 
economic system that subsumes industrial economies rather than replacing them, 
one that now draws directly upon the potentialities of the human mind's symbol- 
processing capabilities as a factor of production (Castells 2000a: 31,100). 
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A major contributing factor to knowledge economy discourse was the emergence of 
an 'economics of knowledge' in the late 1950s. Robert M Solow's (1957) paper 
'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function' put forward the argument 
that up to half of economic growth could not be accounted for by changes in capital 
stocks and labour; the missing element, he contended, was technological change. 
The 'Solow Residual' was born and economists began working to measure this 
missing portion of economic growth and account for the impact of technological 
innovation or other missing variableS21 . 
This constituted the first steps in thinking the 
connections to be drawn out later once knowledge itself became the focus of 
consideration as a factor of production in all areas of economic life, rather than 
specifically the application of knowledge to produce technological innovation. The 
main supposition of knowledge economy discourse is that industrialised countries 
have entered, and other countries are entering, into a new stage of economic 
development where the missing contributor to economic growth is revealed to be the 
growth of knowledge and all its related effects. This is interpreted as producing huge 
changes in how economies function and so how they need to be governed (the areas 
of comparative advantage most worth pursuing, the employment prospects of 
different areas of activity and so the advantages of various education policies, and so 
forth). 
As indicated by the name of the first stream of such thinking, the knowledge economy 
is also frequently associated with a decline in the importance of the industrial 
economy and a corresponding rise in the role of the service sector. Post-industrial 
discourse posits a vast growth in service sector revenue and employment as an 
integral aspect of knowledge economy developments (Bell 1974, Lane 1966) that 
network thinking then takes as a baseline assumption. The majority of this expanding 
service sectors workers are argued to be involved in activities where information (its 
creation, processing, distribution and management) is an integral element of the work 
performed. Industry is said to be on the decline in the most economically-advanced 
countries as a result of technological change and competitive profit- maxi misi ng 
practices, less complicated work being automated or outsourced to economies where 
21 The World Bank's Chief Economist and Vice President from February 1997 to February 2000, 
Joseph Stiglitz, whose major research interest is informational economics and who is widely regarded 
as being a major driving force in the Knowledge Bank agenda at the World Bank, was supervised in his 
PhD at MIT by Solow and wrote his second academic paper with him (Solow & Stiglitz 1968). 
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labour is cheaper (e. g. Davenport & Prusak 1998: 13). The service sector is said to 
be growing due to swiftly rising living standards resulting from other knowledge 
economy developments leading to increased leisure time and income and thus 
greater demand for leisure services (Hirst & Thompson 1996). Technological 
developments are also framed as contributing to a growth in information-related and 
distance-operated commercial and government services (e. g. telephone and Internet- 
based). 
The Foundations of the Knowledge Economy 
In relation to this discourse, it is important to ask what is meant by 'knowledge' in 
relation to economic activity and development. Much literature exhibits weakness at 
this early and fundamental stage with producing explicit operational definitions 
susceptible to cogent empirical and theoretical analysis. Two post- in d ustrial ists, Fritz 
Machlup and Daniel Bell, provide good illustrations of writers who have tried to 
grapple with the question and produced quite different - more wide and narrow - 
answers that serve as marker points by which to negotiate the terrain. Machlup's 
(1962: 21-2) Knowledge Production in the United States uses an inclusive and 
subjective definition of 'who knows and why and what for' as its operational principle 
in distinguishing a wide variety of classifications for knowledge from the 'practical' 
forms used in business and political affairs, through more 'intellectual' manifestations, 
to 'pastime' varieties embodied in small-talk and the 'spiritual' form apparent in 
religious texts and practices (ending with the ambiguous category of 'unwanted' 
knowledge). Daniel Bell (1974: 175-181), by contrast, in The Coming of the Post- 
Industrial Society, marks out a more narrow and restrictive utilitarian definition of 
knowledge, distinguishing it from forms of information exchange such as news and 
entertainment. Knowledge, for Bell, consists of organised sets of statements of facts 
or ideas expressing new judgements, or new presentations of older judgements. 
Knowledge here is that which is objectively known, an 'intellectual property' attached 
to some particular person or group and certified by some form of social recognition 
such as copyright or publishing. It is part of the 'social overhead investment of 
society'. 
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Machlup's (1962: 21-2) definition proposes a way of understanding and categorising 
knowledge's multiple functions, and tries to account for the meaning that the knower 
attaches to the known. Yet the approach raises three important concerns that recur 
more or less directly in a number of later writings (e. g. Toffier 1970, World Bank 
1998a). He firstly states that for ordinary purposes 'all information is knowledge' 
(although not all knowledge can be considered information) and that there is no 
purpose in making a distinction between the two except in special circumstances. 
Secondly he equates the production of knowledge with its communication, the former 
producing socially new knowledge and the latter reproducing knowledge that is 
subjectively new to the receiver. Both of these propositions are problematic and 
contribute to a concern with how any consistent quantitative analysis of knowledge 
production, distribution and use - necessary for constructing an argument to the 
effect of knowledge's increasing importance within economic activity - can be 
aftempted. 
Distinguishing between information and knowledge is necessary to recognising the 
social and economic costs and hoped-for benefits of producing knowledge. The 
notion of an 'information pyramid' (Dedijer & Mquier 1987: 14) is a useful 
visualisation for thinking about the labour involved in taking the pyramid's widest base 
section, great quantities of data, and refining and filtering these into smaller but more 
significant quantities of synthesised information. These can then be finally analysed 
and processed in order to produce useful knowledge. As Davenport and Prusak 
(1998: 5) put it, knowledge is 'broader, deeper and richer' than information. Whilst 
such distinctions will never be clear-cut, a negotiated consensus upon a separation of 
terms would be useful to delineating effects indicating the emergence of an 
information, or knowledge, economy. Furthermore, 'intelligence' sits at the pinnacle of 
Dedijer and Mquier's structure, pointing to questions upon the usefulness of any 
increases in knowledge production that occur outside of solid intelligence systems 
directing knowledge-production to socially-constructive ends. Without this, we could 
end up swimming in a sea of (socially useless but individually profitable) knowledge. 
Thus this is more than a matter of semantics, being relevant to the direction of 
economic developments and the location of economic value-added within different 
levels of information pyramid processing (relating in turn to potential new international 
divisions of labour, discussed in the next chapter). 
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It is secondly important to distinguish between the production and reproduction of 
knowledge, although the two are often conflated in selecting indicators of knowledge's 
growth. Both production and reproduction could contribute to a growing importance of 
knowledge within the economy and so to changes in social organisation and the 
dominant mode of production; to one definition of a knowledge economy, in effect, 
that is the commodification and industrialisation of knowledge. But to argue 
specifically about the economic impact of an accelerating growth of knowledge a 
boundary need be maintained between the economic contributions of socially new 
knowledge, and profit-maximising techniques 'squeezing wealth from knowledge' 
(Langrish et al. 1972: 2). One of the most often cited pieces of evidence for a growing 
knowledge-base is growth in the materials employed in knowledge's representation, 
storage, and dissemination - books, libraries, universities and degrees obtained 
therein (Lane 1966, Toffier 1970, Bell 1974). The conflation leads to the construction 
of unsubstantiated statistics of hyperbolic proportions, particularly amongst futurist 
writers, asserting that scientific ideas come and go twenty to a hundred times faster 
today than they did one hundred years ago based on an estimation of the growth in 
scientific publications (Toffler 1970: 158). 
To avoid such unproductive hyperbole, we need to distinguish and mark off, for 
instance, publishing houses who farm out books upon a topic with little new to 
contribute, and software houses who release new versions of programmes with only 
minor bug-fixes. Improving the distribution of information and knowledge may foster 
what Robert Lane (1966: 649) terms a 'knowledgeable society', but this says little of 
the role of knowledge production in the economy. The problems with concretely 
measuring contributions to knowledge, and distinguishing these from informational 
improvements, could go some way to explaining why the conflation of these issues 
persists in many knowledge economy writings. Problems of the means of 
measurement will be returned to in Section VI 1. 
Returning now to Bell's approach, this is more open to statistical analysis given the 
focus upon owned knowledge that can more easily be accounted for. But for the 
same reason this approach is overly restrictive, recognising only that which can be in 
some form commodified, and only once it has been so. It does not recognise the 
importance of Machlupian developments such as the acquisition and deployment of 
tacit knowledge in relation to managerial practices, shop floor organisation or 
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interactions between labour and technology. In so doing it fences off the possibility of 
understanding changes in economic and social life based upon these. Bell (1974: 
197) instead focuses upon new relationships between science and technology 
accelerating the pace of knowledge production, the 'systematic joining of science to 
invention' allowing theoretical science to lead in shaping technology. The improved 
technological forecasting that stems from this, along with better industrial 
organisation, allows for more systematic investment and intensified innovation cycles 
through reduced time delay between idea formation, technology development, and 
product diffusion. Knowledge is considered the fuel of the technological engine, the 
accelerative thrust that increases the pace of social change in a cycle that feeds back 
upon itself it to generate further increases in knowledge (cf. Toffler 1970, Stonier 
1983). Bell characterises the changing social organisation of science as the 
development of more specific fields of research stemming from advances in 
understanding which branch out and coordinate interests and findings, producing 
increased levels of specialisation within an intricate division of labour. 
The work of Bell and Machlup can thus be viewed as initial contributions to theorising 
and quantifying the role of knowledge in contemporary economies and societies. 
Machlup's work attempts to classify knowledge in its multiple forms, including making 
observations upon the role of tacit knowledge (that knowledge which is known but not 
articulated, and perhaps cannot be formulated in the abstract without losing 
something of the essence of what is known, as with skills acquired through the trial 
and error of their performance). Bell's work observes the importance of networking as 
a mode of organising knowledge production, in writing of the branching and 
coordinating of specialised fields of scientific study. Bringing these two streams of 
post-industrial thinking together, the writers outlined below have generalised and 
amplified the importance of network forms throughout society, with an emphasis upon 
tacit knowledge's flourishing outside of hierarchical (bureaucratic) organisational 
systems. 
The Networked Economy 
'Mhe new competition is one of access to information, resources, and 
partners ... position within a network means everything' (Powell & Smith- Doerr 1994: 394) 
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Networker literature argues that networks have come to dominate as tools of 
communication, social and economic organisation, and governance, contributing to 
the emergence of a networked and informational era from the industrial epoch (Lash 
& Urry 1994, Castells 2000a, 2000b, Rhodes 1995,1997, Powell & Smith-Doerr 
1994, Foray & Lundvall 1996). Individuals, states, corporations and other social, 
political and economic organisations are said to be adjusting their styles of 
association and becoming more 'network-ready'. The network thus functions as an 
abstract model of a mode of organisation that may be engaged at many levels, as 
well as a way of conceiving the flows of information, goods, people and capital argued 
to constitute an increasingly globalised economy. These developments stem in large 
part from ICT developments that facilitate swift global communications and massive 
increases in information and capital flows. The economic significance of such 
projected developments is considered here with regard to enterprise and the labour 
market within already-industrialised countries, before observing problems in the 
measurement of knowledge economy claims, and in the following chapter the 
significance of these developments to less-industrialised countries and international 
labour markets will be returned to. 
One of the most thorough and commanding reflections upon the theme of the network 
as a mode of social and economic organisation is provided in Manuel Castells' The 
Information Age, VoL 1. The Rise of the Network Society (2000a)22. Castells (2000a: 
77) puts forward a vision of an informational, global, and networked economy 
produced through a 'historical linkage between the knowledge-information base of the 
economy, its global reach, its network-based organizational form, and the information 
technology revolution'. The new economy is conceived as a space of global flows of 
information, goods, people and capital, with correlative effects within the coordination 
and governance of the social. It is contended to be global in that although most 
economic activities within each nation-state remain locally-oriented, they still depend 
upon the flows of capital produced through a core of activities which take place within 
a series of globally networked metropolitan hubs (cf. Lash & Urry 1994, Sassen 
1991). 
22 Castells has become the standard-bearer for network society thinking, the fanfares of a 'new age' or 
a 'new existence' ringing loud in his work (Castells 2000a: 509). It is thus with his writings that I deal 
most directly here. 
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On this argument the manifestation of an increasingly competitive global economic 
space combined with the accelerating pace of knowledge production contributes to 
the emergence of new forms of organisation wherein 'the action of knowledge upon 
knowledge itself becomes the main area of productivity (Castells 2000a: 17). 
Corporations are firstly argued to have become more networked as production has 
been outsourced to supplier companies offering cheaper factors of production. 
Turning the production process as a whole into a contractual relationship for the 
capital-holding organisation (rather than just the relationship of labour to the 
producer) enables greater flexibility and mobility as to where operations are based in 
pursuit of a competitive edge. The advent of ICTs has eased and quickened this 
process of dispersing and relocating operations globally. Secondly the acceleration of 
knowledge production is argued to have produced increasingly intense cycles of 
innovation as firms use information and knowledge as tools for gaining comparative 
advantage (Guinet 1996). Corporations would require increasingly large groups of 
specialists to establish their presence as more central 'nodes' within technological 
and communication networks and ensure access to current information. This 
becomes implausible given that advanced technical markets pose large barriers to 
entry in the costs of establishing research bases that can be at the cutting edge of an 
industry (laboratories and tools as well as personnel). As such, co-operative 
partnering of research and development work between companies becomes a more 
viable and desirable business proposal (Hodgson 1999: 90, Castells 2000a: 176-7, cf. 
Foray & Lundvall 1996, Nielsen 1996). The proposed end-result is that the main unit 
of enterprise becomes the projects established at a meeting point between the 
common interests of a number of corporate agents, a 'network enterprise' (Castells 
2000a: 187-8). 
In order to understand what is happening here we need a better understanding of 
how the network is conceived, and the role it is being expected to perform. Castells 
(2000b: 6) emphasises the level of abstraction within his model in referring to the 
network society as an 'ideal type, but even so the model used is inherently 
problematic, being based upon an idealised model of ICTs such as the Internet. 
Castells' (2000a: 501,407-9) use of the term is summed up by one simple definition 
of 'a set of interconnected nodes', nodes being points through which some kind of 
flow passes, and the nature of the node thus depending upon what kind of network 
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we speak of23. Within networks 'flows have no distance, or the same distance, 
between nodes', and nodal distance thus varies between zero and infinity in a simple 
and clean matter of inclusion within and exclusion from the network. Networks are 
asserted to have no centre, main nodes being mere 'switchers' following the logic of 
the network. The concern is with the 'space of flows' (Castells 2000b: 13) and not so 
much with the actors-become- nodes through which flows flow, who simply play their 
part if they are to stay within the network. 
Castells elsewhere problematically attempts to cleave a clean distinction between 
structure and agency in reifying the network as a structure produced by actors which 
constitute its nodes (Castells 2000b: 15-17). The network is firstly treated as a value- 
free automaton which processes only what it is programmed to perform whilst actors 
(nodes) struggle to programme the networks. However once the programme is set 
nodal agency is weakened since there is argued to be little chance of changing a 
network's programming in any way incompatible with its core goals. The nodes that 
constitute the network need adapt to or else be excluded from it as its 'evolutionary 
nature' means that it readjusts whenever necessary to exclude all that is no longer 
useful to its existence 'as cells do in biological processes'. At the most meta-level of 
such thinking we are presented with a 'network of networks' of global capital, 'a 
faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows operated by electronic 
networks' (Castells 2000a: 505, cf. 2000b: 17). A symbiotic relationship is suggested, 
a self-regulating global economy substantiated by flows of goods and people, given 
its face by flows of signs, nourished by flows of capital and brought to a form of 
distributed self-awareness through flows of communications, with an evolutionary 
disposition that allows it to develop in the face of changing circumstances. 
Such a vision denies the agentive role of 'nodes', positioning them as passive 
transmitters of a fixed currency and inferring the ideal of 'double-click' informational 
networks producing 'transport without deformation', of which Latour (1999: 15-16, 
emphasis in original) is so derisive. Somatic effects stem from such an approach in so 
far as the relations within networks are perceived as more horizontalised, equal and 
23 As he says (Castells 2000b: 5), the network is an old form of social organisation. Indeed it must be 
insofar as connection and communication (flows) are founding principles of human societies. The 
language thereby elides the extent to which the theory does not distinguish anything particularly new, 
but rather points to social structures produced by dominant actors which over-determine the actions of 
themselves and others once they are set in place. 
47 
I UYV" ERGITY I 
open than within traditionally defined hierarchical structures (e. g. European Union 
1997). Yet as with financial market-networks in which it is through the process of 
currency translation that profits are sought, so with the passage of 'flows' within 
networks is it through the translation, appropriation and retransmission of that which 
flows that interests are advanced. Switchers in effect constitute points through which 
flows must pass to enable connections to be established. The process of 
problematising a situation so as to constitute a point through which others must pass 
is an exercise in channelling flows of power, and when successful can reconstitute 
the nodelpoint at which this occurs as more connected (clustered) and thus more 
central to and influential upon the interests of all that it is connected t024. 
Labour and the New Economy 
Critical literature has considered several dangers with the acceleration of 
technological and organisational changes associated with the new economy 
pertaining to labour market conditions. These concern the returns made upon capital 
accumulated and reinvested, an imbalance between the supply and demand of 
knowledge and skills, and a distinction between changes in activities undertaken in 
the workplace and changing in the culture of the workplace. As we will see in the next 
chapter, governmental discourse can be similarly trepidatious about these 
developments even though it tends to make grand pronouncements upon the 
potential gains for developing countries. 
To deal firstly with the accumulation of capital, the role of capital in maintaining class 
divisions is likely to be extended to intellectual capital with any increase in the 
centrality of information and knowledge to economic activities. The mass of the labour 
force are likely to maintain low general knowledge levels due to social inequalities in 
access to education whilst those from more privileged backgrounds who pass through 
the basic education channels to go on to higher education and professional 
specialisations will be more likely to secure themselves a niche within the market for 
their expertise (Bell 1974). Importantly, once this far they can expect to find the time, 
money and even employment allowances to continue to develop their skills and so 
24 This is in effect the subject of much Social Network Analysis (SNA) work which looks at the 
constitution of 'networks' in terms of the levels, densities and strengths of connections and interaction 
between actors (see for example Wellman & Berkowitz 1997, Carroll & Fennema 2002, Boulder 2002). 
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stay at the front of their field, reinvesting their skills in learning to ensure that this time 
is spent productively. 
A growing white-collar workforce could remain as exploited as any blue-collar 
industrial sector so long as it remains a grouping of relatively interchangeable labour 
units played off against one another in a competitive labour market. The data-entry 
clerk or call-centre employee could remain in a position little different from the shop- 
floor factory worker in this regard. At the other end of the scale a new social elite 
could emerge who move beyond the need to specialise and acquire expertise in 
general methods of analysis, transcending the increased pace of economic turnover 
to become agenda-setters for future knowledge production and directing the changes 
occupying the rest of society (Bell 1974: 213-216). An 'advanced services middle 
class' involved in the symbol-intensive culture industries, and high-value aspects of 
the leisure, education, health and retail industries meanwhile could benefit from the 
increasing importance of informational products imbued with sign-value. A 'culturati' 
increasingly involved in the production and consumption of 'individuated and high 
value-added symbols' in a relatively enclosed world providing a market for each 
other's produce (Lash & Urry 1994: 164-5). 
Secondly in relation to speaking of an imbalance between the supply and demand for 
skills and knowledge, hierarchical divisions of labour could become re-instituted within 
knowledge-based fields through an over-supply of qualifications (Kumar 1978: 214). 
The perceived necessity of higher education qualifications as one step towards 
achieving employability has already and will further broaden demand. If this demand 
increases at a rate which produces qualified applicants in greater numbers than they 
are required then 'credential inflation' will result (cf. Collins 1979). A widening gap 
between skill acquisition and actual skill requirements could result in jobs being set at 
increasingly high formal skill levels not because of any change in the nature of the 
work, but simply as a filtering device by employers responding to the over-abundance 
of qualifications. As employers take on only the most skilled staff and so raise entry 
levels to industry the pace of technological development could in turn be increased, 
feeding back into the demands placed upon new entrants as well as the expected 
returns for the labour involved. 
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Two outcomes are possible here, firstly 'hyper-acceleration' (Foray & Lundvall 1996: 
26-8) of economic change and market demands as the speed of innovation hastens, 
increasingly dividing the included few skilled workers from the majority of relatively 
under-qualified. The pace of change could further create pressure to continually 
retrain in order to remain employable as skills-demands change with greater rapidity. 
Workers risk devoting energy to areas of specialisation which become obsolete as 
new forms of technology and modes of organisational production develop (cf. Toffler 
1970, Hodgson 1999). Secondly 'under-employment' (Livingstone 1999: 171) - not 
gaining work that makes maximal use of one's qualifications and skills - could 
become a common experience as the proliferation of knowledge economy discourse 
generates an increasing popular demand for lifelong learning which goes unrewarded 
by a lack of changes in the jobs market except for the highly-qualified few. An 
increasing proportion of the working population could be excluded from fulfilling and 
financially rewarding work should the knowledge society dwarf the knowledge 
economy at a general level in this way (Livingstone 1999: 164). The danger arises of 
increasing income inequalities between less and more-skilled labour, and growing 
unemployment amongst unskilled labour25. 
Finally in reply to the optimistic vision of knowledge acquisition enabling employees to 
make greater demands upon employers as a result of their possessing niche or tacit 
expertise upon how the production process might be utilised most effectively (e. g. 
Hodgson 1999), we need to distinguish between changes in activities undertaken in 
the workplace and changes in the culture of the workplace. Having confidence in 
one's greater importance as a unit of the production process due to increased skills 
levels is a quite separate matter from acquiring the skills, and such points of 'labour 
subjectivity' (Hull 2000: 327) are crucial to changing relations in the workplace. 
Submission might still be induced from a workforce in many different ways unless the 
culture of the workplace is altered. Furthermore, if increases in the knowledge 
component of labour are matched by - or induced by - increases in the knowledge 
component of fixed capital, then these workers will still be dependent upon the capital 
of the firm in order to be able to employ their skills. 
25 As when Neef (1998: 4) observes that in the US the top 20% of the labour force considered to be 
knowledge workers earn more than the other 80% of the working population combined. 
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The greater skill-levels demanded of employees to operate more complex machinery 
could perhaps better be expressed as a rising density, velocity and complexity of 
production processes as a whole rather than as an emergent class of expert 
knowledge workers (Curry 1997). On this view no fundamental changes need 
necessarily have occurred in economic activity; what we are seeing can be explained 
as the industrialisation of knowledge production, wherein most knowledge workers 
cease to be independent craftspeople and are instead employed in teams to 
contribute their part to a larger work. On this view computer software developers 
could be regarded as the machinists of the Information Age, 'information mechanics' 
and not knowledge workers (Curry 1997: 11-12). As Zuboff (1988) stresses, even if 
learning becomes the new form of labour then all the requisite opportunities for 
exploitation and alienation remain within the work process. 
Problems of Measuring the 'New Economy' 
As previously noted knowledge economy advocates are sometimes complacent in 
employing crude estimates and categories of information workers that allow them to 
make claims of hyperbolic proportionS26 . The first clear problem with the discourse's 
more assertive, positivistic pronouncements are that claims of great developmental 
accelerations in science and technology are still highly debatable because 
'measurements are still very primitive and controversial' (Wionczek 1983: 150). 
Current statistical measurements are increasingly inadequate for monitoring 
economic information activitieS27 . No umbrella categories have yet been developed to 
demarcate the economic contribution of ICTs in themselves for instance, whilst 
changing organisational structures such as increased inter-firm partnering affect the 
accountancy of work performed 'in-house' or through informal trading. This same 
point upon 'the poverty of statistics' (Block 1985: 83, cf. Carter 1996) is made by 
some knowledge economy proponents in asserting that contemporary measuring 
techniques underestimate the new economy's size and importance. Productivity is 
26 Such as that '60 percent of all workers are knowledge workers, and 80 percent of all new jobs are in 
the information-intensive sector of the economy' (Baroni 2001). 
27 Mark Poster (1990,87) makes the effort and cites data on increases in the training time required to 
qualify for employment in various occupations as evidence of skill upgrading - the Specific Vocational 
Preparation Scale (SVP), as used by the US Dictionary of Occupational Tables (DOT) - yet his 
evidence is still dependent upon quite crude and arbitrary cut-off points such as taking 6 months' 
training to be a distinguishing mark between high and low-skill work, with no detail upon the 
significance of this particular date or why it should apply across all economic sectors. 
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argued to be being continually improved through 'costless quality changes' which 
mean that national productivity increases qualitatively far more quickly than any 
measured output in dollars (cf. Castells 2000a, OECD 1987). 
A number of organisations are now trying to produce devices for measuring 
information economy activity. Private initiatives have taken place such as Rubin 
Systems Inc. and the Meta Group's Global New E-Economy Index (GNEI) and their 
Cyber Atlas, each of which charts the standing of 47 countries in five categories of 
'knowledge jobs, technological innovation, degree of transformation to a digital 
economy, economic dynamism, and globalization' (META Group 2000, IT Matters 
2000, Enos 2000). The World Times and IDC have meanwhile developed the 
Information Society Index (ISI), which aims to measure 55 nation-states' abilities to 
participate in the 'information revolution' through monitoring their computer, 
information, internet and social infrastructures (IDC 2002, Infoshop 2001, WorldPaper 
2001). Both systems have very restricted mandates, looking primarily at adoption of 
ICTs via numbers and power of computers used per head and numbers and speed of 
internet connectionS28 . Governments are also very keen to produce standardised 
measurements of the new growth. The OECD (1 996b) has produced estimates of the 
GDP of major OECD economies that is now knowledge-based, working on the basis 
of a growth in high-technology industries and knowledge-intensive service sectors; 
whilst the World Bank has produced the programmes and literature that are the focus 
of this study. 
The imperfect means of measuring knowledge's worth to the economy lies at least in 
part in its particularly relational use-value. Data upon knowledge production and 
communications tell us very little until we know more about usage, including whether 
and how the knowledge can be applied within an appropriate social and economic 
context (Kumar 1978). As Roszak (1986: 26-9,195) puts it, 'information has come to 
denote whatever can be coded for transmission... regardless of semantic content' and 
without regard for who is communicating with whom about what. The proliferation of 
online gaming, spam email and (music or film) file-sharing of the Napster variety can 
be registered as increasing data transferrals contributing to the information revolution. 
28 The ISI is slightly more comprehensive in also including limited consideration of access to other 
media formats (radio, television, telephones, newspaper readership) as well as school enrolment 
levels. 
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A preoccupation with quantitative measures of growth is therefore a matter of 
concern; 'floods of trivia' might be registered as positive economic indicators when to 
the contrary they risk producing a disempowering 'infoglut', a 'statistical blizzard that 
numbs the attention' as it blots out the presence of useful knowledge (Roszak 1986: 
187-201, cf. Schiller 1996, Koski 2001). Secondly, key occupational categories which 
acquire more desirable status due to these discursive shifts have been argued to 
become somewhat elastic. In so doing, the categories become less useful to any 
statistical exercises designed to measure the 'new economy'. For example, 
increasing numbers of 'engineers' in society could mask relatively unchanging 
occupational structures as job-titles are adapted to fit the trend of the day but the jobs 
themselves remain unaltered should refuse collectors, for instance, be re-titled 
fsanitary engineers' (Kumar 1978: 153-4,214, cf. Webster 1995). 
Three similar problems arise with using the service sector as an indicator of 
knowledge economy developments. Firstly, what expansions there have been in the 
service sector cannot be assumed to indicate the increasing importance of knowledge 
given that the service sector is something of a residual economic category covering 
many disparate activities. Considerable further analysis would be required to 
delineate those elements which demonstrate the increasing importance of knowledge 
in the contemporary economy. Secondly, it has previously been noted by Krishan 
Kumar (1978: 200-210) that only the UK's statistics support claims of the declining 
importance of the industrial economy and correlating rise in the role of the service 
sector, this being the only country that has ever had a majority of the labour force 
employed in industry; with regard to the late 1970s, at least, Kumar maintained that in 
all other countries this sector had shown only marginal decline. Kumars observations 
prompt the tentative counter-assertion that the UK's shift is that of a country returning 
to the international norm after an anomalous period of intensive industrialisation. This 
does not refute the evidence of marginal change in other countries' economies, but 
treats it as being of accordingly marginal significance. Finally, statistical complacency 
is displayed in assuming that increased expenditure on education - the hub of the 
'knowledge industry' service sector - can in itself act as an indicator of our entering a 
new economy or even society (Machlup 1962, Bell 1974). Increases in spending on 
schools, teachers and textbooks indicate only a priority change reflecting a 
governmental response to discursive trends, a concern to produce a more 
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knowledge-oriented society and direct the economy in order to maintain 
competitiveness in a world perceived as being more knowledge-intensive (Kumar 
1978, Webster 1995). 
This final point especially highlights one manner in which knowledge economy and 
society discourse can function within a mode of govern menta I ity, as will be discussed 
in Chapter Three. To quickly summarise three main points that have brought us 
towards this interpretation of the discursive turn under review, firstly generality and 
ambiguity have been noted within this discourse such that its basic premises, in a 
particular form of expression, are widely accepted to have stood true for all 
economies and societies (see Section 11). Further, problems have been observed with 
defining and measuring what a knowledge economy or society is or would be that 
avoids merely calculating the economic gains to be made from applying profit- 
maximising techniques to incremental increases in existing knowledge, or else 
speaking of changes that are very difficult to verify. Finally, the possibility has been 
raised of knowledge society discourse working as an awareness-raising rhetorical tool 
that cultivates new tendencies within the governed, such as new demands for 
education and a shift in the locus of responsibility for securing this from the state as 
provider to the remit of the individual as entrepreneur. In this way the rhetoric of 
knowledge economies and societies can be seen as playing a performative role in 
producing the economic and social changes discussed here. This raises the question 
of what ends are being pursued by whom through the parading of this discourse, and 
the possibilities and dangers therein for different forms of knowledge and ways of 
knowing, and different forms of economy and ways of acting economically, and 
thereby for the project of 'development' as considered in Chapter Four. The following 
section will open up the question of 'whose knowledge' is of concern to a knowledge 
economy, a question that will recur through the following two chapters in thinking 
about this discourse in relation to government and development, before we move on 
to look at the position of the World Bank as a Knowledge Bank within this context. 
Whose Knowledge, Whose Economy? 
'the least glimmer of truth is conditioned by politics' (Foucault 1990: 5) 
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As noted, the dominant focus within knowledge economy discourse is upon an 
accelerating pace in the growth of knowledge. Such an assertion employs a 
quantitative visualisation of the perceived changes, an understanding of knowledge 
as an objectified commodity that can be stockpiled, measured and compared over 
time, as against more qualitative conceptual isations of knowledge's (or society's 
understanding) improving or maturing. A scientific understanding of formalised and 
objectified knowledge is dominant within such discourse, the tools for hazarding 
measurements of the new economy (numbers of articles in journals and books 
published) fitting well with such a conception (Stehr 2001: 496). Stehr argues that this 
can be taken as testament to the success of the scientific community (generally 
conceived) in installing its operative principles as the dominant ones for society as a 
whole. Yet noting the discourse's predominance within a restricted epistemological 
terrain also prompts a cautionary response concerning the need to analyse the 
constellations of interests involved in its performance. 
In thinking about the social implications of knowledge economy and society discourse 
we need to consider the power relations involved in arbitrating the conditions of truth 
production and thereby the 'rules of formation of statements' (Foucault 1984a 54) 
which decree how and whether statements can come to be accepted as scientifically 
true, looking also at how sets of statements come to govern each other such as to 
create 'regimes' of truth. Viewing the matter in this regard we begin to see that fact 
construction is a social phenomenon. Statements can be made that at first occupy the 
position of being points of contention, yet through being increasingly referenced and 
relied upon by others in various contexts a collective process of stabilisation can 
occur such that they move gradually towards becoming accepted parts of the 
discursive tapestry. Claims are considered scientific as they become more securely 
embedded within supporting networks of expert opinion (Latour 1987: 33). In this way 
truth is at all times conditioned by politics. Knowledge is never an innocent or neutral 
entity to be simply counted, but always the outcome of, and a further source of, power 
effects. As well as asking whose knowledge is being emphasised we therefore further 
need to ask how this might affect different peoples and different ways of knowing. 
That is, to ask who is to be attacked and displaced by knowledge, and especially by 
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explaining another's knowledge on one's own terms (Latour 1987: 21 0)29. 
'[O]rganising our ignorance', as Peter Drucker (1993: 175) says, is the main concern 
of the knowledge economy. Except that it can be more than this in that the 
organisation of our ignorance can perform the reconstitution of another's knowledge 
as ignorance (Hobart 1993). 
Viewed in this light, more strident critics have lambasted the naivety of 'new' economy 
enthusiasts on the grounds that the knowledge economy represents an outcome or 
extension of the contemporary logic of capital accumulation (reproducing knowledge 
and information as fictitious commodities alongside other factors of production such 
as labour, Polanyi 1971,2001, cf. Kumar 1978, Webster 1995, Hardt & Negri 2000, 
May 2001, Curry 1997). Such commodification would require processes of 
standardisation to enable knowledge-capital mobility and thus accumulation. This 
could involve the problematisation of alternative knowledges and their reconstitution 
as areas awaiting the intervention of the more dominant epistemic approach (Hobart 
1993). Alternative knowledge currencies would be translated in this manner and 
power expressed in the modes and rates of currency conversion that occur. Others 
have meanwhile argued that knowledge economy developments are a product of 
state management techniques that will in all likelihood work to consolidate military, 
economic and political elites' powers (Mosco 1989, Schiller 1996, Roszak 1986, 
Traber 1986)30, whilst governmental concerns with generalising ICT access and 
usage act as a distracting focus upon the medium of communication to the exclusion 
of concerns with the content (Tandon 2001). As can be seen, the suspicion that the 
knowledge economy could be a conspiratorial hoax designed to reconsolidate the 
power of an elite is an exaggerated manifestation of concerns with the discourse 
expressed by a much wider range of authors. All of these concerns highlight the 
relevance of the politics of knowledge to any analysis of knowledge economic 
29 The process of providing an explanation approximates a definition of a power relation for Latour 
(1987: 157-162). Increasing explanatory power is in turn tantamount to empire-building; accounting for 
increasing numbers of explananda (that to be explained) by employing increasingly fewer explanans 
(that which provides explanation). 
30 One of the most commonly cited examples of the military strategies argument is the Cold War 
providing the incentive for increased research and development of computer technologies which then 
fed into the consumer market; such as the Internet being an extension of the non-centred computing 
principles of ARPAnet, designed to maintain military communications and functioning even during a 
major attack. 
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developments, and will be given further consideration in the following chapter before 
any more substantive conclusions are drawn. 
Conclusion 
As has been illustrated, stronger and weaker links exist between the various 
developments considered here, but the changes occurring are often overstated and 
the functionality of bracketing them together as signifying the emergence of a new 
economy is questionable as an analytical endeavour. These changes do not 
necessarily cohere in the fashion discussed, nor constitute a rupture with an 'old' 
economy; rather, they represent a series of progressions along with a few moments 
of discontinuity. Bruno Latour (1988) has highlighted the need for analysis of such 
generalised conceptualisations as a knowledge-based or knowledge-intensive 
economy or society in arguing that what we mean by 'knowledge' can only be 
understood by examining the conditions and processes through which it is 
constructed and accumulated. 
So in conclusion a restricted understanding of the knowledge economy can be useful, 
but a critical interpretation of such terminology is necessary; the knowledge economy 
is not so useful as an analytical tool, but it has come to function as a very real mode 
of governmentality. The knowledge economy produces a combination of 
governmental hopes and fears and the discourse is being adopted as a mode of 
governmentality because of these. The reality and nature of thegrowth'of knowledge 
and its projected social gains require more critical analysis. The following chapter 
looks at concerns within governmental knowledge economy and society discourse to 
both shape the 'new' economy and produce and govern new forms of subject which 
can operate effectively within it, and Chapter Four will then consider the relevance of 
such discursive practices to the state of contemporary development discourse. The 
notion of horizontalisation within networked modes of organisation has also been 
briefly problematised in this chapter, stressing the need for critical analysis of how 
flows of power concentrate at points and so hierarchical forms become manifest even 
within relatively more horizontalised organisational structures. This issue will recur in 
later chapters dealing with the World Bank's adoption of the language of 
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decentralised networking as a rhetorical turn within its attempts to reproduce itself as 
a Knowledge Bank. 
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3 
Taking Control of Knowledge in theNew Economy' 
Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the discourse of information and knowledge 
economies is appealing in its promise of a new world of opportunities, but suffers from 
weak evidential backing and flawed conceptual framing. The notion of a new social 
form was shown to be even more problematic. This chapter will consider how the 
discourse is practised as a mode of governance oriented towards producing 
knowledge economies and thereby fostering the development of knowledge societies. 
The chapter focuses upon Northern governmental institutions (the United States and 
European states) and the multilateral bodies through which they act (the European 
Union, G8 and the OECD), given firstly that the discursive practices of these actors 
will bear a strong influence over the construction and performance of the 'knowledge 
revolution' as a socio-economic reality. The fears and hopes expressed within the 
discursive practice of such actors are outlined before considering its potential for 
producing new modes of governance, new forms of subject to be governed, and new 
legal and economic infrastructures. Secondly, the G8 countries also hold substantial 
voting power in the two main sections of the World Bank Group and are strongly 
represented in its governance structure (World Bank 2003r, see Chapter Five for 
more detail). Considering the agendas of these countries helps to situate the state of 
development discourse considered in the following chapter, as well as setting the 
scene for the Bank's rhetorical turn towards becoming a Knowledge Bank, the subject 
of Part Two. 
Over the next four sections, several foci of governmental knowledge economy 
discourse will be addressed; of hopes and fears expressed by governments over the 
advent of the new economy; of a governmental concern to produce a new subject of 
governance appropriate to this economy; of the importance of processes of 
standardisation in enabling governance-at-a-distance in an increasingly globalised 
economy; and of the role of the private sector and the institution of intellectual 
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property rights in the consolidation of 'new economy' developments. The combination 
of hopes and fears expressed, and the agency exercised to resolve these, illustrate 
the importance of performing and shaping discursive changes through their practise. 
Further, as will be seen, the performance of these discursive changes by largely the 
same assemblages of actors tend to produce patterns of repetition, with institutional 
changes occurring only incrementally. The dominant contemporary governmental 
knowledge economy discursive practice is argued to represent to a large extent an 
intensification and extension of longer-term shifts in the privatisation of knowledge 
and information as forms of capital; in contemporary societies knowledge grows 
where capital flows as investments in research and development are shaped by the 
concern to produce returns on capital. International knowledge structures are argued 
to frame whose knowledge 'counts' and thereby partially determine winning and 
losing positions in the new economy. Such developments, pursued unmoderated, will 
tend to exacerbate and entrench international inequalities and divisions of labour. In 
this context an alternative conception of the knowledge economy is finally briefly 
considered which is argued to widen knowledge production and sharing opportunities, 
and thereby serve certain ends of 'development' (raising standards of living, 
enhancing freedoms) as considered in the next chapter. The purpose of this chapter 
is not to assert an either over an or however, but rather to encourage recognition of 
the contextually specific advantages and disadvantages pertaining to different 
knowledge economies. The presence of this model (and its contemporary interaction 
with the dominant discourse) further demonstrates the space that exists for alternative 
contributions to the open and underdetermined terrain of knowledge economy 
practices. 
Leapfrogging Hopes and Fears in the Knowledge Revolution 
'Stories are the secret reservoir of values: change the stories individuals or 
nations live by and tell themselves, and you change the individuals and 
nations. ' (Okri 1996: 21) 
We shall deal firstly with how the idea that we are living and working through a 
knowledge revolution is now securely embedded within governance discourse, using 
a set of interchangeable references in the manner of the materials considered in the 
previous chapter (knowledge, information, and learning economies and societies, see 
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for instance G8 2000, OECD 2001 a, European Union 1994,1996). A proliferation of 
organisations, task forces, charters and international agreements have been 
established to define, produce and direct the perceived changes which overlap with 
the perceived threats and opportunities of concerns brought under the banner of 
'globalisation'. Under this banner a new economy is posited wherein countries 
experience vulnerability to flows of speculative financial capital and the need to attract 
investment capital that can scan the world economy as well as increasing global 
economic interdependence and the rising importance of the service sector and 
corresponding decline of manufacturing in industrialised countries (OECD 2001a). 
'Knowledge economy' developments such as increasing computing power and 
scientific innovation are seen as enabling these changes (G8 1999, DOT Force 
2001). The convergence and rapid development of information systems, 
telecommunications and broadcasting technologies in the form of information 
communication technologies (ICTs) form the main concern of such documentation. A 
clear bias is shown towards dealing with Internet-related aspects of the knowledge 
economy as something provoking fear, fascination and hope (UK 1998a, 1998b, G8 
1999, European Union 1997, New Zealand 1999). The Internet lends itself easily to 
dizzying statements upon the accelerating production and proliferation of knowledge 
in cited numbers of users, websites posted and data transferrals conducted online. 
The manner in which the knowledge economy is invoked within the discourse is 
revealing, especially in light of the concluding remarks in the previous chapter. Some 
documentation reflects upon how distinctive aspects of a knowledg e-d riven economy 
are becoming increasingly central to all industries and services, stressing that we are 
not facing the arrival of a new economy so much as a shift in the dominant mode of 
organisation and the rising use of ICTs (Blair 2000b). Many thus refer to the 
knowledge economy as a goal or process rather than an actuality, stressing an 
agentive role for these institutions in negotiating a common set of understandings of 
changes headlined under the banner of the'knowledge economy'and then working to 
produce knowledge economieS31 . These comments lend themselves to the previous 
31 For example, the Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society (G8 2000), an outcome of the 
G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in July 2000, stresses the task as being 'to stimulate and facilitate the 
transition to an information society'whilst the UK DTI's Converging Technologies (1 998a) talks of 
needing to 'create a knowledge-driven economy'. The 2001 Digital Opportunity Task Force Report 
(DOT Force 2001), another product of the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, further emphasises the need to 
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chapter's understanding of the knowledge economy as becoming reified through 
discursive practice as links are drawn between technological and organisational 
changes and given weight in governmental activities so as to further accelerate 
processes of change. 
Leapfrogging has become a common term in the discourse of the World Bank and 
others in the contemporary governmental and developmental terrains (E. g. G8 2000, 
UK 2000b, OECD 2001c, South Africa 1996, Dahlman 2002, Braga 1995, World Bank 
2002n, 2002p, 1998a, BBC 2002b, Annan 2000, Pommier 2001). Leapfrogging 
means skipping key stages of industrial development to move straight into an age of 
hi-tech consumption and production for hi-tech markets. Technologies which are 
being developed and trialled in more industrialised countries could, it is argued, be 
implemented in developing countries with no institutional or technological sloth 
stemming from the need to uninstall and abandon older technologies. Countries could 
bypass analogue networks and buy straight into fully digitised systems for instance, or 
use mobile communications technologies rather than waiting whilst effective landline 
telecommunications infrastructures are established (Braga 1998, UN 1999, South 
Africa 1997). It is not just the South that is positioned to leapfrog however, but all 
relatively excluded zones; for example the UK government has a website devoted to 
leapfrogging as an 'Information Age' initiative for Northern Ireland 
(http: //Www. leapfrog. gov. uk). Leapfrogging could be seen as a new perspective on 
development in encouraging the bypassing of industrialisation. Since the 
establishment of development as a major discourse in the middle of the last century, 
'developed' and 'developing' and 'industrialised' and 'industrialising' have been used 
as -almost interchangeable referents. This emphasis upon the production and 
consumption of hi-tech goods and services illustrates at the least an interest in getting 
developing countries up-to-speed with, and adopting a role in, the knowledge 
economy. As we will see in the next chapter, the next brand of discursive referents 
could describe countries as being more and less 'informationalised' and 
'informationalising'. 
Deployed in too casual a manner, leapfrogging can begin to seem like the futurism 
described in the previous chapter. Whilst the term 'leapfrogging' is not necessarily 
promote awareness of I CTs so as to encourage their adoption in building a new economy whilst 
seeking to integrate 'efforts to bridge the digital divide into a broader international approach'. 
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futuristic in itself, it is at least a form of discourse that needs to be used with great 
caution. The ability to 'leapfrog' will depend upon the congruence of (the continuing 
interconnection between) a number of complex conditions (regarding the 
interdependence of many aspects of national economic and governmental 
infrastructures). It will further require appropriate training of all those who are intended 
to use the new technologies if they are to be put to effective use. The social context of 
leapfrogging will also be important, technologies perhaps requiring practices and 
norms of operation quite new to the context into which they are introduced. As such, 
each instance of leapfrogging will require careful negotiation and planning, and 
perhaps pre-emptive training and adjustment. The danger of speaking broadly of the 
promises of 'leapfrogging' is that it can distract from the difficulties and potential 
problems thereof, and encourage insufficiently planned investments in new 
technologies that drain resources from other developmental endeavours and produce 
poor returns (Davison et al. 2000). 
Leapfrogging could work to ensure greater social and economic inclusion or simply to 
secure stable market conditions within the parameters of a new global economy, 
safeguarding a sufficient supply of primary labour sources and cheap technological 
products from the South, and demand for the products of Northern country knowledge 
economy initiatives. There is a felt ambivalence in the governmental literature in this 
regard. The G8 Okinawa Charter (2000) and the related DOT Force documentation 
(2001), for instance, list a series of central hopes for the impact of ICTs including 
more direct economic markers (increasing ICT connectivity and access, lowering ICT 
costs, building human capital and encouraging participation in the online economy) 
alongside grander but more insubstantial human development notions (enhancing 
sustainable economic growth and public welfare, promoting democracy, 
transparency, social cohesion and human rights and fostering cultural diversity and 
international peace and stability). Both the Charter and DOT Force stress principles of 
cooperation and inclusion in bridging the international information, knowledge and 
digital divides, the Charter invoking the language of rights in insisting that 'everyone 
should be able to enjoy access to information and communication networks. This 
gesture of universal human interest and magnanimity is then grounded in the self- 
economic interest of stimulating the transition of all to an information society, enabling 
developing countries to leapfrog and ensuring G8 countries are amongst those 
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reaping the 'economic, social and cultural benefits' of their doing so. The OECD 
(2001a) similarly stresses that closing the digital divide for developing countries will 
promote growth for aff those in the network including OECD countries themselves (cf. 
UNESCO 1996). 
It is relevant in this regard to note differences in tone between the literature of the 
Northern-based multilaterals and that of individual national governments, the tone of 
government literature often being more distinctly anxious and self-concerned. 
Government literature tends to frame the new developments as a unique opportunity 
for strengthening their position in the global economy, as well as outlining three 
closely-related potential threats. Many express a fear firstly of not being able to shape 
these changes to their advantage and so losing out on potential benefits, stressing 
the need for countries to become more active participants in producing and 
consuming technological change so as to try and take the lead in new developments 
(e. g. UK 1998b). A commonly voiced fear is of losing trained talent to competitors 
offering more fulfilling and financially rewarding work - to suffer brain drain and 'for the 
citizens of more successful countries, in the words of one New Zealand government 
paper (1999: 2,33) 32 - This fear is frequently conjoined with an expressed desire to 
attract trained immigrants and therefore to be the beneficiaries of brain-drain, 
experiencing its counterpart brain-gain. A second related concern is that of losing 
competitive advantage and thus economic activity to the fastest rising amongst the 
'developing' countries, work which does not require a specially trained workforce 
being outsourced to countries where labour is cheaper (New Zealand 1999). One 
outcome of this could be job losses for industrialised countries and a downward 
pressure on wages internationally. Thirdly there is a fear of experiencing cultural 
obsolescence in an increasingly globalised economy should the national culture and 
language become marginalised with the globalisation of communications media and 
in particular the dominance of the English language and of American culture through 
this (Greece 1999, New Zealand 1999). The counterpart hope attached to ICT 
developments is that of using the Internet as an opportunity to widen citizens' access 
to a country's cultural capital (Denmark 1996). 
32 Why being primarily an amusement park and holiday land should be a bad thing if it brings in 
sufficient revenues to allow the polity's functioning is never explicitly stated, but we may presume that 
problems would be perceived with the economy existing primarily in a service role, and therefore 
occupying a more peripheral and unstable position within the international economy. 
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Northern-country governments are therefore keen to obtain a leading position within 
the new economy as it unfolds; to create the most effective (fast, secure) ICT 
networks and become the choicest locations for e-commerce; to lead in Internet 
technology and content development; to become the main drivers of growth in the 
new economy; and to pioneer forms of effective regulation (online security, IPR 
protection) for an age of Instant global communications (Greece 1999, New Zealand 
1999, UK 1998b). Governments fearing linguistic or cultural marginalisation are 
further engaging In programmes to make use of globalisation trends and ICT 
developments in marketing a country 'brand' and culture 'products' to the world's 
consumers, and trying to secure the existence of language character sets in future 
hardware and software developments (New Zealand 1999, Denmark 1996, Greece 
1999, France 1999)33. Such efforts are ongoing with many other subnational 
languages in an effort to reduce cyber-exclusion, as for instance with the Kannada 
language of the Southern Indian state of Karnataka (Noronha 2001). The UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (U N ECA) is a Southern multilateral voice paralleling 
these concerns. In Africa and the Information Economy (UNECA 2000: iii-ix) it refers 
to the dangers of brain drain, but also the hopes for capitalising upon the 'brain gain' 
possibilities inherent within the African 'intellectual Diaspora'34, and stresses the need 
to ensure that local languages are represented online and indigenous African 
knowledge Is drawn upon in playing 'proactively' in the new economy, making the 
Internet more relevant to people so as to encourage participation. So the hopes and 
fears of leapfrogging in the knowledge economy can be seen to be a concern of all 
countries, North and South, as regards their 'development' in the sense of economic 
growth and positioning within the global economy. The concerns of these countries, 
all (at least symbolically) creditors and many also borrowers of the World Bank, and 
each with (however dominant or marginal) a say in the governance of the 
33 With reference to this latter point, see comments upon ASCII and Unicode in Chapter 1. 
34 Castells (2000: 128-9) has relatedly argued that'brain circulation' Is more prevalent than the brain 
drain many governments both fear and hope to benefit from, referring to two points. He refers firstly to 
statistics Indicating Increasing trends In foreign nationals getting PhDs In the US before returning to 
their home country; and secondly the diffusion of research and production around the world through 
network enterprises. Castells too easily dismisses serious structural inequalities such as this'global' 
science being predominantly monolingual (English), although he recognises the problem that Northern 
Interests and Institutions prevail in defining problems and appropriate methodologies for their resolution 
such that Western science reproduces exclusion of large numbers of the world's population 'by not 
treating their problems, or by not treating them In terms which could Oeld results leading to 
improvement in their living conditions'. This Is a point to which this chapter argues In looking at both 
knowledge production and also the legal Infrastructures being established around knowiedge's 
possession. 
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organisation, provide some first indication of the context within which the Bank first 
began to engage seriously with knowledge economy discourse. 
Shaping the Citizenry: Education and Responsibilisation 
'Knowledge and skills, creativity and innovation, adaptability and 
entrepreneurship are the ways by which the winners will win in the new 
economy. ' (Blair 2000a) 
A second major focus of governmental knowledge economy literature concerns 
cultivating tendencies within the governed apposite to the production of a competitive 
economy (e. g. OECD 1996, cf. Rose 1999, Hardt & Negri 2000, Castells 1997). With 
the national economy being seen increasingly as functioning as a node in a global 
network, in line with the neoliberal trends in governmental practices, the focus of 
national governance has shifted away from welfare provision (argued to be unviable 
In an era of global capital flows) towards providing a capital-friendly environment with 
minimal intervention In economic affairs. The make-up of the populace as citizens, 
consumers and workers is central to a country's appeal to mobile capital. Government 
concerns tend therefore to be threefold, aimed at producing the knowledge producers 
and managers, producing knowledgeable citizens, and producing a technologically 
and numerically-literate citizenry. The overall concern could be branded as that of 
seeking to 'transform non-participants in the information society into participating 
citizens' (Barry 2001: 91). 
A central concern in government papers is firsby with how knowledge, skills and 
creativity have become core forms of value-adding capital, key factors of production 
(e. g. Brown 2000, Denmark 1996, France 1999). It therefore becomes a 
governmental problem to ensure the production of the economy's knowledge 
producers and managers, equipping the citizenry with the skills they require if the 
economy Is to be Internationally competitive (European Union 1997: iii, cf. Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 32). Education thus becomes a central policy arena for enabling the 
diffusion of knowledge, cultivating the skills necessary for its productive application, 
and raising awareness amongst the citizenry about the importance of knowledge in 
contemporary society. Fostering partnerships between universities and the private 
sector Is treated as a matter of priority in order firstly to tailor educational institutions 
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towards the needs of industry, producing more readily employable knowledge and 
workers (Scotland 1999, Greece 1999, OECD 1996, DOT Force 2001). It is secondly 
seen as being useful for acquiring funding for the further expansion of higher 
education and strengthening of national research networks whilst maintaining level or 
reducing public expenditure on education. Knowledge production in this way is 
brought under the Influence of capital interests, encouraging the likelihood of research 
agendas and education as a whole becoming more oriented towards capital returns 
potential. Given the presumption of an increasing pace of change, lifelong learning is 
also prioritised in the hope of maintaining an adequately trained workforce and 
fostering an enthusiastic approach to adaptation and innovation (Denmark 1996, 
Greece 1999, OECD 1996,2001a). 
There Is a felt need for governments secondly to produce knowledgeable citizens 
(apposite to the 'knowledgeable society', Lane 1966: 649) who can operate within and 
develop a culture which welcomes and promotes entrepreneurial approaches to the 
production and use of knowledge. The notion of a knowledge-friendly society would 
function as a framing device to foster the growth of a competitive knowledge 
economy, as mentioned in Chapter Two, emphasising that a new era and not just a 
new economic phase is being spoken of. Through this, knowledge discourse might 
filter more deeply into other social discourses in a way that helps promote the 
citizenry's acceptance of responsibility for retraining and marketing themselves to 
potential employers in a more knowledge-oriented environment. Governments, it is 
argued, need to foster a culture of enterprise and an entrepreneurial spirit both within 
themselves and throughout society, as well as informing citizens of how to foster 
within themselves such an approach, so as to unleash 'the full potential of people ... 
establishing the work ethic for the whole of society' (Blair 2000a, cf. Blair 2000b, 
1998: 5, UK 1998b: 15). 
On this view governments should channel energies into cultivating entrepreneurial 
and technological conceptions of citizenship through 'an endless emphasis on 
education and on skills' (Blair 2000a). The UK paper Our Competiuve Future (UK 
1998b: 17,25,37), for example, outlines a path to pursue this through a range of 
endeavours aimed at a variety of audiences, such as providing enterprise awareness 
training for teachers, establishing enterprise centres at universities, and producing an 
online Enterprise Zone for businesses. A shift in emphasis away from welfare 
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provision and the maintenance of relative equity can be felt in this reproducuon of 
citizens as responsibilised entrepreneurs (Rose 1999: 145-154). Through such a shift 
roles previously occupied by the state can be relocated within the citizenry, who are 
expected to market their skills in an entrepreneurial fashion to flexibilised job-markets, 
to monitor and Insure themselves, and to provide privately for ill health and old age. 
The responsibilised citizen can cultivate their freedom through improving their 
economic position at the same time as they enhance the national economy (Rose 
1999, cf. Frissen 1997, Barry 2001, Nielsen 1996)35. Anecdotal examples of these 
changes from the UK might include the rebranding of the unemployed asjob seekers' 
(Rose 1999) who must perform their entrepreneurial spirit to an appropriate official at 
regular intervals to be eligible for state help; the rebranding of many libraries as 
'learning centres', spaces of opportunity (and not merely repositories of texts) 
providing free access to the Internet as part of the People's Network initiative 
(http: //www. peoplesnetwork. gov. uk); and the provision and heavy promotion of 
lifelong learning training and opportunities through initiatives such as 'Learn Direct' 
(UK 2003). 
Governments need finally to produce technologically and numelically-literate 
citizendes who can participate in their own governance by engaging with the 
abundance of knowledge produced in the process of government, monitoring and 
governing themselves by the numbers that make modern large-scale governance 
possible (e. g. population statistics, economic statistics, risk assessments, and so 
forth, Rose 1991). It has been argued that a distinct governmental layer of knowiedge 
managers Is then necessary to consolidate and validate this valuable resource, 
meaning that politicians become merely the friendly public face for an increasingly 
expertise-based system of government (Castells 2000). 
35 As Castells (2000a) notes, an entrepreneurial process can be enabling for professional workers 
trading skills-in-demand. However the danger Is that for a great number of people Increased insecurity 
and stress will be the more likely effects of this entrepreneurial discourse, promoting social dissolution 
and undermining the proclaimed benefits of knowledge developments. When social problems and the 
responsibility for their resolution are placed within an Individual's life-frame, the freedom and welfare of 
those without capital to draw upon (financial, intellectual, social, etc. ) can be dramatically curtailed. Yet 
a learning economy requires a conducive learning environment Inclusive of a certain degree of social 
cohesion and felt economic security. Widening social exclusion could thus undermine the benefits of 
any positive trends In lifelong learning and innovation (Hodgson 1999, Livingstone 1999, Foray & 
Lundvall 1996, Neef 1998). 
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Yet elected politicians within modern mass democracies have only ever been one 
facet of much more extended systems of government requiring producers, managers 
and distributors of information and knowledge. What is more distinctive about these 
changes is that contemporary governmental institutions express a concern for citizens 
themselves to become knowledge managers, relating to the information produced in 
the system's functioning so as to avoid increasing the distance between governors 
and governed. There exists a close interrelationship between quantification (e. g. the 
production of statistics) and the perception of transparency within democratic 
government. Such quantification produces a political space in that numbers and their 
contestation are a resource of all parties, framing and informing civic discourse (Rose 
1991). A commonly expressed hope within the governmental literature is that ICTs 
will enable the establishment of a teledemocracy infrastructure which strengthens 
government-citizen relations; increasing the availability of relevant information and 
improving state-citizen interaction; and widening governments' access to information 
through Increased participation and feedback into the political system (OECD 2001b, 
cf. Brown 2000, New Zealand 1999, OECD 1997, UNESCO 1996, Keskinen 2001). 
Governance and Development at a Distance In a Knowledge Economy 
The third of the governmental discursive foci in relation to the knowledge economy 
outlined In the Introduction can be understood as a response to the concern that 
economic activities are moving beyond standard systems of measurement and 
control. The proliferation of knowledge economy discourse problematises the roles of 
governance Institutions with changing social forms, modes of economic organisation, 
and technologies for exercising and avoiding governance. As argued In the previous 
section, the governance of large populations and the management of the state 
machinery have always depended upon the ability to gather, produce and process 
Information and knowledge (Giddens 1985, Rose 1991), as well as the ability to 
define, measure and regulate economic activities within set borders and to negotiate 
economic relations between the designated territory and others. An inability to 
perform any of these functions would undermine a state's claims to governmental 
authority. Attempts at informational control at the individual state level are argued to 
be becoming less effective In an age of instant and relatively unregulated global 
communications (Castells 1997). The perceived reality of such arguments has 
69 
resulted In a double concern with producing increasingly technicised procedures and 
increasingly globalised modes of government as evidenced by multilateral bodies' 
concerns with 'e-govemance'or'Govemance On-Line (GOL)' (DOT Force 2001, G8 
1999, cf. OECD 1997). 
Firstly with regard to procedures of governance and the increasing role of information 
and knowledge in shaping the political, the management of knowledge structures can 
function as a tool of governance shaping political spaces, determining 'what 
knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means 
to whom and on what terms' (Strange 1988: 121). The phrase 'knowledge structures' 
refers to the defined conditions for making satisfactory knowledge claims, relating to 
the methodologies used in research and the means of extrapolating conclusions and 
presenting results. Dominant knowledge structures will influence the manner in which 
questions are framed and thus the areas that are problematised for research, and the 
limits around defining areas of 'valid' discourse. When effective this process can 
redraw the boundaries of objectivity and spaces of political debate by technicising 
much of politics In a manner promising its depoliticisation (cf. Rose 1991)36. Secondly 
In thinking about globalised modes of governance, the standardisation of knowledge 
and information structures can be seen as a political process (Strange 1988) enabling 
the extension of a territory of governance to areas whose distinctness was previously 
maintained through the use of different procedural norms producing incompatible 
understandings. Standardised Information and knowledge production will thus 
facilitate more globalised modes of governance. The growth of understanding about a 
global economy can be seen as resulting from exercises in constructing globally 
networked 'centres of calculation' (Latour 1987: 215-257) using standardised means 
of producton. 
Given their well-resourced presence in each member country, multilateral bodies are 
often well-placed to gather data internationally and develop such centres. These are 
primarily established to enable the organisation to act at a distance given that they 
require harmonised information sources to facilitate the construction and mapping of 
36 There Is then the danger that societies are drawn further away from transparent democratic 
functioning as Issues are defined out of the political arena and cJashes of interest go unmonitored 
between technical experts, the arena they occupy at a professional level so as to have developed their 
expertise, and the role they adopt within governmental knowledge production and evaluation (e. g. see 
Monbiot 2000: 208-224). 
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their territories' properties. The organisation can then be effective in producing, 
organising and disseminating knowledge and information, and given the stake that 
each member country has In it, it can furthermore be influential in setting informational 
standards for others, defining appropriate means of producing and organising such. 
Through this standardisation process holistic explanatory frameworks may be 
constructed which function as tools of more global economic governance 37 . If 
practices relating to knowledge economy discourse are then engaged, its effects will 
be reified at a global level in the manner of Callon's (1999: 192, cf. 1998: 27-28) 
understanding that economics perthrms the economy. Standard isation, a concern of 
governments In managing their capacity to exercise governance, is therefore similarly 
a concern for the World Bank. As will be seen in Part Two, this concern becomes 
manifest as a will to extend the remit of its own governance at a distance and the 
smooth flow of knowledge within the organisation so as to increase its effectivity. It 
secondly becomes manifest through problematising the roles and aims of national 
development agencies and development NGOs, translating their interests into a 
format corresponding to its work. The Bank already occupies a central position as a 
source of authoritative knowledge upon economic development, its intellectual 
Influence being mediated through its economic leverage with borrower governments, 
its considerable research budgets, and the high profile given to its reports by the 
media as well as educational and governmental institutions (Berger and Beeson 
1998). Through these strengths it can play an important role in shaping development 
discourse and ensuring it is positioned more centrally to the concerns of its member 
governments and other development actors as a provider of knowledge about the 
'new'economy. 
The Private Sector and Intellectual Property Rights 
The fourth major focus of knowledge economy governance is upon fostering a 
productive relationship between the state and the private sector to encourage the 
development of a national comparative advantage in the global knowledge economy, 
much as was noted in the changes to education provision above. This focus is 
twofold, oriented towards laying the foundations for new economic initiatives using the 
37 There are ciose parallels here with Hardt and Negri's (2000: A- xiii) conception of Empire wherein 
sovereignty takes on'a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms 
united under a single logic of rule'. 
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Internet and other ICT developments, and to producing national regulatory systems 
and a harmonised international legal framework defining and protecting intellectual 
property rights (11313s), in an attempt to secure the continuity of established principles 
of capital regulation through the advent of thinking about knowledge as capital 
(Denmark 1996, France 1999, European Union 1994, G8 2000). 
Stress is placed firstly upon the private sector's being a leading player in the 
development and use of ICT networks and expressed in the concern to promote the 
internationalisation and securitisation of e-commerce (ICT-based commercial 
transactions). A strong focus is placed upon harmonising, deregulating and 
liberalising national telecommunications industries and regulations governing the 
Internet and online commerce on the presumption that this will foster competition and 
lower prices, Improve services and promote innovation. The central principles of the 
Okinawa Charter (GS 2000) and much other documentation involve applying 
processes of liberalisation to any products or services even loosely associated with 
the new economy, and harmonising and minimising the impact of other regulatory 
systems (Denmark 1996, Greece 1999, Clinton & Gore 1997, OECD 2001a, 
European Union 1994,1996). 
A number of writers have argued that the discursive practice of the knowledge 
economy is an exercise In maintaining or gaining comparative advantage over other 
countries. The US has been argued to have developed its competitive edge in the 
Information field to consolidate and safeguard the country's economic and military 
dominance, the push for free trade in the information and service sectors potentially 
compensating for its declining competitive position in the industrial sector and its 
increasing dependence upon imports (Strange 1988, Elam 1999, Lehman 1998, Joffe 
1997, Hardt & Negri 2000, cf. Barry 2001). In this context it Is significant that Northern 
governments are at the forefront of pushing to extend service sector liberalisation in 
all WTO member countries including those in the South through the General 
Agreement on Trade In Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
given that it is these countries that are sensing most strongly the service sectors 
growth as an economic force. Opening poorer countries up to international 
competition would make It cheaper In a narrowly-defined short-run for them to use 
imported Northern services and technologies sold on loss-leading introductory 
promotional offers, discouraging the development of domestic competition. 
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Technological lock-in (the fact that it is frequently cheaper to upgrade existing 
technologies than to re-invest in entirely new ones) along with the 'information 
umbrella' effect this encourages - when a country's producers are provided with 
market incentives to ensure that their technologies remain mutually compatible, 
encouraging users locked in to one technology to choose subsequent products from 
the same supplier country (Strange 1988: 135-6) - would then secure future markets 
for Northern products as they become hybridised into national systems. Through this 
dominance less tech nolog ical ly-advanced states could become more dependent upon 
Northern economic organisations, with further consequent effects upon their relations 
with Northern political institutions. For instance, all Internet access is based upon the 
provision of international server engines and telecommunications networks. Whole 
countries can be cut off from the Internet from the outside if the multinational 
companies which provide these networks terminate the service at their own 
instigation or that of the countries in which they have their main base 38. Northern 
dominance in the satellite systems technologies that enable swift global 
communication, media transmission and surveillance can thus function in maintaining 
developing countries' dependence upon keeping favour with Northern political 
Institutions. 
The stratification of relatively powerful and powerless groups within a globalised 
informational economy will depend increasingly upon who is doing the transmitting 
and who the receiving of information, and OECD countries transmit disproportionately 
more Information than they receive (Lash & Urry 1994). The Internet research 
organisation N UA (2001 a) cited sources in 2001 finding that 72.3% of Americans use 
the Intemet39 and made an 'educated guess' that as of August 2001, over 93% 
(479.3m) of Internet users were based in Europe, North America and the Asia/Pacific 
region; whilst Latin America accounted for under 5% (25.33m), and Africa and the 
38 This was the case for Somalia In November 2001 when AT&T and British Telecom shut off the 
international gateways they provided to the country's only Internet company and its main 
telecommunications service provider (the Somali Internet Company and Al-Barakaat) at the initiative of 
the US government In its drive to close funding avenues for the AI-Queda network. Al-Barakaat was 
also an Informal financial transfer network upon which many Somali's depended for money from 
relatives abroad (and In which the Internet Company was a holding partner). The US government 
accused al-Barakaat of acting as a source of lerrorist'funds transfers. By January 2002 a new 
company had been established providing an Internet service, but potentially huge effects could stem 
from this Isolation of such a fragile economy during these two months (BBC 2001,2002a). 39 With Miami having 'more Internet capacity into Latin America than any Latin American city does, 
making it an "absentee Internet infrastructure capitar for the region' (NUA 2001 a). 
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Middle East each accounted for less than 1% of these users (NUA 2001 b)40. Susan 
Strange (1998) has stated that all states are increasingly competing in this field as 
power passes to the information rich more than to the capital rich. Whilst this usefully 
points to the importance of the informational changes that are occurring, such bold 
statements risk over-emphasising the changes taking place. The possession of 
financial, industrial and informational capitals being so intertwined, it is more 
productive to contemplate the development of informational capital into a serious 
governmental concern than to stress ambiguous notions of relative dominance 
between capital forms. 
The second point of emphasis in terms of the relationship between state and private 
sector concerns securing the continuity of established principles of capital regulation 
through the growing role of new forms of capital and the conditions that apply to it, 
and harmonising the continuity of these principles within the international economy. 
How knowledge is constructed as a form of capital, and how markets in the trade of 
this capital are produced, will have important effects upon all countries. The outcomes 
of these areas of contestation will shape whose knowledge and information 
'currencies' are traded, how interchangeable these currencies are seen to be, and 
thus their relative desirability. 
One dominant trend within governmental discourse upon the knowledge economy is 
concerned with knowledge production in the recognised measurable form of patents 
registered, an activity currently dominated by Northern countries (WIPO 2000)41. 
Patenting throughout the world is mostly based around the US patenting system, 
which Is the priority country for the majority of international patent families (Rausch 
40 The estimated world total of users In 2001 (NUA 2001b) was 513.41 million, with Africa quoted at 
4.15m and the Middle East at 4.65m, The OECD (2001 a) quoted similar Inequalities for Internet usage 
In 1998. 
41 Patent authorities In the US and Japan registered well over 50,000 patents in 2000 (157,496 and 
125,880 respectively), with five other countries (Germany, UK, Republic of Korea, France and Italy) 
registering between 20,000 and 50,000, and ten more (Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Australia, 
Netherlands, Belgium, China, the Russian Federation, Canada and Austria) registering over 10,000 
(WIPO 2000). Thus of the twenty countries registering the most patents (including Denmark, Portugal 
and Greece with between 6,000 and 8,000 each), the only three that would be officially recognised as 
being In the broadest sense 'developing' (i. e. would previously have been classed as 'Second' and 
rhird'World) are China, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Korea. Each of these countries Is 
further strongly distinguished from the 'developing' countries of South America and Africa through 
being associated either with the Newly-Industrialising 'Asian Tigers' (the Republic of Korea) or else 
with making a transition from communist towards capitalist operational economic principles. 
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1999)42. Consolidating and harmonising these legal frameworks for staking claims to 
knowledge ownership is a major governmental concern (see e. g. G8 2000: 12, OECD 
1996: 32, European Union 1994,1997, UK 1998b, France 1999, Greece 1999), and 
the shape of the new economy will depend upon the enforcement of these 
knowledge-appropriation structures by both national and multilateral governance 
institutions. The construction of an internationally standardised legal framework for 
the ownership and trading of knowledge and information through the recognition and 
enforcement of patent claims is at present placed primarily in the hands of the World 
Trade Organisation (VVTO) under the remit of its Trade-related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement43. In the WTO's (2000) words, 'Intellectual property rights 
are the rights given to persons over the creations of their minds' through a 
combination of copyright, trademarks and geographical location names, and patents 
upon Inventions, designs and trade secrets. 
The patenting of life-forms indigenous to developing countries which has become an 
Issue In recent years illustrates how knowledge 'growth' can be produced through the 
translation of elements within more marginal systems of understanding into products 
within the formalised proprietary framework, often to then be appropriated by the 
translator. These patents range from the synthetisation of naturally occurring 
chemical combinations found in plants, primarily for medical purposes; through the 
Green Revolution-era patenting of 'improved' crop varieties; to the current trend for 
42 An International patent family Is a set of patents covering the same ground which hold across more 
than one country; to be the priority country means that the country was the location of the first patent 
application. Rausch (1999), on the basis of data extracted and developed from the Derwent World 
Patents Index Database, argues that the US held this role for 63% of families established in 1990- 
1994. Brian Kahin (2001) argues that US patenting structures exhibit an expansionist philosophy. The 
institutional structure in the US, he says, favours the granting of patents over their refusal through, for 
example, giving employee-bonuses in patenting offices for patents approved; having a legal structure 
that carries a strong presumption as to patents' validity; and Imposing potentially high costs upon 
patent-challengers that encourage settlements even when the patenrs validity Is doubted. He further 
notes a rising trend In conceptual patents upon business practces in the US, arguing that these will 
soon be brought Into the international patent family arena. 
43 The World Intellectual Property Organisabon (WIPO 1998) was also mandated in 1998 to analyse 
the intellectual property aspects of traditional knowledge and folklore, to allow stakeholders in these 
forms of knowledge to gain protecton, although its research and pronouncements gain little wider 
attention unlike the WTO's activities. Both the WTO and WIPO are UN bodies, but the WTO Is argued 
by civil society critics to be much more dominated by Northern Interests through Its paperwork-heavy 
bureaucratic structure Incapacitating countries that cannot afford to send a large delegation of 
representatives, the Influence large Northern corporations Wield upon government representatives, and 
the'closed-dooe negotiations that allow 'arm-twisting' (linking trade deals to other aspects of Northern- 
country foreign policy Including debt relieo to determine weaker country's decisions (Bello 1999). See 
for Instance the work of the World Development Movement (http: /Avww. wdm. org. uk), and FOCUS on 
the Global South (http: Ywww. focusweb. org). 
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staking claims based upon minor genetic alterations, or simply for having mapped out 
a genetic code 44 . Patenting crop 'improvements' or genetic maps in this way 
disregards 'property' claims based on tacit or community-based knowledge developed 
over generations of careful experimentation and interbreeding, treating it as a raw 
material for the application of Western principles of scientific knowledge-creation. 
Patenting life upon this basis reveals a very Lockeian approach to property claims 
(see Locke 1988); it is as though to say that those who currently work these 
resources are not utilising them to their full extent (not maximising capital returns), 
and so they are open to proprietorial claims by any who will employ them more 
productively. In such cases we deal not with a growth in knowledge but rather with the 
translation of a flow resource (tacit knowledge) into a stock resource (formalised 
knowledge). Aspects of current systems at the forefront of the 'expansion' of 
knowledge are reminiscent of Rousseau's (1984: 43) founder of civil society who 
simply encloses a piece of the common land and claims it as his own, except that in 
this case the affected peoples will not need to be 'simple enough to believe' because 
an international legal infrastructure will guarantee the rights of the claimant (cf. May 
2001). 
If embedding statements within supporting networks of opinion is treated as an 
Important element in the construction of facts (Latour 1987), then the dominance of 
patenting systems can be seen as strengthening specific epistemological conditions 
for the production of truths on an international level and weakening the perceived 
validity of alternative understandings. To assert in the neutral manner of Nico Stehr 
(2001) noted In the previous chapter that this is testament merely to the success of 
the scientific community in installing its operative principles as the dominant ones of 
society seems more problematic once the Interweaving of epistemological and 
economic power effects are taken into account. Whilst true up to a point, the 
embedding of these scientific principles as the dominant global principles of 
knowledge production is ultimately dependent upon the connections developed 
" RiceTec Inc's attempt to patent'basmab rice' in 1997 Is one of the highest profile of such cases of 
what has been termed 'biopiracy (Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology 2001). 
RiceTec! s Basmati rice claims have apparently survived In only a very restricted form after the Indian 
government contested the case and sought to extend TRIPS legislation on the geographical specificity 
of vAnes and spirits names to other products. The Research Foundation for Science, Technology and 
Ecology (2001) state that from an originally open-ended patent, RiceTec has given up 15 of its 20 
claims and now has stakes only In particular varieties of rice specifically bred up by RiceTec not 
making unconditional claims on the name'Basmab'. 
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between scientific knowledge production and the returns made upon capital invested 
in its production. Given the increasingly technical nature of contemporary scientific 
research, producing knowledge in a patented form becomes an ever-more expensive 
process. Knowledge will tend to 'grow' only where capital flows as investments In 
research and development are shaped by considering their capital returns potential. 
Resources for the purpose will be concentrated at points, and it is through the 
networking of these points that facts will become established. Such networks will 
exhibit affiliations and biases which affect the treatment of claims made from their 
exterior. Claims congruent with the dominant direction of research pursued will 
become established (validated, distributed and collectively stabilised) with far greater 
speed and efficacy than could dissenting claims. Alternative knowledges, and thereby 
alternative knowledge economies and alternative approaches to 'developing' 
economies and societies, could in this way be marginalised to the sidelines of the 
'new'economy 45 . 
Winners and Losers In the Knowledge Revolution 
Following this line of argument, we can see that the winners in the new economy will 
be those quickest to draw up patents, and well-resourced and well-networked enough 
to ensure that decisions turn in their favour. There is thus a danger, however small, 
that the formalisation of tacit Southern knowledges into patented Northern knowledge 
will produce new channels of South-North financial capital transfer and so cultivate 
new forms of dependency 46 . Developing knowledge-producing capacity is thus seen 
as a central aspect of development under the new economic conditions (Miller 2001, 
45 In much the same way that Stephen Marglin (1990) argues that managerial forms of knowledge have 
for so long dominated, and absorbed, the insights of applied workers' knowledge. 46 For Instance, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) holds patents on Terminator Technologies 
(seeds which produce only one generation of crop) and has stated that its priorities lie with developing 
these technologies for commercial purposes, considering farmers' rights to harvest and re-sow multiple 
generations of altered seed to be incompatible with respect for intellectual property rights. These 
developments threaten to squeeze out subsistence economies and extend the dominance of industrial- 
scale agribusiness producing for International markets. Whilst much media attention was given to the 
US-based MNC Monsanto's announcement In October 1999 that it was abandoning its Terminator 
Technology plans, this gesture only resulted from the failure of a proposed merger between Monsanto 
and Delta and Pine Land, Inc. which Is a partner with USDA In the Terminator patents. The Rural 
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI 1999) cites seven other corporations and institutions 
holding such patents, indicating a general Interest In the profitable potential of such technologies. Even 
outside of the Terminator Technology debate, many farmers are today already contractually bound to 
seed suppliers not to store and plant any seed from GM crops they harvest illustrating that the 
technology Is an enforcement mechanism for a legal norm in GIVI seed markets (Tokar 1999, Pascual 
& Scott 2001, St. Louis Business Journal 2001, Raj 1998, RAFI 2001, BBC 1999, CNN 1999). 
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UNECA 2000, King 2000a). Earlier comments upon the distribution of power in an 
informational economy relating directly to countries' relative positionings as 
information transmitters or receivers can also be conceived in terms of their being 
knowledge producers or consumers. Developing countries that remain exterior to 
flows of research capital will be excluded from participating in knowledge production, 
and will therefore be at risk of being consigned to the role of knowledge consumers. 
Developing countries could further 'leapfrog' into the hands of telecommunications 
corporations as technology consumers as the concern to connect to the Internet 
becomes manifest as an end in itself, marginalising reflections upon the comparative 
advantages of such an achievement as against the prioritising of other social and 
economic needs (cf. Wionczek 1983, King 2000a, Tandon 2001). For those who are 
updated and included, the increasing pace of economic and technological 
developments, decreasing product lifecycles and the increasing pace of product 
obsolescence could leave some always two steps behind their 'advanced' 
counterparts in technological uptake (Kenny 1996)47. Meanwhile, for the broader 
mass of all societies, the danger is that the seemingly magnanimous developmental 
endeavour to get countries and regions technologically updated and online, and so 
facilitate leapfrogging within the remit of Northern governmental discourse (e. g. G8 
2000), could wane once the global Internet-using population had reached such 
numbers as comfortably secured industrial economies of scale within the ICT sector 
and other sectors making use of the Internet. In such a case, a significant part of the 
world population could remain excluded from the information economy loop once a 
critical market mass was achieved (Miller 2001, Lanvin 1995)48. 
Whilst Southern countries may therefore make a leap into an information age, if it is 
only to adopt a server role facilitating the development of capital interests based 
predominantly in the North then it is unlikely that they will ever leapfrog to new 
positions within the international economy. In contemplating the likely effects 
stemming from the dominant knowledge economy/society narrative, we need to 
consider the relational character of subordination. As different developments are 
47 '... the technologically marginalised are not necessarily outsiders. They are those who have been 
qompulsohly included. The continual demand to update follows' (Barry 2001: 112). 
48 Many of the excluded could still be brought within the loop through the insecure and monotonous 
labour available within the new economy, producing goods in export-processing zones for an economy 
of signs (brands) to circulate around (cf. Klein 2000) and filling the call centres and warehouses that an 
expanding service sector and burgeoning Internet economy will depend upon. 
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consolidated through changes in governmental practices and the legal infrastructure 
then the content of every country's economic activity may change, whilst structures of 
exploitation remain intact (Hardt & Negri 2000). Importantly however, the simple geo- 
economic disparities which have been the focus of attention in the past (and which I 
have intimated so far in trying to work quickly through a large amount of material) are 
unlikely to exist in such a distinct form, if indeed they ever have. The social divisions 
between those who do and do not benefit from informational developments will occur 
throughout the global economy, producing positions of relative affluence and 
deprivation which we might characterise as the global North and South (cf. Castells 
2000)49. It is to such notions of globally dispersed but regionally specifically focussed 
accumulation that I refer in using these terms. 
Inequalities based upon access to information could add a new dimension to 
asymmetries based upon older political and economic divergences. Considering once 
again Dedijer and Jdquier's (1987) information pyramid mentioned in the previous 
chapter (ascending from a mass base of data through processes of selection and 
refinement that produce information and then knowledge in smaller but qualitatively 
enriched quantities, peaking with intelligence as the most refined point of 
understanding), a new international division of labour running parallel to that which 
has grown up around natural resources can be envisioned wherein the majority world 
(North and South) engage in the least well-remu ne rated activities constituting the 
lower two layers of the pyramid (O'Brien 1983, Castells 1993). Gathering data to be 
exported and processed abroad can be seen as the equivalent of exporting raw 
materials for manufacturing abroad - one of the best ways to fall behind and in itself a 
mark of underdevelopment, whilst a minority produce the Knowledge and construct 
the Intelligence strategies that are the source of economic 'value-added' and 
governmental power. Less value-added work might progressively be outsourced from 
industrialised Northern countries as elements of the 'new' economic development 
become established and cheaper labour inputs are sought for various activities. This 
fulfils one of the Northern country fears mentioned, but most likely in a non- 
economically threatening way for them since labour operating higher up the 
information pyramid (gaining higher rewards) would remain within these countries. 
49 The work of the research and campaign NGO Focus on the Global South begins from this 
presumption of globally-dispersed exclusion (hftp: /twww. focusweb. org). 
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Steps in this direction can be seen when the OECD (1986: 16) notes that Primary 
Information Sector growth ('routine information-handling occupations' dealing with 
goods and services which 'intrinsically convey information' or are useful to its 
production) is slowing down in OECD countries, but that Secondary Information 
Sector growth is increasing ('more skill-intensive information handling tasks', the 
processing of information to produce knowledge). 
Throughout any such changes, nodal points of activity will develop within the global 
economy. Through cumulative cycles of capital accumulation, technological 
development and investments in social and educational infrastructures, any already 
present hierarchical positionings will be exaggerated by the uneven distribution of 
spin-off effects. Incentives to invest in Research and Development and labour training 
will tend to accrue at the processing end of information production, new generations 
of communications infrastructure being established within cities or regions which 
attract business and generate capital for further investment in ICT developments and 
other infrastructure. The cores of such global cities or regions will produce the foci for 
economic activities whilst other areas may fall behind and become increasingly 
disconnected from the flows of capital fuelling the global economy (Sassen 1991, cf. 
Castells 1993). The minority of individuals embodying skills in demand will meanwhile 
find that these can act as a passport to most areas of the world. Those who benefit 
will thus be characters and social groups more in the vein of Lash and Urry's (1994: 
164-5) mobile subjects, whilst the lower end of the social strata, devoid of specialised 
and valuable skills, remain territorially constrained. 
Alternative Explorations: Open Source and Copyleft 
The analysis presented here, of the likely outcomes of where the dominant 
governmental knowledge economy discursive practice is leading to, is not a 
particularly optimistic vision, but rather one overlain with a narrative of the repetition 
and extension of contemporary capital regulation practices to the new areas of 
knowledge and information. However, within the social application of certain 
technological developments considered here exist other practices that harbour 
alternate ways of conceiving the knowledge economy and knowledge-economic 
actors. The immateriality which characterises the new informational economy lends to 
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the ease with which products can be reproduced, legally or illegally. The proliferation 
of copying hardware, downloadable versions of cracked software, and online file- 
sharing networks all threaten traditional notions of intellectual property and its means 
of protection. New ways are constantly being sought of making the process of 
reproduction more difficult and deterring people from breaking IPR rules, from the 
technical to the legal (the potential costs of prosecution), yet great potential lies within 
the gathering momentum of people taking a different approach to this ease of 
reproduction and welcoming it as an opportunity to share and innovate. 
For the purposes of this final section we will briefly consider a single example, that of 
the strong movement amongst computer programmers to supply the 'source code P50 
of programmes alongside the programme itself, as an open document that can be 
accessed by any user so that they can adapt, tailor and improve systems. The 
principle is to leave the source code open for analysis and alteration by all users, with 
no restrictions other than that the code of anything that they in turn produce must also 
remain open; users cannot subsequently place more restrictive conditions upon 
adapted versions of the product. The Open Source Movement (OSM) and the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF)51 are two movements approaching the dissemination of 
intellectual property in this way. Copyleft is a legally-established system based upon 
such a principle whereby something is first copyrighted, and then distribution terms 
such as the General Public License copyleft (GPL) are added giving everyone the 
right to use, modify and redistribute the copyrighted materials or anything derived 
from them on condition that these distribution terms are left unchanged such that'the 
code and the freedoms become legally inseparable' (GNU 2001b, cf. Berry 2003, 
Stallman 2003a) 52 . 
50 The programme logic! s command structure, written in a computer language such as C++. This is 
normally unavailable to the purchaser of a piece of software because after programming this structure 
is recompiled into computer code (a series of Os and 1 s). 51 FSF is an outgrowth of Project GNU and founder of the General Public License copyleft (GPL). 
Project GNU was an endeavour or Richard Stallman to build a free software operating system 
developed from the unfree, but widely distributed and with open source code, Unix system (GNU is a 
recursive acronym, 'GNU's Not Unix', Moglen 1999). 52 FSF and OSM are quite similar in their main assertions, but contain minor but significant differences 
of principle and philosophical approach. Whilst FSF insists that no proprietary restrictions may be 
placed on products under GPL, certain Open Source licenses allow for'restrictive functions' (restricting 
what the user can do with the software) to be embedded in products, reintroducing a proprietary edge. 
Furthermore, FSF bases its approach as a matter of a human right to knowledge as a public good, 
whilst OSM is concerned more with the efficiency brought about through distributed production (Berry 
2003). 
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These co-operative and 'unowned' forms of intellectual production take advantage of 
the ease of re-production of information stemming from the growth of hi-tech 
communications, in encouraging all who can to act almost simultaneously as both 
producers and consumers, or 'prosumers' (Ghosh 1998). This could in turn lead to 
more effective practices of 'reflexive accumulation' (Lash & Urry 1994), allowing 
greater innovation and particularisation of systems than are produced within more 
proprietary modes of exchange. Open sourcing points to what Ghosh (1998) calls 'the 
economic model of the information age... the "cooking-pot" market: an implicit barter 
economy with asymmetric transactions. In cyberspace primary distribution costs can 
be fixed, ideas being shared with one person or a million for the same expenditure of 
effort given that once a contribution to a website is placed online it does not cost the 
poster for it to be accessed (although there may still be costs associated with 
personally maintaining a website). Ghosh's logic is that even if a million copies of an 
idea are shared in return for only one other idea, the sharer does not lose from the 
transaction since the million copies cost no more to distribute. Tacit economic 
calculations may still be at work in that ideas are most likely to be shared if people 
feel it worth their while through gains in reputation, feedback, or other ideas as others 
are encouraged to do the same. As a community of users builds up, more and more 
ideas and tools will be shared and so the worth of this economy will grow as each 
user senses the value of contributing and perceives the potential for their 
consumption 53 . 
Copylefting is a system which began its life and is mostly employed within the 
computer programming world, yet, is swiftly gaining in popularity and could potentially 
provoke wider social reactions to trends in the privatisation of knowledge. For 
instance the Design Science Licence, 'a comprehensive, generalised licence' for the 
application of copyleft principles to 'any work recognised by copyright law', has been 
established by a US organisation intent upon widening application of the principle 
(Stutz 2000). There are interesting indications that the open source approach is 
taking off strongly in this way, moving beyond software and being considered as a 
good approach to facilitate social and economic development as well as having 
53 Ghosh is bold enough to bandy about estimates ($100bn) of the potential value of these ideas had 
they been distributed through more formal mechanisms of market exchange. Although superfluous to 
his argument, such guesstimates bring us back to the point noted in the previous chapter upon the 
inadequacies of traditional accounting methods for mapping out new economic developments. 
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broader effects upon the mainstream of govern mental-economic knowledge economy 
discursive practise worldwide. 
There is a visible trend for adopting and adapting open source as a developmental 
approach. For example the Simputer is a design (using slightly-adapted copylefting 
principles) for a cheap, user-friendly computing device with Internet access conceived 
as a developmental initiative. The Simputer operating system is Linux-based, a well 
respected and freely available computer operating system operating under GPL, 
whilst the hardware specifications function under the Simputer GPL (SGPL)54. 
National and multilateral political institutions and organisations have also expressed 
interest; UNESCO for instance has established a Free Software Portal to improve 
understandings of and encourage consideration and participation in the development 
of open source (UNESCO 2001). President Abdul Kalam of India meanwhile has 
advocated Open Source as the way forward for software in India, whilst South Africa 
has put in place policies expressing preference for the use of open source software 
(Festa 2003, Becker 2003). There has been wide uptake of Linux by government 
bodies in both the North and South (Yee 1999). The 2001 LinuxAfrica 
(hftp: //www. linuxafrica. co. za) conference in South Africa was the first such Linux- 
oriented event to take place on the continent and featured representatives from a 
number of major Linux organisations. The UK's Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights (2002: 105), established to consider the interrelation of development and 
intellectual property rights, has meanwhile advocated developing country 
governments and development organisations exploring the possibilities of open 
source systems to avoid high costs and make use of systems that are more 
adaptable to needs. 
The open source approach has also been advocated as a collaborative means of 
improving access to, and the ability to produce, educational resources in developing 
countries. 'Open content' (Keats 2003, Newmarch 2001) would again mean that 
resources were made available to be modified, used and redistributed in the hope of 
reducing the costs of resource investment for the groups involved. If Southern 
54 The name is both a play on words (simple computer) and more informally functions as an acronym: 
Simple, Inexpensive, Multilingual Computer (Simputer 2000). The SGPL requires a one-off fee to be 
paid to the Simputer trust ($250,000 and $25,000 respectively for entrepreneurs from developed and 
developing countries), and allows a one-year hold-back for commercial use of adapted hardware 
specifications before the new specification need be submitted to the trust to be placed online for public 
use under SGPL. 
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educational institutions produced resources collaboratively in this way then, it is 
argued, the end-results could be made more locally appropriate and up-to-date than 
contributions of older resources from their Northern counterparts. Through the use of 
ICTs such knowledge could be dispersed in contributing to a global 'open source 
economy of ideas' (Ghosh 1998) for use in, and adaptation to, different 
circumstances. The non-monetary exchange of ideas is one of the most promising 
prospects for getting Internet access out to remote and developing communities, 
cultivating global South-South interaction and enabling self-development and the 
exploration of alternative socio-economic models. 
Finally, outside of development concerns, open source is making waves in 
mainstream corporate software development. In 1998 Netscape, a major provider for 
Internet browser software, decided to put its source code out into the public domain, 
having noted the success of the Linux system. Laboratories have also been 
established with the support and collaboration of other major corporations such as 
IBM, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Intel and Hitachi (SDNP 2001). It is significant that 
ordinarily proprietorial enterprises are beginning to explore an open source approach. 
This returns us to an important difference between the discourses of the two 
mentioned movements, FSF and OSM, the former being concerned with the freedom 
of software as a human right to knowledge as a public good, whilst the latter is more 
concerned with the productivity and efficiency gains to be made by widening the 
software's producer and user base (Berry 2003, Raymond 2002). It is more feasible 
that open source could become mainstrearned on the basis of an OSM discourse 
(perhaps adjusted accordingly to enable forms of restricted proprietorship, as with the 
Simputer license) appealing to profit margins rather than abstract principles of right, a 
point of concern to FSF advocates (Berry 2003, Stallman 2003b). However an OSM 
discourse framed in terms of economic efficiency could still produce a range of 
significant further effects within the wider discourse of intellectual property rights, 
depending upon how it is engaged. This potential highlights the underdetermined 
nature of the changes that have been observed or projected, and serves as a 
reminder that we should speak not of the knowledge economy but of the various 
possible (and not necessary exclusive) knowledge economies, as well as of 
economies wherein knowledge's role is relatively unchanged from that which it 
occupied previously. The discursive practice of the dominant knowledge economy 
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narrative can be viewed more productively from within such a context, as can the 
activities of those agencies involved in performing the discourse - such as the World 
Bank in its rhetorical turn towards becoming a Knowledge Bank. 
Conclusion 
It is significant that the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 2000) plays out 
the same governmental-economic narrative as its Northern counterparts, stressing 
the need to cut back regulations and encourage the involvement of private capital in 
fostering the uptake of technology (in telecommunications especially) and e- 
commerce in a bid to allow African countries to leapfrog and play catch-up with other 
economic regions. Documents such as this provide evidence of how the development 
narrative is being re-oriented towards knowledge economy concerns, yet in this 
instance it would seem that older themes and concerns such as the primacy of the 
free market and a prioritisation of the needs of private capital remain unchanged. The 
institutional framework stands fast for now, but the discourse of a knowledge 
economy is more than just new trappings on the house of economic thinking. 
Whatever basis there may be to the many excited papers produced upon the 
emergence of a new economy, we are not experiencing the levels of radical change 
intimated in the notions of whole new stages and modes of economic and societal 
activity. However changes are taking place, especially through the adoption of the 
knowledge economylsociety as a new mode of governance and economic regulation, 
and a concern to produce new types of subject that can perform and prosper through 
the changes considered. 
As I have illustrated through the previous two chapters, the notion of the knowledge 
society has been deployed in a manner which heightens awareness of, and a sense 
of urgency at the imminence of, the coming of the knowledge economy; and the need 
to respond in an appropriate manner or else become an economic backwater, or be 
restricted to working and living within one. In the same manner in which Hardt and 
Negri (2000) draw upon Marx's belief in capitalism's being a progression from 
feudalism to argue that their conception of Empire is a step forward from the 
obscenities of Imperialism, so we might hope that changes understood in the form of 
the 'knowledge economy' will open wider the gateways of opportunity to a greater 
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number of people than has the industrial era. In a similar manner it can also be hoped 
that concerns with the centrality of information to development with regard to enabling 
transparent democratic governance and effective market-functioning might engage a 
progression over the failures that have been seen in the development project since it 
began in earnest following the end of the Second World War. It is to this project, and 
the discourse that surrounds and produces it, that we now turn in the final section of 
the first part of this analysis. 
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4 
The Logic and Machinery of Development 
Introduction 
'In the beginning there was a river. The river became a road and the road 
branched out to the whole world. And because the road was once a river it 
was always hungry. ' (Ben Okri, The Famished Road, 1991: 3) 
Before we can make any sense of new developmental endeavours centring around 
the notion of the 'knowledge economy', we need first consider what development is. 
What is the substance of this concept, central to a major field of discourse, that has 
occupied the time and resources of many governments in the so-called 'developed' 
and 'developing' countries; prompted the establishment of multilateral organisations 
like the World Bank and IMF; mobilised massive political movements, and produced 
many academic departments focussed specifically upon it; and been the locus of 
North-South-North capital flows for over fifty years? In the final chapter of the first part 
of this work, I will argue that 'development is the focus of an open, complex and 
multi-faceted discursive terrain, an assemblage or'apparatus' (Foucault 1980: 194-5), 
within which the voices that tend to predominate are those of governments and 
capital-holders. Development at government level is big business, failed in terms of 
stated objectives such as ending the 'evils' of poverty, hunger and exclusion, but 
successful in producing other outcomes that would most likely not have been the 
direct or indirect aims of many contributors, such as maintaining an international 
balance of power and positions of politico-economic dominance, and producing 
international divisions of labour and spaces for capital expansion. Following a brief 
critical outline of development discourse's core objectives, instruments and 
structuring elements, the performance crisis that the discourse is seen as having 
entered into is considered, as well as the contention that this crisis is actually 
development's normal operational state. 
This latter argument maintains that development is best considered as a form of self- 
sustaining drama indifferent to truth and falsity, the problems it produces becoming 
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the raw materials for further developmental endeavours. I argue that this perspective 
deserves some credit, but cannot be left as a throwaway criticism. Taking the 
dominant strand of the discourse to stand for development per se, and criticising the 
discourse and its practise as a whole on this basis, produces a weak form of 
argument that avoids engaging with the complexity and the open, underdetermined 
range of situations that are produced within the apparatus of development. Each 
dramatic turn produced by the will to reform development so as to bring its outcomes 
into line with its aspirations needs to be engaged with in assessing how things have 
(difference) and have not (repetition) changed. Dramaturgical performances can take 
radically different forms, and some of these could have significant social and political 
effects; the scripting of a drama can be premeditated or improvised, and both the 
drama's performance and its scripting can include the greater or lesser participation 
of those positioned as the 'audience', from the polite handclaps which in part signify 
the end of a performance, through the cheers and boo's of those watching a 
pantomime, to the ad fib involvement of bystanders in performance art. Considering 
this opens onto a first exploration of whether, and if so how, developmental discursive 
practices are altering with regard to the growing importance of knowledge economy 
and society discourses, and an assessment of whether this constitutes a whole new 
act, a new form of performance, or simply a new scene in the development drama. 
The way in which the World Bank has begun to respond to the state of development 
discourse is also given a first consideration here, before we move on to consider the 
Bank's own discourse of reform and renewal in Part Two. 
What is Development? Origins and Definitions 
Three moments - the British Development Act of 1940, the founding of the United 
Nations in 1945, and Harry Truman's inaugural address as President of the United 
States in 1949 - have been accorded the status of discursive events marking 
development's emergence as a political-economic agenda (Abrahamsen 2000, 
Escobar 1995, Sachs 1997, Overton 2000, Ruth 2000, Simon & Dodds 1998). 
However its roots could equally well be traced back through modes of 'colonial 
governmentality' and economics (Kalpagam 2000, Pieterse 2000), Judeo-Christian 
understandings of linear rather than cyclical history (Rist 1997), and the concerns of 
discourses of Modernity (Shanin 1997). Development is an ambiguous term, used to 
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describe everything from the provision of information upon treating diarrhoea in a 
small village, to the financing of a multi-million dollar dam project and the reorientation 
of national state-economy relations. It is the central term of a range of elements within 
a discursive field, and so to talk meaningfully about aspects of development we must 
mark out the areas within this ongoing worldwide conversation in which we are most 
interested (and in turn the main speakers and the terms of their debate). We may very 
roughly demarcate both macro and micro areas of developm ent-in -practice; the large- 
scale activities of governmental and inter-governmental organisations focussing on 
national planning and policy; and the micro-practices of both these groups and 
smaller organisations (charities, non-govern mental organisations and so forth) in 
localised projects. This second form is less a direct area of my concern, although 
there is much to be explored with regard to the interrelations and contradictions 
between approaches and ideals practised at this level and the perspectives operative 
at the governmental. 
This work is chiefly concerned with the macro-practice of development as the 
processes of national and international level policy-formation that are substantially 
oriented towards planning change and so are concerned with justifying intervention 
from above. In this area development is big business, very profitable to Northern 
industries, receiving governments, and development agencies alike (cf. Hobart 1993). 
Self-interest has long been recognised as one of its central driving forces; from 
securing the continued supply of cheap factors of production (especially labour and 
natural resources such as oil) and opening up markets for exports and capital with the 
end of the colonial period; through fears of poverty-induced overpopulation producing 
environmental degradation and subsequent imbalances in the world economy; to 
concerns about political and economic security in the Cold War producing a perceived 
need to institutionalise market principles and capitalist cultural norms in the newly- 
independent countries (Escobar 1995, Abrahamsen 2000, Sachs 1992, Dollar 2001, 
Hettne 1995). As Joseph Stiglitz (1997b) stressed in a speech early on in his time as 
Vice President and Chief Economist at the World Bank, 'developed countries have 
increasingly recognized that it is in their economic interests to provide aid... 
developing countries have become the worldwide engine of economic expansion'. 
Thus the US Agency for International Development (USAID 2001) can state its 
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interest in 'expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the 
citizens of the developing world'. 
We can begin with a conceptual definition. 'Development' is in essence a process 
term signifying a positively-valued form of change; at its simplest it can be understood 
as an increasing or improvement in certain qualities, a form of growth or maturation. 
So it is that experienced development workers and development economics 
textbooks alike can refer to development as simply being 'improving the society' or 
providing a 'quality of life' improvement (Clark 1991: 26, Todaro 2000: 17, cf. 
Soubbotina & Sheram 2000). This 'improvement' has been considered in variously 
more and less narrow terms, but most such distinctions refer to a linear path of 
change, with some countries further along this path than others. As a discursive 
keyword its meaning is denoted by signifiers selected and prioritised through 
negotiation, and so the dominant value structure shaping its definition will therefore 
tend to reflect power-relations between subject positions constituted within the 
discourse. A set of variants upon the key-term are deployed to distinguish countries 
within a set of hierarchical relations as leading or lagging in a quest all are assumed 
to be engaged in. Hobart (1993: 1-2) argues that people must first be constituted as 
under-developed and ignorant in order for them then to be perceived as developing, 
and that 'being underdeveloped often implies, if not actual iniquity, at least stupidity, 
failure and sloth'. Without such symbolic subjugation it would be very difficult for the 
West to claim 'developed' status and position itself to advise the to-be-developed 
upon how to progress. An achieved end-state of the 'developed' or 'industrialised' 
countries has often been positioned against either a negatively-defined state of lack 
or inadequacy (the /ess-developed and iess-industrialised), or a state of progress (the 
developing and industrialising). To consolidate these distinguishing terms, the 
relationship between developers and those to-be-developed is constructed through 
the establishment of categories and knowledge about different states of being, and 
processes of transition. 
As a result of increasing concerns regarding our having entered an age - and 
adopted a language - of perpetual change under 'advanced' capitalism, development 
has in recent times come to be seen as touching all economic players. Contemporary 
development and 'new economy' literature will frequently emphasise that all countries 
are still developing (see for example World Bank 1998a: 79, Heftne 1995: 266). Yet 
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the prefixes and suffixes indicating different levels of progression along a linear path 
still dominate the construction of actor positions within the development landscape. 
New choices of referent are often enough born of frustration with this narrow 
linearity55. Yet as Biersteker (1995) stresses, we need to remain aware of how ideas 
can define away problems as much as they define or redefine them. Any simple 
deployment of a rich country - poor country distinction will firstly demarcate roughly 
the same referents (in terms of country groupings) as the older, and so perpetuate the 
development narrative and its conceptualisations of 'us' and 'other'. It will secondly 
risk overlooking the existence of socio-economic groups of sufficient size and political 
influence in every country who benefit from the dominant system such as to make 
efforts to facilitate its perpetuation. 
A variation upon the North-South distinction is strategically useful in this regard. As 
with the demise of the Third World56 as an analytical category, there is commonly 
accepted to be no simple unified South and no very clear and distinguished North 
(Biersteker 1995). Reference to a 'global North' and 'global South, as mentioned 
briefly in the previous chapter, can however be used as socio-economic indicators in 
referring to the global dispersal of those with and without sufficient resource access 
and political rights and provisions (cf. Sachs 1997: 291). Accepting the difficulty of 
escaping from the strictures of a discourse whilst trying to engage with and criticise 
55 An interesting but problematic contention has been made for instance that the most important 
difference between countries concerns their patterns of consumption rather than production, such that 
we might more usefully refer to Mass Consumption (MCCs) and Elite Consumption Countries (ECCs) 
(Young & Boehmer-Christiansen 1997: fn. 9). This would be an interesting alternative if consumption 
were to be understood in the widest possible sense of consumption of health, education and other 
resources (of the potentialities and fruits of political enfranchisement, and of the transport 
infrastructures well-established within and between capital cities and important trading zones, and so 
forth). Yet significant differences would still remain between countries at the level of production. The 
proportions of population in various relations to the means of production, the predominant forms of 
production undertaken, and the rewards made upon labour under these different conditions are all 
distinguished between countries, and this is missed in speaking only of consumption as much as 
speaking only of production surely misses the importance of consumption differences. 
5 The category of Third World - the countries most urgently needing to be developed and fitting into a 
scheme of First, Second and Third Wodds - remains a powerfully politicised referent and rhetorical 
device. However it is today commonly argued to no longer exist, or at least no longer be useful as a 
single category for a broad mass of 'developing' countries (Castells 1993). This view is prompted by a 
series of changes that have occurred in the past 20 years greatly widening disparities between global 
regions; the demise of the 'Second World' category with the dissolution of the USSR and the perceived 
'failure of communism' extending the reach of the market mechanism as the dominant mode of capital 
regulation; the success of the 'newly-industdalising' East Asian countries (NICs) at 'developing' in the 
sense of increasing their GDP and investing in infrastructure; the partial success of some South 
American economies in the same; and the failure, by the same measurements, of the sub-Saharan 
African region prompting thoughts of the need for a 'Fourth World' category. 
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aspects of its functioning", this work has not and will not make counter-discursive 
contributions upon appropriate terms of reference, but will rather stay within the 
standard terminological boundaries so as to analyse how their use both has and has 
not altered through the changes considered. North and South are thus most 
commonly used In referring to countries seen as more and less 'advanced' upon the 
path of 'development', whilst the g/obaldistinction Is engaged where appropriate. 
Objectives and Indicators: Poverty, Growth and Modernisation 
As mentioned, we might consider the modern development agenda as a means 
towards the end of becoming modern, an extension and/or application of 
Enlightenment rationality. Development has been linked to or equated with the social, 
cultural, political and economic processes of change brought under the banner of 
'Modernisabon': industrialisation and urbanisation; democratisation combined with 
centralisation of power and authority and Increasing bureaucratisation; universalised 
education; Individualisation and the loss of traditional values, ideals and social ties, 
and through this a process of secularisation and the growing dominance of the 
scientific episteme (Hobart 1993, Hettne 1995, Diawara 2000, Sardar 1999, Apffel- 
Marglin & Marglin 1990). The modem episteme, framing the 'economy' in the sense 
of an 'organism', has positioned growth and development as essential aspects of an 
economic story as the organism Is nourished upon the life-force of capital 
accumulation (Gibson-Graham 1996: 97-101, Amariglio 1988, Foucault 1994). With 
modernisation has come a concern with that latest 'modem' phenomenon, 
globalisation, through a feeling that national development strategies cannot operate 
away from serious consideration of their global context (Munck 1999, Ruth 2000). 
Development has thus been argued to require the careful negotiation of a path 
through the Intricate Interweaving of international trade and financial flows, in order to 
ensure adequate Integration on terms conducive to its achievement (Stiglitz 1997a, 
1998a)58. 
'... even the most radically critical discourse easily slips Into the form, the logic, and the implicit 
gpstulations of exactly what it seeks to contest' (Kate Manzo (199 1: 8), cited In Munck I M: 202). 
'Integration Is essential: The Integration of the developing countries, in partcular the least developed 
among them, Into the world economy Is a precondition for their growth and sustainable economic and 
social development' (European Union 2000). 
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Development has been argued to constitute the modernisation of poverty, signifying 
the end of 'pauperism' as an untreatable exterior and the production of 'the poor' as 
objects of knowledge and management to be assisted and controlled (Escobar 1995: 
22-3). Poverty is a core concept in development, and poverty eradication a central 
objective. The sentiment of the World Bank's (2000m) mission statement, 'our dream 
is a world free of poverty, is repeatedly echoed in other governmental and civil 
society pronouncements that the central objective of development must be to 'reduce 
poverty with a view to its eventual eradication' (EU 2001, cf. Clark 1991: 19). 'The 
poor is a relational category, a dispersed and diverse agglomeration of peoples 
bound together by the collective attitude of the non-poor towards them They are 
defined in their negativity through the non-possession of goods, of resource access 
and of a certain standard of living, the lack of an income which is expected to secure 
these things, and the lack of agency to secure such an income for themselves. 'The 
poor' are predominantly defined by their passivity, and throughout the mainstream of 
development discourse up to the present they have been constructed as destitute and 
merely awaiting aid of some kind (cf. Rahnema 2001). Mechanisms to deal with 
poverty then produce passivity through a discourse which informs 'the poor' of what 
they are and are not capable of or entitled to. As we shall see in considering 
developments at the Bank, a certain few more recent discursive contributions have 
begun to consider how 'the poor' might be differently constructed, not presuming the 
unchanging homogeneity of the referent, and inscribing within it specific agentive 
capacities and voices. 
Eradicating poverty through development requires negotiating definitions of what 
poverty is, the means to measure and mark out 'the poor' existing in this condition, 
and the means and instruments by which to deal with it. Development discourse 
produces and problematises 'poverty' through a series of statistical operations. 'The 
poor' are the product of an exercise in commodification and standard isation, of 
defining and measuring 'incomes' before contrasting the results within and between 
countries. Figures such as the proportion of the world's population living in poverty on 
less than $1 or $2 a day are regularly produced in speeches by the World Bank 
President and elsewhere (e. g. MDG 2001a) in framing presentations and stressing 
the need for development. The varying significance of these sums to 'the poor' in 
different countries, and the difficulty of calculating such figures with regard to those 
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living in non-monetary-based communities, are marginalised in the process of 
producing economies to-be-developed through 'modalities of counting, classification, 
and accounting' (Kalpagam 2000: 420). 
The repeated deployment of 'the poor as a globally homogeneous referent can 
produce a certain laziness in the analysis of local, national and international issues of 
resource distribution (production and consumption), social visibility and political 
representation. The more development discourse revolves around the (singular) 
problem of the global 'poor', the more it is reduced to being primarily the statistics- 
producing exercise that constitutes one necessary but alone insufficient aspect of its 
operations. So as well as the wealth of specific data and information deployed in 
framing problems, articulating solutions, and criticising perceived failed initiatives, an 
overwhelming barrage of millions and billions of deprived peoples stretching the 
imagination beyond any sense of the real is regularly produced 59. The use of such 
statistics is primarily performative, the specific accuracy of the content (or the 
explanation of its context so as to frame its significance and justify apparent 
inconsistencies) being less significant than the intended effect of impressing upon 
audiences the urgency of the matter to hand and shocking them into action, or into 
complicity with the suggestions of the writer or speaker. 
To draw an example from the operations of the World Bank, in 1997 Bank President 
James Wolfensohn (1997a, 1997d, 1997e, 1997f, 1999g) made five references to the 
number of children not in school, varying from 120 million in the February to 150 
million in the May of that year, falling by 10 million with each subsequent reference 
before jumping up once again to 150 by the September6o. In a 1999 article written 
with Archbishop Dr. George Carey, the number of 250 million was given for what was 
seemingly the same referent, whilst in a paper written with the development 
economist Armartya Sen and published one month before, nearly half that figure was 
given: 
59 Arturo Escobar (1995: 234) for instance argues that poverty became a global problem when in 1948 
the World Bank defined as 'poor all those living on a per capita income of less than $100 per annum, 
making two-thirds of the world's population officially 'poor. 
60 Wolfensohn would seem to be aware of the apparently purely dramaturgical appearance of his use 
of statistics, at one point in a speech insisting that '[t]his is not a Hollywood presentation, this is not a 
statement by someone who's trying to attract attention, these are the facts of the demographics' 
(Wolfensohn 19991). 
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'Three billion people live on less than $2 a day, 1.3 billion do not have 
clean water, 130 million children do not go to school, and 40,000 children 
die every day because of hunger-related diseases' (Wolfensohn & Sen 
1999) 
'In 1999,11 million children under the age of five will die of preventable 
disease. For those children who live past five, more than 250 million of 
them will work instead of going to school' (Wolfensohn & Carey 1999) 
Importantly, alongside the statistical blizzard Wolfensohn also frequently engages a 
stylistic manoeuvre that personalises the Bank's development programme through 
anecdotes that emphasise the importance of individual successes, and draw parallels 
between the hopes and needs of peoples of all countries. The insistence that'the real 
test of development can be measured ... by the smile on a child's face' exemplifies 
Wolfensohn's (1995) personalisation of the development story, paralleled in the 
presence of the smiling child on the Bank's website front-page mentioned in Chapter 
One. Wolfensohn commonly refers to the hopes and dreams of, the chances for and 
the threats to, our children and those in developing countries in his speeches, as well 
as the children not in school and our responsibility to ensure they get an education 61 . 
'Our responsibility' to give the world's children a chance is an emotionally inclusive 
phrasing stressing a common project for the developed and the developing to leave 
behind us a more just, peaceful and safer world for the children (Wolfensohn 2000b). 
In this way Wolfensohn rhetorically seeks to bring onboard the implied lackadaisical 
listener who may not care about the fate of the poor in developing countries: 'We can 
sit comfortably in Paris or in Washington and ignore them. But our children cannot' 
(Wolfensohn 1997i). 
The emphasis upon inclusivity and making the audience feel the benefits of 
development by putting a face to success stretches through Wolfensohn's (1995a) 
anecdotal style as a whole, relaying stories of 'the woman entrepreneur that I met in 
the small town of Katwe, Uganda', 'villagers in the arid province of Gansu, China', and 
'slum dwellers in Port-au-Prince, Haiti' whom he has met and seen development 
working for through Bank-funded projects. A few Bank initiatives indicate that 
Wolfensohn's anecdotal style is being influential, encouraging a warmer and more 
61 Wolfensohn referred to such at least 32 times in the nearly 60 speeches documented on the Bank's 
website up to December 1999 (Wolfensohn 1995,1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 1997e, 1997f, 
1997g, 19971,1998a, 1998b, 1998f, 1998g, 1998i, 1998j, 1998k, 19981,1998m, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 
1999e, 1999g, 1999h, 1999i, 1999j, 1999k, 1999m, 1999o, 1999p, 1999q). 
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user-friendly element within its discourse, and promoting the image of a listening 
bank. The Bank's mission statement has been expanded into a book, Our Dream: a 
world free of poverty (Granzow 2000), advertised as depicting 'real stories about 
poverty... where the Bank and its partners have made a demonstrable impact' (World 
Bank 2000m), whilst the Voices of the Poor project seeks to recount individual stories 
with a face, again being advertised as having 'asked the poor about their experience 
with poverty' in a study of '60,000 people in 60 countries' (Wolfensohn 2000b). 
So, to briefly summarise what we have seen so far, the origins of development as a 
social and governmental project are ambiguous - the roots of the contemporary 
understanding of the word as a desired process are traceable to various points of 
origin giving the impression of 'development' as anything from a post-war to a near- 
perennial concern of Western societies. Development can be seen as a form of 
exercise in pursuit of modernisation, transforming societies in their politics, their 
beliefs, and their margins (bringing 'the poor' within a discourse of societal 
management), and in its dominant form is conceived as a linear path of change from 
less to more upon a scale of positively-valued variables (income per capita, access to 
health and education resources, and so on). As a result, development exists as the 
product of a series of statistical operations, wherein the statistics frequently play a 
performative role in raising the priority of developmental issues as a matter of 
urgency, and reducing the complexity of various problems to the materials 
appropriate to a developmental formula. At the same time the discourse works 
through persona li sation, giving development a 'face' so as to draw out the 
connections between the more and less developed, and to help its benefactors feel 
the effects of development's practise. 
Development Beyond Growth? 
Consistently, at its core, the dominant forms of 'improvement' and change considered 
as objectives of development at the macro-level have long been economic growth, 
measured in the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), alongside indicators of 
industrialisation. The rhetoric of trickle-down theory has dominated within this 
governmental development discourse (the notion that as an economy grows and 
more capital flows in and through it, more will pass by even those poorest areas, so 
96 
that all will benefit from economic growth). Earlier attempts to define and measure 
poverty worked from population statistics and GDP, with little consideration even of 
national income distribution beyond quintile measurements (dividing the national 
income into fifths and considering the proportions of the population in each fifth, from 
richest to poorest). Two quotes from firstly the then Vice President and Chief 
Economist at the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, and secondly from John Clark, an 
experienced development worker and writer 62 , can serve to illustrate 
that however 
much different actor groups may disagree on aims and instruments - such as the role 
of the market - there is some consensus across a broad range of critical participants 
that development has in the past been defined too narrowly: 
'It used to be that development was seen as simply increasing GDP. Today 
we have a broader set of objectives, including democratic development, 
egalitarian development, sustainable development, and higher living 
standards. ' (Stiglitz 1997a) 
'Development is in crisis, and the clamour for a new approach is growing, a 
new approach based on a broader definition of development (Clark 1991: 
26) 
As the quotes illustrate, the standard response to a perceived crisis in development's 
performance and in the confidence of its actors has been to broaden the outlook of 
development efforts (producing multiple prefixes such as human-centred, sustainable, 
egalitarian, and participatory or democratic development) and to position new 
variables in the development process such as basic needs, women, education and 
the environment (and so construct new sets of statistics and negotiate their standards 
of measurement). Poverty is increasingly defined more broadly as an issue of access 
to many resources and not just as a measurement of income (a food system, 
education, healthcare, land, natural resources, credit facilities, space for political 
involvement, social-political-physical infrastructure)63. 
62 Clark worked with Oxfam and other NGOs for 18 years before working for the World Bank's NGO 
and Civil Society Unit for 6 years. He later took up a post at the LSE whilst on a sabbatical from the 
World Bank, and now works as a Project Director in the UN Secretary General's office on reforming the 
UN's relations with civil society. 
63 For example, from the European Union (2000) Development Policy Statement 'Poverty is defined 
not simply as the lack of income and financial resources but also as encompassing the notion of 
vulnerability and such factors as no access to adequate food supplies, education and health, natural 
resources and drinking water, land, employment and credit facilities, information and political 
involvement, services and infrastructure. ' 
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So whilst the LIN Development Program (UNDP 1999: 18-19) writes of development 
being a combination of economic growth and social change, standard development 
economics textbooks (e. g. Todaro 2000) today also emphasise that we have moved 
beyond GDP-centred development visions to embrace the widening of sustenance 
(basic needs), raising of self-esteem, and increasing of freedoms as core values. 
These appended versions are then thematised as the new development project, 
Development MU1, as when Clark (1991: 30) speaks of seeking 'just development' 
through the DEPENDS approach (Development of infrastructure, Economic growth, 
Poverty alleviation, Equity, Natural-resource base protection, Democracy, and Social 
justice). New targets are also set at an international level to re-vitalise the projects 
momentum and emphasise unity. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG 2001 a), 
a set of objectives determined through negotiation at the LIN Millennium Summit and 
agreed upon by all member countries as well as major multilateral players such as the 
World Bank, place poverty reduction at the top of their development shopping list but 
also emphasise other goals such as achieving universal primary education and 
improving gender equality, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health, 
combating HIV and AIDS and ensuring environmental sustainability. 
Development, especially as practised by the World Bank, is also presented as 'a 
process of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy'. Development on this view 
constitutes a liberation from the strictures of poverty and from the apolitical, 
disempowering mode of existence that this fosters or imposes: freedom 'from 
starvation, from undernourishment, from illiteracy, from preventable and premature 
death, but also freedom of speech, of political participation, and of social cooperation' 
(Wolfensohn & Sen 1999, cf. Sen 2000). Weakening the ties of tradition and 
promoting liberal-democratic political institutions and market-economies is seen as 
strengthening freedom and opportunities for all, and weakening unjustly held 
positions of power. So Joseph Stiglitz (I 997a), in his time at the World Bank, spoke of 
how development constitutes a transformation of society, with people 'breaking out of 
the poverty in which they had been mired for centuries'. Stiglitz (1 997b, my emphasis) 
elsewhere reaches the conclusion that'[i]n the process of development, poverty can 
be reduced, the environment maintained, civil liberties increased, and civil society 
more generally strengthened'. Development is thus presented as a potentially wholly 
positive experience. A sense of humility is advised with regard to past errors 
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alongside an awareness of the need for widening participation in the agendas for 
change, but with such cautions the promised outcome is a win-win situation. 
This turn in the discourse can be seen as a reaction to liberation's deployment as a 
critical tool against development within Dependency Theory and those approaches 
brought under the banner of Post-Development, an attempt to reclaim this positively- 
valued mode of change as an aspect and not a failing of development. I will next 
briefly outline and assess the contributions of Dependency Theory and Post- 
Development in arguing that the discursive apparatus of development is more 
underdetermined than its staunchest critics insist and that it is therefore worth 
maintaining a position of engagement with development, aiming for a radical 
reconfiguration of its discursive practice, rather than rejecting it outright. Whilst certain 
contributions outlined below are helpful in honing down a critical perspective upon the 
discourse under consideration, others present an unproductively over-determined 
diagnosis of development as a form of sovereign (Western, American) and repressive 
power, forgetting firstly that spaces for resistance and cou nter- practice will always 
exist, and secondly that for such power to hold good it must in some way be 
productive (Foucault 1984a: 61). In forgetting these things these contributions in 
some way practise something of the subjection (of 'the poor', the 'underdeveloped') 
that they accuse the discourse of. 
Critical Thinking Against and Beyond Development 
Development has been argued to be a mode of oppression fostering hopes that are 
unrealisable within the system that it originates from and contributes to. Dependency 
Theorists like Andr6 Gunder Frank (1996) contended that the now-developed 
countries may once have been un-developed, but were never under-developed. This 
was rather a condition emerging out of the same process by which the developed 
countries became developed; on this view capitalism cannot be expected to develop 
the less-developed countries because it is not a 'system of development' (Amin 1997: 
14). The direct aid provided as emergency relief by the developers was in turn argued 
to express only the guilty generosity of the oppressor (Friere 1996). Structures of 
imperialistic resource extraction and labour exploitation made development possible 
in the now developed countries, but operated rather in the fashion of counter- 
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development for others, producing increasingly polarised modes of association 
between countries more central and peripheral (or metropolitan and satellite) to the 
international economy (Wallerstein 1979,2000). The dynamics of exploitation and 
expropriation were on this view such that countries 'to-be-developed' supply the major 
source of low-cost (low value-added) materials and labour upon which 'developed' 
countries then perform high value-added activities. Flows of capital gather in their 
initial form in the poorer countries, to be multiplied and deposited like silt in the 
economies of the economically-dominant countries. The process has been 
allegorised to a vampiric sucking of the lifeblood (economic resources) out of 
countries (Frank 1996: 106-7, cf. Amin 1997: 10-14). For this reason 'delinking' (Amin 
1990: xiv) countries and subjecting all inter-national economic and social relations to 
the imperatives of internal national development has been argued to be the only true 
path towards de4opment. True development can be 'total liberation' on this view, 
only when it is self-directed and democratically-organised 'self-development', as 
against what is perceived as the efficiency-obsessed and consequently elitist post- 
war 'development' endeavours (Goulet 1996: 545-549)64. 
Dependency Theory suffered from positing a single, inherent structure of capitalism 
that determined all international relations and flows of capital and allowed little space 
to explore how the situation may have (under a variety of contemporary conditions), 
or may in future be (by action affecting these contemporary conditions) altered other 
than through separatist endeavours such as that suggested by Samir Amin. This view 
in turn depended upon a belief in the benevolence of developmental elites within 
countries and a great faith in the transparency of country governance structures to 
ensure that separatist projects would not simply foster autarky and corruption, 
empowering local elites in new ways. If we start instead from the premise that there is 
in fact no 'capitalism' but rather a series of existent and potential or latent 'capitalisms, 
(that is, many different modes of capital regulation that would be recognisably 
64 Samir Amin's later work (1997,1999) has moved away from the more deterministic position adopted 
here, now considering the logic of international capital accumulation as being 'underdeten-nined' in a 
manner more akin to the Foucaultian positioned outlined later in this chapter. That is, as consisting of 
an assemblage of different trends that open onto a number of different possible outcomes, even if 
likelihoods are heavily biased through the mutually supportive interactions of more dominant players. 
From this more underdetermined and open understanding Amin is able to suggest a more optimistic 
vision of a 'polycentric! world wherein new balances of power and new roles for the World Bank and 
IMF create the political space for renegotiating the regulation of capital in ways that promote 
development. 
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'capitalist), this opens onto the possibility of exploring the many different forms in 
which development also can be reproduced. Dependency Theorists did not question 
the stated ends of development as conceived in the mainstream of post-war 
discourse (industrialisation, modernisation, economic growth), but rather contended 
that the suggested means towards these ends within the mainstream of development 
discourse were obstructive rather than facilitatory. 
Post- Development is the name given to the somewhat loose agglomeration of critical 
writers upon development who have questioned both the suggested means, the ends 
towards which they are directed, and the need for any intervention or planned change 
in the communities of those to- be-deve loped. The label has come to encompass a 
broad swathe of writers, from the self-avowedly anti-development (Illich 1997, Sachs 
1992, Rahnema 1997) or post-modern (LApres-Developpement 2002), through more 
cautiously experimental interventions with post-structuralist intentions (Brigg 2002), to 
those uncomfortable with the label in criticising both development and post- 
development discourse (Munck 1999, Maiava 2002, Fagan 1999), but nonetheless 
trying to somehow go beyond development. Two lines of criticism which have 
emerged to dominance are particularly worth consideration; firstly the argument that 
Development is a form of Modernisation which is in turn a form of Westernisation, the 
production of 'the poor' and 'underdevelopment' as discursive objects being first steps 
towards 'developmental' interventions that extend Western social and economic 
principles; and secondly the assertion that development inevitably fails in practice, but 
that this failure is consumed and reproduced in discursive modifications that further 
drive developmental endeavours. 
Firstly, then, can the Modernisation entailed within Development be read as a mode 
of 'Western isation'? Development on this view is seen as 'a standard by which the 
West measures the non-West' (Sardar 1999: 49), the discourse of 1t, 2 nd and 3rd 
Worlds being one produced and managed primarily through the agency of I st World' 
scholars and public policy institutions (Tucker 1999: 6-7). Development is presented 
as an 'amoeba-like, shapeless but ineradicable' entity with no core content but one 
essential function of justifying intervention in the name of a higher goal (Sachs 1992: 
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4, cf. Frank 1997)65. Intervention requires organisation and preparation, and so 
development becomes 'a synonym for more or less planned social and economic 
change' (Hobart 1993: 1, cf. Escobar 1992). These interventions introduce new 
modes of representation, extending the influence of Western norms (such as 
concerns with the primacy of rationality and efficiency) and integrating nations into the 
dominant economic and social framework of liberal-democratic cons umer-ca pita I ism, 
and in turn colonising peoples' realities and imposing a Western world-view upon 
developmental subjects (Marglin 1990, Mehmet 1999, Sachs 1992, Escobar 1992, 
1995, Latouche 1993). 
As mentioned earlier with Escobar (1995), development discourse is here held firstly 
to produce 'the poor' as a passive category of subjects who are never given the 
chance to explain what help they feel they do and do not need, or even to negotiate 
how poverty is defined and thus whether they fit the category ascribed to them. 
Societies prior to developmental intervention are meanwhile depicted as existing in 
states of underdeveloped destitution, with masses of 'the poor waiting to be lifted out 
of their condition (Sahlins 1997, Rahnema 1995). The 'developing' sit somewhere at a 
mid-point, with the threat of potentially sinking back into the quagmire of 
underdevelopment if developmental efforts are interrupted hovering as a permanent 
threat and inducement to play by the development rules. Once 'the poor' and the 
'developing' are established and the subjects understand their position of inferiority, 
developmental initiatives then serve in enforcing a Western economic viewpoint and 
extending the operative principles of homo economicus to the subjects of 
development (Escobar 1995, Rahnema 2001). As Majin Rahnema (2001: 5, cf. 
Rahnema 1995) puts it, 'the "have-nots" are led to internalize the values of the 
"Economic Man"', producing a mushrooming of induced needs that are then classified 
as lacks66. With the reproduction of Economic Man, development intervention serves 
to extend Western market principles and institutions across the world. 
65 Shifts in the discourse are often characterised as being designed to re-legitimate the North's right to 
intervene in the South once the discourse's appeal fades. For example see Abrahamsen 2000 on 
developmental concerns with 'good governance'. 
66 For writers like Rahnema (1995) and Ivan Illich (1997), even the Basic Needs contribution to 
development discourse (wherein the focus was supposed to shift towards securing sufficient food, 
clothing, shelter and basic education for'the poor and away from large-scale projects) was simply the 
imputing of the needs and lacks of a normal person in a Western society. 
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This form of algebraic critique (Development = Modernisation = Westernisation, 
D=M=W) is once again too closed and reductionist. Although it might serve as an 
effective polemical and confrontational debate-opener or politicising slogan, it leaves 
no space for analysis of the actual logic and dynamics of development discourse and 
serves in effect to reduce understanding to a campaign banner. To equate 
development with modernisation, with Westernisation, is to insist that the three 
signifiers attach to exactly the same referent, or at the least that what is development 
fits neatly inside what is modernisation, which in turn can be encapsulated within what 
is Westernisation. Yet to return to a comment from the beginning of this chapter, 
development is an ambiguous term, in essence a process term signifying a positively- 
valued form of change. The territory marked out by development is not necessarily 
more or less inclusive than, but simply different from that of modernisation or 
Westernisation, and although in the manner of a Venn diagram there are undoubtedly 
some points of overlap it is bad analysis to generalise such restricted occurrences to 
a terminological equation. There is no logical equivalence to be drawn between 
modernisation and 'Westernisation', which is but an over-embracing reference to the 
spread of a certain form of capitalist regulation and its perceived social, political and 
cultural effects (cf. Amin 1997, Pieterse 2000)67. Certain contributions to development 
discourse presume the potential for universalising a Western socio-economic 
perspective and institutional forms, but once again the existence (potential and 
actual) of different forms of development calls for a more critical and conditional, 
textured analysis of contemporary events. 
The second major trend of post-development thinking holds that the failures of 
development are a part of its functioning (Lohmann 1998), that development 
constitutes the planning of poverty (Illich 1997) rather than the path towards its 
resolution. The statistics frequently cited - as with the Wolfensohn speeches above - 
to emphasise the need for development work have hardly improved, if not worsened 
for many countries, over the post-war period of the development project, whilst so- 
called 'donor fatigue' has affected both governments and individuals". Development's 
67 'Americanisation' and 'Global isation' are commonly enough used in referring to an ambiguous and 
presumed related set of phenomena, whilst the spread of 'Toyofism' or the 'East Asian' model of 
economic governance are given scant attention in such critical literature (Pieterse 2000). r"3 From the problematic status of US contributions to the World Bank Group's soft-loan wing the 
International Development Association (IDA), the latest episode of which is mentioned later in this 
chapter with the Report of the Meltzer Commission, to the ongoing gap between the proportion of GNP 
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'monopolistic, arrogant and failed form' (Caufleld 1997: 338) has been argued to 
constitute 'a closed system of beliefs impervious to ostensibly contrary evidence' 
(Hobart 1993: 4), using the falsehoods and failures it generates as the raw materials 
for further planning and corrections (Lohmann 1998) whilst elements of the agenda 
are consistently reaffirmed in the face of criticism and counter-evidence 69 . 
On this view the problem-solution rhetoric is necessary to generate institutional 
momentum, build public support and harness capital to the cause. Yet as a system 
designed to extend the practice of market principles around the world, inequality and 
relative destitution are perceived as necessary by-products of its end-goal. 
Development is intended 'to deliver an exploitable global proletariat into the hands of 
capital' (Cammack 2002: 125-7) or else to continue producing 'the poor' as an 
observable, regulatable category in providing fuel for the developmental machine 70 . 
Failures and falsehoods being constitutive of development's reproduction implies, 
critics argue, that in questioning the terms and conditions of development discourse 
one participates in that discourse and so perpetuates it by lending legitimacy to its 
mode of representation. Development should instead be treated as a game or a 
drama, a genre of imaginative literature indifferent to truth and falsity (Frank 1997, 
Lohmann 1998). Rather than criticising the production of untruths undertaken in its 
from most developed country governments devoted to development assistance and that called for by 
the UN. In 1999 only 4 out of the 21 DAC (Development Assistance Committee) member countries 
contributed the 0.7% of GNP to Official Development Aid (ODA) called for by the UN, the average 
standing at 0.24% (European Union 1999). USAID (2001) meanwhile proudly declares that the US is 
'spending less than one-half of 1 percent of the federal budget on development assistance, stressing 
that it is the quality of aid that matters more than the quantity (USAID 2003a). This is of course an 
otherwise quite legitimate point, but one that is somewhat worthless if the relative quantity of the good 
quality aid is too small to make any significant difference. Although aid from these countries may have 
risen in real terms (allowing for inflation) over the decade 1990-2000, contributions from all countries 
except Japan fell as proportions of GNP, with those from the US, France and Germany failing by 
between 40% and 50% (OECD Observer 2001). Increasing poverty in the face of these development 
efforts is a commonly-accepted reality, from introductory texts (Todaro 2000) to Wolfesohn speeches 
ý1998e). 
9 As with David Dollar and Aart Kray's (2001) paper for the World Bank asserting that anti-inflation 
policies - the manna of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal economic policies generally - are 
'hyper-pro-poor. The paper also argues that there is no evidence that direct investments in education 
and health improve the incomes of the poor; the implication of these remarks from a narrowly 
economistic perspective on development would seemingly be that they therefore do not improve the 
well-being of the poor nor constitute development. 
70 Foreign aid is seen as becoming Whabit-forming drug'as the impulse towards planning change is 
institutionalised, yet development is in the end only a process of 'poor people in rich countries giving 
money to rich people in poor countries', development being big business to all those Involved in the 
'developing' (Caufleld 1997: 338). 
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name, the critic needs to cast off both the rhetoric and the vision of development 
(Hobart 1993, Sachs 1992, Lohmann 1998, Abrahamsen 2000)71. 
Again things are rarely this simple, and to portray them as such is unproductive. Post- 
Development, as with Dependency Theory, can at times be too broad-sweeping in its 
critique, when what is needed is to act with a more critical and specific focus in order 
to locate possible spaces for productive engagement with the dominant discourse (cf. 
Diawara 2000). The "'regime" of truth' (Foucault 1984a: 74) dominant within 
development discourse has perhaps exhibited narrow conditions of truth production, 
restricting what might be regarded as admissible counter-evidence. Certain groups of 
actors and styles of discursive contribution positioned within development parameters 
may embody the contradictions and the obstinate disregard for counter-evidence that 
critics articulate. Yet we would in turn need to employ a very narrow understanding of 
development as a single specific and unified discursive project in order to assert that 
these conditions have held and will hold for all contributions. 
Much post-development literature holds to such a monolithic characterisation of 
development discourse, making it more anti-development than post, as it fences off 
all possibilities of change and concludes that the only progressive step is to reject the 
discourse as a whole (Munck 1999). This is something that, when coming from a 
'First World' perspective, can seem somewhat Eurocentric (Fagan 1999). The manner 
of eulogising the beautiful simple life of the 'vernacular pre-development society 
(Rahnema 1997a, Illich 1997) can, when performed too casually, become as crass a 
counter-assertion as that which it seeks to criticise (the voice of the development 
expert portraying such a society as destitute). In this way post-development 
sometimes practises what it criticises in portraying development simply as an 
extension of colonial practice. Using crude conceptions of power and positioning 
those to-be-developed as entirely passive continues the process of turning people 
into objects (Brigg 2002, Hart 2001, Tucker 1999)72. Consequently many post- 
71 This approach would appear to draw upon notions of hegemony as illustrated in the work of Laclau & 
Mouffe (2001: 139): 'A hegemonic formation also embraces what opposes it., insofar as the opposing 
force accepts the system of basic articulations of that formation as something it negates, but the place 
of the negation is defined by the internal parameters of the formation itself. 72 The strand of Post-Development discourse that decries development as the new colonial 
Westernisation uses a sovereign conception of power being held and exercised over the South by the 
North. Development is depicted as a solely repressive power, and the citing of Foucault in many such 
works appear as posturing rather than any serious attempt to analyse or'deconstruct' the discourse of 
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development writings hold little in the way of positive suggestions, but rather remain 
in the realm of critique or outright rejection, the most positive options being perhaps to 
call for an 'aesthetic' grassroots effort to bring 'good people' to work together 
(Rahnema 1997: 399-400). 
It is problematic to refer to a single development project given the complex 
assemblage of which the discursive field consists: contributions from various actor 
positions, social practices, institutions, rules and norms and regulatory and 
administrative interventions that construct the categories of the poor and developing 
countries as well as the means by which they are to be monitored, measured, and 
engaged with. It would be more productive to consider 'the dispersion of the points of 
choice that the discourse leaves free', the 'strategic possibilities' marked out within 
development conceived as an 'apparatus' (Foucault 1980: 194-5,1972: 36-7, cf. 
Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 118, Escobar 1995, Brigg 2001,2002). In this way we might 
criticise the sense of development discourse's having a determining logic (such as 
D=M=W), observing that the interplay of different elements within the apparatus can 
allow for a wide variety of representations and modifications. At the same time, we 
can admit that the assemblage has 'a dominant strategic function' in existing to 
respond to a perceived need, that of the 'assimilation of a floating population' of 
newly-liberated countries, turning 'the poor' into a regulatable mass of governable 
subjects (Foucault 1980a: 195, Rose 1999: 49). Instead of insisting that development 
is entirely resistant to counter-evidence and will carry on unaffected by critical 
contributions, it would be more productive to analyse how elements of the 
assemblage overlap and reinforce one another at points, but also come into 
contradiction at others, producing discontinuities and fractures within the dominant 
practice and so opening up spaces within which new ways of conceiving 
'development' and 'the poor, new possibilities of resistance, can be explored 73 . 
development (see for example Rahnema 1997a, 1997b, cf. the critiques of Pieterse 2000: 180 and 
Brigg 2002: 422). 
73 Further, the idea that development is in some sense an aspect of modernisation need not be a 
damning critique. If we adopt a critical stance in arguing that Modernity is as yet still a negotiable and 
aspirational goal or an unfinished project (see for instance Latour 1993, Munck 1999, Foucault 1984b), 
then we might paraphrase Latour (11991) in saying that we have never been developed. The challenge 
is still to explore what development is and how we can become more developed in the manner we 
choose upon such reflection. 
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The analogy of development with drama is more interesting than Lohmann (1998) 
allows space for 74 . Drama will often reflect something of its context of production, 
bringing the world onto the stage, and at the same time can have real social and 
political effects, spilling out from the stage into the world. The analogy can be useful 
in looking at how the World Bank has positioned itself as a key player in the 
development drama, writing parts for actors (by devising projects for corporations and 
investment capital), directing (states upon appropriate governance activities and how 
to play their lines to prospective investors), and acting (through the production of 
development knowledge and the direct impact of its loans). It can also be useful in 
thinking about how the discursive shifts considered here might orchestrate new 
scenes, new acts, or new forms of performance within the development drama; the 
analogy will be pursued in later chapters in asking what possibilities exist for changing 
the nature of the performance of development. If the development project is perceived 
to have failed at least in part insofar as it has been conceptualised and implemented 
in a top-down manner, then we need to consider what possibilities exist for bringing 
the audience (be that n on-g overn mental organisations or other undefined civil society 
actor-networks) on-stage and turning the drama into something more akin to a piece 
of agit-prop performance art. The scripting of the piece might be reduced and a 
recognition of improvisation within it increased, producing the space for considering 
activities undertaken without external planning and intervention as forms of 
development worthy of assistance; what Susan Maiava (2002: 2-4) has described as 
opening up Intentional (grand-scale, top-down) Development to the Immanent or 
Indigenous development of 'what people are doing anyway' as agents of their own 
developmene'. 
74 Other modes of practice have been characterised in a similar manner as endlessly failing, and 
thriving on their own failure (see Osborne 1996 on liberalism, Rose & Miller 1992 on government), but 
the authors wisely do not jump to the hasty conclusion that this means such practices are 
fundamentally flawed and better abandoned. This reflexive process is rather seen as lending to the 
strength of the practice, and making it a more interesting subject of study and critical engagement. 75 For Maiava (2002: 2-4) this would require emptying ourselves of notions of what development should 
be, recognising indigenous efforts already being conducted by those to-be-developed, and working to 
support them. Attempts at doing this, she argues, could help to move intentional Development towards 
a point where the two meet. 
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Shifting Developmental Agendas and the 'Knowledge Revolution' 
We might now usefully return to the trumpeted agenda of widening development 
objectives and ask what these shifts amount to. Importantly the core of the 
development narrative has seemingly remained the same insofar as non-economic 
factors are frequently referred to as merely supplementing economic considerations, 
economic growth still being an essential and necessary condition (Stiglitz 1997a, 
2000a, Todaro 2000: 17-19, see also the criticism of Rahnema 2001: 4, Latouche 
1997). It would seem that the most significant shift has been that the traditional 
development recipe now comes with added ingredients stirred into economic growth. 
Nonetheless these changes should not be dismissed. Given that the same actors 
(multilateral organisations and developed and developing country governments) 
operate upon the same scenery (national and international economies), that much of 
the performance's logic remains unaltered is perhaps less important than that such 
changes have been achieved. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1998: 358-360) notes, 
development is no longer monitored and measured solely by increases in GNP. 
People now count in some form in all development work and more inclusive 
development indices are widely respected and used - such as the UN's Human 
Development Index, included each year in its Human Development Report, a 
mainstream counter-voice to that of the World Bank's World Development Report. 
Pieterse characterises the big divide within development as now existing between 
social development, incorporating much of the mainstream as well as alternative 
development contributions, and the number-crunching approach. Institutionally, he 
says, the line can be drawn between the UN and the IMF, with the World Bank 
straddled precariously somewhere between the two. 
James Wolfensohn's presidency at the Bank has certainly been marked by a 
professed leaning towards the 'alternative' development perspective 76 . The direction 
of the Bank under Wolfensohn's tenure can be characterised as an attempt to bring 
onboard those who have previously stood against it as critics through the propagation 
of an ethos of renewal. This has consisted of seeking to redefine the development 
76 'Two general attitudes prevail in development economics. One favors a hard-nosed - even fierce - 
approach, emphasizing sacrifices to be made ... Set against this is an alternative outlook that sees development as an essentially Iffiendly'process, based on mutually beneficial exchange ... We lean towards this alternative outlook, but also agree that it must be reinforced by sound macroeconomic 
poficies'(Woffensohn & Sen 1999). 
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agenda and the Bank's place within it for the new millennium and the 'new' economy, 
scripting the Bank an adjusted role in development, a new style for performing that 
role, and finally also articulating new content that it will perform within the role. The 
idea has been to present a 'fundamental renewal' of the Bank (1999h), aspects of 
which will be considered in greater detail in the following chapters. 
Firstly, then, the scenery on which development occurs has been argued to be 
changing, demanding the performance of a new role from the Bank amongst others 
(civil society and governments included). Wolfensohn (e. g. 1995,1997a, 1998e, 
1999g) commonly refers firstly to how official development assistance is declining 
whilst private capital investment flows to developing regions are massively 
increasing77 . This emphasises the need 
for the Bank and governments to try to 
'integrate the private sector into economies' (Wolfensohn 1998e, cf. Stiglitz 1997a) so 
that investors act as part of the social sector and not just as profit seekers, whilst also 
creating secure structures for capital's free flow, within defined limits. Another 
frequent reference for Wolfensohn in this regard is the rise or 'explosion' of new civil 
society 'players' (Wolfensohn 1997d, 1995) on the development terrain, such that the 
group as a whole becomes an essential 'participant' and 'partner in the development 
process' (Wolfensohn 1998h). In response to the growing number of development 
actors the approach has been to decentralise Bank operations and to advertise its 
performance of a new role more as a catalyst or partner than as a leader of 
development efforts: '[flor us, the future is the future of partnership' (Wolfensohn 
1997C)78. 
Concern is expressed, secondly, over the need to change the Bank's style in 
performing its role, emphasising a concern with the social alongside the economic, 
and drawing upon the theme of partnership to stress a need for countries to own their 
77 In his first Annual Meetings Address Wolfensohn (1995) referred to private capital flows as being 
'now three times official development assistance', further stressing however that over 80% of such 
flows go to only 12 countries and as such 'private investment is not yet the answer for these poorer 
countries', urging that the Bank needed to show donors that it was in their'own self-interest to maintain 
an adequate level of support'for IDA. Many would agree with Wolfenson's remarks about private 
capital; Samir Amin (1997: 23-4) remarks that the entire LIN system seems marginal by comparison to 
the Bank's funding and lending, but that bilateral funds are still more important than the amounts of 
capital dealt with by the Bretton Woods twins - and overall both these forms of aid constitute 'minor (non-negligible)' fractions of the capital market, which is dominated by private capital flows (cf. Jordan 
2000, Wilks 1999a, World Bank 2000n). The subject also featured regularly in Stiglit; es speeches of the 
time (e. g. Stiglitz 1997a, 1997c, 1998a). 
78 'Partner or'partnership' occurs in every speech recorded by James Wolfensohn on the Bank site 
from 1995 through to 1997, and very frequently after that. 
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development programmes rather than having them imposed from Washington. For 
Wolfensohn (1998e) the widening of development concerns addressed above mean 
that 'equity and social justice' need to be the main goals for taking development 
'forward', ensuring social and educational systems exist to protect the vulnerable and 
enable people to develop. This involves renegotiating the relationship between the 
Bank, the state and civil society to stress inclusion and ownership, bringing people 
onboard in designing and implementing the development agenda of their country. 
This is a first step along the path that will be considered in more detail in the following 
chapters of playing down the Bank's role and stressing that development must come 
from the people: '... it is not for the World Bank to change the behavior of a country ... 
But what we can do at the Bank is to give a lead ... it becomes a symbolic act and 
means we are a very real partner' (Wolfensohn 1998c). 
Finally, these changes in role and style mean that the Bank needs to bring a whole 
new content to the development stage. This is expressed through a will to cast off an 
old costume that has hung around its neck for the last decade, identifying it as an 
easy object of criticism, and to remould the organisation as a global development 
knowledge manager, a Knowledge Bank, the subject of the next chapter and beyond. 
Wolfensohn's presentations often function to embed and naturalise such new 
elements in the Bank's agenda - as above and as when the 'informabon gap' is 
inserted casually as a new variable into the standard statistical onslaught, framing 
new problems for developmenteers to engage with (Wolfensohn 1999h)79 . The work 
of Joseph Stiglitz (who was Vice President and Chief Economist at the World Bank 
from 1996 until late 1999) was also very influential in this regard, both in his academic 
work prior to assuming the post and his subsequent work for the Bank8o. 
79 'In the developing world, with the exception of China, 100 million more people are living in poverty 
today than a decade ago. In at least 10 countries in Africa, the scourge of AIDS has reduced life 
expectancy by 17 years. More than 33 million cases of AIDS in the world, of which 22 million are in 
Africa. 1.5 billion people still lacking access to safe water and 2.4 million children who die each year of 
waterbome diseases. 125 million children still not in primary school. 1.8 million people who die 
annually of indoor air pollution. A wodd where the inthrmation gap is widening. And the forests are 
being destroyed at the rate of an acre a second. ' (Woffensohn 1999h, my emphasis). 
8() Stiglitz has a Nobel Prize for his work in economics dealing with the importance of knowledge and 
information in market systems, and the need for careful case-by-case negotiations of the state-market 
relationship rather than the application of a prescribed economic formula. 
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The old costume of the Washington Consensus' had surrounded the Bank since the 
phrase was coined by one of its officials in 199081. Stiglitz joined the Bank criticising 
the Consensus that he felt had dominated thinking there as well as at the IMF and 
other multilateral organisations and Western governments since the beginning of the 
decade. As part of the scripting of renewal, both Wolfensohn and Stiglitz made noises 
of a break with the old consensus: 
'Today, surely, it is time to retire once and for all that tired old phrase of the 
so-called Washington Consensus. ' (Wolfensohn 1998d) 
'The so-called "Washington consensus" of U. S. economic officials, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank was formed in the 
midst of ... serious problems. Now is a good time to re-examine this consensus ... essential ingredients were also left out or underemphasized by the Washington consensus' (Stiglitz 1998a) 
Stiglitz warned in his first speech as the Bank's Chief Economist that 'there is a 
danger that the Washington consensus has become dogma and, as dogma, may 
sometimes be applied inappropriately' (Stiglitz 1997a) 82 . He argued that 
this neo- 
liberal economic doctrine was breaking down and that a shift was taking place 
towards a 'post-Washington Consensus' (see Stiglitz 1997b, 19970. The post- 
Washington Consensus was given headline status in Stiglitz's work early the next 
year (Stiglitz 1998a), said to be based on 'a better understanding of what makes 
markets work well', a recognition of their dependence upon state frameworks and 
other social institutions to enable their functioning; and thus of (limited) areas where 
state action is preferable to the direct use of markets. The broadening of the 
development agenda (especially emphases upon sustainability, equality and 
democracy) was positioned in partnership with a recognition of the need for state 
81 John Williamson (2000 2002) used the phrase to explain what he felt was a consensus emerging 
within the multilateral organisations as to the best set of policies for Latin American countries as of 
1989. He listed a series of ten points framed around macroeconomic discipline, economic openness, 
and the establishment of a market system. 82 Stiglitz was critical of the IMF's unquestioning focus on trade and capital account liberalisation in all 
cases, which he saw as laying the foundations for a crisis in the case of East Asian economies in 
particular. Once the short-term capital investments and real estate bubbles burst and the East Asian 
economies faced a severe economic downturn, he was more openly critical of the IMF's insistence 
upon economic austerity measures as a'solution' (tightening monetary policy and keeping budgets 
balanced rather than allowing for the emergence of a temporary budget deficit to ride out the economic 
storm). This placed him in a difficult position with regard to the BanWs leadership as well as the IMF's 
and the US treasury, leading to his eventual departure from the Bank, as detailed in the following 
chapter. 
instruments to promote effective market-functioning and effective regulation of 
competition and financial flows (Stiglitz 1998a) 
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Stiglitz has since been criticised by the term's creator amongst others (Williamson 
2000: 254-6,2002) for attacking a neoliberal straw-dOI184. On this view the Consensus 
was never more than a speech-friendly brand name that filled an ideological vacuum 
and characterised the decade, with many policy practices having little more in 
common than that they were designated by proponents and detractors alike as 
Consensus policies (Nafm 2000: 506-8,2002). Even so, Stiglitz's public distancing of 
both himself and the Bank from the Consensus worked as a rhetorical tool to signify a 
break with past practices and past criticism. Whatever the Consensus may have been 
intended to signify, the position that Stiglitz criticised was that which the Bank was 
perceived to occupy, by its critics at least, and so this burning of the effigy of the 
Consensus functioned as one part in the ritual of renewal we will be considering, to 
clear the air for talk of new initiatives, partnerships and a new Bank. 
Further recent shifts in development agendas have centred around the changes 
considered in the previous two chapters concerning the importance of information and 
knowledge, the embeddedness of (tacit) knowledge in the country's people and their 
interaction, and the efficacy of encouraging horizontalised, decentralised and 
networked modes of organisation in such a global project. Achieving universal basic 
education is now a central concern of all organisations subscribing to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG 2001b), whilst for a major international research, policy 
campaign and development organisation such as Oxfam International 
(www. oxfam. org) knowledge-related issues touch all of its three headline campaigns 
for 200385. US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill (2001) has meanwhile pushed a 
Knowledge Bank-friendly line in linking increased productivity to 'expanding human 
83 Stiglitz was not alone in this approach within the Bank; Burki and Perry's 1998 Latin America and 
Caribbean Department publication Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter indicated 
that forms of new institutional economic thinking were becoming reasonably well embedded within the 
Bank. 
84 Williamson (2000: 254) has argued that the term was always meant to be 'geographically and 
historically specific! (to the best set of policies for Latin America in 1989), and specifically did not 
include certain neoliberal policy proposals such as capital account liberalisation, for fear of inducing or 
exacerbating events such as the East Asian crisis (cf. Nairn 2000,2002). 
85 These three campaigns centre around providing universal basic education, ensuring intellectual 
property rights legislation does not impact negatively upon the poor, and making international trade 
more fair (which includes dealing with the impact of intellectual property rights on the right to 
manufacture more affordable versions of copyrighted drugs in developing countries). 
112 
skills and knowledge' and stressing that the Bank's loan portfolio for education 
projects must be dramatically expanded. The postulated information and knowledge 
divides receive attention as being inseparable from the economic, with all the hopes 
and dangers indicated in the previous chapter of being left behind to end up as 
excluded Fourth World zones in the new economy or of leapfrogging industrialisation 
to take a lead in the hi-tech sector (G8 2000). 
In the previous chapter we saw criticisms levelled that the knowledge economy 
stands to promote a new international division of labour wherein poorer countries' 
economies serve the capital-generating activities of the richer for minimal 
recompense, turning the focus of economic activity around to ensure that the more 
developed nations maintain their competitive advantage. The application of 
development thinking to knowledge economy concerns could thus be read as 
evidence of its 'imperialistic' tendencies, facilitating a new manner of exploitation that 
functions under the promise of future rewards. Through this shift in economic 
discourse can be seen a pattern of change and repetition in development discourse 
as countries come to be perceived as information alised and informationalising, whilst 
development critics begin to speak, in effect, of being under- information alised. Indeed 
Stiglitz, for his part, in his emphasis upon bringing developing countries into the 
scientific age, draws uncomfortably close to implying 'traditional' peoples as the 
world's children, students of a better Western way of knowing. In commenting upon 
the Bank's contributions to this discursive shift, Stiglitz stresses that as well as 
government 'policies to facilitate the transfer of technology', a 'transformation of 
society' is necessary to facilitate the new development agenda -a shift away from 
traditionalist perspectives towards a 'scientific mentality' (Stiglitz 1998a, 1998h, 
2000c). The implication is that the person with a scientific approach is freer to 
question and to learn, and that 'once one begins to question traditional beliefs, 
change is inevitable' (Stiglitz 1998h, 2000c). Stiglitz's remarks could be seen as 
evidencing the imperialistic representation of the Western scientist as 'superior 
knowing expert ... and the people being developed as ignorant passive recipients or 
objects of this knowledge' (Hobart 1993: 5). 
Yet in stressing that these changes in mindset have to come from within the subject, 
Stiglitz (2000c: 18) also draws a fine line between his approach and that of the critic, 
focussing upon enabling learning rather than merely demonstrating the truth. This 
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facilitating role fits well within a developmental outlook which is more open and 
underdetermined than the critical position indicates. Insofar as development functions 
as a tool of modernisation, and knowledge and information have become discursive 
foci in the contemporary stage of modernity, it is entirely appropriate that 
development discourse has adopted these concerns as its own. Much as the notion of 
the knowledge society can work as a rhetorical device, as noted in Chapter Three, 
heightening awareness and prioritisation of knowledge economy concerns, so the 
discursive practice of development could also function rhetorically in stressing to its 
developing country audience and participants that they need to perform under the 
new mode of competition if they hope to achieve other developmental alms. Such 
discursive manoeuvres are dangerous insofar as the production of a new international 
division of labour is one possibility, but they are not inherently bad in that this is a 
possibility (however heavily the odds are weighted) and not a determined outcome. 
The discourse could also enable countries to unlock their 'human' capital and benefit 
from competing in a new and growing economic area. To what extent the Bank's 
performance of this discourse is potentially enabling and/or constraining for the 
countries to be 'developed' ('informationalised') will be the subject of the remaining 
chapters. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that 'development is a complex and shifting 
assemblage of multiple discursive practices, an 'apparatus' of development that is 
dominated but not over-determined by concerns of modernisation, integration and 
economic growth. Reductive critiques of development as a single cohesive entity 
produce weak arguments by avoiding engagement with this complexity and the open 
and underdetermined situations it produces, presuming too simple a relation between 
dominant influences and the substance of developmental discursive practice. The 
practice of development has faced crises induced by the disparity between its 
projected hopes and the failure indicated in its own statistical constructions. In 
response the discursive practise of development has become one of adjustment, 
broadening the manner in which it is conceived to include new variables that 
contextualise do not diminish the central importance of economic 'development' or 
growth. The latest adjustments to development discourse have seen the adoption of 
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knowledge economy concerns such as bridging various divides in the hope of 
leapfrogging, the prospects and dangers of intellectual property rights, and the 
importance of universal basic education. 
The World Bank has similarly adopted an 'alternative' development agenda, and has 
most recently turned to the meeting of development and the knowledge economy. 
The shifts in emphasis at the Bank considered in Part Two are in part a reaction to 
questions which have surrounded it since its origin, but that have become 
increasingly problematic in recent years. These have affected its operational 
capacities in increasing the hostility and resistance it faces and as well as the 
reluctance of donor governments to fulfil their funding roles. The Bank has been 
crificised for spreading itself too widely without analysing whether it had a 
comparative advantage in the fields in question (Caufield 1997: 309, Wilks 2001a). 
Expansions in the Bank's programmes have been argued to occur solely as reactions 
to criticism, as attempts to put right its belated recognition of an issue's importance, or 
out of an unwillingness (by the Bank or its major Northern donors) to accept new 
major players onto the multilateral development organisation terrain. In Part Two, 
having surveyed here the state of knowledge economy and development discursive 
practices, we move on to consider the Bank's efforts to remould itself as a global 
knowledge management and a knowledge for development organisation playing a 
central role at the juncture of these discourses. Current efforts to reform and redirect 
the organisation could be regarded as being made in response to the critical 
comments noted above, aiming to redefine the Bank in a meta-governance role, 
decentralising operations and outsourcing work to semi-independent organisations, 
whilst establishing and contributing to the practices and governance of more and less 
independent actor-networks. In shaping discursive developments and the 
development terrain itself through its intellectual contributions, educational projects 
and choices of partnership, the Bank could draw back from the over-stretched 
positioning it is perceived as occupying to participate in the reproduction of a division 
of labour within a development community based around shared discursive norms 
and standards. This would, as we will see, rightly be the subject of much caution and 
criticism, but could also hold some slim potential for opening the organisation up to 
become a more open, dialogic space within which developments other than the 
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hegemonic form of grand-scale economic Development might benefit from the flows 
of financial and intellectual resources associated with the Bank. 
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PART TWO: 
Programmes of Renewal: the World Bank as a Distant Gatekeeper 
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5 
Programmes of Renewal and the Emergence of the 
Knowledge Bank 
Introduction 
This first chapter of Part Two will trace the emergence of the Knowledge Bank 
agenda through a series of reforms initiated under the new President, James 
Wolfensohn, as from 1996. What I shall call Wolfensohn's Project of Renewal was 
designed to personalise the development story and present the Bank as the friendly 
face of development; putting smiles on the faces of children through its focus upon 
participation, ownership and consensus rather than the harsh financial face it had for 
years personified for its critics. Elements of the Bank's history and politics will be 
summarised in outlining the context of the Renewal, and three programmes from 
within it will be considered in noting how the organisation endeavours to position itself 
centrally within a 'new' development through a series of problematisations. 
The Bank's discursive practice of Renewal is noted to incorporate something of all 
four streams of knowledge economy/society discourse mentioned in Chapter Two, 
within two dominant senses of the Knowledge Bank. Firstly a Knowledge for 
Development Bank (K4DB)86 bringing together something of the post-industrial and 
futurist tendencies, concerned with the increasing importance of acquiring and using 
knowledge for economic activities and hence for development. Secondly a 
Knowledge Management and Networking Bank (KMNB) concerned with the need to 
decentralise operations, to outsource and partner in seeking to maximise efficacy and 
efficiency and to coordinate this dispersal of operations through management of the 
development players involved and the knowledge and information they produce. The 
concern to become a global knowledge management organisation is a central thread 
weaving together the programmes of the Wolfensohn Project. 
86 This acronym is an adaptation of the Banks own MID branding used in the 'K4D Program' and 'K4D 
Community' of the World Bank Institute, discussed in the next chapter. 
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The following chapter will consider the KMNB whilst this chapter will focus upon the 
K4DB in terms of what knowledge and information are for the Bank and how it sees 
itself as using them in its development endeavours. The World Development Report 
1998199: Knowledge for Development (World Bank 1998a) launched this new image 
to a global audience, and so forms the subject of the second part of the chapter. One 
dominant trend within the Bank's performance of 'knowledge for development' is 
observed to involve the conflation of information and knowledge, in conceptualising a 
commodifiable form of capital, within an extension of liberal economic discourse. This 
is argued to tend towards reproducing several governmental knowledge 
economy/society discursive trends through the lens of a broadening development 
agenda (leapfrogging, intellectual property rights, and expanding the realms of 
potential capital activities). The presence of, and potential for, developing alternative 
perspectives and so encouraging greater difference within the patterns of repetition, is 
also considered here and again in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
Origins, Structure and Governance of the World Bank: Actor-Networks 
and Project-Networks 
The World Bank is the largest and oldest of the multilateral development bankS87 . Its 
first and main arm (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
IBRD) was established when its constitutional Articles of Agreement were signed at 
the Bretton Woods meetings in 194488. The World Bank Group also comprises in the 
main four other distinct organisational bodies: the International Development Agency 
(IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investments 
Guarantees Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). World Bank' refers to the combined actions of the IBRD and IDA, 
87 Other multilateral development banks include the Inter-American Development Bank established in 
1959, the African Development Bank in 1963, the Caribbean Development Bank in 1970, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, created in 1981. 
'38 The Articles of Agreement of the IMF and IBRD were adopted at Bretton Woods in July 1944 by a 
meeting of forty-five governments, but it was nearly eighteen months later before these became 
effective after being signed by twenty-eight governments. The Bank was not on the main agenda of the 
meetings, but Catherine Gwin (1997: 197-8) argues that plans for an international bank to facilitate 
investment flows by sharing in private investors' risks had been a pet U. S. government project since 
1941, and so the notion was bound to arise at such a significant gathering. Gwin cites the then US 
Treasury Secretary's stated aim as being to move the financial centre of the word 'from London and 
Wall Street to the United States Treasury' (the IBRD's chosen base was Washington), much to the 
chagrin of other attendees whose position was weakened by the fact that the US was fronting up most 
of the initial capital. 
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whilst World Bank Group' refers to all five bodies. IBRID is the main lending body of 
the Bank Group and IDA acts as the soft-loan adjunct of its operations. By 'in the 
main' I refer to the fact that over the years the Group has become involved in 
partnerships, and has established and housed within itself an array of organisations 
with varying degrees of autonomy. In so doing it has constructed, coordinated and 
embedded itself within a series of extended development networks. Below is given a 
very brief outline of the five main bodies' functions, before we return to this point. 
IBRD makes loans at near-commercial rates to developing countries for projects and 
economic adjustment programmes; it is currently made up of 184 member countries 
(World Bank 2003a) which are ascribed Part I or Part 11 status according to whether 
they are creditors or borrowers respectively. Only member countries can borrow, and 
becoming a member involves making a contribution to IBRD's capital base". IBRD 
loans are made at near-market rates to middle-income countries and poorer countries 
with secure credit histories (it will also lend to private enterprises in a member country 
if the government agrees to be a guarantor)90. The IDA is a soft-loan window of the 
IBRD, established in 1960, that provides long-term capital loans at concessional rates 
to the poorest countries. Seventy-nine countries, accounting for just over half the total 
population of developing countries, are eligible to borrow from IDA (2.3 billion people 
or 53%, World Bank 20010. IDA is funded mostly by contributions ('replenishments') 
from the governments of Part I member countries. 
IFC, MIGA and ICSID are all stressed to have their own capital bases and country 
membership, but to share in the Bank 'development mandate' of promoting economic 
growth in developing countries (World Bank 1998f: vii-ix). The IFC, established in 
1956, is commissioned to catalyse private sector investment in developing countries 
89 Couribies do this by buying shares up to a level denoted by an assessment of the size and state of 
the country's economy. Countries only pay in a proportion (about 7%) of the shares' denoted 
cost, with the remainder being held in reserve as 'callable capital' (Thibodeau 1996), 
guaranteed to be paid on demand if the Bank requires funds due to defaulting debtors or a 
collapse in its credit rating. 
go In its original manifestation the Bank was intended for post-war reconstruction of European 
economies damaged by the war, but soon after its establishment it became clear that this job would 
require resources far outstripping those of the Bank. IBRD made its first loan, to France, in March 
1947. Within a month of this first approval, US Secretary of State George Marshall proposed the 
European Recovery Program - the Marshall Plan - and as a consequence the Bank began to turn its 
attention to the development field. In March 1948 it made its first loan to a developing country (Chile), 
and in September 1950 made its first loan to an African country in lending to Ethiopia (Kapur et al. 
1997b: 1217-1220). 
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and build confidence in areas for investment through its participation (World Bank 
2003b). It has been argued that the IDA and IFC were established as political 
concessions to divert attention from a UN initiative (the Special UN Fund for 
Economic Development, SUNFED, established in 1959) working on a one country - 
one vote basis (Kapur et al. 1997c: 152-4,1171, cf. Gwin 1997, Caufield 1997, Bello 
1999)91. MIGA became fully operational in 1988, its role being to facilitate 
international investment flows by offering political risk insurance covering 
expropriation, civil disturbances and currency inconvertibility. MIGA is comparatively 
small compared with other Bank Group organ isationS92. ICSID was created in 1966, 
again with the intention of promoting international investment-capital flows. The 
purpose in this instance was to provide facilities for the reconciliation and arbitration 
of investment disputes between member countries and investors from other member 
countries. ICSID presents itself as 'one of the main mechanisms' for settling 
investment disputes under four multilateral trade and investment treatieS93 and 
dealing with 'over 900 bilateral investment treaties' (World Bank 2003e), positioning it 
as a significant player in negotiating the terms of market governance and regulation. 
This outline gives a first indication of how the Bank Group, and the Bank, might better 
be conceived as an assemblage of actors rather than a simple actor as such. The 
Bank could then be considered as a network of actors, except that within each of 
these 'actors' lies a host of programmes and initiatives bound formally by the Bank's 
minimally-defined mandate, interacting with other parts of the organisation, and with 
parts of other organisations, both within and without the Bank Group (something that 
will be explored further in Chapter SiX)94. We might then think of the Bank as a 
composite or 'network of networks' (Castells 2000b: 22). Yet although this would 
91 The IFC and IDA were both proposed in 1951 by an advisory group to President Truman, in what is 
argued to have been a means of strengthening underdeveloped countries seen as strategically 
important to the US in gaining an advantage over the Soviets during the Cold War (Gwin 1997: 205). 
92 in 1999 MIGA was made up of less than 100 staff and a capital stock of $1 billion (Bank Information 
Center 1999a: 4). Nonetheless it advertises itself as having facilitated an estimated $41 billion in 
Foreign Direct Investments (World Bank 2003c). 
93 The North American Free Trade Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty, the Cartagena Free Trade 
Agreement and the Colonia Investment Protocol of Mercosur. 94 The Bank is, for instance, organised into six operational regions, each with its own Vice-President 
(Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South Asia) as well as the five networks that will be 
discussed in the next chapter, and a number of other organisational units responsible for coordinating 
operations, external relations and organisational evaluations (Operations Policy and Strategy (OPS), 
Operational Core Services (OCS), External Affairs and United Nations Affairs (EXT), and the 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED)). 
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seem to capture more effectively the multiple levels of association that can be seen 
within and around it, we need also remember that the Bank and the Group can still 
speak with one voice - for formal occasions, programme statements, or the front- 
page of its website for instance - reminding us of the organisation's actor-face. 
As Latour (1999: 19) has remarked of the agency/structure debate, it might be better 
to refuse the apparent contradictions of the actor and/or network, thinking of these as 
but 'two faces of the same phenomenon' and moving on to consider how ideas and 
practices circulate within, outside, across and through the boundaries that formally 
designate 'the Bank' or'the Group'. Similarly in speaking of the Bank's programmes 
of action the categories of projects and networks break down to become poles within 
a space of what I will term project-networks. 'Projects' depend upon establishing 
connections between different groups of actors inside and outside the Bank, and 
'networks' display something of the programmatic substance and structured 
governance expected more of a specific project. Often, as will be shown in the 
following chapters, Bank-fostered 'network's are developed as projects and opened 
up to external partnership only once their mode of operation has been reasonably 
well established, a point which both stems from and lends itself towards the 
maintenance and management of a single identifiable public'face' of the organisation. 
These conceptual-terminological pointers are useful in thinking about the multiple 
'Knowledg e Bank' discourses considered in this chapter, as well as in addressing the 
politics of networks and questions of how to open the Bank up to critical engagement 
in later chapters. 
Dominant Influences upon the Bank 
'. . the Bank is not a monolith and significant differences of emphasis exist, even among major documents. ' (Stern 1993: 23) 
The Bank describes itself as a 'global cooperative' owned by its members (World 
Bank 2002d, 1999e). Its governance structure comprises, in descending order of 
seniority, a Board of Governors (one per member-country, usually senior financial 
executives and ministers), a Board of twenty-four Executive Directors to whom the 
Governors delegate their power, and then Bank management. The Board of 
Governors meets once a year, each Governor having two hundred and fifty 'basic 
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votes', plus one for each stock-share the country has bought as its contribution to the 
IBRD's capital base95. The G-8 countries hold just over 45% of IBRD and IDA votes, 
with the US having the largest shareholding, enough to guarantee it a veto on 
changes to the Bank's Articles of Agreement (16.39% of IBRD and 13.88% of IDA as 
of November 2003, World Bank 2003r). The Executive Directors then oversee the 
Bank's work more closely, meeting several times a week to review loan projects and 
policies and reporting back to the Governors. The five member countries with the 
largest voting share nominate a member directly to the Board of Executive Directors - 
the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK - and three more countries have 
sufficient voting power to choose to represent themselves (China, Saudi Arabia and 
the Russian Federation). This leaves 176 countries forming voting blocs to select their 
representative from the sixteen remaining seats, in both the IBRD and IDA (World 
Bank 2003r)9'5. In theory a hierarchical chain of monitoring and responsibility operates 
through Executive Directors - management - staff. However the Directors have been 
argued to be too distant both from Bank operations and from the many countries 
some of them represent, rubber-stamping an increasing number of decisions as the 
Bank's mandate widens, and doing little in the way of monitoring or control (Woods 
2001: 84-7, Ascher 1983). 
Although the Group's heterogeneity complicates speaking of 'the Bank' as a subject 
in its own right, a limited set of cultural norms and practices do carry through its 
operations with enough dominance to justify addressing key manoeuvres, such as 
those considered in this work, as representative of the Bank or the Group as a 
whole 97 . Notes of caution have been aired against seeing the Bank as a machine 
95 The basic votes were a nominal gesture of formal equality instituted at the Bank's creation; the 
importance of these basic votes has varied over time, with their relative decline over the past 45 years 
indicating the growing centralization of Bank control in the Northern countries. Basic votes initially 
accounted for 11.3% of the total voting power in 1946, rising to 14% by 1955, and now constituting 
roughly a mere 3% (Woods 2000: 828; 2001: 87). 
96 For instance, in 2001 Bassary Toure from Mali could cast 2.01 % of the total votes in speaking for 24 
countries (World Bank 2000j: 119-120). The politics of the voting structure is highlighted by noting that 
at the time of the Bank's establishment several countries wished to contribute more and thereby have a 
larger say in the institution's running, but were disallowed: 'Australia, France, India, and Iran ... each insisted on recording their complaint of an inadequate quota' (Woods 2000: 828-30). 
97 For instance the IFC, ICSID and MIGA are formally 'legally separate'from the Bank (IBRD and IDA) 
with their own governing boards (Bank Information Center 1999a: 2), although this separation can in 
many senses be regarded as merely a technical formality. Legal separation allows each institution to 
pursue distinct (and perhaps conflicting) policy paths given their different client bases, and gives 
independence to their credit ratings such that other group members are not affected by borrowers 
defaulting on I BIRD or IDA debts. However the President and Board Members of the Bank, IFC and 
MIGA are 'identical' (Bank Information Center 1999a: 2). The Bank's President is also Chairman of 
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working systematically in the interests of capital; because of 'disconnect' within the 
Bank hierarchy it is argued that the organisation cannot be dominated solely by 
Northern donor opinions and agendas (Rich 2002: 50-1)98. Furthermore the 
organisation's size, management structures, and strong organisational culture mean 
that outside influences are frequently transformed when taken onboard by the Bank, 
and the diversity of voices active within the organisation mean it needs to be read at 
an internal level as a complex meeting of divergent interests (cf. Leiteritz 2002, 
Bebbington et al. forthcoming). Yet however indirect the outcome, the Bank is heavily 
influenced by Northern govern mental-econom ic interests out of a pragmatic concern 
for self-preservation. Major statements of intent such as Presidential speeches and 
the annual World Development Report might thus be read as expressing a form of 
'intellectual consensus' (Ascher 1983: 425). Three threads of influence could be 
identified as the professional-cultural, person al- presidential, and political-financial. 
Considering firstly the professional-cultural influences, it has been noted that from 
wherever they may originate, the great majority of Bank staff are educated in the 
United States and the UK in economics (Stern & Ferreira 1993, cf. Wade 2001a)99. 
This dominance of staff from the same educational background helps contextualise 
the emergence of an epistemological consensus around market-led economic growth 
as the most effective means of achieving development, and the marginalisation or 
exclusion of alternative voices. This can be illustrated through a series of four 
dismissals, reprimands, or exclusions that have been exercised over staff in recent 
years. The first of these involves a name that has recurred a number of times so far in 
our exploration, that of the Bank's former Vice President and Chief Economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz. Having been critical of the IMF's 'Washington Consensus'-style 
approach to the East Asian economic crisis, Stiglitz left the Bank having officially 
ICSID's Administrative Council and its Secretary-General is the World Bank's Legal Vice President 
(World Bank 2003e). The Council consists of one representative from each state which has signed up 
to its convention; all members must also be members of the Bank, and by default each country's Bank 
Governor is also their Council representative unless another preference is declared (World Bank 
2003e). 
98 Disconnects between Executive Board government representatives and Bank managers, 
Washington-based and country-based staff, policy and project staff. For instance Ascher (1983: 423- 
436) notes that policy and project staff have wide discretion as to how orders are 'absorbed' and 
adapted to leave little trace of the intended change. Staff are also argued to have an 'information 
advantage' over managers which facilitates this absorption, passing appropriate feedback up the 
monitoring chain whilst little changes on the ground. Thirdly, staff often contribute to shifts in 
development thinking from their areas of expertise, making 'influential declaratory statements as to 
what types of policy are necessary and desirable' (Woods 2000: 833, cf. 2001). 
99 The ratio of economists to non-economists has been estimated at around 28: 1 (Malhotra 1999: 42). 
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'resigned' in November 1999 amid widespread speculation based on unconfirmed 
reports that Lawrence Summers, then US Secretary to the Treasury, had asked for 
Stiglitz to be silenced on threat of President Wolfensohn abandoning hopes of gaining 
a second term in office (Moberg 2000, Ambrose 2000a). Stiglitz was kept on as a 
special advisor to Wolfensohn, but after classifying IMF staff as 'third-rank students 
from first-rate universities' in a periodical article (Stiglitz 2000b) all official contact 
between Stiglitz and the Bank was terminated, to more widespread claims from critics 
that this was the doing of Summers. 
Lawrence Summers held Stiglitz's position at the Bank from 1991 to 1993 during a 
policy period dominated by Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and so-called 
'Washington Consensus' thinking. Summers became infamous in the critical 
community for a leaked internal memo in 1991 arguing that the Bank should 
encourage the migration of dirty industries to developing countries on the basis that it 
made good economic sense (see e. g. George & Sabelli 1994: 96-111, Whirled Bank 
2001)100. Following the leaking of the memo it was explained as an idle thought 
experiment, but the moment nonetheless defined his tenure for external critics, and 
as Clinton's US Secretary to the Treasury the face of Summers has remained 
prominent in the minds of those who complain that the US maintains an overweening 
influence over the Bank. A catchphrase portrayal of the Knowledge Bank agenda 
might be seen as an attempt to strengthen the Bank's 'friendly' Stiglitz (social 
development) face over and against the more strictly financial Summers 'bank' face 
that has characterised it over the past twenty years especially. It is not so much 
Summers or Stiglitz in themselves that are important, as the caricatures they perform 
of different camps within the Washington-based governmental-economic elite. 
The second example of professional-cultural influence involves Ravi Kanbur, who 
was brought to the Bank by Stiglitz in 1998 to be the lead writer for the World 
Development Report 200012001: Attacking Poverty (World Bank 20OOv). By mid- 
2000, some months before the Report's publication, Kanbur had resigned and written 
a letter to the Bank's management expressing concerns about unreasonable attempts 
100 Because economic costs in terms of lost earnings from pollution would be less in countries with 
lower incomes; because the marginal costs of incremental increases in pollution would be less in 
countries that are to begin with less polluted; and finally because the demand for a clean environment 
will have a high income elasticity and so demand for industries to use costly pollution-reducing 
technologies would be much higher in the richer countries. 
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to tone down its criticism of the effects of globalisation on the poor. Once again those 
in the critical community claimed that it was Summers who had been involved in re- 
writing these sections (Wilks 2000). Thirdly and fourthly are two cases that made the 
Bank's own Staff Association Newsletter (World Bank Staff Association 2001: 1-2). 
William Easterly was a senior research officer at the Bank who had an editorial 
published in the Financial Times for a book in which he criticised the major post-war 
development strategies for their ineffectiveness. The book had been written with 
support from the Bank (allowances for writing on paid-time and the book sold in the 
Bank's store), and the editorial was marked as personal opinion. He was nonetheless 
put on leave without pay for two months by the Bank's Ethics Office for having 
disregarded 'Media Guidelines', before finding other work. Ashraf Ghani was also put 
on leave without pay for an opinion piece in the Financial Times. He was later 
supported by James Wolfensohn and reinstated, but the Staff Association Newsletter 
was strongly critical of whether these cases indicated that staff were supposed to 
'check their civil rights at the door when they join the Bank Group'. Other senior Bank 
staff have meanwhile written of these affairs that 'the Bank is a raucous debating 
society', in comparison to the IMF at least, and that the mentioned exits would have 
been unnecessaryif the transgressors had shown a little more decorum and restraint' 
(Ellerman 2001: 3)101. This illustrates how whilst Bank culture by no means over- 
determines the work of its staff, and many pockets of independent thought will 
survive, the predominance of one particular mindset will serve to make it harder for 
dissenting voices to be heard and given their due - with even generous critics seeing 
their voices of dissent as lacking decorum. 
Speculation upon the Summers-Wolfensohn relationship highlights the second notion 
of personal-presidential influences upon the Bank. The Bank's location in Washington 
further embeds cultural and personal influences upon the organisation, as well as the 
US's choosing every Bank President. Finally, the standing of 'majority voting' or veto 
101 Ellerman, a senior economist within the Bank, has commented of the departures of Stiglitz, Kanbur 
and Easterly that outsiders might see the Bank as comparable to 'the Catholic Church at the time of 
the Spanish Inquisition', perhaps in reference to Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli's highly-regarded 
work Faith and Credit (1994: 5), which made use of the analogy in referring to a 'rigidly structured 
hierarchy preaching and imposing' its doctrine with a 'quasi-religious mode of self-justification'. 
Ellerman (2001: 3-4) is also more critical at times In this piece, warning of the dangers of the Bank 
adopting Official Views, thus mixing truth and power in such ways as that'critical reason gives way to 
bureaucratic conformity; a community of development researchers gives way to a company of 
intellectual clerks; and honest and open debate gives way to an organizational ideal of agreement, 
accommodation, and 'playing with the team"'. 
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privileges ensure that the buck for all fundamental decisions regarding the Bank stops 
with the US, the only country with sufficient votes to hold a veto. The cut-off point for 
making changes to the Bank's Articles of Agreement, its core constitution, was 
originally set at 80% of votes on the Board of Executive Directors, with the US holding 
safely over 20% of votes. As the US drew close to no longer holding 20% of votes 
through reductions in its contributions and a rise in the number of new members, it 
pushed to raise the majority voting level for such changes to 85% and so maintain its 
veto position, before selling some of its votes to China in 1997 (Woods 2000: 833, 
Gwin 1997: 238). These examples drive the argument that for as long as the Bank is 
housed in the US, which holds veto over major organisational changes and 
nominates every Bank President, and as long as it draws heavily upon Northern 
academic institutions for its staff, the organisation is unlikely ever to grow too distant 
from the foreign policy lines of its major Northern donors. 
The political-financial aspects of influences upon the Bank concern its establishing 
flows of investment capital North-South- North through development projects. Many 
critics have pointed out how much the governments of Northern countries gain from 
World Bank operations in developing countries. These dominant shareholding 
members are often home to the largest corporations that can win production contracts 
associated with project loans, those who can profit from investing in Bank bonds, and 
the financial speculators who can benefit from the liberalisation of capital markets that 
the Bank and IMF have attached as condition alities to loans in the past (Woodward 
1998: 46, Korten 1995)1 02 . Furthermore, around 80% of the consultancy jobs needed 
to establish Bank projects are carried out by Northern consultants. The argument is 
that the Bank's most powerful members gain contracts 'roughly in proportion to their 
shareholdings in the Bank, and once consultancy work and interest payments to 
bondholders are factored in, Northern countries make a clear financial benefit from 
Bank-style 'development (Caufield 1997: 243-9) 103 . 
102 In putting work out to tender the Bank discounts bids from the borrowing country's firms by 10-15% 
so as to give them a better chance of competing with international corporations; but even so, only 
around 44% of payments go to local firms (mostly for construction work), with the rest going to foreign 
companies mainly from donor countries (Korten 1995: 81). The Bank has before now been sold as a 
great deal for the US by investment companies in terms of contracts obtained for project work. See 
Thibodeau (1996) for a critical reaction to this point from a Republican (CATO Institute) perspective. 103 A 'private sector agenda' has been argued to predominate within the Bank because of the fast 
growth of MIGA and the IFC in comparison to the IBRD and IDA (Durbin 1998: 1, cf. Bank Information 
Center 1999a, Wilks 1999a). Gwin (1997: 270-1) further cites a 1982 US Treasury Report noting that 
the multilateral development banks have contributed to'the achievement of our global economic and 
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Programmes of Renewal 
A question which recurs throughout literature upon the Bank, given the assemblage of 
Northern economic interests who can potentially benefit from its work, is whether it 
ultimately ought to be seen - and whether it sees itself - as a bank or a development 
04 organisation (e. g. see Amin 1997: 24, Birdsall 2000, Bello 1999, Korten 1995)1 . 
Referring back to observations made in the previous chapter, the supposed tension 
between these two roles can be better conceived as existing between the Bank's 
practising different understandings of development, since in its more dominant 
Northern-governmental economic varieties the roles of 'bank' and 'development 
organisation' can become barely distinguishable. The Bank's position seems 
ambiguous at least in part because a variety of individually modified 'development's 
are practised within its broad frame. Yet poverty and debt are the Bank's business, 
and without these it would have to either radically change its operations or cease to 
exist. In terms of measuring World Bank performance, then Vice President for 
Development Policy Jo Ritzen (2000: 1) stressed in a speech that the 'ultimate 
measure' of performance must be 'development - and more specifically, poverty 
alleviation'. He then quickly added that a second important measure must be the 'rate 
of return on equity', given that 'a necessary condition for the institution's survival' is 
that it maintains its status as a sound investment for bond holders' 05 . 
Yet even with 
this concern to ensure the North makes good financial returns on its endeavours, a 
pattern of unwillingness to fulfil the periodical replenishments of IDA funds has 
emerged in the US political system ever since the second such set of donations 
(Gwin 1997: 209). 
In June 1995 James Wolfensohn acceded to the Bank's Presidency, taking control of 
an organisation 'in crisis' (Rich 2002: 27,2000, Caufield 1997: 310-3); facing 
problems with renewals of IDA funding and critical reviews of poor project 
financial objectives and thereby ... our long term political/strategic interests', indicating the political- financial stakes placed in the Bank. 
104 This relates in turn to whether the Bank's main clients are its donor governments, borrower 
governments, private capital interests or the poor (Rich 2002: 51-2). Wolfensohn (11 997i) has previously 
referred to 'the 4.7 billion people who are my clients' whilst other Bank documentation refers to client 
counti1es (Ritzen 2000). 
105 The Bank has made a profit every year since its establishment, and holds an AAA credit rating on 
US markets (World Bank 1999e, 2000n, BIC 1999b). 
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achievement records and budget overruns'06, and struggling to reposition itself in a 
development world increasingly dominated by private capital flows, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The Bank had been much criticised in the past for displaying 
arrogance, secrecy and intellectual bullheadedness which were seen as resulting in 
failed projects and policy programmes (see for instance George & Sabelli 1994, 
Caufield 1997, Amin 1997, Strange 1996, Mehta 1999a, 1999b, Fine 1999, Caddell 
1999, Wade 2002a, 2001a, Rich 1994, Korten 1995). In part due to such criticism 
from both within and without, reform had already become an organ isafi onal ly- 
normalised phenomena, with the Bank undergoing a series of at least five substantial 
reorganisations focused upon re-thematising and re-prioritising its organisational 
structure and operations (cf. Pincus & Winters 2002a); nonetheless an internal study 
in 1996 rated over one third of the Bank's public sector reform and privatisation 
operations unsatisfactory (George & Sabelli 1994). The Bank had thus been 
struggling to change both itself and its public image in recent years, with some 
relative success, adopting each new development thematic that became consolidated 
in the discourse; placing emphasis upon basic needs, environmental sustainability, 
women and children, democratic participative governance, and so forth. Wolfensohn's 
accession was coloured by talk of further change. 
One year after Wolfensohn took control he began his own Project, proposing the 
Strategic Compact (World Bank 1997a, 1997b, hereafter 'the Compact') as a plan for 
Bank renewal'07 . The Compact constitutes the first in a series of problematisations 
(Callon 1986) studied here, engaged by the Bank in seeking to position itself more 
centrally within the development field. That is, consolidating allies in its agenda by 
translating other development actors' problems into the Bank's frame of reference 
and arguing that the best way for them to progress is by working with the Bank in 
pursuit of its plans (cf. Rose & Miller 1992: 183-5). The need for the Compact was 
framed within the context of changes to the international development scene 
106 The 'Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact report (commonly known as the 
Wapenhans Report after its lead author) on the Bank found that the vast majority of financial conditions 
placed upon its loans were not being complied with; a result of what the report termed the Bank's 
'approval culture' -a tendency to push-money-out-of-the-door rather than follow up projects in their 
implementation and assessment (Bankwatch 2001: 6, George 1994: 224). In 1995 IDA, the Bank's 
soft-loan wing which provides longer-term loans to the poorest countries at a nominal rate of interest 
and with a grace period before repayments have to begin, was due for its tenth replenishment through 
contributions by donor countries. This was being held back by budgetary wrangles in the US Congress. 
107 This was approved and engaged by mid-1 997, with the implementation period officially ending in 
2000. 
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mentioned in the previous chapter that challenged the operations of the Bank and 
others; the growing availability of multiple capital sources for developing countries; 
the broadening of the development agenda to include social, environmental and 
governance concerns; the proliferation of 'playersin development (non-g overn mental 
and private organisations); and the information revolution and post-industrial 
economic practices raising standards of performance and making knowledge central 
to development (World Bank 1997a). Demand for Bank services was perceived to be 
stagnating and its effectiveness was felt to have declined. The Compact was thus 
presented as a Renewal to refuel current business activities, refocus the development 
agenda, retool the Bank's knowledge base, and revamp institutional priorities (World 
Bank 2002a, 1998b, 1997a, 1997b). 
The Compact centred around two main themes of change embodying both internally 
and external ly-oriented concerns, alongside a third of self-monitoring and analysis. 
The two main themes were firstly to institute a knowledge management/sharing 
culture within the organisation and so consolidate the Bank as a leading partner in 
development and governance efforts, and secondly to catalyze a discursive shift 
within the development community towards a greater awareness of the centrality of 
knowledge to development. Instituting a knowledge management culture within the 
Bank was incorporated within the objective of consolidating the Bank's position as a 
premier global knowledge management organisation and so a development leader 
providing 'just-in-time, just-enough knowledge on call' to staff and partners (World 
Bank 2001b, 1997a: 20, cf. 1997c). This in turn connected with other elements of 
standard contemporary economic and management discourse concerned to improve 
responsiveness and effectiveness; flattening internal hierarchies, decentralising and 
networking'08 in order to encourage selectivity and partnering; and pursuing areas of 
comparative advantage to lower costs, raise productivity, improve capacity, speed up 
service provision and tailor services to needs (World Bank 1997a, 2002a). The 
second outlined intention to catalyze a discursive shift in encouraging knowledge 
economy thinking from clients and partners would also thereby position the Bank as a 
108 Four themed trans-country and departmental networks were established in 1997 to facilitate 
communications and knowledge sharing; the Human Development (HD), Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development (ESSD), Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure (FPSI), and the Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) networks (World Bank 19980.1 will give more detail of 
these and explore their significance in the following chapter examining structural developments under 
the Knowledge Bank programme. 
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leader in the new development agenda (World Bank 2001b: 3,27,1997a). The third 
element of the Compact plan involved designing and implementing new tools for 
measuring the Bank's performance, perhaps as a pre-emptive response to the 
anticipated criticism that this would be yet another ineffective reorganisation, but also 
indicating the organisation's technicised mode of discursive operations. Tougher 
analysis of project proposals and tougher monitoring of project implementation using 
'a scorecard of performance indicators ... a set of 
development indicators ... regular, 
objective surveys' (World Bank 1997a: 27) have been encouraged on the 
understanding that better measurements lead to better planning, which in turn leads 
to better policy-making and so to better development'09. 
The Comprehensive Development Framework (Wolfensohn 1999n, hereafter 'the 
Development Framework'), unveiled in January 1999, was a second initiative 
undertaken partly in response to the feeling that progress in achieving the Compacts 
goals was solid but slow (World Bank 1998c, 1998d). It was therefore designed to 
build upon Compact themes such as recognising the broadening development 
agenda, and encouraging selectivity and partnership in the pursuit of comparative 
advantage. The Development Framework proposes a Bank-defined matrix of actor 
groups and focus areas to improve coordination of development efforts and facilitate 
monitoring and evaluation. Its 'balance sheet' conceptualisation featuring 
macroeconomic considerations on one side and social, environmental and other 
concerns on the other promotes the Bank's new agenda as being more inclusive and 
holistic; whilst the outlined list of 'players in the development field' (governments, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, 'civil society in all its forms' including NGOs and 
others, and the private sector) provides a public statement of willingness to co- 
operate and work in partnership with all relevant concerned development actors 
(Wolfensohn 1999n: 4,21-2). The Development Framework thereby also emphasises 
'proactive knowledge management by client countries who take 'ownership' of their 
development programmes"O, building upon decentralisation and partnership 
narratives (outsourcing programme definition and implementation) and emphasising 
the importance of the new 'knowledge' development in which the Bank has been 
109 Later reports on the Compact frequently seek to demonstrate programme implementation success 
through reference to a series of quantified variables upon service provision quality and percentage 
increases in staff and projects classified successful (World Bank 1997c, 1998b, 2002a). 
110 'A key lesson of the past 50 years is that development cannot be done to a country; it must be done 
by the country' (World Bank 2001 c: 32). 
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seeking to craft itself a central role (Wolfensohn 1999n: 9,29). In this way the two 
main Compact themes of consolidating the Bank's position and catalysing a 
discursive shift can be heard ringing strongly through the literature of the 
Development Framework as it attempts to organise and prioritise changes in the 
widening development agenda and formalise a division of labour between 
development actors, stabilising and normalising development identities and activities. 
Whatever criticisms may be levelled at the Development Framework for segregating 
the broadened development agenda away from the core macroeconomic analysis"', 
it at the least presents the organisation's value-system in a more transparent format 
than had been achieved previously and so functions in opening up a space for critical 
intervention. The documentation states that its implementation will require 'changes in 
the culture and attitudes of all partners, including the Bank, but softens this imposing 
tone by asserting that the Development Framework is based upon a 'natural 
evolution' of opinion within the development community towards consensus upon 
core principles (World Bank 1999e, cf. 1998c, 1998d, 1999b, 2000a). In parallel with 
the criticism that the Bank has too often pursued economic growth at the expense of 
social considerations, it states that 'direct observations ... well documented 
in 
evaluations from across the World Bank' (World Bank 1999e) emphasise that the 
social has to be treated as a central aspect of development. A lack of 'harmony' in the 
past between the Bank and others in the development community is noted, but a call 
is made for the 'name-calling' to stop as groups recognise their common goals 
(Wolfensohn 1997g). In this way the Development Framework is positioned as 
leading a movement of the development community' 12 . 
111 The matrix form has been argued to fracture and discourage the consideration of cumulative effects 
of cross-cufting issues such as gender, environment and rural development (Wilks 1999b). The fear is 
that it may undermine alternative perspectives by facilitating 'weak sustainability' trade-offs between 
the 'costs' and 'benefits' of development, with traditionally defined economic growth treated as a 
positive and its side-effects taken into account only through monetary 'guesstimates' discounted over 
time. It is argued that this will sideline alternative understandings of development and the various 
agendas and priorities they seek to address. This criticism could be levelled at many such attempts to 
categorise and analyse a terrain consisting of multiple concerns and interests; the contested issue with 
the Framework is less the specific programme of analysis than the dominant value system upon which 
the Bank's whole conception of development is based. 112 Avoiding any expression of humility that might seem apposite to its critics the Bank continues being 
'proud of our history and of the role we have played' in contributing 'significantly to the betterment of 
mankind and to the improvement in the lives of many in poverty' (Wolfensohn 1999n: 1,3). The 
dismissal of criticism as name-calling indicates something of an unwillingness to openly engage (at the 
Presidential level at least) with those who have serious problems with the Bank's operations. 
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The Strategic Framework (World Bank 2001 a, 2001 c) was the third programme in this 
project of renewal, a 3-5 year programme begun in 2001. The Compact was the 
beginning of a process of change, but change can be slow. The Compact 
Assessment (World Bank 2001b: 8 my emphasis) stresses that 'the beginning of a 
change in some aspects of Bank culture' has been achieved, leaving much more to 
be done 'to turn the Bank into the highly aligned, efficient and performance-based 
institution that the Compact envisioned'. The Strategic Framework is thus set as 
consolidating and pushing forward changes achieved through the Compact and 
Development Framework, as well as aligning the Bank with the Millennium 
Development Goals (IVIDG 2001a), the broadened UN-sanctioned development 
shopping list mentioned in the previous chapter. The Strategic Framework asserts 
that the Goals establish a new common ground for pursuing partnerships in 
development work, and that the Bank will play a 'convening and facilitating role' 
employing its knowledge producing and management capacities to overcome 
'statistical problems' faced in 'measuring progress' towards the Goals (World Bank 
2001a: 3-4). It has since been active in establishing the Goals' websites (IVIDG 
2001a) and new partnering ventures for knowledge production and management 
detailed in the next chapter. 
Continuity within Renewal 
The notion of encouraging 'ownership' was in one sense a notable break with many 
past activities, after years of providing loans with policy-based conditionalities decided 
primarily in Washington' 13 (although as we shall see throughout the rest of this work 
the cosmetics of changes are often applied quickly in adjusting the language and 
rhetoric of the Bank's public face whilst the culture, momentum and operations of the 
organisation need time and encouragement - or stricture - from a variety of sources 
to align themselves with any such 'break'). The Wolfensohn Project was also to some 
degree a re-branding and mainstreaming of practices ongoing within the Bank 
however; underlining, highlighting and headlining keywords and practices that were 
already written into the organisation's scripted development role. Below the historical 
context of two key issues is briefly considered - of interaction with non-governmental 
113 The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were the most critically noted variety of such, loans 
being made on condition of governments liberalising import and export duties, capital accounts and so 
forth, integrating them into intemational flows of trade an investment and speculative capital. 
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actor-networks, and the involvement of borrower country governments in the 
country's economic and development policy formulation (ownership') - which 
emphasise continuities running within the Renewal, framing it as a strategic 
performative device that has worked to highlight ongoing changes and lend 
momentum to further efforts. 
With regard firstly to interactions with non-g ove rn mental actors the Bank (2001e) has 
described itself as having formally begun to 'interact with civil society in the 1970s', 
establishing a formal 'global mechanism'for dialogue in the 1980s, and decentralising 
these practices in 1995, from which point on 'interactions have steadily increased and 
expanded'. In more formal terms, an Operational Policy Directive was agreed with the 
Board of Directors in 1981 which encouraged the Bank to increase its engagement 
with non-governmental organisations (World Bank 2000s, 1998h). In response the 
Bank formed an NGO-World Bank Committee with 16 major NGOs in 1982. Facing 
criticisms of lack of transparency and autonomy. the involved NGOs then decided to 
liaise separately from the Bank and thus formed themselves into the NGO Working 
Group on the World Bank (NGOWG) in 1984 to discuss priorities, form research 
programmes and hold meetings in developing countries to develop links with those 
whose voices they were seen as representing, gradually increasing the NGOWG's 
membership to 26 participant NGOs by 2000 (Willets 2001). The Committee and the 
NGOWG continued to maintain dialogues and then as from the mid-1990s - as 
mentioned and in accordance with key elements within the discourse of Renewal - 
the Bank's interaction with non-govern mental actors gradually underwent a process of 
decentralisation and terminological adaptation, strengthening regional liaison points 
and increasingly referring to its engagement with 'civil society' and 'civil society 
organisations' (CSOs) instead of just 'NGOs' 114 . The ambiguities and 
difficulties 
entailed in effecting this latter discursive shift in the Bank's language of participation 
and partnership will be considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
114 In 1996 NGO 'liaison officers'were appointed in all regional departments (World Bank 1997d); in 
1999 the Civil Society Thematic Team (a loose affiliation of staff who interact with civil society) was 
extended to include senior staff from all regions and departments (World Bank 1999k), whilst what was 
originally known as the NGO Unit of the Social Development Department became the NGO and Civil 
Society Unit; and in 2002 was again reshaped as the Civil Society Team with a new structure (the'Civil 
Society Engagement Teams') intended to deal with the'growing level of engagement (consisting of 
around 120-130 staff, 'mostly social scientists', with 70-80 Country staff in their respective country 
bases, 40 Regional and Department staff based at the Bank's Washington headquarters, and a core of 
nine people constituting the global Civil Society Team, World Bank 2003u, cf. World Bank 2003t: 1). 
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The NGOWG also began in 1994 to engage a similar discursive turn around the 
notion of decentralising its operations through regional meetings and formal elections 
15 for regional representatives (NGOWG 2000a)' . In 1999, 
in the light of these 
changes, James Wolfensohn encouraged the NGOWG to rethink its role as well as 
that of the Committee (NGOWG 2000b). The result of this has seen the dissolution of 
the World Bank-NGO Committee and the NGOWG as it was, and the initiation of a 
series of negotiations to establish a new system formalising interactions between the 
World Bank and 'civil society' (the Joint Facilitation Committee and the World Bank- 
Civil Society Forum)' 16 . The outcome of these changes 
to this most institutionalised 
point of contact between the Bank and its wider community of non-g ove m mental 
actor-networks remains in process, and so will not be considered directly here; the 
more interesting point to be taken from what has been noted is the extent to which 
and the time over which the Bank has been interacting with non-governmental or civil 
society actor-networks, and how these interactions are frequently portrayed in a 
progressive light in Bank literature' 17 . 
Internal reviews by the Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank 1999j: A) 
have criticised the manner in which the Bank has interpreted 'involvement' by NGOs 
and other civil society groups too broadly and optimistically, leading to over-inflated 
claims of NGO participation when intended participation rather than actual results had 
been reported; or else to claim participation following meetings over initial project 
proposals, the feedback from which has not always been fully accounted for in later 
reports (cf. World Bank 2000u: 8,2003v: 8). The general tone in this and other 
literature however remains one of constructive criticism, emphasising a progressive 
increase and expansion of interaction such that it can be asserted that 'we're on the 
right track' but that 'we' can and will do better (World Bank 2003w)111ý. With each 
115 The NGOWG has described itself as 'the only clear and independent voice for Southern NGOs' With 
regards to influencing development policy at the global level (NGOWG 2000a). Although it underwent 
such processes of decentralisation, it was nonetheless criticised as an 'institutionalized' gathering of 
selected larger NGOs unrepresentative of smaller grassroots organisations (Bretton Woods Project 
2003b, Atkinson 2000). 
116 After a series of negotiations the Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC) has now been established with 
Bank and civil society members, which will in turn negotiate the establishment of the World Bank-Civil 
Society Forum (see for example NGOWG 2000b, World Bank 2003t, 2003v, 2003w). 
117 As when the Bank described the first 'high-level' meeting of the JFC in October 2003 as 'another 
im ortant milestone in its relations with civil society' (World Bank 2003w). 
Reference is made for instance to the complex and 'evolving' relationship between the Bank and 
NGOs or civil society (World Bank 2003t: iv, cf. World Bank 1998h: 4, Clark 2002), and to progressive 
generations of civil society involvement in the Bank's work (World Bank 2003t: 2). 
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successive paper the Bank has celebrated the greater involvement of NGOs in its 
funded projects - and increasingly also that of 'civil society' - both in terms of 
numbers of projects, and deeper levels and earlier stages of involvement (see World 
Bank 1998h: 4, cf. World Bank 2003t: ii, 1997d), such that by 2000 the Bank (2000s) 
could write of NGOs 'and civil society' being involved in over 70% of the projects it 
funded, compared with only around 21% in 1990119. The negotiations to replace the 
NGOWG were also celebrated as involving 14 civil society networks 'as well as 
NGOs', and marking an 'important milestone in its relations with civil society' (World Bank 
2003w, cf. World Bank 2003v). The Renewal therefore did not initiate an involvement 
with this wide array of actors, but rather served to highlight what had been achieved 
and point the direction in which the Bank wished to push further -a renewal of efforts 
rather than of the Bank. This has also served to frame the discursive environment 
around a 'changing' Bank, positioning critical-constructive reformist dialogue as the 
perceived more 'reasonable' option as a counter-weight to the discourse of opposition 
that the organisation has encountered from all quarters. 
The second point upon continuity within renewal occurs in thinking about the notion of 
'ownership'. In 1990 a Learning Group on Participatoty Development was set up 
within the Bank to 'identify challenges to the support of a participation agenda in the 
Bank's operations' (World Bank 2001 s: 2); the Group reported on its findings through 
the Operations Policy Department in a 1994 document entitled The World Bank and 
Participation (World Bank 1994: 2). The text was concerned with participation both in 
the sense of bringing local NGOs onboard Bank projects and also in stressing that 
'the Bank needs to work with governments to enhance their ownership of 
development projects'. Then Bank President Lewis Preston remarked in the report's 
Foreword that 'the World Bank's interest in participatory development is not new ... 
projects can be more efficient and sustainable when they involve those they are 
intended to help'. The 1994 report was described as an 'action plan' to mainstream 
effective participation practices already underway at the Bank and 'enhance 
119 Since 1983 the Bank has produced annual Progress Reports on its engagement with NGOs (World 
Bank 1998h, World Bank 1997d) as well as a whole series of guidelines for staff (e. g. World Bank 
1995b), internal reviews (e. g. World Bank 1999j), and briefings papers for staff, non-governmental and 
civil society organisations, and any interested wider audience (see respectively World Bank 2000s, 
2000t, 2000u). For a further list of publications in this area see 'The World Bank and Civil Society 
Publications' in the Social Development Patficipation and Civic Engagement section of the Bank's site 
(World Bank 2002s). 
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ownership of development projects' (World Bank 1994: 1-2, cf. World Bank 1995a 120 . 
By 1996 the World Bank Participation Sourcebook (World Bank 1996: xi-xii) emerged, 
describing itself as building on the work of the Learning Group. This text adopted a far 
less confident tone in emphasising that it was not a policy document and not intended 
to persuade Bank colleagues, but rather only to help those who were already 
convinced of the benefits of increased participation. However President Wolfensohn's 
foreword to the Sourcebook (1996: ix), commending staff 'pioneering participatory 
approaches' and encouraging others to learn from such practical experience, 
provided a signal of the intention to mainstream these practices within the 
organisation as a whole. 
With regard to all aspects of the renewal, budgetary constraints always threatened to 
impinge upon the Wolfensohn Project however; the Compact itself involved calling for 
121 an increase in contributions from member governments of $250m over three years . 
Several assessment papers in 2001 noted increasing operational costs and stressed 
the organisation's incapacity to deliver under current budget constraints (World Bank 
2001 a, 2001b, 2001 C)122. So indications of necessary budgetary increases to cover 
the rising costs of what has been achieved and to carry the agenda forward have 
been made regularly. Yet given the problems the Bank has faced even with securing 
regular replenishments to the International Development Agency mentioned earlier 
(see Gwin 1997: 209), calls for further Renewal funding would have been both 
unpopular and unimpressive without good substance. Each new programme has thus 
functioned as both a new platform to call for funding increases in stressing the need 
for further changes (cf. World Bank 2001 b), and a renewal of the Wolfensohn Project 
of Renewal, jogging memories and drawing attention by re-addressing a series of 
core principles, and promising a new Bank fit for the new economy and the new 
development problems and solutions possible therein. Under three new banners the 
same themes recur, the same changes in the development field and problems arising 
are posited, the same goals are proposed and the same Bank strengths focussed 
120 Participation was defined by the group as 'a process through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them' (World Bank 
1994: 1). 
121 The total cost of the Compact programme was calculated in 2001 to have reached $761 m (in 1997 
$s); the difference was to be paid for through reduced operational and staff costs at the Bank. 122 The increased focus upon participation, knowledge production and knowledge management, and 
aligning the Bank's work with the Millennium Goals, were all said to have increased costs at the Bank, 
and also to have generated significant increases in overtime (World Bank 2001 a, 2001 b, 2001 c: i-ii). 
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upon for facilitating their achievement123 . Each new programme and 
initiative 
manifests an adaptation and extension of the Wolfensohn Project to consolidate the 
Bank's position as development's friendly face, working to put smiles on the faces of 
the children, and instituting a culture of renewal within the Bank that deflects criticism 
through these initiatives. Large swathes of previous Bank activities can be dismissed 
as Old Bank and unrepresentative of the organisation as it is or hopes to become, as 
with the shift to a post-Washington ConsenSUS124. 
So, thus far in this chapter, we have seen that the World Bank Group is a complex 
entity which incorporates a number of organisational bodies, each pursuing the same 
overall mandate within a formal ly-defined autonomy. This organisational assemblage 
consequently harbours a variety of different points and spaces of agency, but 
manages to coordinate a public 'face' for a restricted number of activities through both 
its hierarchical governance structure and the relative dominance of one particular 
outlook amongst its staff, which lends to a distinct organisational culture shaping a 
'Bank' way of doing things. The dominance of Northern member-states within its top- 
level governance consolidates this situation, but does not determine it. Indeed, 
nothing necessarily determines such a state of affairs, and the Bank has shown, at 
least at the level of relatively marginal intra-Bank discourses and then top-level public 
pronouncements, a willingness and ability to commence upon projects aspiring to 
significantly change the organisation. In the second half of this chapter we now move 
on to consider how the latest programme of change at the Bank has become manifest 
in its contributions to contemporary development discursive practice within an 
understanding of our entering a 'knowledge' economy. In later chapters we will look at 
how this discourse of change has fared, and at what possibilities exist for it to be 
engaged with and pushed further from both within and without the Bank. 
123 s ... our world-wide reach, our strength as a financial institution, and country-specific knowledge; our comprehensive perspective, sectoral depth and, also, capacity to integrate across sectors; our global 
knowledge and research capacity... ' (World Bank 2001 a 4). 
124 Criticism of current activities also touch the Bank only lightly since during renewal everything is 
open to reconsideration - nothing need be static in this era of permanent revolution. 
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The World Development Report 1998199 and the Emergence of the 
Knowledge Bank Agenda 
'My goal is to make the World Bank the first port of call when people need 
knowledge about development' (Wolfensohn 1997a) 
,... some people are empowered to know and decide, others to implement 
the decisions, yet others not to speak, or not to be heard if they do' (Hobart 
1993: 16) 
'To speak for others is to first silence those in whose name we speak' 
(Callon 1986: 216) 
( 
The Knowledge Bank programme is a central thread weaving the renewal trinity 
together. The production, organisation, storage and dissemination of knowledge have 
always been areas of concern for the Bank, and aspects of a knowledge agenda have 
long lain within it125 . But 1996 marks 
the official unveiling point of the agenda when 
the organisation describes itself as having embarked 'on a new vision ... to 
become a 
Knowledge Bank that spurs the knowledge revolution in developing countries' (World 
Bank 1999c, cf. Wolfensohn 1996b). This concern with the centrality of knowledge to 
the Bank's work stems from the two concerns stressed in the Compact of 
consolidating the Bank's position as a development leader and seeking to catalyze a 
discursive shift. 
Firstly in this regard, there was the sense that the Bank's ability to produce, manage 
and distribute knowledge and information was a primary area of comparative 
advantage (World Bank 1997a), coupled with the concern that its knowledge 
generating ability was eroding 126 , producing fragmented and uneven research 
bases 
and gaps in the Bank's knowledge (Ritzen 2000, Goldman 1999, cf. World Bank 
2001b, Fine 1999a). Given the increasing competition the Bank notes within the 
development field, the urgency to revamp its strengths would have been acutely felt in 
125 Knowledge's importance has been one aspect of an organisational self-image at least since the 
days of Robert McNamara's tenure, and in the 1987 Bank Reorganisation then President Barber 
Conable referred to a 'knowledge-based' institution which should provide 'intellectual leadership' 
(George & Sabelli 1994: 188-191). A Bank paper copyrighted in 1995 (Gaudette & Talero 1996) 
positioning the Bank as a knowledge broker show that the idea had been under development for some 
time. Stephen Denning (2001), World Bank Knowledge Management Program Director from 1996- 
2000, describes himself as pushing ideas about the BanWs KM role amongst colleagues through the 
early 1990s in another post. 
126 Said to be evidenced by a decline in staff years devoted to research, and a shift from emphasising 
knowledge creation to emphasising its dissemination. 
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any discussions of renewal. Networker and Manager aspects of the knowledge 
economy/society discourse considered in Chapter Two can be observed here in 
thinking about how the Bank can coordinate others' activities, bringing together 
communities of actors and facilitating knowledge sharing whilst ensuring strong 
communication flows also within the organisation. Consolidating the practice of the 
World Bank as a Knowledge Management and Networking Bank (KMNB) could both 
improve internal operations and make it a stronger player on the development terrain. 
I will explore this idea in more detail in the following chapter. 
Secondly, increasing knowledge concerns in the various discursive environments in 
which Bank actors were involved would also have been felt. The Bank has been 
portrayed by sympathetic critics as being quite effectively swayed by the fides of 
change flowing around it, playing an important role in communicating ideas and 
stimulating debate but not being an agenda-setter (Stern & Ferreira 1993) 127 . As 
knowledge economy discourse became an increasing concern in economic discourse 
and the discursive practice of certain governments, and the idea was adapted and 
adopted into different disciplines, Bank staff would h' ave been able to push for the 
organisation to explore what it could contribute as a Knowledge for Development 
Bank (K4DB) in further catalyzing the discursive shift in both developmental and 
governmental discursive practices. Here the Post-industrial and Futurist tendencies 
within knowledge economy/society discourse are observable, exploring knowledge's 
importance as a factor of production, speaking of decentralising and flattening the 
organisation, and making projections of developing countries leapfrogging whole 
stages of development and entering a mobile hi-tech ICT-driven economic age 
without the baggage of an industrial era. 
The World Development Report (WDR) is the Bank's main annual publication, with a 
very wide and dispersed audience, comparing very well in terms of both publication 
figures and overall budget against the annual reports of the UNDP and UNCTAD 
(Wade 2001 a: 130) 128 . The role and purpose of the WDRs is however somewhat 
127 At the time of writing Nicholas Stem held a senior position within the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development but has now replaced Joe Stiglitz as Vice President and Chief 
Economist of the World Bank. The mentioned paper was commissioned for and published in the 
Bank's own analysis of its first fifty years (Kapur et al. 1997). 
128 Wade cites the Bank's Report as running to at least 50,000 copies in English (and up to 100,000 in 
some cases), with another total of 50,000 copies in seven other languages, whilst the UNDP's Human 
Development Report runs to a similar 100,000 in 12 languages and UNCTAD's Trade and 
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ambiguous. Both James Wolfensohn and Joseph Stiglitz have stated that the Reports 
are not intended to act as a presentation of a Bank programme (see Bretton Woods 
Project 2000a) 129 , and they are always fronted by a disclaimer stating something 
to 
the effect that 'the judgments made herein do not necessarily reflect the views of its 
Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent' (World Bank 1998a: ii), 
on which grounds they cannot be considered to constitute formal policy statements 
(cf. Mawdsley & Rigg 2002: 9). However the 1998/99 Report under consideration 
here (Knowledge for Development, World Bank 1998a, hereafter 'the Report' ) clearly 
frames and prioritises elements of the programmatic, thematic and organisational 
changes undertaken through the Wolfensohn Project. The WDRs are only one point 
of crystallisation in a longer process of thinking and debate within and outside the 
Bank, with their themes being developed within presentations and new content to the 
Bank's web-presence. Over fifty other names are directly listed as contributors to the 
1998/99 Report, as well as '[m]any others inside and outside the World Bank' who are 
indirectly credited for providing comments, papers and contributions (World Bank 
1998a: iv). The WDRs furthermore now always undergo at least two sets of external 
consultations before publication, which is significant in terms of the Bank's concern to 
be seen as a listening bank engaging in partnerships for development. The 1998/99 
Report is listed as being carried out under the 'general direction' of Joseph Stiglitz 
and Lyn Squire (now director of the Global Development Network, considered in the 
next chapter). Stiglitz's influence upon the Report is clearly visible through his 
speeches which fore-grounded the publication and served to embed the Knowledge 
Bank agenda within Bank and development community discourse, deploying terms, 
concepts and phrases used therein 130 . 
Development Report runs to under 25,000 copies in only five languages. He also cites budget figures 
of $3.5-5 million for the Bank's Report budget as against roughly $1.5 million for that of the UNDP and 
$700,000 for the Report of UNCTAD (Wade 2001 a: 130). 
129 In response to a letter querying its role, James Wolfensohn and Joseph Stiglitz (Bretton Woods 
Project 2000a) both stated that they saw the WDR as a crucial tool for engaging in dialogue with the 
development community, a contribution to ongoing analytical work on development issues, and a 
catalyst for debate. They each stressed that it was not intended to focus specifically on the Bank's 
gesent and future direction and current and proposed operations. 30 Such as the notion of the financial system as the brain of the economy (Stiglitz 1997c, 1998a, 
1998e, 1998h, 1998i, 19981,1998n), the idea of knowledge as a global public good (Stiglitz 1997a, 
1997c, 1997e, 1998a, 1998k, 1998p, 1999a, 1999f, 1999j, 2000c), the knowledge'gap' between more 
and less developed countries (Stiglitz 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998h, 1998k, 1998o, 1998p, 1999b, 
1999h), and the Knowledge Bank itself (Stiglitz 1997b, 1998h, 1998p, 1999b). 
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The WDRs can be understood to perform extemally as public relations exercises, 
producing the 'face' of the Bank (cf. Mawdsley & Rigg 2002); they can also be seen to 
perform intemally within a process of identity construction, producing a space wherein 
a 'voice' of the Bank can be articulated, and acting as a catalyst for debate to resolve 
differences of vision and focus within the organisation. In this way the Report is the 
most significant keynote publication outlining the Knowledge Bank programme. It can 
be seen as performing an agenda for the Bank's new scripted role, 'a starting point for 
future research' (World Bank 1998a: 14), problematising the development field in 
asserting the need for the Knowledge Bank. For instance the Bank bemoans the lack 
of standard measures and systematic evidence that result in uncertainty about how to 
promote knowledge for development (World Bank 1998a: 131-143), and elsewhere 
(World Bank 2001 b) stresses that it should give credence only to properly measurable 
variables in its work. This problem is positioned as a concern of the global 
development community (World Bank 1998a, 1999c), highlighting the need to develop 
consistent and accepted measurement devices and so bringing attention to the 
Bank's own work in this area. In the manner of the governmental literature considered 
in Chapter Three, the new economy is casually asserted as faCt131 (the global 
knowledge explosion, the primarily knowledge-based nature of today's advanced 
economies) and great opportunities and threats to development are held to exist for 
those who respectively do and do not take up the baton quickly enough and run with 
the new story of knowledge's centrality. These threats and opportunities are said to 
be 'opposite sides of the same coin', implying underdetermined and manipulable 
outcomes, but their immediacy raises the stakes. Developing countries are said to 
need to increase their knowledge capacity as quickly as possible or else fall behind 
and face 'unhappy consequences' (World Bank 1998a: iii). 
The Bank puts knowledge 'on a par with money' (World Bank 1999f, cf. Denning 
2003, Pommier 2001: 25) as a developmental factor through claims that capital flows 
are increasingly affected by the strength of country knowledge bases, and that 'it is 
131 'Back-of-the-envelope'(Wodd Bank 1998a: 26) calculations predict huge economic gains from 
improved knowledge acquisition and guesstimates are placed upon the influence of knowledge 
production and distribution on growth. Even when more substantial studies are cited, causal links are 
asserted with reference to a statistical display rather than argued for. For instance, the Bank notes a 
statistical correlation between higher levels of education in mothers and lower rates of infant mortality 
and draws the conclusion that education must therefore help with maintaining children's health. 
Similarly the Bank cites anecdotal statistical correlations between poverty and education to argue that 
education must be responsible for raising living standards (World Bank 1998a: 17-18,52,120). 
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lack of knowledge that causes markets to collapse' (World Bank 1998a: 14). The 
Report hints at the more pessimistic possibilities considered in Chapter Three of 
these developments exacerbating inequalities in knowledge and so multiplying other 
socio-economic intra- and international inequalities'32 . At the same 
time, 
developments in communication technologies are 'shrinking distances and eroding 
borders and time' as well as fostering a 'global store of knowledge' to which everyone 
could potentially have access (World Bank 1998a: 1). 'Potentially' is a keyword the 
Report uses to conditionalise many grand declarations of change which, it argues, will 
be achievable only if we look at development from a knowledge perspective. The 
result is that the Bank can speak authoritatively of policies developing countries must 
prioritise and opportunities they have to seize in order to pursue a knowledge agenda 
and compete effectively in the global economy' 33 . 
Once the need for an agenda change has been established, in the Report and 
elsewhere five key actor groups (national governments and their bilateral aid 
departments, the private sector, international governmental organisations, academic 
and research institutions, and non-govern mental organisations and civil society, 
World Bank 1999c) are outlined as well as their goals and the challenges they face in 
such a rapidly changing environment. In the light of these challenges it is then 
suggested that their goals will be achieved through the advancement of the 
knowledge economy, and that the difficulties faced in this regard can be overcome by 
working through a Bank-defined partnership134 .A division of labour is outlined which 
prioritises private-sector agency in any potentially profitable area (information 
communication technologies (ICTs) infrastructure development and distribution, and 
the main fields of knowledge production), with other actor groups playing mainly 
facilitatory or regulatory roles. Governments for instance should aid private sector 
knowledge production through providing an open trading regime and a supportive but 
minimal regulatory framework and social safety net (World Bank 1998a: 3). Civil 
132 The state of African and East Asian knowledge-bases and investments are cited as potential 
causes for huge differences in economic growth (World Bank 1998a: 26-39, esp. 29). 
133 For example, '[the Report] then examines three critical steps that developing countries must take to 
narrow knowledge gaps', 'They will have to adjust their regulations accordingly. In some cases they will 
have to abandon certain outmoded regulations' (World Bank 1998a: 2,12). 
134 For example a burgeoning knowledge economy will provide new opportunities for private sector 
trade and investments whilst governments see their economies strengthened by pursuing such areas 
of rapid growth, which it is in turn claimed will help actors looking to give the poor a chance in the 
modem economy. 
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society groups meanwhile should function as a social and political buffer zone, 
bridging the gaps between global agencies and local organisations 135. The challenge 
for all development organisations is laid out in stating that lack of knowledge leaves 
people unable to progress, whilst information failures produce market failures and so 
hamper economic growth and therefore development. The Bank's agenda can then 
be summarised as addressing this urgent challenge to minimise exclusion by sharing 
knowledge and the capacity to produce it, and establishing institutions to secure free 
and stable markets that can ensure growth through knowledge. 
The vague, emotive and inclusive group of 'the poor' emerge again in the Report 
(World Bank 1998a: 78-80), partially reconstructed as those that information problems 
will affect worst136 . There is no newly measured group of the 'informational poor', 
however, but rather the same 'poor' who are enveloped within the new value-system 
and conceived as being poor in informational terms as well as industrial-financial 
capital. The Report indicates a change in tone by stressing that the poor must be 
listened to, often having information about their living space unavailable to external 
actors 137 . The Voices of the Poor (World Bank 2000q) project 
for instance, a 
'participatory research initiative' mentioned in the previous chapter which 
characterises this change well, involved conducting 'listening exercises' in 60 
countries to gather together 'voices' and report perspectives on poverty and the 
wishes and desires of 'the poor'. This initiative can be read as a positive attempt to 
create space for others' stories that might promote reflexivity within the Bank's 
operations and conceptualisations of development (encouraging recognition of the 
need for localised agency and goal-definition). 
It can also be seen, however, as merely an adaptation in the Bank's self- 
representation, as the poor still have the most ghostly, unreal voice in the literature, 
positing a common ground in the 'they' who 'we' all wish to help, from which the Bank 
135 A narrative of globalisation is articulated throughout the Report (World Bank 1998a: 22) to lower 
government expectations of being able to do more and determine their own economic development, 
countdes having 'little leverage on global trends' and being unable to isolate themselves from these. 
136 Primarily because these people have least access to education, means of communication, 
institutional safeguards to ascertain information quality and recourse to legal support should they fall 
foul of informational abuse. The Bank elsewhere issues a call to 'not forget the villages and slums' 
without access to even basic utilities, never mind the modem technologies it sees as promising this 
new world (2000c). 
137 This is reminiscent of Wolfensohn's references to'the poor he met through 'walkabouts' undertaken 
upon acceding to the presidency (1995) as desiring more input into the formation of development 
projects and participation in civil society (as well as greater stability, security, and opportunity). 
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can launch its initiatives. The Report still conjures up a passive poor, speaking of 
giving the poor a voice and providing them with the information they need, and the 
editing and processing of voices from the gathered documentation means 'the poor' 
gain mass audience only through Bank processes of translation. This is a necessary 
aspect of any process of translation, but it is not necessary that the Bank should be 
the sole collator and translator of 'voices'. Such work could usefully be outsourced 
from and funded by the Bank and performed by local groups. Although the nature of 
poverty is nominally redefined, no significant redefinition of the ends or means of 
development occurs. 'The poor remain as an incredibly broad classification that 
homogenises a diverse range of disenfranchised peoples, maintaining a form of 
disenfranchisement through representational inequality, with the 'poor' global majority 
reproduced as one voice (or an edited collection of randomly sampled voices) 
alongside that of the Bank. This in turn maintains a continuity within the development 
'project', managing the discourse in terms of the actor positions occupied therein and 
the 'voice' different positions can express with regard to defining problems and 
suggesting and mobilising solutions. The management of the 'voices of the poor is 
one means by which the Bank can be constituted as an 'obligatory passage point' 
(Callon 1986: 197-204) between those bracketed as 'the poor' and those eager to 
eradicate poverty. 
Boxed Light: Forms of Knowledge 
Different discourses can be discerned within the Bank's work concerning the nature 
and use of knowledge for development which indicate something of, firstly, the 
distinction noted in the last chapter between social and number-crunching 
approaches to development (Pieterse 1998: 358-360), and secondly, the question 
asked earlier in this chapter as to whether the Bank ought to be seen as a bank or as 
a development organisation. Tensions recur between indications of a new agenda 
concerned to respect alternate knowledge systems and promote self-reliance, 
broadening the organisation's economic imagination and recognising the worth of 
other understandings of development, and attempts to adapt the new agenda to older 
themes, subscribing to the view of a single expansive knowledge structure whose 
adoption is necessary in order to achieve development (thereby encouraging 
Southern consumption of Northern produced knowledge and technologies). The 
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Bank's ambivalence with regard to these two closely-related issues shows through in 
its definitions of knowledge forms and so in its understanding of knowledge's role in 
development, and its broader conceptualisations of knowledge and consequent policy 
position. In thinking about areas and forms of knowledge, the Report firstly (World 
Bank 1998a: 1-2) briefly acknowledges the existence of many forms before defining 
two broad classificatory categories as those it considers important to economic 
development, thereby restricting its mandate. A similar conflation of knowledge and 
information, as in the work of Fritz Machlup (1962: 21-2), is then performed in 
referring firstly to 'the difficulties posed by incomplete knowledge of attributes' as 
'information problems', and then secondly to unequal knowledge about technology as 
'knowledge gaps' (World Bank 1998a: 1)138 . The Report then continues 
in this vain, 
knowledge and information being used fairly equally and interchangeably, apart from 
for the functional matter of demarcating the Bank's areas of interest (speaking for 
instance of 'approaching development from a knowledge perspective' and negotiating 
the risks and opportunities of the 'information revolution' World Bank 1998a: 2). The 
two most substantial sections of the Report are devoted to the two knowledge forms, 
framing it within quite a tech n ical-economic outlook. 
The 'knowledge gap' metaphor emerges from the conceptual isation of a single, 
expansive, dominant knowledge structure constantly being expanded by countries 
that 'push the knowledge frontier outward' (World Bank 1998a: 2). With this reductive 
epistemological demarcation, ongoing economic differentials between countries can 
be explained by insufficient efforts being made to reduce the knowledge gap. The 
national knowledge base (the knowledge held and the national capacity to create 
knowledge) is expressed in the Report by a few concrete indicators such as levels of 
investment in Research and Development. As with the works considered in previous 
chapters, the production of technical knowledge worldwide is seen as growing due to 
increases in patents issued. The possibility that increases in patenting could result 
from changing corporate trends and business practices such as those noted in 
Chapter Two is not considered (the possibility that within networked research 
partnerships patents might be used more often, insofar as formalising ownership in 
138 The Report does not so much define knowledge about technology and attributes as imply them 
through examples. For instance knowledge about technology is given as the examples of knowledge 
about'nutrition, birth control, software engineering, and accountancy, whilst that about attributes is 
characterised as knowledge about the quality of products, diligence of workers, and the 
creditworthiness of firms (World Bank 1998a: 1). 
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this manner more clearly defines partners' rights concerning the knowledge 
produced). The Report also notes that not all technical knowledge is patented, but 
little is said of other knowledge forms, except when discussing the potential impact of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes upon indigenous or traditional knowledges, 
which still ultimately fall under the broader technical knowledge banner of know-how 
(cf. World Bank 2000d). 
The Report's approach to knowledge also employs two seemingly contradictory 
metaphors from which stem a series of negotiations over the role of knowledge in the 
economy. Bank literature refers firstly to knowledge being 'like light' (World Bank 
1998a: 1,1999c) in that it is weightless, intangible, and travels easily, enlightening 
people's lives and economic activities. Here the non-rivalrous and non-excludable 
aspects of knowledge are stressed as fundamental attributeS139. These properties are 
argued to make knowledge a public good, meaning that its creators are unlikely to be 
fully compensated for the social benefits it produces 140 . The 
Bank secondly refers to 
treating knowledge as a commodity, 'putting knowledge on a par with money' (World 
Bank 19990 and emphasising that although 'knowledge is different from other 
economic goods' it is still primarily an economic good (World Bank 2000b: 1). 
Knowledge is here promoted as 'the new currency in the fight against poverty' 
(Laporte 2002a). It has been argued that internal Bank disagreements could account 
for the inconsistency or tension running between these metaphors (Mehta 1999b). 
Alternatively the metaphors could be seen as working in conjunction. The knowledge 
as light analogy can be argued to consolidate the grounds for fabricating knowledge's 
commodification and possession rather than contradicting theM141. 
139 The fact that one person's use of some knowledge does not prevent others from using it, and the 
difficulty in preventing others from using knowledge once it is known. 
140 Many questions arise with this approach to knowledge as a global public good; as Diane Stone 
(2001: 8.2000) states, the terms could usefully be unpacked to ask who is the'global publicand what 
is a 'global good'. A Public Good should be apolitical, meaning that this notion tends to treat knowledge 
as homogeneous, neutral, and technical, without asking about its socio-political and power functions. 
141 To play with metaphors, the example of a candle is given of knowledge being like light (cf. Stiglitz 
1997b); I can light your candle from mine without diminishing the light from my own, and so it is argued 
it works with sharing knowledge. However the lighting of candies is the provision of a service, and 
possession of a lit candle enables the service to be carded out. Further, the more lit candies that exist, 
the less any one candle-holder could ask for the service they provide as supply increases relative to 
demand. So a potential capitalistic interest emerges to formalise candle-ownership and restrict supply 
relative to demand to facilitate rent-seeking. If light could be boxed then under contemporary structures 
of ownership and capital accumulation, it most likely would be. 
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The public good status of knowledge anyway establishes a problem because the 
market cannot cope with such a good and so knowledge will tend to be undersupplied 
if left as it is. The emphasis of the Knowledge Bank narrative is consistent with the 
rest of the Bank's work in stressing the centrality of free trade and the private sector, 
but cautioning upon the need to ensure that such public goods are also provided in 
good measure 142 .A central element of the Knowledge Bank and 
Compact agendas is 
to promote knowledge sharing both within and without the organisation so as to 
improve its service provision, encourage innovation and promote knowledge transfers 
in all directions (North-South-North) 143 . Regulatory action is therefore seen as a 
Bank 
concern, to negotiate a balance between creating incentives to produce knowledge 
(as a commodity) in and for the market, and ensuring any such knowledge is 
adequately distributed (like light) so as to raise people out of poverty. North-South 
knowledge transfer in the Report refers primarily to the leapfrogging potential of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for development144 . The Report (World Bank 1998a: 
39,57) argues that only international trade and competition will promote sufficient 
investments in Research and Development, the private sector having 'the principal 
task of developing infrastructure and disseminating information and communication 
technologies' (World Bank 1999c). As such only an adequate international intellectual 
property rights (IPR) structure will ensure that the knowledge economy blossoms 
sufficiently to secure developmental potentialities. A strong IPR regime is seen as 
being necessary to demonstrate the safety of intellectual property and so encourage 
knowledge's production and international transfer. 
Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge or Development 
The IPR question demonstrates well how'the Bank' can inhabit more than one space 
on many issues, a mix of discourses expressing relative fatalism, satisfaction, and a 
critical search for alternatives existing within the extended networks of Bank activity. 
142 Nonetheless the narrative would appear to approach libertarian extremes at points when the Report 
(World Bank 1998a: 68-9) speaks of competition negating the need for regulation without adding any 
conditions, free market competition having proved itself more successful than the state provision of 
services. 
143 Knowledge Management and Knowledge Sharing refer to the same phenomenon at the Bank, the 
'managing of knowledge through systematic sharing' (World Bank 1999e). 
144 The Report acknowledges the problern that that FDI is directed towards potential profit, and so will 
gravitate to some areas more than others (World Bank 1998a: 29), but does not seriously pursue the 
implication that this could exacerbate intra- and inter-country inequalities and risk creating centre- 
periphery patterns of underdevelopment. 
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The ambiguous outcome for developing countries from strengthening the global IPR 
regime is briefly recognised in the Report when it firstly admits the potential for IPRs 
to hurt developing country interests by shifting bargaining power towards producers of 
recognised and formalised knowledge, as has been noted in previous chapters. A 
number of individual Bank staff research papers further stress the ambiguous 
relationship between levels of IPR protection and FDI, and thus the proposed 
'benefits' to developing countries (see for example Bora 1999, Fink & Primo Braga 
2000, Devlin, Guerrieri & Page 2000, Maskus 1997, Smarzynska 2000, Watal 1999). 
In the Report these concerns are then fenced off through a precautionary bias 
towards extending proprietorship, the Bank refusing to take a stance against a 
stronger global IPR regime because it perceives a lack of evidence in arguments both 
for and against (World Bank 1998a: 34-5). The Report speaks of traditional 
knowledge being 'improved' through the involvement of Northern corporations and 
recommends that countries allow companies to research on licence and then use the 
patents system to ensure they gain financially when goods are synthesised and sold 
to market (World Bank 1998a: 35-8)14,5. 
Other Bank literature and endeavours meanwhile emphasise the importance of 
promoting free information flows through open source software and lo4echnology 
systems, developing country knowledge production and management capacities and 
avoiding charging for its knowledge services (or charging for them separately so as to 
encourage self-reliance upon the country's own knowledge, World Bank 1998e, cf. 
Ritzen 2000) 146 . The Bank is a main funding and organisational partner 
in the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a network of 
research centres which has established seed-banks to preserve biodiversity and 
conducts further research with the aim of 'nourishing the future through scientific 
excellence' (CGIAR 2001). The CGIAR's Chairman is always a Vice President of the 
World Bank, and the secretariat and website of the group is based within the Bank. 
The Bank's Indigenous Knowledge Notes make reference to databases of indigenous 
knowledge it has created to pre-empt corporate patent claims (World Bank 2000d: 3- 
4). The IK Notes further consider problems with IPRs' for community knowledge, 
145 The Bank (1998a: 35-8) claims that such synthetisation and marketing of medicines dedved from 
traditionally-used plants have led to 1990 estimated global sales worth $43bn. 146 'Ultimately they must establish their own knowledge-bases, authenticate them from their own 
expedence, interpret what is meaningful from their own perspectives, and create a future that meets 
their own needs' (Wodd Bank 1998e). 
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given that the ideas in question develop in an open source manner and have no 
particular claimant. The Notes suggest using geographical location rights or traditional 
resource rights to construct 'a framework of principles upholding the rights of 
traditional communities'147 . 
Little mention is made in the Report or elsewhere in the Bank's IPR literature to such 
pre-emptive protection, and neither is there any serious consideration of the viability 
of open source systems beyond minimal reference to 'public' software. The Report 
(World Bank 1998a: 8,34-6) presumes that IPR frameworks are the only viable way 
forward, their strengthening being framed as a determined fact rather than a 
148 negotiable and workable set of possibilities . 
Similarly some Bank literature stresses 
that everyone should be empowered to contribute their own knowledge to 
development endeavours, highlighting the importance of not undermining local 
technologies and traditional medicines (World Bank 1999c, Ritzen 2000). Yet the 
Report also speaks of using education to overcome 'inhibiting traditional practices' 
such as traditional remedies, and to encourage people to be more open to 'modern 
methods' in modern medicine and agricultural techniques in the context of an 
optimistic reading of the Green Revolution 149 and genetic engineering (World Bank 
1998a: 38,41). It interprets developing countries' attempts to develop computer 
systems and disease treatments as reinventing the wheel (World Bank 1998a: 2), and 
advises them instead to acquire and adapt knowledge and appropriate technology 
from the North. The development-oriented focus upon education could, when 
deployed from within such an outlook, function as an extended advertisement for 
Northern knowledge prod UCtS150. 
147 As with the case of RiceTec and the Indian government in the dispute over RiceTec! s attempts to 
claim ownership of the name 'Basmati rice' (see Chapter Three). 
148'Stronger IPRs are a permanent feature of the new global economy' (World Bank 1998a: 36). 
149 The Green Revolution is cited in the Report (World Bank: 1998a: 43,8,4) as a 'paradigm of 
knowledge for development spreading new knowledge to feed the world. Yet this example works 
equally well in the counter-argument that the knowledge 'revolution' stands to further Northern capital 
interests at the expense of the poor (e. g. George 1991: 17). 
150 In a similar fashion to the government discourse analysed in Chapter Three education is promoted 
as facilitating knowledge absorption and the production of future knowledge producers, with well- 
governed market mechanisms being the key to resolving optimal outcomes (private educational 
institutions having lower unit costs and higher productivity outcomes). The discursive terminology 
non-nalises this presumption, referring to families as 'consumers' in 'the private market for education'. 
Again as with the discourse considered in Chapter Three, 'partnerships with industry' are seen as 
crucial to ensuring school and university curricula are relevant to the needs of industry (World Bank 
1998a: 44,48-9). 
150 
The Bank as business aspect of its operations also shows here, when South-North 
knowledge transfers are understood as referring to the Bank's role in translating local 
knowledges into 'global development assets' (World Bank 19990. The Bank's 
Knowledge Management mission is encapsulated as 'adding to our wealth of cross- 
country know-how and expertise by systematically capturing new country-specific 
experiences and indigenous knowledgeý (World Bank 1999f, my emphasis, cf. 
Pommier 2001: 26). Elsewhere the Bank (2001a: 9, emphasis in original) insists that 
'the increasing emphasis on knowledge, advice, and capacity building does not imply 
a decline in lending', meaning that this seemingly major conceptual shift - placing 
knowledge at the centre of development concerns - is not intended to effect any 
radical changes in the Bank's enterprise as a money-lending institution. Goldman 
(1999: 1-6,16-27) has argued that the Bank's business is knowledge-p rod uction, 
which constitutes its main area of social control by 'manufacturing consent', whilst 
staff see knowledge (and not lending capital) as the Bank's greatest source of 
power'51. Its presentation of knowledge is considered to be in many ways more akin 
to the promotion of a product, producing data that gets loans moving and so keep the 
organisational machinery rolling over. Kn owledge- production on this view can be 
seen as a Public Relations exercise, cleaning up the 'facts' and presenting projects as 
'win-win' situations. This all serves to illustrate something of the ambivalent position of 
the Bank, with quite contrary discourses inhabiting the space that formally 
demarcates it, but the alternative models living somewhat in the shade of the 
dominant Northern govern me ntal-econom ic discourse. 
The production promotion and public relations aspects of its work can be seen in the 
urgency with which it has begun to address the 'knowledge for development' issue 
since it came within the Bank's purview. Knowledge's primacy tends to be asserted in 
statements that 'knowledge is development', the critical factor of production and not 
merely another tool (World Bank 1998a* 19, World Bank 2002b). The move from the 
claims of Chapters Two and Three that knowledge is a key factor of production, to 
claiming that knowledge is development, is significant. Knowledge can regarded as 
development only under a narrowly-defined economic conception of development 
equated with the amassing of capital, where increasing a country's knowledge base 
151 He concludes, '[t]he Bank's power is in its control over data, experts, government officials, remote 
locations -a whole information network that no other organisation can pull together' (Goldman 1999: 
27). 
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would increase its capital stocks and so constitute development. This would refuse 
the new gentle face of the Bank, concerned with holistic understandings of 
development (economic and social)152. Yet the Bank is trying to redefine its 
understanding of development, and so the assertion that 'knowledge is development' 
can more usefully be seen as being akin to the 'knowledge society' heuristic device 
considered in Chapter Two, a motivating banner under which the importance of 
knowledge for development is emphasised and a rallying call-to-action is led by the 
Bank 153 . 
Discursive Practice and Normalisation 
The presumption that all groups want the advancement of the knowledge economy is 
in one sense safe in that it would be difficult to be against opportunities to 'leapfrog' 
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whole stages of development, were this possible' . It can be framed as an attempt 
to 
position the Bank as what Callon (1987: 197-204) terms an 'obligatory passage point' 
(as was also mentioned earlier with reference to the 'voices of the poor') as the 
problems others face are redefined on the Bank's terms of reference and its 
understanding of contemporary developmental issues and its proposed activities are 
framed as the best or only way forward for others to pursue. What is more tenuous is 
the presumption that all want the advancement of the Bank's understanding of the 
knowledge economy. This tends to be 'black-boxed' (Latour 1987: 41-44) in much of 
the literature, setting Bank-centred ideas of what needs to be done to support and 
advance this vision as the starting point for further negotiations. We might say that the 
Bank attempts to write the new script and then invite participants for the roles it has 
created, as with the identity-stabilisation exercise of the Development Framework. 
The literature considered can be seen as seeking to position the Bank at a higher 
152 From this perspective the statement borders upon being a non sequitur insofar as it conflates and 
equates object and process; the amassing of knowledge cannot be equated with social development 
because knowledge needs to be put to use to be engaged in developmental practices. 
153 In the manner of the anecdotal examples that frame the dominant progressivist narrative running 
through the Report of people gaining access to world markets by using the Internet to sell their craft- 
goods direct; and of using information technology to help exterminate disease-spreading pests (World 
Bank 1998a: 60). 
154 The Report (World Bank 1998a: 57,59) and other Bank literature's use of leapfrogging (e. g. World 
Bank 2002n, 2002p) often refers to countries bypassing the establishment of landline telephone 
systems and adopting wireless mobile ones instead, or installing fully digitised networks whilst most 
industrialised countries still retain analogue ones. The use of 'leapfrog' is fairly casual and futurist, 
promising great opportunities of advancement without cautioning of the potential problems with 
ensuring compatibility and social readiness to adopt the new technologies. 
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level of the development terrain as a premier knowledge management organisation, 
stressing its ability to provide well-situated policy advice to governments, civil society 
groups and other multilaterals; casting it in the role of an actor, writer and director of 
the development drama. 
Several consequences could potentially stem from this. Firstly the adoption of a mode 
of new developmental discursive practice by an organisation with the intellectual, 
political and economic influence of the World Bank could amplify its presence within 
global development policy debates. Certain argumentative premises could become 
accepted in engaging with its discursive turn to argue over objectives and means of 
their achievement. A new space within which it is acceptable to perform alternative 
modes of analysis and make policy proposals could then be produced, normalising 
acceptance of certain posited changes. The knowledge focus might also displace 
concerns and depoliticise areas of development. If knowledge is conceived as 
development then issues that many see as central to the development probleM155 ca n 
be repositioned as minor issues to be resolved through addressing the key problem. 
Vagaries and contested elements within development discourse are reduced to 
matters of 'lack' of knowledge on the part of developing countries. Myriad questions 
upon the nature, heterogeneity and desirability of development are excluded from 
consideration; there simply is a hole and it needs to be filled. 
Secondly, discursive normalisation of functionalist metaphors drawn by the Report 
(information as the 'lifeblood of every economy', finance as the 'economy's nervous 
system', and financial institution's' 56 as the economy's 'brain', World Bank 1998a: 72, 
81, cf. Stiglitz 1997c, 1998a, 1998e, 1998h, 1998i, 19981,1998n) further encourage 
an understanding of economies as biological organisms with their own natural life- 
course and which can ensure of themselves that capital is used in the most effective 
ways. These analogies normalise consideration of a minimal regulatory framework as 
a preferred means of economic governance on the supposition that finance is a very 
finely tuned system that should not be touched other than by those financial 
organisations attuned to its intricacies. No other analogy is made to infer that 
155 For example economic cycles of dependency and underdevelopment caused by or maintained 
through unfair trading practices, and representational imbalances allowing dominant groups to set the 
international economic agenda. 
156 The Bank here refers to what I term 'organisations' such as banks and financial investors and 
speculators. 
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governments and international governmental organisations could be conceived as the 
brain surgeons or neurologists of the economic body. By a technocratic displacement 
marking the economy 'out of bounds', a 'do not touch' sign is hung over the economy 
for governmental institutions. 
Finally, the prioritisation of knowledge could generate misplaced efforts. Demand for 
hi-tech goods and services could arise where resources would be better employed 
elsewhere, as when the Report (World Bank 1998a: 68) speaks of 'leveraging poor 
57 peoples' willingness to pay' for telecommunication systems' . Economic gains could 
also be sought where they are elusive. The Report unreservedly encourages all 
countries to engage with labour opportunities in the knowledge economy as though 
this were an ever-expanding pie. The danger is that countries will be set on the same 
economic programme at the risk of oversupplying knowledge goods and services and 
so reducing the potential benefits for each participating country as market prices fall. 
As more countries move into low value-added sectors of knowledge work as first 
steps in the new economy, there is the danger an international knowledge economy 
division of labour emerging, as discussed in Chapter Three (cf. Cammack 2002) 158 - 
Conclusion 
One understanding and application of the Knowledge Bank programme, then, sings 
the same songs as the governmental voices heard loudest in Part One; development 
literature's dominant themes of underdevelopment as lack or inadequacy; the 
celebration of free trade as the policy solution to attract capital and pursue 
development; and the treatment of knowledge and information as being 
commodifiable through the development of an intellectual property rights framework, 
which would enable their incorporation within the dominant contemporary system of 
capital regulation. The Knowledge Bank programme in one way performs an 
organisational re-branding of the World Bank as a Knowledge for Development Bank, 
157 Development organisations could also concentrate on becoming efficient knowledge producers and 
managers at the expense of their roles in promoting social and economic development (cf. King 2000a, 
2000b). 
158 Education is given a strong developmental focus in the Report (World Bank 1998a: 54) not on the 
basis that it can enrich, and enable people to take better control of, their lives; but rather because it is 
one step in expanding and 'building a healthy, skilled, and agile labor force'to enable countries to 
compete in world markets. The education to be promoted (mathematics, science and engineering) is 
chosen for its perceived contribution to economic growth on the basis of statistical correlations 
between enrolments and later growth in GDP. 
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promoting its knowledge products in the process. But as has been noted, the 
organisation is a large and complex assemblage of different actor-networks, and 
alongside this concern to treat knowledge as money there exist efforts to preserve 
forms of knowledge as public goods, as with the CGIAR, and to protect the open 
source nature of 'indigenous knowledges'. 
To adapt an idea of Anthony Bebbington et al. (forthcoming), writing about the Bank's 
adoption and adaptation of 'social capital' into its discursive practice, it seems that the 
Knowledge Bank exists as several conversations within the Bank, each with its own 
grammar and priorities. Whilst some economistic minds might view knowledge simply 
as capital and concern themselves with knowledge maximising (profit-maximising) 
policies, other social scientists (and broader-minded economists) may be more 
concerned with the significance of, and problems with, this socio-cultural shift, and the 
need to reconsider our institutions of capital regulation, and project-focussed groups 
may be more interested in the possibilities of using ICTs and networking to increase 
project success rates through knowledge-sharing. Because of the Bank's dominant 
cultural and structural influences, the economistic perspective has assumed 
dominance as this discourse has entered the Bank, but its success could provide 
opportunities to widen the discursive terrain a little and open spaces for other voices 
and understandings. As has been noted, partnership discourse existed as a more or 
less marginal interest within the Bank for a number of years, from the organisation's 
first formal interactions with civil society in the 1970s. It was not until Wolfensohn's 
latest Project of renewal that this relatively minor discursive practice within the Bank 
was given the organisation's full attention, opening up a range of conversations 
within, without, and across the boundaries formally demarcating the Bank upon what 
this participation should and could be. Once the terms of reference are widely 
recognised, a range of voices talking about the need for the Bank to listen and 
participate in discussions are more easily heard 159 . Elements of such multiple 
operative agendas can be seen within the Bank's engagement with networked modes 
of organisation as a Knowledge Management and Networking Bank, which we 
consider in the following chapter. 
"9 As is shown by the development of pre-publication participatory processes around the Wodd 




Performing the Knowledge Bank Agenda 
Introduction 
Through the Renewal discourse of decentralising and partnering, a second 
understanding emerges to that of the Knowledge for Development Bank discussed in 
the previous chapter, of a Knowledge Management and Networking Bank, practised 
as Bank-initiated project-networks are partnered or outsourced. This has effects on 
the constitution of the organisation as a development actor and a network of 
development initiatives, a space wherein different groups seek to coordinate the 
various assemblages of people, technologies and capital that flow through and 
around it. One node within the organisation (the World Bank Institute) has gradually 
begun to establish, somewhat post-facto and with limited success, the appearance of 
a programme of change from the kaleidoscopic m6l6e of new initiatives. The Institute 
is considered in this chapter for its ability to retell the story of the Knowledge Bank 
and to set an agenda for future development. 
This chapter argues that the 'Knowledge Bank' is not a specific programme in the 
sense indicated in the Renewal literature or the World Development Report 199W9. 
A few new lines have been written into the Bank's development script 
(decentralisation, partnership, the Frameworks), changing the organisation's 
character-description on paper at least. But it is not currently well-practiced in how to 
perform such a new role, and the 'agenda' is developing rather as a mushrooming of 
relatively autonomous variations upon a theme. The changes (and lack of changes) 
observed are rarely themselves scripted - any such attempts at scripting would tend 
only to demonstrate the dispersed nature of the agency assembled in the name of the 
Bank. The pronouncements which make up the discursive body of the Renewal and 
the Knowledge Bank set the scene for a series of improvisations upon a theme, 
producing what we might refer to as a scenario of renewal in which top-level 
publications prompt Bank actors with reminders of the new theme. A common trend 
within many changes is to minimise the role of partners in defining project-network 
156 
operations, whilst advertising a more decentred, partnered approach. However the 
agenda also opens up more possibilities than are seen in the core literature. 
The trend for 'fostering' initiatives out to partnerships implies that partnership has a 
role as an organisational survival strategy, a way of keeping on-side both its donors 
and the wider development community. This indicates an interesting vulnerability and 
posits an opportunity to use the Bank's discourse upon itself, encouraging its practise 
in opening it up to alternative discursive contributions and engaging it in different 
approaches to development. As well as the prompting role of top-level publications, 
the audience also have a role in expressing approval and disapproval and calling for 
changes, and performing alongside those within the Bank also already exploring 
alternative perspectives upon development. The Bank's deployment of network 
discourse is also considered in this regard, and questions upon how the Bank might 
be reconstituted through the dispersal of agency indicated within the outline above 
are laid out here for further consideration in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
The Knowledge Bank as a Holistic Therapy 
A statement of intent for developing the Knowledge Bank agenda emerges in the 
ninth chapter of the World Development Report 1998199 (World Bank 1998a) entitled 
'What can International Institutions Do? '. Country-based developmental advice from 
the Report's first two sections is reiterated (building country knowledge production 
and management capacity, and helping countries develop infrastructure and 
institutions to obtain and use knowledge, World Bank 1998a: 130) before three roles 
of knowledge creation, exchange and management are outlined as potential 
contributions of the Bank (and others). Creation returns to the notion of knowledge as 
a global public good. Such knowledge as cannot be brought within a property rights 
structure being consequently undersupplied, the Report emphasises the need to 
intervene in markets both as a knowledge producer and to facilitate knowledge 
production by others (providing market incentives for private producers and fostering 
collective action). Exchange and Management refer to the Bank's (1998a: 140) 
concern to become 'a clearinghouse for knowledge about development', bringing 
together country experiences and development organisations' work for others to learn 
from. This clearinghouse role is cast in an agentive service light and not that of a 
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passive 'corporate memory bank of best practices' (World Bank 1998a: 140), 
stressing the importance of collecting, adapting, and disseminating information and 
knowledge, and advising users. 
As a result the Bank's focus under the new agenda includes aspects of continuity and 
adaptation, maintaining its role in policy advice and increasing its monitoring and 
analysis of funded projects (World Bank 1998a: 135-145). Arguing that 'analytical 
work ... 
improves project performance' (World Bank 1998a: 137), and that the benefits 
of research tend to carry over to other projects, studies are cited to illustrate the 
benefits of continued monitoring and assistance of projects in justifying existent, and 
arguing for more such, extensive follow-ups and longer-term involvement with 
supported development initiatives. In this way the need to devote more time and 
resources to monitoring and aiding p rojects-in- process is stressed. This supervisory 
role ties in with the second assertion driving the emphasis upon policy advice, that'in 
poor policy environments, ideas are more important than money' (World Bank 1998g: 
1 160 7) . 
Policy advice includes disseminating the results of Bank policy research so as 
to encourage the adoption of 'good' development practice (World Bank 1998a: 135- 
161 137) . It also includes the concern to 
develop Bank 'products and product lines in 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge' (Ritzen 2000: 3). A move away from the 
position the Bank has been much criticised for, of 'push ing-money-out-the-door', 
could be latent within such changes in attitude were Bank expenditure and staff-time 
to be redirected to supporting fewer projects and giving these greater attention. 
However when we look for details of how the 'new' Bank will be shaped the story 
becomes less clear. The Knowledge Bank agenda represents a holistic sense of 
change with no specific programme of action, incorporating changes (such as the 
emphasis upon participation and ownership) that the Bank was undergoing prior to its 
advertised turn towards a knowledge-focus. To continue the analogy of development 
160 This notion became a Bank renewal theme through rehearsal of the idea in a number of papers. For 
instance an abbreviated version was presented to the Reinventing the Wodd Bank conference (see 
hftp: /twww. woddbank. nwu. edu) as well as appearing in later policy research bulletins (World Bank 
2000g). 
161 As when development agencies promoted free markets within public policy discourse throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Eliding its own agency in portraying a progression towards greater knowledge 
upon and Improved understandings of development, this'trend toward economic liberalization and 
greater openness' is presented as an entirely consensual process in the Report (Word Bank 1998a: 
135-137), countries being depicted as having responded of their own will to published research and 
advertised examples of good practice. No explicit mention is made of the conditionalities applied to 
Bank and IMF loans which played a considerable role in inducing such policy shifts during these years. 
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with a drama, we might describe these changes as being shifts in the scenery (a 
proliferation of initiatives emphasising their contributions to knowledge management 
and knowledge-producing capacities at the Bank, between the Bank and other 
development actors, or of developing countries) whilst the plot of the piece (the main 
characters and their styles of interaction) continues relatively unchanged. Within its 
top-level publication rhetoric the Bank is eager to tell a story of how it is changing its 
dominant mode of operations and becoming a decentralised, flattened organisation 
that outsources work and partners with external actors to ensure maximum efficiency 
and effectiveness. What is achieved is other than what is set out within the 
programmes of renewal considered in the previous chapter. The Knowledge Bank 
becomes both more than and less than, in essence simply different from, the 
programme of Renewal; at moments more holistic and at others a m6lde of multiple 
disjointed specifics. 
The Knowledge Bank agenda is less than a programmatic change insofar as it is not 
so focussed and concrete. Threats stemming from the cost-cutting side of the 
Renewal - of unit and programme dissolution and staff relocations or dismissals - 
have highlighted the benefit of accentuating knowledge-related aspects of ongoing or 
proposed work. This organisational pressure to perform renewal and relevance to the 
Knowledge Bank project has promoted a rash of endeavours dressed in the fashion 
of the day through redescription as much as through any programmatic changes. The 
agenda might therefore deploy a new organisational ethos under which practices 
adapt and continue, as when the Bank emphasises 'embedding knowledge sharing in 
all World Bank products and services' (World Bank 2001g). Yet it might also produce 
a knowledge-wash as projects and policies are painted in renewal colours in order to 
gain kudos either within the Bank Group or else with external partners and donors' 62 . 
Cynicism and 'change fatigue' within the organisation (Caufield 1997: 327, Wilks 
162 For instance whilst IBRD and IDA, as the core World Bank, are more obviously affected by and 
bound to the commitments made within the Strategic Compact renewal programme, the World Bank 
Group body the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Authority (MIGA) chooses to refer to its 
'unparalleled knowledge' of developing economies as one of its unique strengths enabling it to work as 
an 'objective intermediary'; and stress how its 'online investment information services' facilitate 
capacity-building whilst headlining capacity building activities on it home-site (World Bank 2003c). 
Meanwhile the International Finance Corporation (IFC) lists knowledge-sharing - and knowledge- 
based activities such as advice provision and technical assistance - amongst its value-adding core 
activities for developing country initiatives promoting private investment (World Bank 2003g). 
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2001 a) could furthermore dampen the impact of yet another top-down programme 
with its increased work-loads and new hoops to jump through. 
At the same time, the notion of the Bank as a Knowledge Bank carries good currency 
both within and without the organisation, drawing upon familiar and fashionable 
discourses and being sufficiently vague as to appeal to a wide audience. The 
performance of knowledge economy and society discourses within all the social 
sciences would have meant that it was a relatively common currency within Bank 
conversations, with changes brought about under a familiar guise being more 
amenable than those in a foreign tongue. The discourse's edge of fashionable 
thinking meanwhile would strengthen the sense of the new in these processes of 
renewal. The knowledge focus is new but not too radically so, a fresh but familiar 
face. Furthermore, the non-specific nature of much Knowledge Bank discourse has 
allowed the notion to be adapted in a variety of ways. The understanding of the 
agenda varies from space to space, but the essence of the rhetorical turn embodied 
in its key-terms, slogans and issue-focus remain constant. The discourse's 
adaptability has produced openings for new initiatives as it has begun to permeate 
the Bank's organisational structure. The aura of the Knowledge Bank has thus been 
wrapped around the World Bank like a magic cloak of renewal as the organisation 
has begun to buzz with new (and newly-redefined) publications, programmes and 
project-networks. As one World Bank paper (2002c: viii) referred to it being 'a 
Sisyphean endeavour to attempt to construct a single detailed strategy' of even just 
the ICT aspects of the Bank's agenda, the same can be said of attempting to 
schernatise the changes undertaken in the name of the Knowledge Bank. For this 
reason it becomes more than a programmatic agenda; a more subtle, rhetorical turn 
that colours everything, with potentially far greater longer-term outcomes than the 
agenda of which it is part. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the rhetorical focus is new 
but the organisational self-perception has been latent for years. The shift can in this 
sense also be seen as an attempt to redefine the Bank's oeuvre, to raise a 
generalised awareness of one understanding of the organisation and increase self- 
awareness of perceived strengths. To redefine the Bank's identity under a new 
banner by which many practices might continue, adapted to wear Knowledge Bank 
colours. 
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New organisational patternings have been layered on top of the older regional and 
operations-based groupings. The Bank (2002d: 2,2002b, 20020 now describes itself 
as being organised into regional departments, service departments, Thematic 
Groups, Communities of Practice, and Professional or Thematic Networks. The 
Professional Networks were created under the Strategic Compact as a new 'matrix 
management structure' drawing Bank-wide operations together under subject- 
oriented titles emphasising the new agenda (World Bank 1999g, 2002d: 3-4,2002g). 
Communities of Practice (CoPs) are an idea adapted from private sector practices to 
fit within the Bank in parallel with its own Thematic Groups (TGs). Both are described 
as informal 'groups of people ... passionate about a common subject', 
brought 
together to share knowledge on common concerns and problems regarding the 
Bank's development work (World Bank 20020. CoPs are said to differ in being more 
focussed on external agents' problems and needs, whilst TGs are established 
primarily to connect Bank staff (World Bank 2003k). A lack of clarity is displayed 
however when these Communities are alternately billed as adapted forms of, 
equivalent to, or subsuming the Thematic Groups, leading to varying estimates of the 
number of Communities and Groups in existence according to the definition used 
(World Bank 2002f, 2003p, 2003q). What are presented as the Bank's 'three pillars' of 
Knowledge Sharing (and were earlier referred to as the pillars of its Knowledge 
Strategy) perhaps more succinctly capture the general thinking within the Bank upon 
its Knowledge role. Effective as rhetorical call s-to-action, these are sufficiently 
indeterminate as to be susceptible to little of the concrete monitoring and analysis that 
a 'strategy' might demand: 
,... making effective use of knowledge to support the quality of our 
operations; sharing knowledge with our clients and partners; helping clients 
enhance their capacity to generate, access and use knowledge from all 
sources' (World Bank 2003h, cf. World Bank 2001 h). 
So, as we shall see in greater detail through the rest of this chapter, the Knowledge 
Bank renewal has functioned as a holistic remedy lain over the Bank, bringing new 
colour to the skin of older endeavours and smoothing the Bank's complexion in 
promoting the impression of an organisation bound together in pursuing a common 
project, despite its dispersed constitution. The specifics of how the medicine will work 
are somewhat under-defined, and so these are consequently given less attention than 
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the promises of its remedying effects for the Bank, the development community, and 
the project of development as a whole. 
New Forms: Knowledge-related Project-Networks 
Four styles can be demarcated within the proliferation of new initiatives according to 
the greater and lesser involvement of external agents; more internally-coordinated, 
Bank-oriented operations intended for an internal and/or external audience (Bank 
Operated Project-networks, BOPs); those which began life outside the Bank, but into 
which it has bought a stake as a partner (Externally Operated Project-networks, 
EOPs); those that operate primarily from within the Bank but incorporate a formally 
established internal-external partnership (Multiple Operator Project-networks, MOPs); 
and those which began life in this form but have now been fostered out to stand alone 
as 'external' initiatives (Fostered Project-networks, FoPs). Two points of caution 
should be aired before moving on. Firstly, project-network forms will obviously overlap 
and co-exist more messily than such a quick outline indicates. The forms defined 
above do not indicate distinct organisational approaches but rather markers of 
degrees of outside networking, funding and partnership drawn up in order to consider 
whether certain styles of endeavour promise more or less opportunity for opening up 
critical reflexive spaces within the Bank and encouraging changes in its dominant 
developmental discursive practice. Secondly this outline is not intended to define a 
new mode of engagement by the Bank, but rather a shift in emphasis. The Bank was 
engaging multi ple-operator project-networks and fostering initiatives before the 
pronouncement of any official intention to practice decentralisation and 
163 outsourcing . What is significant is the incorporation of these practices within a 
Bank 
'programme' of Renewal, officially acknowledging and encouraging such an 
approach, building upon the mainstrearning of emphases on participation and 
ownership mentioned in the previous chapter. Bearing these two cautions in mind, we 
can now proceed to consider the potential of these four approaches engaged by the 
163 For instance the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was created within the Bank in 1990, its pilot 
phase being fully operational by 1992, and then by 1994 was converted into a partnered initiative 
between the Bank, UNDP and UNEP after petitioning by developing country governments at the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (the'Rio' Summit, see Young & Boehmer- 
Christiansen 1997 for further detail and an interesting analysis of Bank-GEF relations). 
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Bank with regard to the practice of its discourse of decentralisation and partnership, 
and thereby for producing changes in the organisation's dominant modes of practice. 
More strictly Bank-Operated Project-networks (BOPs) include extensive exercises in 
information and knowledge provision gathered mostly under the Data and Statistics 
section of the Bank's website, an extensive series of statistical exercises that 
expands with each new trend in development thinking (2003i)l 64 . The list consists of 
longstanding projects and departments, illustrating how the knowledge focus is 
wrapped around pre-existing endeavours in re-scripting the Bank's oeuvre, as well as 
newer endeavours designed to facilitate knowledge sharing within the Bank'65. Some 
BOPs seek to link Bank staff with external partners, but tend to maintain operational 
activities entirely within the Bank and position external partners as rather non- 
directive, leaving the partnership as something quite nominal except for financial and 
technical assistance. For example infoDev (a partnership of private and governmental 
donors managed by the Bank that provides grants to promote the use of ICTs in 
governance and development) has an external Donors' Committee within its 
governance structure. However this meets only once a year, with a Bank Vice- 
President responsible for convening and chairing the Committee and appointing other 
staff within the governance structure, most posts being filled by Bank staff (World 
166 Bank 2002j) 
Many BOPs therefore continue quite standard Bank endeavours, such as making 
loans to encourage the adoption of new technological developments on the promise 
that this will facilitate participation in the 'new' economy. The advantages for Bank 
groups are that they can provide a response to the organisational pressure to perform 
the knowledge and partnership agenda whilst reducing their financial and technical 
164 Databases such as the World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance, Africa 
Live, and the Poverty Monitoring system are now Bank staples. Newer exercises such as the World 
Bank Institute's Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) produce something more distinctly 
Froduct-like than the WDI (World Bank 2001j). 
65 Various capacity-building initiatives such as the Statistical Capacity Building (SCB) and General 
Data Dissemination System (GDDS) teams also offer specialised and 'personalised' country services 
to this end, whilst policy advice groups such as the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) are designed to give 
swift specialist advice to improve the design and implementation of development policy. 
"56 The Professional Networks also perform such a role, as do the Thematic Groups and Communities 
of Practice. The Investment Promotion Network (IPAneo is another, a'portal website'BOP designed to 
facilitate foreign direct investment in 'emerging markets'. It includes an array of external sponsors from 
the UN to North American, European, and Japanese ministries of finance and development. However it 
is still securely Bank-operated and features an online document database sourced primarily from the 
Bank with links to subsidiary MIGA websites (World Bank 2002k). 
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burden through external contributions where possible. Whatever claims to increased 
legitimacy can be derived from such nominal engagement of partners are another 
potential benefit. The restriction of external involvement to financial and technical 
assistance and nominal coordinative roles weakens the expectation of any significant 
new directions being undertaken however. The changes captured within the BOP 
bracket offer comparatively little potential for using the new agenda to rework the 
organisation. Frequently no space is given to alternative development priorities or 
conceptual isatio ns of knowledge and exploring methodologies for their development. 
Statistical exercises are performed and data-banks are produced using established 
Bank practices. Online schemes such as the Africa Live Database (LDB) for instance, 
a 'program to help improve monitoring and evaluation capacity in African countries' 
(World Bank 2002r), provide a regionalised ongoing exposition of the Bank's 
information gathering activities, whilst the B-Span webcasting service archives Bank- 
organised presentations as a public 'bank of knowledge' (World Bank 2001 k). 
Externally Operated Project-networks (EOPs) are orchestrated from outside the 
organisation and so exhibit strong external partner activity, with greater or lesser 
Bank involvement. EOPs are interesting insofar as some use is made of Bank 
resources for endeavours defined by an external association in which the Bank is only 
one player. However the Bank's less coordinative role restricts both the range of 
endeavours it becomes associated with in this way and its level of involvement, with 
dominant aspects of the organisation's culture influencing partnership choices' 67 . 
Participation in projects where the mandate is defined through negotiation can 
potentially generate compatibility problems with more dominant organisational 
preconceptions of the Knowledge Bank agenda. As such, the Bank more often 
partners with other regional development banks, multilateral organisations, 
governments, and corporations tending to express relatively compatible operative 
assumptions, defined goals and preferred means of their achievement'68. These 
167 For instance PARIS21 (Partnership Advocacy Resource Information Strategies) can be considered 
as an EOP. This is a project-network aiming to consolidate the effective use of statistically-based 
evidence in policy formation and promote transparency and accountability in governance. Established 
in 1999 in response to a UN Economic and Social Council Resolution, it is operated through a 
secretariat housed within the OECD and includes the Bank's involvement alongside other major 
multilateral and intergovernmental bodies such as the IMF and the EC as partners (PARIS21 2001). 168 With regard to focussing upon capital-oriented conceptions of development and the importance of 
free moving financial and industrial capital in achieving this (such as with the Trade and Development 
Centre, run between the World Bank Institute and the World Trade Organization). 
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types of organisation are far more likely to be seen as Bank EOP partners than other 
more differently thinking organisations. Overall, and as will be explored in greater 
detail later in this chapter and in the following, the Bank has tended to avoid 
involvement with already established EOPs in favour of pursuing its own endeavours 
that it later, when deemed appropriate or necessary, fosters as 'independent' 
initiatives, producing the feeling in the non-governmental development community 
that the Bank tends to squeeze out alternatives. 
Multiple-Operator Proj ect- networks (MOPs) and Fostered Project- networks (FoPs) 
are therefore quite closely intertwined. MOPs incorporate those project-networks that 
are still largely internally coordinated, but feature much more active involvement by 
and with external partners 169 . FoPs are most often cultivated with 
heavy Bank 
involvement before it withdraws to play its lesser 'partner' role. The African Virtual 
University (2001,1995) is one such initiative, a primarily ICT network-based 
organisation intended to improve access to affordable tertiary education across Africa 
that was put forward as an idea within the Bank in 1995, initially established and 
funded in 1997 through the World Bank's Africa region and infoDev, but by 2001 was 
being described as having made the transition from a Bank project to an 'independent 
non-profit organisation'. Similarly with the case of World Links for Development 
(WorLD), a five-year pilot MOP established in 1997 to help developing countries 
educate their youth in a manner appropriate to their participation in the 'new' 
economy; this produced an independent NGO (World Links) in 2000, to which it 
passed its mandate once a specified project-time had ended. Meanwhile a separate 
initiative (ICT for Education) was established within the Bank to mainstream the 
projects findings, so that in effect a MOP was split to develop into two separate 
initiatives, a BOP and a FoP (World Bank 2003j). These educational initiatives will be 
considered further in the next chapter. Fostering is not a necessary step, but many 
multiply-operated initiatives are later fostered or outsourced to stand as 
independents. The MOP-FoP shift can either be accomplished with obvious intent 
from the outset through the project-network's strategic development as part of the 
Bank's decentralising ethic, or else through the increasingly active involvement of 
partners and a certain amount of petitioning by externals (for instance civil society 
169 For example the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) which is 
housed within the Bank but involves 62 partner organisations and institutions including governments 
and corporations, and conducts research through 16 centres based around the world (CGIAR 2001). 
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actors and governments) producing tensions that are resolved in giving projects 
greater operational autonomy. Once externalised, such project- networks often include 
a large number of active non-Bank players and the Bank is nominally only one partner 
in the governance structure, although in a number of cases the Bank has been 
considered as continuing to dominate the project-network's governance, as we shall 
see with the Development Gateway especially in the next chapter. 
As will be seen in the cases of three Global siblings (the Global Knowledge 
Partnership, Global Development Network, and Global Development Gateway - now 
registered as the Development Gateway) in this chapter and the next, the Bank's 
style of outsourcing can vary between a partial and agentive form of dispersal with 
managed control wherein it defines the goals, structure, operations and principles of 
governance of the bodies to be outsourced before doing so, to a more open-palmed 
approach of putting an incomplete organisational form out into the development 
community and being comparatively welcoming of proposals for its further 
development. Frequently a number of Bank employees are carried over to new 
positions within the outsourced units, encouraging the continuation of a Bank 
intellectual and operational culture. The perceived independence, and thus the 
development community's acceptance, of FoPs therefore rests on an assessment of 
funding and staffing sources, governance structure, and where an initiative is housed. 
Partnership functions as a form of organisational survival strategy in terms of both 
funding and community acceptance. The tendency to push initiatives out to stand on 
their own in the development world raises questions about the dispersal of the Bank's 
influence under different guises, but also posits an interesting vulnerability that is 
expressed in the attempts to gain the approval and acceptance of other development 
actors. It is important to take note of this vulnerability, as well as the show of strength 
such a proliferation of initiatives is often taken to indicate, because it signifies an 
opportunity for working with and through the Bank's discourse of renewal, 
decentralisation and partnering to influence the reconstitution of a somewhat new 
Bank. 
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Telling Stories: The World Bank Institute and Project-Networks 
So whilst there is no single programme to the Knowledge Bank agenda, there are 
trends in the changes being undertaken. Furthermore, one Bank department has 
been elevated to play a leading role in producing and co-ordinating a substantial part 
of the agenda's practical substance. The World Bank Institute (hereafter 'the 
Institute'), 'the learning arm of the Bank', was created in 1999 (although a first 
preliminary meeting was held in 1998) by bringing together the two Bank departments 
responsible for internal and external training to create 'a center for global learning', 
'promoting knowledge and learning for a better world' (World Bank1999i, 2000h) 170 . 
The Institute has been progressively nurtured to a position of greater centrality within 
the Knowledge Bank agenda and the Bank as a whole 171 . As the 
Institute's 
Knowledge and Learning Manager puts it, 'the Bank has entrusted the World Bank 
Institute with the responsibility to lead the shift toward a knowledge and learning 
Bank' (Laporte 2002b: 3). The 'Knowledge Bank Chronology: 1996-2002' (World 
Bank 2003h) lists the Institute as having been 'given a catalytic and aggregating role' 
in 2002 to ensure the integration of the Bank's knowledge agenda both within the 
organisation and in its work for clients. The Institute can be viewed as a MOP, with its 
core organisational unit wholly Bank-staffed and coordinated and a nominal External 
Advisory Council consisting of eighteen members meeting once or twice a year. Yet 
within, it hosts p roject- networks of varying levels of external sponsorship and 
coordination such that more than a quarter of the Institute's overall budget is provided 
through co-financing by around 100 donor partners (including the EC, IMF, UN, 
regional development banks, and a large number of US and European companies) 
whilst it works with over 150 training partner institutions in donor and borrower 
countries (World Bank 2000h, 2001 i). 
170 The Institute's Mission Statement states that: 'The World Bank Institute creates learning 
opportunities for countries, Bank staff and clients, and people committed to poverty reduction and 
sustainable development' (World Bank 2000h). The departments were the Economic Development 
Institute for Bank staff, and the Learning and Leadership Center for policy-makers from developing 
countries. 
171 From a single department brought into being under the stewardship of Joe Stiglitz, who was its 
Senior Vice-President at its establishment (World Bank 1999i) and left the Bank within a year of this, it 
has grown in stature to now act as the Learning link on the header-bar of Bank homepage alongside 
other defining Bank categories such as Countries, Data and Research. 
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The emergence of the Institute as a focus for knowledge activities within the 
organisation has begun to spin the web of the Knowledge Bank over the three 
Knowledge Sharing pillars of creating, sharing and applying knowledge, so that under 
the shade of a wealth of more and less grandiose pronouncements various forms of 
project-networks have mushroomed. The Institute engages with most elements of the 
Knowledge Bank agenda through projects for learning, producing and managing 
knowledge, and using technology and networking for development. It is involved in 
each of the four modes of engagement outlined above; a variety of BOPs such as B- 
Span and the Development Education Programme (DEP) exist here alongside MOPs 
such as the Trade and Development Centre, whilst the Institute also works in 
establishing and working alongside FoPs like the GKP and the Asian and 
Mediterranean Development Forums (World Bank 2000h: 4-6). 
The Institute firstly plays a role as a Knowledge Management and Networking Bank 
initiative. The World Bank's Knowledge Sharing programme is based here, a distinctly 
Knowledge Bank endeavour in the first sense of turning the Bank into a premier 
knowledge management organisation, aiming to systematically capture and organise 
'the wealth of experience gained from our staff, clients, and partners' (World Bank 
2003p), make this available to the development community, and so consolidate the 
Bank's leading position in the field of development knowledge and experience. The 
Institute also secondly houses a Knowledge for Development Program (K41), 
launched in 2000, World Bank 2001h), demonstrating its role in performing a 
Knowledge for Development Bank. K4D is intended 'to develop a framework for the 
knowledge-based economy and to provide concrete applications for its client 
countries', focussing upon 'building the knowledge dimension into' country 
development strategies (World Bank 2001h, 2002i). This involves assessing 
countries' knowledge needs, devising strategies to help them fill the gaps, and so 
enabling them to compete in the knowledge economy. Furthermore, returning to the 
notion of Communities of Practice mentioned earlier, different Institute Programs are 
given space to undertake their own Communities and as such the K41) Program has 
initiated the Knowledge for Development (K4D) Community by absorbing another 
external ly-ori ented Bank project-network into the Institute 172 . Through the K41) 
172 TechNet was devised in 1994 and billed as a 'cross-cutting thematic group' to promote the use of 
science and technology for development. Since 1999 TechNet has been subsumed within the Institute 
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Community the Institute could potentially seek to bring other knowledge-focussed 
initiatives spread across the organisation under one banner, providing the Knowledge 
Bank story with a more clearly-defined face and sense of direction and over time 
changing the Bank's ethos and redefining its oeuvre in a manner characterising the 
Knowledge Bank agenda. 
Yet neither the K4D Program nor the Institute as a whole could be said to embody a 
Knowledge Bank programme, as much as symbols of organisation and reorganisation 
(pillars, programmes, networks, groups and communities) overlap and intertwine 
throughout Institute literature. Plurality and dispersal define the Institute's efforts as 
much as they do those of the Bank as a whole; the K4D Program is one of twenty 
Learning Programs operated through the Institute, itself made up of four programmes 
which are themselves multiple entities (courses, services, tools, and the K4D 
Community, World Bank 2003n, 2001 n). Although the Institute has increasingly 
assumed a more directorial role in producing and co-ordinating initiatives fitting the 
Knowledge for Development Bank and Knowledge Management and Networking 
Bank agendas, many regions of the Bank already independently perform such 
knowledge roles and others are affected by the pressure or the desire to do so. As 
much as the Institute might attempt to overlook the institution of a knowledge sharing 
culture within the Bank, the points at which this is adapted, adopted and put into 
practice will remain somewhat dispersed. Their association with different interest- 
groups (both within the Bank and external partners) will ensure that various project- 
networks maintain some, greater or lesser, degree of autonoMY173. 
Opening Up the Bank 
To help us facilitate the sharing of global knowledge and lessons of 
experience with the Bank's clients in all regions, we have organized 
ourselves into Networks. Networks are an integral part of the institutional 
renewal effort aimed at improving the quality, relevance, and cost- 
effectiveness of the assistance we provide to our clients. They are an 
explicit way of linking Bank-wide communities of staff ... and equally 
and reconfigured as the K4D Community (World Bank 2000p, 2001 h). The lack of clarity mentioned 
earlier shows again here when both TechNet and the MID Community are listed as existent Thematic 
Groups on the main Groups outline page (World Bank 20020. 
173 Project-networks concerned with protecting indigenous knowledges or using local knowledges in 
environmentally-sensitive development endeavours, for example, might be considered as practising 
the Knowledge Bank whilst never coming under the remit of the Institute. 
169 
important, of linking Bank staff with our partners outside the Bank' (World 
Bank 2002g). 
So conceptions of how the World Bank might most effectively contribute to the 
discursive practice of development are changing, but the Knowledge Bank cannot be 
classed as a specific programme of change. Appropriate policies have been 
advocated for international organisations in the new economy that correlate with the 
Bank's own theme of Renewal. A series of reorganisations have been undertaken to 
regroup actors within the Bank around activity-themes. Project-networks have 
mushroomed up sporting the language of renewal and knowledge (producing, sharing 
and managing). A new department has been created to catalyse activities around the 
idea of Knowledge for Development, and has over time been positioned more 
centrally within the Knowledge Bank agenda, but is unlikely to be able to assume a 
central coordinative role within the dispersal of activities. All of these developments 
return us to the idea of the Knowledge Bank as a non-specific endeavour. However a 
series of exercises have also been undertaken through the Renewal to reorganise the 
space defined by the Bank and produce new nodes to connect otherwise distant 
groups inside and outside of this space. The advertised aim of creating networks 
between professional groups inside and outside of the Bank indicates a willingness to 
engage its resources and skills upon a wider - somewhat trans-Bank Group - terrain 
of operations. As Bank-initiated and Bank-partnered project-networks become more 
numerous, more diverse and more dispersed within the development terrain through 
the Knowledge Bank Renewal, so the form and content of the organisation as a whole 
could be altered. One potential outcome of adopting the rhetoric and procedures of 
decentralisation and dispersal in this manner could be to effect a fracturing or partial 
dissolution of organisational boundaries, blurring a little the boundary-lines 
distinguishing the 'Bank' as a distinct actor from 'non-Bank' actor-groups. 
Partial dissolution could have the effect of extending the Bank's influence as a 
facilitator, coordinator and convenor of development efforts. Dissolution would result 
in a proliferation of nominally-independent, Bank-associated bodies operating within a 
broadly-defined framework of consensus (sufficient to veto Bank involvement) upon 
the nature of the problems within the development project and the viable means of 
their solution. This could in turn normalise the conditions and standards under which 
contributions can be made to development discourse and development knowledge 
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around the Bank's own epistemological, methodological and socio-economic 
presumptions, thereby consolidating its position within and strengthening the 
dominant strategic (economistic) functions of the development apparatus. As 
increasing numbers of organisations produce and use knowledge or information 
formulated under conditions established by the Bank, its informational resources and 
calculative machinery are strengthened and the Bank is positioned to assert a more 
coordinative role, connecting development actors and facilitating knowledge's flow 
between nodes. The enabling and constraining implications following from this for the 
discursive practice of development will be explored in greater detail in the following 
chapter. 
Another effect of the blurring of organisational boundaries demarcating the Bank as a 
distinct actor could be to loosen the governance currently exercised by its central 
Washington node, opening the organisation up to the greater involvement of more 
trans-Bank actor-networks contributing to, reframing, and asking different questions of 
development. As the number and variety of partnerships engaged by the Bank 
increases, so the Bank could come increasingly to be constituted as a series of looser 
assemblages of actor-networks traversing a space formally defined as the 'World 
Bank'. The World Bank too 'has to be composed, made up, constructed, established, 
maintained, and assembled' (Latour 2000: 113), and the manner in which this 
happens might be more open to negotiation through the changes being considered. 
Yet the Bank has always been to some degree a loose assemblage, with staff 
174 brought in on consultancies from universities or businesses , specialists working on 
contract for specific projects, a governance structure made up of Governors involved 
in their own country work for most of the year and meeting only once a year, and the 
Bank Group's constitution as an umbrella for five officially distinct and separate but in 
reality quite overlapping organisations. The manner in which staff within technical 
departments responsible for giving projects clearance (such as an environmental 
green-card) have to sell their services to regional departments producing such 
projects 175 indicate that internally the Bank has been organised as a space of 
174 In 1996 the Bank was already making public notice that it was 'stepping up its secondment of 
private sector staff Into the Bank - and the assignment of its regular staff to enrichment programs in 
private companies' (World Bank 1996: 69). 
175 With all the bureaucratic politics this brings with it, such that more critical assessors might become 
less employable by project-developers who don't want to have to do redesigns, encouraging a 
consensual approach to environmental and other assessments of projects (Rich 2002: 33-4). 
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temporal and contingent connections for some time (cf. Rich 2002: 33-4). Again, as 
was mentioned in the previous chapter with regard to the Bank's relations with non- 
governmental agents and the notion of 'ownership', the significance of partnering and 
networking within the Bank's discourse is best understood as acknowledging ongoing 
trends, encouraging and mainstrearning and so performing them to an audience of 
donors, partners, critics and clients. The spread of partnered project-networks is an 
aspect and an outcome of this discursive practice. 
As previously mentioned, the Knowledge Bank agenda might be seen as an attempt 
to strengthen the Bank's 'friendly' Sfiglitz face over and against the Summers 'bank' 
face that characterises it for many critics. Stiglitz, as we have seen, came to the Bank 
concerned with broadening the development agenda beyond a strictly-defined 
economic mandate to look at the state's role in producing and regulating 'free' 
markets (promoting its value as an agent of development rather than merely a 
financial administrator or else a potential interference or impediment), transparency in 
governance, and how ownership of the development endeavour by those to-be- 
developed could make involvement stronger, efforts greater and so increase the 
chances of producing successful outcomes (e. g. Stiglitz 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999c, 
1999d). The Stiglitz face is prominent in the well-publicised manoeuvres advertising 
the Bank as a reformed, caring, citizen of the world community 176; a common concern 
of Wolfensohn, and Stiglitz in his time at the Bank, has been to promote the 
organisation as one which listens to those it works with 177 . Yet the Stiglitz face 
is only 
one element within a Bank in which the Summers face is still perceived as being 
centre-stage in terms of officially approved and censored stories of development and 
economic growth, as seen in the four cases (including Stiglitz's) mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, high-profile Bank research papers claiming to show 
that economic growth per se, 'globalisation' (read: of trade and finance), and capital 
account liberalisation are always either super-pro-poor, pro-poor, or at worst with no 
176 Much of the Renewal agenda bears his hallmark concerns with free flows of information and 
governmental transparency, and with recognising the importance of building up human and social 
capital in achieving development goals (social capital in a Robert Puftnam sense rather than that of 
Pierre Bourdieu -a device of economic analysis rather than one of social analysis and c6tique - see 
e. g. Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002). 
17 Related effects have included the increased focus upon social development; education and training, 
knowledge management and policy-making skills, good governance practices, secure and stable legal 
infrastructures to encourage good economic regulation, and encouraging ICT adoption through the 
promise of countries leapfrogging stages of development. 
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significant positive or negative effects for the poor (Dollar & Kraay 2001), indicate how 
little has changed in the mainstream of the Bank economic thinking that will be 
peddled in its new lines of knowledge products (cf. Ritzen 2000). 
The fact that a Summers face still exhibits a certain dominance does not mean that 
the Stiglitz face within the Bank carries no weight. Although, as also noted in the 
previous chapter, economists trained at US and UK universities predominate within 
the organisation, such an observation tells us little in itself. Clusters of other interests 
occupy spaces within the Bank, whilst economics itself is by no means a discipline of 
one voice and development discourse too is a heterogeneous affair within the World 
Bank. Bebbington et al's (forthcoming, cf. King & McGrath 2000a) observation of 
social capital discourse's existence within the Bank as several conversations in which 
the economic is dominant, was argued in the previous chapter to hold true for 
knowledge economic discourse also, and we might presume that the same could be 
said of many fields in which the Bank has a stake. The different discourses of 
knowledge in economic terms, considered in the previous chapter, testify to this. 
Whilst some parts of the Bank are concerned to extend and consolidate a global 
system of intellectual property rights legislation, other departments or sub- 
departments have invested time in trying to think about different ways of protecting 
traditional and indigenous knowledges and funding research centres to secure areas 
of free knowledge. 
So the Bank is best characterised as a somewhat open space inhabited by different 
voices. To this extent there are productive potentialities to be explored in using the 
mentioned fracturing to affect further change within the organisation, developing 
trans-Bank networks that can provide support to critical internal voices pushing further 
the organisation's partial re-conceptualisations of both itself and the development field 
within which it operates. The Bank might be played at its own game, in seeking to 
diffuse the organisation more, so that the conversations within it can open up onto the 
public stage and receive both public review, and contributions from those still 
positioned as 'the audience' of the Bank's public face. This could be otherwise 
characterised as seeking to convert BOPs into MOPs by petitioning for the more 
active involvement of the Bank's partners; pulling MOPs out to stand as the more 
independent FoPs in much the same way, and demanding greater independence of 
such project-networks and their governance; and encouraging the Bank to use its 
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resources to open up development discourse to alternative voices, engaging 
minimally (except for financial and organisational support) in EOPs. Should the Bank 
more clearly perform with several voices, then, to paraphrase Foucault (1984a: 75), 
this might produce a first step in detaching the power of its truths from the forms of 
hegemony within which they currently operate. 
Understanding Networks and Partnerships 
So a network mentality is being instituted within the Bank as the metaphor becomes 
more deeply engrained within its public performance, a model of the organisation's 
political future in the style of 'a diagram on the basis of which reality might be 
refashioned and reimagined' (Barry 2001: 87). Section Three of the 1998 World Bank 
Annual Report (World Bank 19980, 'Working through Networks', provides an example 
of the network metaphor being applied widely to an array of what could previously 
have been referred to as partnerships, gatherings or communities. Similarly the 
Repo rt (World Bank 1998a) is dotted with various references to networks physical 
(roads, railways), socio-technological (telephones, computers), financial (credit 
assessment), knowledge-focussed (academic, research centres, laboratories, global 
knowledge, social ly-embedded knowledge), and more purely social ('kinship'). The 
Institute meanwhile is described as 'promoting knowledge networks and communities 
of practice' such as the Asian and Mediterranean Development Forums, the Global 
Knowledge Partnership and World Links (World Bank 2000h: 3). A will to be 
178 perceived more as a 'network enterprise' , than as an overgrown 
bureaucracy 
concerned primarily with ensuring its own continued existence (which the Bank has 
on past occasion been accused of being, see George & Sabelli 1994, Wilks 2001 a), 
might lie behind this flirtation with networks, outsourcing and decentralisation. 
As was mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, the discourse of Renewal as a 
whole, and more specifically here the tendency towards decentralising, outsourcing 
and partnering Bank operations, functions as something of an organisational survival 
strategy. The discursive turn gives new attention and emphasis to activities that have 
been ongoing at the Bank for some time, painting the organisation in their colours and 
178 Castells, 2000a: 187, a form of enterprise 'whose system of means is constituted by the intersection 
of segments of autonomous systems of goals'. 
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celebrating its embracement of the new and more gentle face they help it to present. 
The language of progression within such endeavours is again notable as through the 
institution of a networking, partnering mentality the Bank performs a new openness to 
criticism; as with reports on its establishing a study of its Structural Adjustment 
Policies with 'a global network ... of some 500 NGOs and civil society organizations - 
many vehemently critical of structural adjustment', such that 'voices are being heard 
that were previously silent' (World Bank 1998f: 74,90). Two points of interest arise 
here concerning the terms used in defining the Bank's potential partners and the 
assemblages they form. 
To consider firstly the 'non-govern mental' grouping within the Bank's desired 
development partners. The Bank describes itself as having traditionally engaged with 
NGOs because of their prominent activities as research and pressure groups, but as 
now extending its reach, in the progressive evolutionary tone noted in Chapter Five 
(see e. g. World Bank 2003t: iv, 2,1998h: 4). A discursive shift has therefore been 
attempted within the organisation throughout the period of the Renewal towards 
speaking of 'civil society' and 'civil society organisations' (CSOs), rather than just 
'non-governmental organisations' (NGOs), as an indication of the Bank's broadening 
and deepening interest in engaging external participation and forming partnerships 
with non-Bank agentS179 . NGOs are considered as one 
branch of civil society in the 
Bank's discourse, 'civil society' being used as an inclusive means of referring to all 
that does not fall under the rubric of government (and bilateral/mu Iti lateral 
governmental agencies) and the private sector (World Bank 2000t: 3, cf. World Bank 
1999d, 2000a, 2000i, 2000r). 'CSO' is therefore understood as referring to all non- 
governmental and non-profit organisations, including 'trade unions, community-based 
organizations, social movements, faith-based institutions, charitable organizations, 
research centers, foundations, student organizations, professional associations and 
many others' (World Bank 2001 e, cf. World Bank 1998h: 3,2000t: 8,2003t: 2,2003u, 
Wolfensohn 1999: 26). 
179 This change is still an active process - as mentioned in Chapter Five the World Bank-NGO 
Committee and the NGO Working Group on the World Bank (NGOWG) have been dissolved whilst 
negotiations (which are still ongoing) take place over the establishment of a World Bank-Civil Society 
Forum. 'Civil society' and its 'groups' and 'organizations' have been present in the Bank's discourse for 
some time, but with more frequent references made to NGOs (see e. g. World Bank 1998c, 1998d, 
1999j). It was only with the restructuring of the Bank's NGO and Civil Society Unit as a Civil Society 
Team that references to the acronym 'CSO' began to be made, and with equal or greater frequency 
than those to NGOs (e. g. World Bank 2000t, 2000u). 
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The danger in this opening up of partnership discourse is that the terminology 
becomes even more radically under-defined, which in turn opens wider the possibility 
that the Bank could engage fully in a discursive practice of participation but do little to 
open up to critical interjections and alternative perspectives. Important distinctions 
under the label of NGOs already remain under-defined and under-analysed within the 
Bank's, as well as wider, developmental discourse'80. The engagement of NGOs 
funded by contributions from corporations, Northern governments, and citizens of the 
global North can for instance already too easily - without careful negotiation and 
definition of terms - be hailed as a 'participatory' approach as legitimately as any 
exercises conducted with associations directly representing communities of those 
affected by Bank development projeCtS181 . Eliding the importance of analysing already 
problematic categories such as 'NGO', and introducing more inclusive and 
ambiguous, and less well-defined and understood, terminology such as CSO, could 
contribute to the formation of new hegemonic understandings within the wider 
discourse upon what constitutes a 'legitimate' actor or 'valid' contribution to the 
development terrain. 
The terminological shift has lacked direction and clarity, however, with variations in 
the listing of groups included within 'civil society" 82 , and the emphasis upon agency 
therein' 83 . This confusion indicates that although, or perhaps because, 
the Bank 
advertises its concern with civil society as being functional and not theoretical (World 
'so Between International NGOs, 'Northern' and 'Southern' NGOs, Grassroots Organisations (GROs), 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and others (cf. Martens 2002, Reuben 2002, Hardt & Negri 
2000: 312, Tvedt 1998,2002, Edwards et al. 1999, Munck 2002). 
181 For more critical thinking on the role, nature, and independence - or lack of it - of NGOs, and the 
need to carefully negotiate who represents 'whom' and how this is decided, see e. g. Batliwala 2002, 
Martens 2002, Nelson 2002a, 2002b, Edwards et al. 1999, Tvedt 1998,1994, Edwards & Hulme 1996. 
For discussion of the influence of 'Northern' environmental I NGOs over the voices of 'Southern' 
development NGOs in the US Congress' decision over its IDA-1 0 funding replenishment decision, see 
Chiriboga 1999, Nelson 1996. 
182 For instance academic institutions and their membership have been listed within civil society (World 
Bank 2000r: 5,2000i, 1998c: 51,1998d: 1) as well as being listed separately alongside references to 
civil society, implying a separate status (World Bank 2000r: 6,1999b, 1999d). The same confusion has 
at times been noted with NGOs, foundations, and 'labor unions' (World Bank 1998d: Annex 1,2000r: 
45). 
183 NGOs have been more often listed in specifically active roles in development projects, and civil 
society or CSOs mentioned in terms of the need to engage participation (e. g. World Bank 2000r). 
NGOs are furthermore given more frequent mention than many other CSO groupings. The ambiguous 
status of CSOs, as definitions have been developed and fine-tuned, has led to NGOs and CSOs being 
at times segued as 'NGOs/CSOs' (World Bank 2000r: 58). 
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184 Bank 2000u: 5, cf. Nelson 2002b: 4, Nelson 2002a) , the 
discursive shift and the 
terminology used therein has not been completely 'black-boxed' (Latour 1987: 41-44). 
Rather, spaces for debate have been temporarily opened up within and around the 
organisation upon the nature and constitution of its 'partners', and thereby its 
understanding of 'partnerships' and 'participation' (NGOWG 2000a, 2000b, World 
Bank 2003t, 2003v). The apparent edge of vulnerability in the Bank's needing to 
engage participation discourse (in a way that garners the approval and acceptance of 
both the wider development community and its governing member-states) provides 
opportunities for reproducing and maintaining such spaces of negotiation upon the 
nature and positioning of the Bank, and how its critical interlocutors are defined, 
perceived, and related with. This returns us to the importance mentioned in the 
previous section of engaging with different voices within the Bank and seeking to 
encourage changes in how the organisation is perceived (as more dispersed and 
multiple), how it is constituted (as assemblages of more relatively autonomous units) 
and how it contributes to and consequently shapes development discourse (as a 
series of individual contributions detached a little from the hegemonic forms within 
which they currently operate). These concerns are the basis of the further 
explorations conducted in the final two chapters. 
To refer now to the second point of interest noted above, the Bank frequently refers to 
any assemblage of N on-G overn mental and Civil Society Organisations as a 'network' 
(e. g. World Bank 1996: 51-2,1998d: 6-7,1998f: 74,2003v, 2003w). The network is a 
problematic way of conceiving an assemblage of five hundred variously sized, more 
and less independent organisations. The levels of connectivity between these groups 
prior to the Bank's mobilisation is not spoken of, but we might presume that the 
constitution of a 'network' of all the mentioned groups could only be said to have 
come into existence through the Bank's agency. This points to an issue developed in 
the following chapter of the Bank's tendency to produce networks which - contrary to 
Castells' (1999: 5) assertion noted in Chapter One - have a centre, that is occupied 
by the Bank. The presumption that this is unproblematic implies a romanticised 
understanding of ICT-style networks as spaces of unmediated and horizontalised 
flows wherein ideas can be transported or resources transferred without encountering 
184, 
... what 
is important about the civil society debate is not that we agree who is "in" and who is 'out" in 
some abstract sense, but that we agree on a working definition - and classification - that helps us 
make appropriate decisions about whom to involve in different tasks. ' (World Bank 2000u: 5). 
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any processes of translation or changes in understanding of their potential 
significance, use, meaning, and so forth (in the manner of what Bruno Latour, 1999: 
15, calls 'double-click information'). 
Such a notion of smooth and instant network flows can tend to obviate the texturing 
and patterning of relations and flows of power; the lack of participation by certain 
groups, the clustering of activity from others, and the alliances that form within and 
influence the constitution of the 'network' (cf. Barry 2001: 15). The network instead 
needs to be approached as existing on a three-dimensional terrain, wherein flows 
interact with hierarchies and experience frictions and blockages; and considered with 
regard to how various nodes can play a greater role in bringing and holding a network 
together (and so act as more and less 'obligatory passage points' for engaging 
network connections and activities, see Callon 1986: 197-204). Adopting such an 
approach could illuminate something of the more and less limited potential of certain 
partnered project-networks established through or with the Bank's involvement. Three 
FoPs might be considered in this regard in observing the different outcomes of Bank- 
initiated project-networks gaining or lacking independence and so forming different 
kinds of network, the Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP), the Global Development 
Network (GDN), and the Development Gateway. The first two are considered here 
whilst the Gateway is treated as a more extended case study in the following chapter. 
Firstly the fairly unproblematic case of the Global Knowledge Partnership (1999a), 
which describes itself as an 'evolving, informal partnership' of public and private 
sector organisations sharing knowledge to promote a broadened vision (sustainable, 
equitable) of development. The Partnership was established in 1997 and its 
Secretariat spent its first few years housed within and staffed by the World Bank 
Institute. Yet the organisation's evolution towards independence has been fairly 
substantial. From its earliest days it has included a healthy array of partners such as 
seven United Nations departments, the World Health Organization, the International 
Labor Organization and NGOs critical of other World Bank work such as the Third 
World Network (Global Knowledge Partnership 1999b). In 2001 the Partnership's 
Secretariat was moved to Malaysia, and will now rotate between partners roughly 
every five years. It is accountable to an Executive Committee, on which as of 2002 
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only one sifting member was an employee of the Bank'85 . The housing of the 
Partnership's Secretariat in a Southern country is quite novel and promising. Critical 
commentary appears quickly online and spreads rapidly, and the fact that so little is 
said of the GKP on the many sites criticising the Bank can be taken as a sign that it is 
more accepted as a knowledge sharing platform not dominated by any one particular 
agenda than a number of other initiatives"'s. The GKP would seem to have 
succeeded in achieving respected FoP status because the Bank drew back quite 
early on and through the first few major conferences (GKI and GKII) the group's 
structure and governance were negotiated between members, whilst endeavours 
undertaken through the Partnership remain relatively dispersed, the Partnership 
umbrella facilitating sharing of initiative ideas rather than directing them according to 
a programme of action. 
Secondly, the Global Development Network (GDN) is another association brought 
together by the Bank that has had a more troubled beginning. The Network was 
created to build social sciences research capacity in developing countries by 
directing, funding and coordinating research activities, 'generating, sharing and 
applying knowledge about development' (Global Development Network 2001). The 
Network was established within the Bank under the leadership of Joe Stiglitz in 1999, 
and initially housed within and funded primarily by the World Bank Institute. Again the 
Network was designed to bring on-board other funding and supporting partners, and 
had become a legally independent organisation and moved out of the Bank by July 
2001 (World Bank 2001m). Whilst the Network now includes over 200 registered 
partner organisations and a series of ten regional development networks for which it 
is establishing regional 'windows', it still carries many markings of being a Bank- 
inspired initiative. Glancing over the online rdsum6s of the eighteen listed Network 
governing members in early 2002, one third had had or continued to have direct work 
experience and ongoing contact with the Bank' 87 , and (included in that third) the 
Network's director (Lyn Squire) was a World Bank employee of 20 years who had 
185 The Partnership's Executive Director at this time was furthermore a female Malaysian national 
JRinalia Abdul Rahim) trained in Public Policy rather than economics (Cornerstone 2001). 
86 Even so, the Partnership bears traces of what might be regarded as its time in the Bank, such as 
the focus upon ICTs over other aspects of development knowledge and 'appropriate' technologies, and 
the dominance of English as the accepted Partnership language of communication (cf. de Silva 2000). 
187 As well as Lyn Squire, one more governing member remained directly employed by the Bank, one 
had previously been a research fellow there, and three more were ex-Bank employees (Global 
Development Network 2002b). 
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taken charge whilst the organisation was an intra-Bank project, and moved with it 
when it became independent. The regional networks grant schemes were, as of 2002, 
based on Bank funding and worked alongside the Bank in initiating knowledge- 
sharing programs, whilst Network members were provided access to Bank knowledge 
tools'88. So Bank personnel, money, technology, and knowledge practices retained 
key roles within the Network's functioning. 
Concerns were raised in the Network's first year about an 'economics bias' within the 
group (King & McGrath 2000a). This was acknowledged in a statement (Global 
Development Network 2002a) of the governing body admitting that'there remains a 
strong perception that the Network is an exclusive club for economists' but clarifying 
that the network was intended as a tool for all social sciences. The statement 
admitted a series of points of structural bias such as the constitution of the governing 
body (mostly economists), but stressed that the Network was open to all. At the same 
time, two non-economist members were brought onto the governing board to correct 
something of the felt bias. Diane Stone, one of the new members, has since written 
several papers on the Network. Stone (2001: 3,25) admits that the Network is still 
seen by some as 'a child of the World Bank', but contends that it is evolving now that 
it exists as a legally independent entity. She acknowledges the dominance of Bank- 
style economic discourse within the organisation, but stresses that knowledge is 
'contested within the network', describing it as a 'battle of ideas' being waged over its 
nature and operations. In another paper Stone (2000: 249) toys with the notion that 
other Network researchers might 'housetrain' the economists to tailor their 
dominance. Stone (2001: 3-6) secondly notes concerns that the Bank established the 
Network without any serious consultation of civil society groups and so without 
listening to concerns that a Bank-funded initiative would duplicate efforts, squeezing 
out already existent development studies networks that would be positioned as 
competitors for funding, partners and audience. 
Stone's points highlight two important questions with regard to the potential of 
multiple-partner initiatives produced by the Bank. Firstly that of how independent the 
initiative is felt to be, and so what potential lies therein for renegotiating its structure, 
188 The World Bank Data Groupoffers GDN affiliated institutions access to the Statistical Information 
Management and Analysis (SIMA), a comprehensive socio-economic database' (Global Development 
Network 2002b). 
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governance and operations should it be felt that the endeavour is too much a 'child of 
the World Bank' and so is likely to carry forward a development agenda that may not 
fit entirely with the aspirations of its potential and actual partners, and others that it 
affects. Secondly the matter of placement, and whether the initiative is felt to be 
squeezing out, and so threatening the existence of, pre-established independent 
ventures (producing FoPs where it could engage with and support EOPs). These 
issues become very apparent in the third and most contentious case, that of the 
Development Gateway, considered in the next chapter. The perceived problems with 
the Gateway most clearly address an issue noted throughout this chapter, of how one 
potential outcome of dispersal could be to extend the Bank's influence over the 
development apparatus at the same time as it reduces its emphasis upon the roles for 
which it has been predominantly criticised in the past (such as enforcing economic 
liberalisation as a conditionality of loan approvals), and plays out a new role as an 
educator, facilitator and convenor. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how the ethos of renewal has spread throughout the 
organisation as a holistic medicine for all the Bank's ills, and has been performed as a 
Knowledge Management and Networking Bank in producing new, more and less 
independent, project-networks. The language of decentralisation has begun to 
permeate the Bank but the shifts in practice have been more ambiguous. Whilst the 
Bank now focuses upon coordinating and networking development activities, it 
frequently seeks to remain a central node within the networks it fosters. Bringing 
others onboard is one issue, giving up the reins of power is quite another. Many 
project-network forms demonstrate a will towards decentralisation combined with an 
unwillingness to loosen the Bank's control. This dispersal with managed control 
carries forward much of an old Bank agenda in new knowledge-network clothes. 
Furthermore, the outsourcing of project-networks to stand as 'independents' 
practising development within a Bank-defined framework raises concerns about how 
this process could extend and consolidate the Bank's influence over the development 
terrain, as will be considered in the following chapter. 
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However the complexity of discourses practised within the Bank warn against reading 
the Renewal reforms in a closed and presumptively negative manner; the changes 
ongoing within the organisation are still relatively open and underdetermined, and 
cannot be simply dismissed. Vulnerability is expressed, for instance, in the Bank's 
eagerness for approval and acceptance and the related adoption of a discourse of 
partnerships. The use of under-defined categories of potential partners (NGO, CSO) 
leave this discursive turn relatively open to critical engagement; growth in the number, 
variety, and levels of involvement of other development players have produced a 
proliferation of trans-Bank activities that encourage thinking of the Bank as a more 
dispersed, diffused, and underdetermined organisation. Such dispersals of agency 
can facilitate connections between those inside and outside the organisation working 
to push these re-conceptualisations further and encourage the Bank to exist as a 
space of debate more than an authoritative voice of development. 
The most positive aspect of the unfolding agenda considered here is the potential it 
harbours for producing more such opportunities for moments of relative autonomy 
within project-networks that need to be seized and used, before they become 
subsumed within the dominant narrative of capital-oriented practices within the 
organisation. Through continual critical interaction it would be hoped that the Bank 
could enable greater dispersal and autonomy of its project-networks (FoPs), that it 
could interact more often and more substantially with externally-originating activities 
(EOPs); and so that it could contribute to the growth of local spaces and capabilities 
for thinking and practising different developments by those the organisation is 
supposed to help. The following two chapters will consider further the potential of this 
organisational dispersal both to extend the power and reach of already-dominant 
(development, knowledge economy and governance) discursive practices; and also to 
disturb the dominance of these narratives by diffusing and blurring somewhat the 
boundaries delineating 'the Bank' and defusing a little the power of its truths by 
enabling the strengthening of connections around different approaches to and 
conceptions of development. 
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7 
Knowledge for Development or Governing Development through 
Knowledge? 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters outlined how the Bank has been seeking to re-conceive 
itself and its operations around the effective use of knowledge for development, 
reorganising itself in a more decentralised networked manner that might encourage 
this through a structured dispersal of distant and partnered operations going beyond 
itself and including other voices, however nominally. Problems have been noted with 
the dominant conceptualisation of knowledge within the organisation as a single 
objective system of truths produced in accordance with standards ascribed to or even 
set by the Bank itself, and with the unwillingness to properly decentralise control of 
'dispersed' activities to parties outside of the organisation or a restricted cohort of 
approved actors. The new agenda trumpeted through the Renewal exhibits 
potentialities that have not been fully realised, given that the dominant organisational 
approach towards networking tends to orient the Bank towards the centre of the 
partnerships and networks it helps to create. 
This chapter explores this politics of networks further in considering how Knowledge 
Bank practices function in producing the 'development community' to whom the Bank 
appeals, through its engagement in education and training, and the deployment of 
project-networks and new technologies to facilitate engagement in and knowledge 
sharing for development. These practices produce normalising influences upon 
development discursive practice, with enabling and constraining outcomes. A process 
of responsibilisation is engaged through these changes, bringing developing countries 
and the populations thereof to govern themselves by World Bank numbers, and so 
facilitating its ability to govern (and develop) at a distance (cf. Rose & Miller 1992: 
180-1). One particular fostered project-network, the Development Gateway, will be 
considered in more detail with respect to these potential outcomes. The chapter also 
reviews how criticism produced changes in the Gateway, indicating ways in which the 
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New Bank discourse is opening parts of the organisation up to interaction with its own 
critical community, a point that will be considered in further in the following chapter. 
Shaping the World's Citizenry: The Bank for Learning 
As with the production of project-networks with external involvement, educating and 
training actual and potential partners is something that the Bank has been engaged in 
for a long time at some level 189 . From prospective applicants 
for project-funding, to 
present and future generations of policy-makers (and development workers, 
educators and corporate players), the Bank has been involved with educational 
infrastructures world-wide through loans, scholarships, internships, research grants, 
and funding and training for policy and research programmes. Again what is new is 
the strength with which education and training are now being pursued by the Bank in 
its knowledge work'90. The Bank (2001 u) describes itself as being 'already the world's 
largest external financier of education', but being now 'more committed than ever' to 
helping countries develop their education systems and build 'dynamic knowledge 
structures' essential to the new economy. This shift in emphasis frames as major 
Bank priorities the governmental foci considered in Chapter Three; the development 
of countries' capacities to educate, train, and absorb, adapt and share knowledge 
from elsewhere; their stock of trained knowledge producers, managers and 
government actors who can engage with this knowledge; and the governments' own 
capabilities to produce technologically and numerically-literate, knowledgeable 
citizens'91. To paraphrase Andrew Barry (2001: 91), these foci attend to the matter of 
transforming relatively non-participating countries (and the populace thereof) into 
participating citizens in the new economy. 
189 Various Bank literature (e. g. World Bank 2002n: ix, 100) states that the Bank has been supporting 
tertiary education since 1963 when it officially began to 'lend for the education sector. 
190 For example: 'Between 1997 and 1999, the number of education projects financing distance 
education activities and education technology activities has increased respectively by 20 and 90 
? ercent'(Wodd Bank 2002p: 2). 
'To compete in today's knowledge-driven economy and shifting global markets, countries need a 
flexible workforce of skilled, dynamic workers able to create and apply knowledge' (World Bank 2001v); 
'If sub-Saharan Africa wishes to participate in the knowledge-intensive, global economy, it must be 
able to produce large numbers of scientifically and technologically-literate, innovation receptive, highly 
adaptable, and problem-solving minded people with predisposition to lifelong learning. ' (African Virtual 
University 1995: 2). 
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The programmes and projects that these concerns produce fall roughly under three 
areas of policy reform and infrastructure development, materials provision, and 
distance education. The means and objectives of the Bank's work in these areas are 
set as being beyond the concerns of just the Bank and framed instead in terms of 
furthering the international community's commitment to education as a step on the 
path towards development, as embodied in the Millennium Development Goals. In 
this sense every project-network that emerges from under the education umbrella 
within the Bank is constructed as a Multiple Operator endeavour, and more and less 
direct references to other partners populate the literature. Education is part of the 
gentle face of the 'new' Bank. The agenda that it encapsulates is still very Bank- 
determined in terms of economic outlook and policy practices subsequently 
advocated, but is presented as an enabling device for governments to negotiate their 
own programmes of change. 
The importance, firstly, of reforming tertiary education and developing educational 
infrastructure is linked directly to the production of knowledge societies in a manner 
highlighting its centrality to the Knowledge Bank agenda, with research projects 
conducted upon how education needs to be changed to produce Education for the 
Knowledge Economy (World Bank 2001 u, 2002n: 99). In keeping with the Renewal 
themes a Thematic Group has been established from within a Network to begin a 
series of initiatives represented under the Global Education Reform section of the 
Bank's site (World Bank 2001 W)192 . Furthermore, consistent with the Bank's dominant 
economic voice and in line with the governmental discourse considered in Chapter 
Three, key documents within the Education web-domain are framed in new 
institutional economic terms, neoliberal economic-govern mental presumptions being 
tempered by recognition of the state's necessary minimal involvement in areas of 
market failure, but strongly favouring the market as the preferred economic tool 
wherever possible (e. g. World Bank 2000n, 2002p, Soubbotina & Sherarn 2000). 
Meanwhile new subgroups such as EdInvest (the Education Investment Information 
Facility, hftp: //www2. ifc. org/edinvest) have been established to 'play a catalytic role ... 
in promoting private investment ventures in education' and producing 'a toolkit on 
public-private partnerships' (World Bank 2002p: 3). 
192 The Education Reform and Management Thematic Group and the Human Development Education 
Network of the Bank. 
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The nature of reform is therefore predominantly directed towards opening up the 
'state monopoly' of tertiary education that the Bank feels predominates too widely in 
many countries, developed and developing, and breaking up the 'culture of privilege' 
this is argued to foster in the process (World Bank 2002n: 69,88). The Bank 
advocates lowering barriers to entry, to allow private institutions to flourish and 
generate a more diverse educational market, on the basis that this will reduce the 
economic burden on governments and produce 'healthy competition, innovation, and 
managerial efficiency. These reforms are then treated in the Bank's new 
responsibilising, participatory, enabling style. Its role is cast as that of facilitating the 
policy dialogue that can bring about such reform, and supporting it through project 
lending for infrastructural development and other needs (World Bank 2002n). The 
Reform website explains how the Group intends to 'gather and share knowledge on 
worldwide experiences' of reform so as to provide training courses for Bank staff and 
country Education Ministers, tools for assessing country reform capacities, templates 
against which to map education systems in planning reforms, a 'tool library' of other 
reform devices, readings on the politics of reform, and indications of best practices 
and case studies (World Bank 2001 W)193. 
Secondly regarding materials provision, the Development Education Program (DEP) 
of the World Bank Institute produces materials and tools for teachers on issues 
pertaining to a widened conception of development in digital and material form. DEP 
produces a child-friendly entry-point to the Bank's site and teacher notes to work 
alongside this, and a set of educationally-oriented webpages organised under 
DEPweb (World Bank 2001x, 2001y). The idea is to present a platform for knowledge 
sharing and promoting best practices, enabling a global conversation to bring forward 
education based upon limited resources. Similarly the World Development Report, 
referred to in Chapter Five as the Bank's main annual publication with a very wide 
and dispersed audience, is given away free (to Southern educational institutions 
especially) in tens of thousands just after publication, as well as being freely available 
for downloading. 
193 For example: 'By partnering with the private sector, the Task Force will ... play a catalytic role for the Bank in promoting private investment ventures in education in developing countries. The end result 
will be the production of a toolkit on public-private partnerships' (2002p: 3). 
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Free educational resources will be very attractive to schools on restricted budgets, 
usefully serving as tools to facilitate education upon development. Yet at the same 
time these free resources could also work to normalise development education 
around a Bank mode of understanding. This leads critics to worry that such texts 
could crowd out independent publications in places where they might be the few 
resources that poor educational institutions can be sure of obtaining every year 
(Bretton Woods Project 2000a). Whether any crowding of individual publication 
formats occurs is difficult to ascertain, but the wider and more subtle effect would be 
the constant and relatively prominent visibility of Bank thinking (a certain mode of 
understanding as well as an interpretation of contemporary development issues) 
throughout the education process. This in turn could improve its perceived authority 
with educators and the educated who may later become part of the country's 
knowledge- or policy-producing communities, normalising a more widely accepted 
understanding of development definitions, approaches, problems and solutions. 
A good example of the ambivalent positioning of such resources is a school textbook 
on development written by Bank staff, Beyond Economic Growth (Soubbotina & 
Sheram 2000), which is made freely available in PDF format under DER The idea of 
the book was that it could function as a template that could be adapted by local 
educators and published in their local languages. Adaptations would then be placed 
online in an English version, with the adapted sections highlighted so that readers 
could compare and learn. Alternatively schools could simply 'use this international 
template without adaptation as a source of relatively current statistical data and 
widely accepted concepts' (Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 2-3). The book is a 
reasonable introductory text, posing questions upon what development is and how we 
can measure it, incorporating concerns with equity, health, education and 
sustainability. It thus serves as a useful educational tool, whilst at the same time 
engaging a normalising role insofar as normative statements are asserted as the 
feelings of the development community as a whole, or the results of knowledge 
produced through extensive experience' 94 . 
194 For example: 'it is increasingly recognized that state intervention is justified only where markets fail', 
'Empirical evidence suggests that globalization has significantly boosted economic growth in East 
Asian economies' (Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 63,66, emphasis in original). 
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In the chapter on 'Public and Private Enterprises', for example, 'Socialist experiments 
with 'excessively equal income distribution' are written off as having been bad for 
economic efficiency' 95 and 'market liberalization' is bold-typed as good economic 
96 policy with little caution except for two final paragraphs' . Otherwise, the 'typically 
low efficiency' of state enterprises is noted to 'hinder economic growth', meaning that 
state intervention can be justified 'only where markets fail, and even then 
4government provision of undersupplied goods and services is not necessarily the 
best option' (Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 63-5). The final chapter then uses a 
Comprehensive Development Framework-style banner to address a handful of 
contemporary Bank themes of activity such as social capital, corruption, and the 
importance of country governments owning their own development programmes and 
coordinating other development agents ('In Search of a Comprehensive Development 
Strategy', Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 90-93). Whilst the notion of producing a text to 
be adapted for country-specific experiences and languages prompts the impression of 
an Open Content approach as discussed towards the end of Chapter Three, the 
initially exclusive authorship by two Bank employees counters this impression and 
indicates that the communities of those brought together to produce adaptations, 
alongside the Bank's ownership of the project, will ensure that adaptations are 
variations upon the text's market-favourable theme. 
Finally, with regard to the Bank's three areas of education-related programmes and 
projects, its efforts in facilitating and practising distance education achieve something 
of each of the previous two mentioned areas of activity, developing infrastructural 
capacities through the promotion of public-private partnerships, and providing 
educational materials from the Bank's own resources, as well as those of private 
educational institutions. Similarly they demonstrate an ability both to facilitate 
educational endeavours within poorer countries, and to normalise the Bank's priorities 
and approach to education and development as those of the wider community. 
195'Take, for example, the experience of socialist countries, where deliberately low inequality ... 
deprived people of the incentives needed for their active participation in economic activities ... the 
consequences of socialist equalization of incomes were poor discipline and low initiative among 
workers, poor quality and limited selection of goods and services, slow technical progress, and 
eventually, slower economic growth leading to more poverty' (Soubbotina & Sheram 2000: 29). 
196 The penultimate notes in under a hundred words how market reforms in some countries in transition 
to a market system have led to 'neglect of the state's vital functions', whilst the final asks 'why are an 
effective state and viable private sector both important for development? ' before going on to speak of 
globalisation in the following chapter. 
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Projects such as the African Virtual University (2001, AVU), for instance, a 'university 
without walls' aiming to bridge the digital divide and 'propel Africa into the knowledge 
age', combine a will to develop educational infrastructural capacities within 
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developing countries with the provision of education materials at-a-distancel . In 
hardware terms the AVU helps to establish learning centres equipped with satellite 
and computer technology to receive distance courses, and on-site 'facilitators' to 
liaise with tutors and give assistance to students. Beyond this the focus is upon 
distance services (an online library and 'digital learning portal' knowledge sharing 
device). In its early stages AVU was admitted to depend upon 'established', namely 
Northern, 'producers of course and educational materials', but the stated aim was that 
it should later begin to 'engage in the production of top quality instructional materials 
in Africa by Africans' (African Virtual University 1995: 4). Nonetheless AVU's 
educational mandate still expresses bias in what is conceived as useful education, 
speaking of improving 'science, engineering and business instruction' (African Virtual 
University 1995: 3) with little or no reference to other disciplines of study. 
So we see here how the dominant practices at the Bank with regard to education -a 
core concern of both knowledge economy and contemporary development discourse 
- reproduce aspects of the dominant governmental knowledge economy discursive 
practices discussed in Chapter Three. These practices could tend in turn to produce 
normalising effects within the discursive practice of both education and development; 
promoting particular approaches to and particular forms of education, as well as the 
use of particular means of funding; and encouraging the adoption of a common 
understanding of development and the shared concerns of both developers and those 
to-be-developed. 
197 A range of other initiatives covedng all four outlined modes of Bank engagement are involved in 
distance education. WorLD was established to explore the use of ICTs in developing educational 
networks and resource-pools to connect teachers, schools, and education ministries worldwide. (World 
Bank 2003j, World Links 2002). The Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) is sold as being 
devoted to capacity building and learning, facilitating the creation of a network of policy-makers and 
development experts through use of contemporary ICTs (World Bank 2002m). Finally the Global 
Distance Education Network coordinates activities between other external distance education 
institutions, and the Bank (2001t: 32) further claims 16 distance learning centres of its own. 
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Instituting Technologies of Development and Governance 
'greater emphasis has been placed on knowledge as a catalyst of reform 
... courses help spread up-to-the-minute knowledge on key development challenges' (World Bank 1998f. 7) 
'if the Bank is to be a knowledge leader, it needs to be on the lookout for 
new products and product lines in the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. ' (Ritzen 2000: 3) 
Distance education opens onto a further range of activities, in the distance training of 
development players, producing a stronger sense of the phrase 'development 
community'. Further to its educational activities for future knowledge producers, the 
Bank has also focussed upon training the current producers, users and policy 
makers, as well as building their capacity to produce. In doing so it secondly 
influences the priorities that will shape this production, seeking to connect and so 
produce networks or communities of approved educational institutions as well as 
those whom it has trained, and thirdly works to establish and consolidate the 
presence of its tools or technologies of development. 
In respect of training, Bank programmes and literature now focus on the supportive 
act of building countries' trade-related 'capacity' (TRC13 programmes). This entails 
enabling more effective participation in international trade negotiations by developing 
the skills and understanding of policy-makers and enterprises in handling trade 
issues, and developing policy and governmental institutional capabilities for 
negotiating and implementing agreements (Powell 2002: 3). The Institute handles 
TRCB work through training programmes with indicative titles such as Global 
Integration and the New Trade Agenda, Using Knowledge for Development, and 
Poverty Analysis for Policyrnaking (World Bank 2003n). This assistance role performs 
the Knowledge Bank vision well, pushing education rather than dollars and displaying 
a care to develop countries' capacities to develop themselves. 
Secondly, through the Renewal's focus upon decentralising and networking, the 
organisation the Bank has engaged in the production of communities or networks of 
actors sharing common sets of epistemological and discursive presumptions. In 
relation to educational initiatives, for instance, Worl-D and World Links (a MOP and 
related FoP mentioned in the previous chapter) were established to explore the use of 
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ICTs in developing educational networks and resource-pools to connect teachers, 
schools, and education ministries worldwide (World Bank 2003j, World Links 2002), 
whilst the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) is advertised as facilitating 
the creation of a network of policy-makers and development experts using ICTs 
(World Bank 2002m). Finally, the Global Distance Education Network (Glob 
DistEdNet, wwwl. worldbank. org/disted) aims to coordinate activities between other 
external distance education institutions, in producing a network or community of such. 
Networks are also produced to 'disseminate' stories of success, best practices and 
the benefits of reforms, as with the Global Education Reform (World Bank 2001w) 
space mentioned earlier. 
Thirdly, the Bank produces a series of tools - of association in the form of project- 
networks such as the Development Gateway, and of data, information and knowledge 
production, management and dissemination, as seen in the Bank-Operated Project- 
Networks (BOPs) occupying the Data and Statistics section of its web-space (World 
Bank 2003i). A couple of more recent examples illustrate a will to improve the 
transparency and widen the understanding and use of certain Bank tools. Since the 
Reporfs publication, and in line with the Bank's self-positioning as the leading 
knowledge-producing partner with regard to the UN Millennium Goals, the World 
Bank Institute (WBI) has developed a Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) as 
both an expositional and interactive pedagogical device. KAM collates 66 quantitative 
and qualitative variables under six broad categories, to compare countries' 
performances in 'new' economy terms' 98 . Through such 
devices knowledge 
production, management and technological uptake become conducive to the cross- 
country analyses which the Bank sees as its area of comparative advantage (cf. 
World Bank 2001c), whilst opening up the possibility for client countries to use these 
tools in their own self-assessments. The Country Analytic Work (CAW, 
www. countryanalyticwork. net) website, established in October 2002, is another web- 
portal device through which the same themes of capacity-building and education run. 
Defined as a partner-maintained knowledge sharing website to improve inter-agency 
198 The categories are of economic performance, economic regime and incentives, governance and 
institutional regime, education and human resources, innovation systems, and ICT and information 
infrastructure. Because it is seen as unwieldy to deal with so many variables in presentations on 
knowledge economy strategies a simplified scorecard of fifteen is often used by WBI staff, including 
Internet connections, education enrolment, literacy and investment rates (see Dahlman 2001,2002, 
World Bank 2001 r). 
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coordination and cooperation on country analytic work, its aims are listed as being to 
enable clients to engage in policy reform negotiations, implement development and 
reform strategies, and to make effective use of loans, and to inform the general public 
upon how the agencies involved do their work'99. 
The production and management of a framework of consensus is at stake in this 
discursive practice of empowerment (and widening of participation) through the 
provision of training and production of tools, as the Bank produces knowledge that 
serves to justify the approach of it and other economic and development 
organisations. The normalisation of the discursive practices of a global neoliberal 
policy framework of which the Bank is part (cf. George & Sabelli 1994, Wade 2001C) 
works in reproducing its hegemonic perspective across national and international 
governmental and developmental communities, shaping conceptions of the good with 
regard to governance and leadership, and economic and development policies. 
The consolidation of communities of actors sharing a common space of discussion 
empowers the actors therein, and strengthens the perceived validity of the discourse 
they employ; techniques, devices and standards of knowledge production and 
management become more standard as discursive practices are increasingly 
normalised around the points of consensus resulting from their dispersal and 
acceptance. That is, in this case, Bank-defined knowledge production and knowledge 
management techniques and devices could become more widely utilised and 
accepted, and in this way the organisation could come to influence and set standards 
for the production and management of development knowledge and information, and 
so influence conceptualisations of development (the definition of problems, the 
negotiation of solutions and so forth). This would consolidate the position aspired to of 
being a central actor-network within the development terrain, and the first choice of 
other actors for information and knowledge, 'the premier global development 
institution' (Wolfensohn 2001a: 4, my emphasis). As this occurred so its 'intellectual 
199 The notice from the Bank announcing the establishment of CAW elided its own agency through use 
of a passive form of phrasing: '[tlwenty-four multilateral and bilateral donor agencies have launched a 
joint website to share information on country analytic work, the World Bank announced today' (World 
Bank 2002q). No mention was given of the Bank's role within the site beyond being one partner, and 
yet its role in site organisation and input is substantial. In January 2003 the Bank provided 11 of CAW's 
listed 22 Product toolkits and 6 of the 13 examples of 'best practice', and dominated every section of 
the Document Library, with links to 'Development Gateway Related Topics'further being provided in 
every area. 
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technology' would be more securely instituted within the developmental apparatus, 
providing greater authority to both the Bank and those authorities choosing to deploy 
development discourse in its manner (cf. Rose 1999: 27). 
Producing a Common Space of Development 
As argued in Chapter Three, knowledge economic discursive practices produce 
knowledge economies by enabling the development of new areas and forms of 
calculative agency, through expanding the accepted realms of economic calculability 
(cf. Callon 1998: 27-28,1999: 192). The Bank's aim of helping countries make the 
'transition to a knowledge-based economy' in order to pursue 'the new opportunities 
raised by the knowledge revolution' (World Bank 2002i), is a good example of such 
discursive practices in the development terrain. Through a variety of project-networks 
the Bank devises tools of calculation, performs calculations, and trains clients and 
partners in these new calculative practiceS200 . The Bank is a big development player 
(especially in terms of access to financial, intellectual, and 'social 201 capital), and its 
position and consequent influence situate it well to bring together actors from across 
the development terrain in catalysing activity around new project-networks. The Bank 
can then play a major role in establishing such endeavours before withdrawing to a 
nominally minor position by outsourcing (fostering, FoPs) ventures once they are 
established. Between these two levels of involvement (the initial major and ongoing 
more minor roles), the Bank will often be positioned to partially determine the later 
development and application of the tools it fosterS202. Yet such fostered project- 
networks could also gain wider acceptance, use and involvement than they would as 
wholly Bank-run activities, dispersing their influence and effectivity within the 
development community, and increasing the number of points at which 'Bank' 
elements negotiate-at-a-distance the constraints within which development is 
conceived and practised, the choices that are made amongst available development 
200 It is the Knowledge Sharing section of the Bank's site, run through the Institute, that speaks of 
'putting knowledge on a par with money' and 'adding to our wealth ... and expertise by systematically 
capturing ... indigenous knowledge'(World Bank 1999f). 201 'Social' in the 'economic' sense of placement within development networks or communities of donor 
and borrower governments, and non-governmental or civil society organisations that have partnered 
with it previously. 
202 That is, in such cases the Bank acts as a dominant partner in the design of new development 'tools' 
and the application of their first use. This first use can shape the tools' perceived appropriate use, and 
so who the tools appeal to and their dominant initial user base. This consequently affects something of 
the tools' subsequent applications. 
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tools, and the subsequent use these tools are put to. The production of a sense of 
'ownership' is most conducive to donors such as the Bank if recipients share in the 
donor's vision and accept the dominant conceived framework of means for its 
achievement; that is, they understand and agree with the broad frame of what is 
being put forward by the Bank to be undertaken. 
Such effects stemming from the spread of Bank tools and training practices have 
consequently been argued by NGO critics to generate 'upstream conditionality' 
(Powell 2002: 8), gently herding opinions within the Bank's discursive frame of 
reference so as to render unnecessary other more visible exercises of authority such 
as the placement of (economic adjustment) conditionalities directly upon loanS203. 
This usefully and eloquently expresses something of the potentially negative, 
restricting effects of this discursive influence; but at the same time we need to 
carefully avoid reading only the negative from within these changes, and also of 
ascribing too much agency to this one organisation. Such discursive normalisation 
could also produce enabling consequences in improving negotiations of common 
understandings of development and consequently lending towards improved 
developmental agency. For countries and civil society actors to feel involved in 
partnerships, or to feel 'ownership' of projects, they will need to fully understand and 
be able to participate in meaningful dialogue over the issues at stake and the viability 
of alternative proposals. One effect of such processes of normalisation, then, could 
be that a more fluid space of global policy analysis was produced, enabling more 
effective global communications on development problems and solutions, increased 
knowledge sharing, and enhanced developmental capacities arising from better co- 
ordination (such as the elimination of gaps and overlaps in efforts) 204 . The Knowledge 
Assessment Methodology (KAM) mentioned earlier, for instance, potentially makes 
the Bank's Interaction with client countries somewhat more transparent as the 
variable selection and data collation side of the policy advice equation are made 
203 As the research group Development Initiatives (2002) puts it, many donors see 'ownership' as 
'largely rhetorical ... their real concerns continue to revolve around how they can get developing country governments to implement donors' preferred policies and programmes'. Wilks & Lefrangois 
(2002: 11) further assert that'In theory, the World Bank is now prepared to let borrowing country 
F004 vernments set their own policies, In practice, it goes to great lengths to Influence their choice'. 
One MOP (the GDLN, World Bank 2002m) has thus clearly stated its mission statement as being to 
enable 'decision-makers across the developing world to have affordable and regular access to a global 
network of peers, experts and practitioners with whom they may share ideas and experience that will 
help them In their work'. 
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visible in a standardised format, opening up dialogic spaces of contestation between 
Bank assessors and external groups. 
We need also remember that the Bank is only one organisational player amongst a 
large number of other Northern and Southern governance institutions on the terrain of 
any normalisation that is occurring, and that trainees could share as much in the 
desire to be trained in a school of thinking occupied by the Bank as the Bank does to 
share its understanding. As a result of changes ongoing over the last twenty-five or so 
years - and partly resulting within some countries from conditionalifies attached upon 
Bank and IMF loans - the market dominates within most governmental discursive 
practice today and most countries' economies are relatively locked-in to flows of 
international financial and Investment capital. Many countries' policy options are 
consequently restricted by fear of 'capital unfriendly' practices producing capital flight 
and drawing the economy into recession. In consequence, in seeking to produce a 
normalised space of development knowledge production and policy application the 
Bank does not need to institute new modes of thinking so much as to contribute to the 
reproduction of a hegemonic discursive framework by suggesting adjustments that 
draw in more support and iron out inconsistencies between the minutiae of 
governmental-economic thinking in different countries. Furthermore, any such 
normalisation as does occur will always only ever be partial and incomplete because 
the tools produced, and the project- networks in which members engage, will bear 
different significance and utility to each. Processes of translation and adaptation will 
characterise the whole process. 
So the increasing focus upon education and training demonstrates a will to produce 
the subjective conditions under which agents act in a manner appropriate to the 
reproduction of dominant elements within this discursive apparatus typified in the 
high-profile public face of the Bank. That is, to shape 'the powers and wills of 
autonomous entities' in producing more governable subjects, instrumentalising a 
'regulated autonomy' such that it might more effectively 'govern at a distance' as a 
global knowledge manager (Rose 1996: 56-7, Rose & Miller 1992: 180-1). Thus 
spring forth the many projects and networks focussed towards achieving various 
educational ends which in the process produce the partners conducive to pushing 
forward agendas broadly within the Bank's overall vision but without its direct 
involvement. Through this democratisation of development various actors are 
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repositioned as more 'responsibilised' agents and programme 'owners'. We see a 
shift in emphasis away from strict austerity and market liberalisation conditionalities 
applied to loans, and towards a more neo-liberal form of governing individuals and 
countries through their freedom to choose by influencing the conditions upon which 
knowledge is produced and such freedoms are exercised (Rose & Miller 1992: 201). 
By incorporating civil society within these practices of official development and 
encouraging independent use of the Bank's technologies, non-g overn mental and civil 
society organisations become active agents in governing themselves and those they 
seek to help by the numbers they produce to define and evaluate problems and to 
think solutions (cf. Rose 1996,1993,1991). These points can usefully be illustrated 
by considering one of the better-publicised and more controversial Fostered Project- 
Networks the Bank has initiated, the Development Gateway. What follows is an 
extended case study in the politics of networks for the World Bank. 
A Gateway to Development 
The Development Gateway (hereafter 'the Gateway') is a project-network endeavour 
billed as being established to become a gateway to the Internet for all those seeking 
development knowledge and information, 'a portal website on all aspects of 
development' (Development Gateway 2000f: 3). The Gateway was designed at first 
as a Multiple Operator initiative to be housed within the Bank. It was later outsourced, 
at least in part in response to the critical reception the idea was given by the other 
development organisations constituting one group of potential partners. The degree 
and effectivity of this outsourcing has remained a contentious point with Bank critics, 
but, nonetheless, noticeable changes have been made in the Gateway's means of 
governance and the way in which it has been presented since the idea was first 
leaked from the Bank in early 2000205. 
The Gateway vision brings together many aspects of the processes of normalisation 
discussed here 206 , as well as carrying strong overtones of the Renewal, wherein a 
Bank project-network acts as a global knowledge manager producing a common 
205 The first public mention of the Gateway was made in an internal Bank draft dated February 2000 
that was leaked to a critical NGO (the Bretton Woods Project, Gateway 2000a) and subsequently 
distributed as an urgent action to their email group list and posted on their website in April 2000. 206 Such as the standardisation of education and the means of producing, presenting and managing 
information and knowledge as well as of the training of the producers, presenters and managers. 
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online global development space, commonly accepted understandings of 
development, and the knowledge to act upon these. It further goes to illustrate 
something of the possibilities and limits of fostering and outsourcing the Bank's work, 
as will be illustrated. The Gateway has been promoted as using the Internet to 
develop a 'common platform' to 'reinforce a network of communities', providing 'one- 
stop access to quality data, information and knowledge' for development worldwide 
(Development Gateway 2000f: 3,7). In his Comprehensive Development Framework 
proposal Wolfensohn (1 999n: 29) sketched an idea of an Internet site that could 
maintain constantly updated development information as Annexes relating to all 
points in the Framework matrix. The Gateway itself was put forward as 'another tool 
toward achieving the same objectives' as the Framework through the Internet, to be 
implemented and structured according to its principles and providing the means to 
promote information access, knowledge sharing and collaboration so as to give more 
leverage to the Bank's holistic development planning methodology (Development 
Gateway 2001c, 2000f: 4,7, World Bank 2000i). The Bank billed itself as playing an 
'initial catalytic role' within the Gateway, which would partner with Bank projects 'to 
leverage and promote existing efforts' to bind World Bank Group units (such as the 
GDN, the GKP, infoDev, and the GDLN) together to increase effectiveness. Bank 
activities were said to be 'an integral aspect of the Gateway', with its Knowledge 
Management group working with the Gateway 'to ensure that... Bank work is 
leveraged to the fullest extent possible' (Development Gateway 2001 c). 
The Gateway is a distinctly hybrid entity, clearly blurring the lines between notions of 
'projects' and 'networks'; conceived as a site providing information and knowledge 
managed by a team of experts and providing different points of access for various 
users and subject areas; but also as a portal to a globally dispersed assemblage of 
approved member-sites and a series of franchised Country Gateways that manage 
and present their own content in a style authorised by the central Gateway. The 
language of networks recurs throughout Gateway literature as it is characterised as a 
'network of development solutions' (Development Gateway 2000b: 1) facilitating the 
establishment of networks of experts, advisors, businesses, development 
communities, Country Gateways, and knowledge sharing, as well as contributing to 
the building of a 'networked economy' (Development Gateway 2000g: 6). The 
approach would appear to be that more is always better as the Gateway promises to 
197 
build on existing networks and create new ones (Development Gateway 2000b: 5). 
The danger that this proliferation and multiplication of initiatives could produce a form 
of disempowering network-glut in the manner of Roszak's (1986,187-201) 'infoglut' 
noted in Chapter Two (an overabundance of networks leaving agents confused) is 
given scant attention. For this reason it would be useful to examine what forms of 
network the Gateway is conceived as building, occupying, and being, for which we 
need first consider what problems the Gateway was proposed as a solution to. 
Problernatising Development Online 
'Great strides have been made to harness knowledge and use Internet 
technology for sustainable development and poverty reduction, but much 
remains to be accomplished' (Development Gateway 2000b: 2) 
As with the Renewal programmes, Gateway literature has frequently opened by 
seeking to problematise the development field (in this case its online variant) in 
asserting the need for such an initiative. The Gateway proposal was put forward as 
being of concern to all those in any way connected with development issues and the 
net of interests to be served was cast as wide as possible. Development and donor 
communities were appealed to for their involvement in the establishment of a 
Gateway which would 'empower' and 'enable' all those involved through improved 
access to useful knowledge (Development Gateway 2001c, 2000e). A standard 
situation outline was presented framing the passive mass of the poor as a common 
object of concern for several broad actor groups (the public and private sectors, 
donors, and civil society) and positioning economic development at the root of 
development per se (thereby presenting the common interest as being that of 
enabling countries' economies to develop and encouraging participation in the global 
economy), before highlighting several changes said to have occurred over the past 
ten years. These included standard Compact and Framework listings (World Bank 
1997a, Wolfensohn 1999b) such as a proliferation of new development actors and 
partnerships, the growth in significance of private capital flows over those of official 
North-South development assistance, and lack of coordination amongst development 
groups impeding the performance of projects, preventing groups from learning from 
each others' past experiences, inhibiting partnerships, and concealing investment 
opportunities from those with capital. 
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Now the Internet was also presented within the problematisation as opening up new 
opportunities for development, knowledge sharing and economic activity, whilst 
fragmented efforts combined with limited access to technical and personnel resources 
dampened the potential for using it as a development tool (Development Gateway 
2000b: 4). The Bank further problematised the existence (and ease of availability with 
the advent of the Internet) of different and sometimes incompatible information and 
knowledge based upon different modes of discourse, and argued that development 
actors had not coped well in assessing the validity and usefulness of these products 
of different systems of understanding. The need for the Gateway was not premised 
upon a shortage of available information, therefore, but rather the burden of a 
disorganised excess or overbearing 'wealth' of such (Development Gateway 2000b: 
1); although 'great strides' had been made, much remained to be done (Development 
Gateway 2000b: 2, cf. 2000f: 3). Envisioning the Internet as somewhat anarchic, 
messy and unreliable, and apparently motivated by the belief that 'making knowledge 
productive is a management responsibility' (Drucker 1993: 173), it was assumed that 
those who use the Internet will need editors and guides if they are to make good use 
of their time online. 
The Gateway was therefore outlined as a complementary project to function 
alongside and aid development actors with regard to their own activities. The need for 
such an initiative was urged in its Project Proposal (Development Gateway 2000f: 24) 
by stressing that of the 1200 Internet sources examined by the Bank that carried 
content similar to that proposed for the Gateway, no other portals had its 'objective, 
breadth and global scope'. It was further stressed that the Gateway, as a portal, 
would of course provide pathways to these other sources, and thereby help those in 
search of knowledge whilst bearing no risk of 'crowding out' the field. The need to 
address online content issues was presented as an under-considered 'other side' of 
problems facing actors concerned with ICT access issues and the digital divide, 
rather than a new and extraneous concern (Development Gateway 2000f: 5). 
The Gateway (2000f. 2) was thereby proposed as a solution to a series of problems, 
a point which everyone would benefit from passing through in the pursuit of their 
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goaIS207. It was billed as becoming the Internet development portal covering 'all 
aspects of development', making connections between groups and between areas of 
concern, and acting as a means of distributing and accessing information upon 
development topics. A series of eight brief examples were presented in most core 
literature encompassing the defined actor-groups in a variety of situations, all 
benefiting from the Gateway (2000b: 3). Three related roles were put forward for the 
Gateway in this regard. It was presented firstly as a distilling device, sorting the wheat 
from the chaff in the online development information overload. Secondly it was 
proposed as harmonising data sources, bringing knowledges together and 
overcoming the 'fragmentation of information'. Finally the Gateway (2000b: 1-3) was 
considered as a guide, assisting others in negotiating the excess of online information 
and making it 'easier to access and navigate'. This guide role portrays the Gateway 
(2001c) as 'targeting' groups and providing 'services' to its users 'tailored to the 
needs of specific audiences'. 
So the Gateway-approach to 'networks' would appear to be of the main Gateway unit 
actiing as a central node establishing and managing connections, governing the 
network. Counter to Castells' (1999: 5) notion of networks as having no centre, the 
central portal is here intended to act as a gatekeeper and a central communicative 
hub through which information and members pass and are vetted, through control of 
membership, funding and an editorial role. That funding flows through the central hub 
encourages the build-up of a hierarchical arrangement inducing clustering wherein 
proximity to the central hub (in terms of viewpoint, style of expression or requested 
contributions) could be hoped to secure future contributions. As has been noted with 
the trend in Bank p roject- networks, this is one in which the Bank (or its associate) 
remains central to activities. 
207 Through a series of components and entry points tailored to various actor roles (the Development 
Marketplace, the Civil Society Forum, the Government Forum), the Gateway was presented as a 
resource base providing 'one-stop access to quality data, information, and knowledge'. Country 
Gateways - country-owned sites based on the Gateway structure and designed to provide more 
focussed information and 'ensure grassroots participation and broad-based ownership'- were also to 
be established as 'franchise partners' (Development Gateway 2000f: 7-13). 
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Negotiating the Gateway 
Ever since the Gateway's first exposure to criticism, after being brought into the public 
eye through the leaking of an internal Bank draft document (Gateway 2000a) to the 
Bretton Woods Project NGO in April 2000, it has been promoted as being intended to 
become an independent organisation legally distinct from the World Bank and 
drawing staff from both the Bank and other partners (Development Gateway 2001c, 
2000b: 6). Nonetheless there was a felt likelihood amongst a number of development 
actors that the Bank's policy of partnering and outsourcing ventures might work more 
to enhance the perceived legitimacy of this endeavour than it would to allow others 
space to negotiate the visions and objectives that were being pursued, producing a 
skin-deep diffusion of control. Posting respected NGO names alongside that of the 
Bank, it was felt, could promote the perceived independence of the project if little 
else, encouraging the involvement of others as well as lending credence to Bank 
knowledge claims that were posted as 'Gateway' expertise. The leaked Gateway 
Draft received swift critical feedback which put pressure on the Bank to officially state 
its plans and articulate its intentions for the mandate, structure, and nature of 
Gateway operations, including the number and the roles of partners that would be 
brought onboard. 
The Bank was eager to advertise the project as going ahead with the backing of civil 
society, as an aspect of the performance of the New Bank, and so reacted quickly. By 
May 2000 an open email discussion forum upon the Gateway had been set up in 
collaboration with the Bank208 and preliminary Concept Note and Editorial Policy 
documents had been produced and placed online for public appraisal (Development 
Gateway 2000c, 2000e). The language of the documentation was beginning to 
change, lessening the emphasis upon Bank control of the project. The Draft Proposal 
(Development Gateway 2000a) had declared that the Bank would take 'early 
leadership' of the project and provide most of the 'government, management and 
staffing', engaging in partnerships 'with the understanding that the WBG [World Bank 
Group] will retain editorial independence and control' of the Gateway. By May 2000 
the talk was of 'editorial neutrality' rather than independence and control, 
208 This happened at Bellanet (www. bellanet. org). The forum archive is now available at hftp: /twww. bellanet. org/gdgpdnciples. 
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emphasising only that 'generally accepted norms of discourse will be required of all 
who participate' (Development Gateway 2000e: 1). On a more cosmetic front the 
Bank's logo was removed from the Gateway banner on the project home-page and 
the 'Global' in the Gateway's original moniker (Global Development Gateway) was 
dropped to reduce the similarity with other global Bank initiatives (the Global 
Development Network, Global Development Learning Network, Global Knowledge 
Partnership, and so forth). It remained unclear as to whether these shifts were 
responses to criticism, or to personnel changes within the Gateway Team (as 
indicated by Bank representative Sarah Cambridge at a consultation meeting in June 
2000)209. 
More significantly, the Development Gateway Foundation was established in 2001 as 
an independent organisation to which the Gateway would be handed over. The 
Gateway became fully established and active in July 2001, the Foundation some 
months later, but after this point the Bank made efforts to stress that the Gateway and 
Foundation were now fully independent entities, a truly fostered Project-Network set. 
Nonetheless the Gateway Foundation's - and so the Gateway's - claims to 
independence have remained suspect in critics' eyes; staffing overlap with the Bank 
for instance is stronger than observations made on the Global Development Network 
in the previous chapter, from members of the Gateway Board of Directors to Topic 
Guides (subject specialists). The Bank is also considered a Founding Member of the 
Gateway Foundation alongside ten listed country governments (Development 
Gateway 2003b). Founding Members sit on the Board of Directors, the Bank holding 
three seats as well as the CEO position. Each Founding Member contributed $5 
million and other corporate bodies have been accepted onto the Board on the basis of 
similar contributions. A number of seats have been made available to civil society 
representatives, but the donations have drawn criticism of seats on the Board being 
obtained through a capital bias in the Gateway's governance (Wilks 2001b, 2001c). 
Again, as has been noted in the previous two chapters, social agency in the Gateway 
literature is under-defined, which could have repercussions upon the choices made 
209 Sarah Cambridge, at a meeting at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) in Brighton in June 
2000, strongly implied that the initial proposals were made by technical staff unfamiliar with the 
politically-charged environment in which the Bank operated, and that once more developmentally- 
minded staff were brought onboard the respective changes were made as a matter of course. 
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for any 'civil society representatives', and so how the discursive terrain of Gateway 
operations are or are not altered by this widening of participation 210 . 
In Pursuit of a Narrow Vision of the Knowledge Economy 
The Gateway vision employs quite particular understandings of knowledge, the 
knowledge economy, and the use of the Internet in knowledge sharing that 
demonstrate the dominance of the Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework 
thinking. A Stiglitzian holism is displayed in the variety of knowledge and development 
categories to be given space within the portal-site, whilst Wolfensohn's New Bank is 
performed through the concern to ensure that it operates through a globally-dispersed 
array of partnerships. Yet still the focus is upon one particular understanding of 
knowledge over and against any focus on the limits and potentialities, enabling and 
constraining effects, complementary and contradictory aspects of different ways of 
knowing (cf. Van der Velden 2002). The notion of simply depositing knowledge upon 
the Internet develops from an understanding of knowledge as a disembedded, 
concrete and functional currency, a tangible something that can be harnessed, taken 
out of context and applied elsewhere. This repeats the Bank's conflation of 
knowledge with the formality of reproducible statistical information noted in Chapter 
Five (World Bank 1998a: 1, cf. Machlup 1962: 21-2), which frequently results in a 
prioritisation of information over knowledge given that information is more easily 
pooled, aggregated, and deployed 211 . 
The editorial principle noted above thatgenerally accepted norms of discourse will be 
required of all who participate' (Development Gateway 2000e: 1) begs the question of 
whose discursive norms are being referred to. Given the projects origins and 
establishment within the Bank, the staffing overlap, and the initial selection of partners 
for the initiative by the Bank, it can be presumed that for some time at least the 
210 For instance, 'civil society gmups' is sometimes used as a catch-all abbreviation for all that is not in 
the public and private sectors (Gateway 2000b: 2), whilst at other times a more or less extensive and 
overlapping list of actor groups is given, as when NGOs or academia are listed separately from civil 
society (Gateway 2001 c, 2000e). To be safe, a hedging phrase such as... and other key partners' is 
sometimes added (Gateway 2001f), but its specifies are never dealt with. 21 1 Although the two are frequently paired and used interchangeably in Gateway literature for instance, 
and although the phrase 'where words of knowledge meet' has been adopted as the Gateway's 
(2001 a) slogan, in much of its literature (e. g. Development Gateway 2000b, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f, 
2000g, 2001 a, 2001 c) 'information' as a term of reference occurs twice as often as'knowledge' even 
when references to 'information technology' are excluded. 
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Gateway will be dominated by a Bank frame of discourse. As an indication of the 
current and expected future direction of this Fostered Project-Network (FoP), the 
Gateway has become increasingly embedded within the community of other Bank 
initiatives, its logo and links to appropriate Gateway pages appearing on many 
sections of the Bank's site as well as those of other MOPs and FoPs. It is clearly 
expected that the Gateway will continue to operate in close partnership, as a 
coordinative node, within the Bank's dispersal of activities. 
As mentioned, the Gateway was conceived as a means of pursuing the objectives 
laid out in the Comprehensive Development Framework, to be structured around the 
same set of principles (Development Gateway 2001c). Its compartmentalisation of 
issues has thus drawn the same criticisms as those of the Framework, pointing to the 
dangers in its employing a conceptual structure that de-emphasises or de-legitimises 
actor-groups and developmental problems that cut across the Bank's issue matrices. 
Such moments of overlap in the critique of different New Bank programmes indicate 
how country 'ownership' of development policy has been conceived to some extent as 
the ownership of franchised versions of Bank knowledge products like the County 
Gateway. This in turn indicates the knowledge governance role that the Bank is 
adopting through such endeavours. Countries would be free to add content within a 
Bank-designed structure; but through selective categorisation and pre-set definitions 
of the necessary conditions that should be met by 'appropriate' Gateway knowledge, 
certain development issues could come to appear less visible or important than they 
would by using another set of structuring principles. The Gateway could practice the 
Knowledge Bank agenda such as to leave diversity within its structure existing as 
variations within the paradigm of Western economic development planning. 
It is useful to bear Tim Jordan's (1991: 128) notion of 'technopower in mind at this 
point. Jordan argues that technopower in cyberspace is produced by an increasing 
reliance upon technological tools that appear to neutrally point the way to better 
knowledge management, but that in fact produce 'information constituted by the 
values inherent in the tools'. The Gateway can be regarded as such a technological 
tool; mediating the information it presents through the values it embodies, and so 
translating the meaning and intention of others' knowledges into its dominant mode of 
thinking; and establishing and consolidating a preferred knowledge structure by 
embedding its assertions within supporting networks, shaping understandings of the 
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world through the classificatory categories and vocabulary it deploys. For example, 
we might consider the roles of filtering and harmonising online development 
contributions, and guiding users through the available material. Harmonisation would 
involve processes of translation to ensure that all information and knowledge is 
communicable within the same discursive framework. Yet as noted in Chapter Three, 
translation and standardisation are political processes wherein different interests are 
advanced according to the agenda and approach of those contributing resources to 
these exercises (Strange 1988: 121,1996: 165). New harmonised knowledge 
products will exhibit the values of the translator (and furthermore much might be lost 
in translation given that some knowledge will not be easily detachable from the social 
circumstances in which its epistemic community of production is based). Under the 
Bank's dominant influence such harmonisation would likely function where possible to 
translate information sources into forms more readily employable as source materials 
of econometric analyses, yet when the results are presented as 'harmonised' 
development information then the politics of mediation processes could remain, if 
unchallenged, relatively inconspicuous. 
The overall effect would be to marginalise counter-discourses and so constrain 
opposition to the dominant development discourse, connecting with the wider 
Knowledge Bank agenda in educating and training future knowledge producers and 
users, so as to tailor future knowledge production to fit the dominant Bank-Gateway 
development model. In this way the Gateway could be considered as hybridising 
Curry's (1997: 11-12) understanding of the knowledge economy as the 
industrialisation of knowledge production noted in Chapter Three with a 'putting-out' 
system, as multiple independent endeavours are fitted to a Gateway framework and 
begin producing more wool for the Bank's mill. Local producers would be encouraged 
to act as responsible technological citizens in feeding the central fact-producing 
calculative machinery, governing themselves by the numbers they produce in 
accordance with a Bank recipe. In this way the Gateway has sought to be the focal 
point of a community, and indeed would appear to have aimed at becoming a whole 
development 'village' more than just the community centre; featuring a discussion 
caf6, a marketplace, a library (and other public information services), and an 
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educational establishment212 . This will to build the infrastructure of a (development) 
community marks the Gateway out as being more than just an online portal, and 
highlights the danger of having one dominant face in the village who acts as caf6- 
owner, marketplace-regulator, librarian, and head-teacher. 
Finally, it also runs counter to most understandings of the Internet's virtues as an 
informational resource, and notions of the appropriate skills to develop within 
knowledge workers in a knowledge economy, to seek to implant a single authoritative 
editorial tool as the guide to development online. Many of the roles the Gateway was 
established as being intended to fulfil were already being achieved on a multiplicity of 
smaller independent sites prior to the idea's emergence. Each independent portal 
may have been incapable of providing everything that the Gateway intended to given 
their different resource constraints, but in their plurality it was possible that the parts 
could equal or surpass the Gateway's whole. Just as a variety of knowledges are 
more valuable in their diversity than any end-result of intellectual mono-cropping 
resulting from a global standardisation of conditions for the production of truths, so a 
diversity of development stories will tend to produce more a fruitful discussion than 
the consensus-space of the Gateway vision. The proposal that the Gateway should 
act as a filter to clear the field and make life easier for others is less preferable than 
facilitating the emergence of an effective knowledge-based division of labour, forging 
stronger links between knowledge workers operating in a decentred fashion, and 
developing the skills of such workers to search for and critically assess diverse 
materials for themselves, with no need for any one group to hold undue influence 
over the publication of officially approved stories of development. 
Contesting the Image of the New Bank 
During the time of its establishment the Gateway became a part of the wider space of 
contestations marked out by the Renewal as a whole, over definitions of what the 
World Bank is today, and what its role in the development terrain is. I will here outline 
important elements of the interaction between the Bank and its critics over the 
212 The March 2001 Project Proposal included suggestions of an Aid Effectiveness Exchanges where 
ideas and stories of success (or failure) could be shared, a Gateway Marketplace to facilitate 
investments, contracts and so forth, a clearinghouse of information and a database of useful 
development knowledge, as well as resources to facilitate relevant training. 
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Gateway before considering strategic approaches to the Bank in this light in the 
following final chapter. The Bank's response to the suspicious reactions of many 
critics was, as mentioned, to effect certain changes immediately as well as to engage 
in a series of open discussion forums. Following the discussions a review piece was 
produced by the Gateway Team (Development Gateway 2000h). The piece is 
interesting because it can be read as an attempt to reassert the Bank's authority 
through a strategic redefinition of actor-positions and interests. In the document 
Gateway critics were implicitly criticised as holding back the progression of 
development discourse and practice by clinging to a vision of an Old Bank as an 
ideological neoliberal machine, whereas now 'the Bank is known as a global 
institution with a global membership and a recognized capacity to deliver' 
(Development Gateway 2000h). The piece twice confined more substantial concerns 
about the Gateway to existing 'mostly in civil society', before then reconstituting this 
group as two distinct actor positions of North and South, so as to produce politico- 
economic explanations of a reactionary critical (and predominantly Northern) position. 
Suspicions and critical voices were defined as being limited to 'some European civil 
society organizations' which held 'political suspicions' and were thus less open to 
discussion, it being 'difficult to change the mindset of such critics'. The perception of 
the Bank as unresponsive was explained as being due to the critics' own 
unresponsiveness to evident changes at the Bank, their being 'less inclined to 
suspend their mistrust, and as a consequence being unable to 'move forward 
together'with the Bank and its partners. Meanwhile organisations from 'civil society in 
developing countries' were characterised as having 'overwhelmingly expressed 
interest in participating'. The 'majority of people' were said to 'fundamentally 
appreciate the work of the Bank' and appreciate that the Gateway Team were doing 
their best to negotiate a 'complex problem'. This move to construct and divide off a 
minority of critics from the majority of supporters, and locate them within Europe, 
characterised such groups as being regressive in not understanding the needs of 
Southern organisations (Development Gateway 2000h)213. 
213 It was implied that such misunderstanding perhaps arose because of a lack of awareness amongst 
critics of digital and knowledge resources divides and their not appreciating that things they (the 
Northern groups) took for granted were desperately needed by groups in the South (such as access to 
trained individuals who could navigate the Internet and assess materials in building effective subject 
portals). 
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As it was, some groups did welcome the proposals and some were cautiously 
interested 214 , but others both North and South rejected the idea and criticism 
remained trenchant. Consultations were considered to have been insufficient and the 
Bank was considered to have been unresponsive to feedback, it being suggested that 
the Gateway Team had already decided what they would do and were carrying out 
consultations simply as a matter of procedure. It was claimed that the Gateway was 
still too much a product and a tool of the Bank, advertised as an independent venture 
but working through a Bank development agenda and threatening to squeeze out 
alternatives. The Gateway was effectively dismissed as a product of Renewal-wash.. 
The critical response seemed to be that the Bank might be singing the notes of its 
new decentralisation and partnership song, but that its heart wasn't in the 
performance, and the result was just another Bank intervention in the development 
field. 
In spite of the Bank's depiction of the Gateway's receiving mostly support from the 
South, early in 2001 a forum in South Africa (with representatives covering thousands 
of South African NGOs, trade unions and churches) authored a letter to Bank 
President James Wolfensohn to 'firmly and unequivocally state [their] intention not to 
participate' in the project (Kabissa-Fahamu 2001). Several 'open letter' emails were 
also penned as statements of complaint or of opposition and non-engagement that 
gained hundreds of signatures from organisations and individuals around the world 
pledging to endeavour to construct alternativeS21 5. As a result of such strategic non- 
involvement the Internet presence of direct vocal opposition to the Gateway has 
declined since the project's establishment. Some Southern groups have focused 
instead on ensuring that alternatives are available and fully functioning, so as to 
detract from demand for the Gateway rather than contributing to its presence centre- 
stage in the online development community, even if only as a force that is opposed. 
Choike in South America (hftp: //chasque. choike. org), and Africa Pulse in Africa 
(www. africapulse. org) represent two regional development networks that have started 
214 See for instance the more positive review given of the EDC discussion forum (EDC 2001), and 
OneWorld Europe's summary of its meetings held in Brussels, 2000 (OneWorld Europe 2000). 215 For instance the Bretton Woods Project (2000b), a London-based research organisation and 
pressure group, produced an open letter of disapproval back in September 2000, in response to the 
first series of negotiations with civil society. Following further negotiations the Voice of the Turtle 
(2001), a small independent online journal, orchestrated an open letter of non-involvement pledging to 
'avoid all contact, whether official or otherwise, with the World Bank's Development Gateway'. 
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up since, and at least in part in reaction to, the Gateway216. These sites work to 
achieve some of the same goals in a less coordinative central portal sense. 
The stories of the two networks is illuminating in terms of showing both how critical 
groups have attempted to position the Gateway as an unnecessary intervention, and 
also how the greater dispersal of Bank resources through engagement with 
Externally-Oriented Project-networks (EOPs) could usefully enable more independent 
and 'owned' initiatives to blossom. Project co-ordinator Roberto Bissio is upbeat 
about Choike, claiming that it is competing effectively with the Gateway in its Internet 
traffic ranking217 . Africa Pulse meanwhile 
is at present unfunded and described as 
"ticking over, rather than being developed'. The project co-ordinator Alan Finley 
describes a 'general donor disinterest' in such projects after the first flurry of funding 
for the One World initiative. Indicating the importance of calls for Gateway funds to be 
dispersed to independent networks, Finley stresses that funding is the greatest 
limitation to the project. With the funds, he insists, 'the site would flYP218. 
It is interesting to note how resistance to the Gateway emerged in some form both 
inside and outside the Bank such that key documents were leaked to external groups 
and posted online to draw the attention of the critical community 21 9. Resistance to the 
Gateway was then coordinated in a fairly decentralised fashion through open letters 
and email and web-based updates. When this dispersed and critical global online 
resistance engaged with the Bank in criticising its dominant cultural practices, 
changes were produced. Even if not to the satisfaction of critics, it is significant 
nonetheless that the Bank moved so quickly to change aspects of the Gateway and 
216 Choike is coordinated by the Third Word Institute (TWI), a Uruguay-based development NGO 
network that filed a corruption claim against the Gateway in July 2001, and AfricaPulse by 
SANGONeT, a coordinator of the meetings that produced the letter from South Africa. To quote 
Roberto Bissio, one of the Choike organisers at TWI, 'we decided to put our energies to constructively 
show through Choike that better things can be done With so much less'. Personal communication with 
Roberto Bissio, Director of Social Watch, rbissio@chasque. net, 151h April 2003. 
217 Bissio cites results from Alexa (www. alexa. com), a public Internet traffic ranking service. Alexa 
results in April 2003 show Choike roughly 20% behind in terms of user reach, but with users accessing 
more than three times as many web-pages within the site once they are there. With relation to both 
figures Choike's ratings had improved since the last three month period whilst the Gateway's had 
declined. Alexa's ratings results are however known to be less reliable the lower the rating of the site, 
and neither the Gateway nor Choike have particularly high ratings values. Data downloaded from 
www. alexa. com on 1e April 2003. 
218 Personal communication with Alan Finley, alanf@sangonet. org. za , 14 
th April 2003.. 
219 As mentioned, a draft proposal of the Gateway was leaked to the Bretton Woods Project early in 
2000, with the result that the idea became general public knowledge before it had been intended to 
become so. 
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engage in open fora to discuss further potential changes. The most significant of 
these changes was to formalise a transition of the Gateway from a Multiple-Operator 
to a Fostered Project-network with the creation of the Gateway Foundation as an 
independent governing organisation. Even with all the critical comment that has been 
passed on the inadequacies of this externalisation, it is still perhaps more than was 
initially intended and than would have been done had the Bank not faced the strength 
of criticism it did so soon after the emergence of the Gateway idea. The Foundation at 
least sets down on paper a separation of organisations that can be monitored and 
critiqued by watchers of the Bank and the Gateway. As Stone (2001) writes of the 
Global Development Network's ability to evolve now that it has come out from under 
the Bank's wing, so the same might be hoped of the Gateway. The Internet potentially 
offers avenues for circumventing the epistemic dominance of economic elites, 
redefining 'development', and sharing knowledge upon alternative ways of living. The 
Gateway's influence upon this potentiality depends very much upon the Bank's 
intentions, how these intentions and their realisation are shaped through interaction 
with its partners and critics, and consequently the way in which the governance and 
ownership structures of local projects such as Country Gateways are practiced and 
adapted. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how the Bank's dispersal through Renewal enables it to 
produce processes of normalisation over development discourse, on- and off-line, 
producing and training the current and future knowledge producers, managers and 
users in shaping how development agents and countries come to be positioned within 
the discursive practice of the 'new' economy. Normalisation can produce enabling 
effects, such as the Bank would appear to desire from reading the discourse with 
which it surrounds its performance, developing a shared frame of understanding 
amongst an increasing number of actors and so a smoother conversation upon the 
procedures of development once the ends and a substantial number of the means 
have been agreed upon. However this production of consensus can also consolidate 
relations within the development terrain around the Bank's approach to development, 
indicating the direction that all should be headed in their efforts to improve standards 
of living and sketching out desired actor-positions for developing countries in a 
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knowledge economy. Through the exercise of such influence upon developmental 
discursive practice other understandings of development can be further marginalised 
and the dominant approach of the Bank (and others performing the mainstream of 
development discourse) reproduced and consolidated as the only seemingly valid 
way forward. 
Yet the opportunity is there within the Bank's own discourse to push for further 
change. The concern to perform the Renewal and become a dispersed Bank that 
listens to the poor lends strength to those critical voices still engaged in conversation 
with the Bank (and so whose voices are listened to as legitimate contributions and not 
just 'name-calling', Wolfensohn 1997g). The examples of the Global Development 
Network and the Development Gateway, and the changes brought about in response 
to criticism, are illustrative of this point. With regard to the Gateway for instance, 
despite the dominant trend exhibited for consolidating a technical-economic 
understanding of development, development discourse within the Bank and its 
project-networks is a heterogeneous affair, all the more so the more diverse are its 
partners. The more the Gateway is monitored inside and outside the Bank, the less 
chance there should be that it is dominated by an officially-approved narrative of 
development as economic growth; and the more it faces resistance by critical voices 
recognised as valuable by the Bank, the more it might be pulled further away from the 
Bank to allow its self-development, as Diane Stone (2001: 25,2000: 249) hopes 
might happen for the Network. It is to the potentialities of such resistance for pushing 
the Bank further in its own discourse, as well as the politics of defining valid and 




Discourses of Reform and Abolition: 
Diffusing and Defusing the Bank 
Introduction 
This final chapter will consider the discourses of reform and abolition that have 
continued to surround the World Bank throughout its latest efforts at renewal. It will 
firstly review the potentialities and limits that have been observed within the Bank's 
knowledge-renewal and the politics of networks it embodies, noting the modes of 
discursive practice and forms of association the Bank has become involved with, and 
the overlap within these with the patterns of repetition and difference characterising 
the wider discursive shifts considered in Part One. Thinking about the contemporary 
and potential future positionings of an organisation operating within and acting upon 
the institutional constraints that in part define it and shape its reproduction, the 
question of whether the Bank should be reformed or abolished is argued to be an 
unproductive distraction. However it is observed to be a distraction that has been 
used by the Bank in defining the terrain of its own discourse of reform and the limits of 
'legitimate' contributions and strategies of engagement by its critics. 
It is proposed here instead that a range of more and less 'radical' positions are 
capable of applying pressure for change in a productive division of labour, opening 
the discourse of reform up to new contributions from both within and without the 
organisation in a manner that could enable different voices and different perspectives 
upon development to be heard more clearly. Associations or 'networks' of different 
critical agencies operating around and across official Bank boundary-lines, in the 
manner that has been observed in the previous two chapters, represent the strongest 
contemporary possibilities for opening the organisation up. Encouraging a dispersal of 
its operations could help to detach the power of its truths from the hegemonic 
conditions under which they currently operate (cf. Foucault 1984a: 75), which could in 
turn encourage a reconceptualisation of the Bank's role within - and thereby 
adaptations in the wider discursive practices of - knowledge economics and 
development. 
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The Knowledge Economy, the Knowledge Bank, and the State of Renewal 
Several common qualities have been noted between the discourses considered in 
this work, the first of which is their mobile and open nature. Each is firstly dominated 
by a small number of (frequently governmental-economic) players who exercise 
strong influence over the discourse's practise in the production and reproduction of 
hegemonic sets of relations. Nonetheless the multiple and dispersed nature of 
contributions ensure that the discourse ultimately remains relatively underdetermined 
and open, and that such relations remain always somewhat contingent and unstable. 
Secondly, patterns of repetition and difference mark all the discursive shifts 
considered; repetition occurs as clusters of interests work to ensure that the 
discourse reproduces preferred understandings, but each new turn can produce 
openings for the pursuit of different understandings and practices. Finally there is the 
importance of the dramatic performance of discourse; the production of events that 
perform a moment of rupture in marking a shift, such as the G8's Okinawa Charter on 
the Global Information Society (2000), President Truman's inaugural address in 1949, 
and the World Bank's (1998a) World Development Report 1998199. That such 
moments occur some time after the beginning of the events to which they refer is less 
significant than the buzz of discussion that they prompt and that mark them as 
historical events. 
The discourses and their practise develop, at least in part, through the continual 
presence of critical interjections. Hegemonic moments of discursive formation can 
develop through the production of 'common' points of interest and the alignment of 
actor-networks around these, but such moments are necessarily temporal and 
alterable in their reproduction. Points of discursive conjuncture (overlappings between 
different discourses) and discussions around key discursive events are two moments 
that have been considered here wherein spaces of opportunity can arise for critical 
contributions to be heard more clearly. Such moments can potentially be used to 
produce restricted autonomous zones wherein different practices might be 
expedmented with. The pursuit of such opportunities might not uproot the dominant 
set of discursive practices, but could stimulate more and less productive modifications 
- as with effects within mainstream economic practices stemming from the spread of 
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open source and free software discourse220, and again with regards to how it is now 
quite usual for once extraneous variables to be included in the development 
discourse processes of calculation and planning221. 
Similarly the Bank can be seen as having responded to shifts in the discourses it 
inhabits and contributes to, as well as to criticisms of its own actions. The 
organisation has performed a Renewal of its structuring through drawing upon 
aspects of all four discursive streams outlined in Chapter Two; bringing post- 
industrialist concerns (such as Machlup's (1962) conflation of knowledge and 
information and Bell's (1974) concern with commodifiable, appropriable forms of 
knowledge) together with casual futuristic talk of leapfrogging stages of industrial 
development, and strong practical organisational concerns with discourses of 
knowledge management and networking. The Bank's orientation has been affected 
by this discourse of Renewal, lending greater rhetorical emphasis to its knowledge- 
related work such as policy advice, capacity-building and education and training, over 
its more bank-like lending operationS222 . As well as perspectives within the 
Bank upon 
the value of formulating and implementing consistent and stringent intellectual 
property rights legislation - consistent with the position of owners and producers of 
formalised intellectual 'capital' - more developmental concerns upon the economic 
treatment of knowledge have also been expressed with regards to protecting 
indigenous knowledges, encouraging knowledge sharing, and tailoring IPR regimes to 
facilitate Southern access to new knowledge and technologies. 
The Knowledge Bank initiative has nonetheless been criticised as running too closely 
parallel to the governmental discourses explored in Chapter Three in two ways. Firstly 
through tending to conflate knowledge and information and elide the multiplicity of 
ways of knowing, thereby lending legitimacy to the will to standardise, translate and 
reproduce the multiplicity as a singular and more capital-friendly Knowledge'rm (e. g. 
220 The spread of such discourses has led to attempts at extending the principles beyond the realm of 
software with the Simputer and Open Content the adoption of open source principles into the practices 
of large corporations like IBM and Netscape, and the use and advocacy of open source by 
governments North and South, as mentioned in Chapter Three. This could in turn have further effects 
upon the stances governments adopt within negotiations upon the harmonisation and implementation 
of intellectual property rights legisation. 
221 Such as the environment, education, and the question of the role of the state in establishing and 
r@Dulating markets. 
2" Although, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the Bank (2001 a: 9) has stressed that emphasising its 
work in 'knowledge, advice, and capacity building' does not imply any reduction in its lending activities. 
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King & McGrath 2000a, Caddell 1999). Secondly in tending to promote knowledge's 
treatment as a form of capital through discourses upon its status as a public 
(economic) good, as well as upon the need to consolidate a regime of intellectual 
property rights ownership (e. g. Mehta 1999a, 1999b). Similar variations upon the 
same elements of Bank economic and development discourse thereby prevail in its 
Knowledge Bank posture, through the concern to open economies up; to the use of 
(Northern) Foreign Direct Investment (for development); and to international trade, 
encouraging countries to adapt and find a 'new' role within the international trade of 
'new' goods and services. The fear of such critics is that the Bank's pursuit of this 
long-standing interest could strengthen the likelihood of many contemporary 
economic and social inequalities being maintained throughout any economic and 
social developments in the roles of information and knowledge - with perhaps a little 
geographical reordering and a few more opportunities being produced for some (not 
all). 
Such lines of criticism are entirely appropriate, yet at the same time we must be 
careful not to envision such a final outcome as being inevitable; to do this would be to 
retreat into a dystopic vision reasserting the perpetual dominance of capital over 
human interests and refusing consideration of events in their particularity and 
difference. What we need instead to do is to accept these negative aspects of 
repetition (almost as a matter of course) and to look for and work to strengthen the 
slim positive opportunities within any such re-ordering of economic activities. The 
World Bank is not a monolithic creature consisting of automatons producing new 
variants of a standard economic narrative, let alone producing the same answer to 
the question of knowledge's role in fostering development. As Diane Stone (2001: 22) 
has put it, '[t]o portray the Bank in this way misses the complexity of perspectives 
within the organisation'. At the same time, the dominant voices are too dominant and 
long-standing, too institutionalised and too protective of their own professional 
interests, to allow all but a handful of dissenting voices within their sphere of influence 
and to give much weight to those few. The circle is not entirely closed, but neither is it 
very effectively open. As was outlined in Chapter Five, it is restrained through 
selective employment practices geared towards rewarding those who subscribe to an 
'approved' knowledge system; through career progression structures, organisational 
training courses and reorganisations that consolidate this, ensuring discordant 
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opinions and knowledge do not frequently become too vocal within the organisation; 
and through a culture of censorship that cuts short the career-paths at the Bank of 
many who choose to speak out differently. 
The dominant organisational tendency that has been observed in this study is for the 
Bank to nominally diffuse its activities whilst retaining a large degree of control. 
Returning to the recurrent metaphor of development as a drama, the Knowledge 
Bank performance is best considered as a different scene within the same act (much 
like the knowledge economy discourse upon which it is based); some aspects of the 
script have changed as knowledge has become a more dominant focus, but much of 
the rest of the performance has remained substantially unaltered 223 . Some new 
lines 
have been written into the Bank's script, picking up on the language of 
decentralisation and partnership as a result of critical interventions it has faced, and 
discursive trends it has adopted, but is currently not well-practised in performing a 
new role. As a result the performance is more in the manner of a pantomime routine, 
asking most of those constructed as the 'audience' (civil society) to participate 
nominally - staying in their seats and calling out scripted lines - whilst others are 
selected by the main actor (the Bank) to come onstage at its direction and enliven the 
performance without straying too far from the main script. The Bank is changing, but 
ongoing pressure needs to be applied to guide these changes and push them further; 
and tools to this end are provided in the Bank's own experimentation with discourses 
of partnership and decentralisation. 
Discourses of World Bank Reform and Abolition 
As a result of such patterns of constrained change and repetition, many have 
remained unhappy with the performance and direction of the Bank under 
Wolfensohn's renewal. Critical responses have consequently emerged from a variety 
of places which indicate something of the different interests that are invested in the 
organisation's functioning - including the US Congress and its International Financial 
Institutions Advisory Commission (IFIAC 2000) that was established to report on the 
223 The list of central actors and the dynamics of their interaction (economic and political elites, national 
governmental institutions and multilateral organisations performing the hegemonic discursive form of 
development), played out against a backdrop of structural inequalities around the same scene-setting 
devices (such as the unmarked and passive mass of 'the poor. 
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contemporary position and purpose of the Bank and IMF, other development actors, 
and a good number of the Bank's own staff224 (see e. g. Bello 2000a, 2002b, Rich 
2000, Fidler 2001, Pender 2001, Wade 2002b, Easterly 2003). In response to this 
diversity of critical voices the organisation has, as we have seen, sought to 
emphasise its newly-scripted role as a listening Bank. Whilst it would be difficult for 
the Bank to act much differently towards criticisms coming from its major donor- 
governor institutions such as the US Congress, the shift towards discursive practices 
of widening participation in and ownership of development projects express the same 
concern for the organisation to be seen as listening by its non-govern mental critics. 
As has been argued in relation to the Bank throughout Part Two, slim opportunities 
for fostering changes in the organisation's discursive practices result from these 
listening performances; however such opportunities exist within the limiting context of 
the Bank's proclivity for defining the discursive terrain to the advantage of its 
dominant sets of interests. 
One recent turn in the Bank's partnership discourse has engaged with the critical 
responses of those of its potential partners within what it now recognises as civil 
society organisations (CSOs). As has been noted, this referent has been introduced 
into the Bank's discourse but remains under-analysed and under-defined, and hence 
too broadly inclusive (incorporating NGOs and a wide array of other non-government 
actor-networks). The Bank's response has been to define and divide this extensive 
and ambiguous grouping into two reductive and moral ly-colou red, caricatured actor- 
positions; of those radidaAabolitionists only interested in engaging in 'critical protests' 
against it, as against a 'more informed' and 'maturing' range of moderate-reformers, 
with whom it can sit down and engage in 'constructive dialogue' (World Bank 2003t: 
21-25) 225. Since, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the discourse of self-reform has been 
an organisational normality at the Bank for some time, the position of the moderate- 
reformer critics can then be read as those helping the Bank to reform. Unfortunately 
various Bank critics have also often adopted these caricatured positions as their own 
and denounced the aspirations of the 'other' as utopian (see e. g. Bond 1999a, 2000b, 
224 As indicated by the mentioned reprisals and departures of Stiglitz, Kanbur, Easterly and Ghani, and 
the leaking of draft documents on the Development Gateway. 
221 This concern is not entirely new, but is being stressed anew in the discourse upon the Bank's 
channels of partnership (see e. g. World Bank 1995b: 23: 'Some NGO critics are fundamentally 
opposed to the Bank and all that it does', 'It is important ... that concerns submitted to the Bank by responsible NGOs with relevant local knowledge be taken seriously'). 
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2003, Locker 2000, Socialist Alternative 2001). Although such comments are often 
framed as comradely criticism, they are unproductive insofar as the end-goals of both 
'reformers' and 'abolitionists' are quite blue-sky ambitions. 
Between these under-defined and over-simplistic caricatures of potential partners and 
critical agencies, a generous space is created within which the Bank can adopt a 
moral high-ground in drawing the perceived limits on 'valid' positions and strategies 
adopted towards it and choosing who it engages with and how, justifying non- 
engagement with a bad radical abolitionist outside as against good reformist talkers. 
In this way it can, for instance, praise the Jubilee 2000 coalition as an effective 
moderate dialoguer without mentioning that its pressure-raising campaign-work has 
also included what the Bank terms the 'more radical ... obstructionist' actions of those 
with whom there is 'little basis ... to expect that constructive relations are possible or 
desirable' (such as forming 'human chains' in an attempt to prevent Bank and IMF 
representatives accessing their annual meetings, World Bank 2003t: 21-2, cf. Jubilee 
2000 UK 2001). 
These simple caricatures of critical actor-positions draw crude and distracting dividing 
lines and elide the overlapping diversity of end-goals held to and tactics used by 
different critical actor-networks. Different perspectives do exist in the sense of those 
who speak of reform of the Bank and those who speak of the need for its abolition; 
the former being all those who hope that the Bank can (through the application of 
pressure) engage more fully in reforms and behave in a manner more likely to 
promote development (as they understand it); and the latter including all those who 
see the Bank's problems (emphasising variously the political, economic, structural 
and cultural) as too overweening, such that the best hope is to close the organisation 
down. Yet the most productive space for co-ordinating oppositional groupings in 
pressuring the Bank for change exists at the broad intersection between Reformers 
who want to change the Bank and other International Financial Organisations (IFOs) 
so radically that they would not be the organisations we know, and Abolitionists who 
realise that short of changing the institutions within and upon which the IFOs are built, 
any vacuum of power left by their abolition would be filled by very similar siblings. 
Alternative caricatures can usefully be drawn up to illustrate this point, re-considering 
important commonalities and differences different critical positions; in this light we can 
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speak of Northern Protectionists, Liberal Regulation Advocates, End-Goalh Activists, 
and Social, Economic and Environmental Justice (SEEJ) Critics. 
Re-defining a Common Ground 
The views of the Northern Protectionists, firstly, are framed in terms of maintaining 
and advancing North em-co u ntry political and economic interests; a strong 
representation of this group can be made by elements within the US Congress and 
Treasury. The publication in March 2000 of a Congress-mandated Report commonly 
referred to as the 'Meltzer Report' (the report of the International Financial Institution 
Advisory Commission, chaired by Professor Allan Meltzer, IFIAC 2000) brought the 
debates between Northern Protectionists wider attention and illustrated how concerns 
within this camp stretch across the reform-abolition boundary. The Commission took 
the position that the Bank was irrelevant to poverty reduction, and operated in 
counter-productive competition with both other Regional Development Banks and 
private capital. It therefore suggested radically reducing the size of World Bank 
operations to minimise the chances of it squeezing out private finance capital 
opportunities, renaming the Bank a World Development Agency; terminating the 
World Bank Group (merging the IFC into the Bank - the IBRD and IDA - and closing 
the MIGA); cancelling all debts owed by the Heavily-Indebted Poorest Countries 
(HIPCs) and focussing on grants over loans; and gradually ceasing lending to 
countries other than the H IpCS226. Such 'reforms' would effectively close down the 
Bank-as-we-know-it if adopted in full, and it has been argued that this was the 
intention of some Commission members (Griesgraber 2000, Schalatek 2000). 
Lawrence Summers, in his position as then US Secretary to the Treasury, responded 
cautiously and critically to the Report by rejecting a number of its core proposals on 
the basis that they would weaken the Bank's ability to 'serve vital U. S. interests' in 
promoting market reforms in developing countries (US Treasury 2000). Summers 
(1999) married this pursuit of US interests with the older mainstream development 
discourse contention that economic growth is almost inherently good for the poor, 
being necessary and nearly sufficient for development and therefore poverty 
226 The Commission suggested that the Bank cease lending to countries with an annual per capita 
income over $4000; and offer only restricted assistance to countries with per capita income over 
$2500, phasing this out as the income rises (International Financial Institutions Advisory Committee 
2000: 10-12). 
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reduction. Other Protectionists have meanwhile more explicitly called for the Bank to 
be closed down or even more radically restricted, on the basis that it merely aids 
countries who then compete for American industry and jobs (Buchanan 1999, Whalen 
1995)227. 
A second group which we can consider is the Liberal Regulation Advocates. This 
group would incorporate many longstanding critical academics (Wade 2001 a, 2001d, 
2002a, 2002b, Gray 1999,2002, Pincus & Winters 2002a) alongside more recently 
emergent advocates for change such as investment banker George Soros (1998) and 
a number of prominent figures that have been associated with the Bank (Stiglitz 2002, 
2000b, Easterly 2002,2003, Kapur 2000,2002, Kanbur 2001, Clark 2002). This 
group of critics maintain that the world needs a world bank in some form; either in the 
sense of a multilateral organisation to regulate the world economy and ensure the 
production and protection of 'global public goods' such as the environment and 
knowledge (e. g. Wade 2001c, Gray 1999, Soros 1998); or else a stripped-back 
Development Bank akin to that of the Meltzer proposals (Pincus & Winters 2002a). 
Advocates tend also to be in accord with the Bank in its dominant conception of 
development as an outcome of economic growth (Wade 2002b: 234-5, Cf. Easterly 
2003, Stiglitz & Squire 1998, Fidler 2001, Pincus & Winters 2000a). Debates then 
remain over how such growth is defined and achieved and how central various forms 
of it are to development. They tend to be critical of the level of influence Northern 
member states (and especially the US) exert over the Bank, and stress the need for 
more transparent and democratic regulation (Wade 2002b, Fidler 2001, Kapur 2000, 
2002)228. 
Importantly there is also a tendency to be critical of Northern NGOs in the same 
regard; the greater involvement of 'civil society' in the Bank's operations is not always 
viewed positively by such critics. Many respect the organisation's potential for 
undertaking a restricted operational mandate effectively (when it is stated clearly and 
set within an appropriate framework of governance and accountability), and fear that 
under Wolfensohn the Bank has been becoming 'soft-headed' in its attitude to NGOs 
227 See also for example papers presented at the Cato Institute (www. cato. org) and National Center for 
Policy Analysis (hftp: /twww. ncpa. org) such as Thlbodeau 1996, Bartlett 1997, and Bovard 1987. 
22" In this they share common ground with many more critical NGOs and even the United Nations 
Development Program, which in its Human Development Report 2002 (UNDID 2002) stressed many of 
the same points upon the Bank's democratic deficit, and problems of accountability and transparency. 
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and their perspectives on development (Fidler 2001). Robert Wade (2001c) has 
drawn analogy between the situation the Bank currently faces and Gulliver's 
encounter with the Lilliputians in Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels; with the Bank 
being tied down by external interests vying for its attention, from donor and borrower 
government interests, through potential and actual corporate partners, to an array of 
civil society organisations focussed upon global, national and special interests. Wade 
upturns the metaphor of large organisations as ships being steered by a manager at 
the helm, to posit the Bank as a large ship whose progress in any direction is severely 
impinged by its being pulled in many directions by a morass of small tugboats (cf. 
Wade 2002b, Fidler 2001). 
Thirdly, at the far end of the 'scale' or reform and abolition we could position what I 
have referred to as the End-Goal Activists, resolute and determined actor-networks 
intent upon dismantling and abolishing the Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the global 
systems of 'capitalism' on which they are seen as being based, defined primarily in 
terms of 'corporate greed' and 'US imperialism' (e. g. Locker 2000, Howard 1999, 
Socialist Alternative 2002, Fighting the Octopus 2001). The storybook analysis forms 
an emotive, impassioned call to various forms of violent and non-violent direct-action, 
as seen in the more head line-grabbing moments of protest in recent years at 
meetings of the World Bank, the IMF, and other assemblies of national and 
multilateral political and economic representatives. Here the end goal is the 
immediate goal. It is openly acknowledged by these groups that the problems they 
take issue with concern the institutional context the Bank operates within and 
performs through its activities, and that changing the Bank alone is unlikely to be 
either possible or particularly effective. Thus calls are made to bring all banks and 
financial institutions into 'public ownership' (Socialist Alternative 2002) as part of a 
dystopic-utopic portrait of where we are now and where we could be. 
These three actor-position caricatures leave a broad remaining mass which I have 
here labelled as the Social, Economic and Environmental Justice (SEEJ) Critics. This 
umbrella covers a broad array of research and campaign actor-networks concerned 
with various aspects and understandings of environmental sustainability, and social 
and economic justice, in the conception and practise of development. Within this 
group the boundaries of reform and abolition most clearly break down and other more 
interesting questions emerge concerning the discursive practices of networks, 
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partnerships and speaking for others. What we could call the SEEJ Reformer sub- 
category returns us firstly to the Bank's own official history of engagement with its 
critics, mentioned briefly in Chapter Five with reference to the NGO Working Group 
on the World Bank (NGOWG). The NGOWG's position was in effect quite similar to 
that of the Bank in admitting the legitimacy of direct protest actions as being 
sometimes necessary, but playing down the credibility of such approaches in insisting 
that difficult organisational changes tend to be more 'genuine and lasting' when they 
develop from negotiations between the Bank and its critics (NGOWG 2000a: 4). Other 
SEEJ Reformers work with ideas that would, if implemented, be equivalent to 
reinventing the organisation; criticising the Bank's 'mission creep' in the manner of 
some Advocates and arguing that it needs to be restricted to a clearly defined 
developmental mandate both to streamline its functioning and enable effective 
monitoring and regulation (Bretton Woods Project 2003a, Wilks 2001a, Caufield 
1997); and calling for a democratic upheaval in the Bank's governance, organisation, 
and structuring, as well as a radical overhaul of its transparency and accountability 
(FOEI 2001). On this latter point at least the calls of both certain Advocates and SEEJ 
Reformers also tie with aspects of the Meltzer Report's recommendationS229. 
Stronger claims for reform find strong points of overlap with the sub-category of SEEJ 
Abolitionists who argue that the World Bank is incapable of reducing poverty and 
promoting development, being organ isational ly and culturally stuck within paradigms 
that cannot handle contemporary global economic and political events (Bello 2000a, 
2000b, Danaher 2001). This critique contends that the Bank is ultimately and 
inevitably a product of Northern capital interests, and can therefore work in no other 
fashion. Calling for its reform is in effect being an apologist for the system (polishing 
'Washington's boot on Third World necks', Bond 2001a), because as the Bank 
internalises each claim placed before it, its organisational and cultural momentum will 
ensure that these are turned into new variants upon its same functioning. Calls for 
participation in project definition result in the nominal inclusion of civil society groups 
within their own compartmentalised ghetto (a comment that was passed on the 'civil 
society' unit within the Gateway), and calls for greater ownership of development 
229 A number of SEEJ Critics and Advocates saw the Report as promoting some good policy changes 
'often for the wrong reasons', even if many other proposals were 'no more acceptable, or even worse, 
than the practices it object[ed] to' (Wood 2000, cf. Wade 2001 c, Christian Aid 2003, Bretton Woods 
Project 2003). Approved changes included renaming the organisation to clarify its role, establishing 
independent evaluation procedures, and creating more equitable voting structures (Wood 2000). 
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programmes result in transfers of power once all controls are fixed (as was again said 
of the Framework programmes and Gateway franchises, cf. Wilks & Lefrangois 2002). 
To shut down the Bank is therefore said to be the only progressive option for which 
230 critics can strive 
However many who wish to abolish the Bank would concur that within the 
contemporary institutional context (the dominant international systems of capital 
regulation) there is a need for global organisations to act as rule-setters and 
regulators (of international trade, investment and capital flows, and so forth); in short, 
for some restricted system of global governance (cf. Pincus & Winters 2002a: 18-19). 
For example, beyond the headlined absolutism Walden Bello (2002a: 116-8) talks of 
decommissioning, neutering, or radically reducing the powers of the Bank and turning 
it into 'just another set of actors coexisting with and being checked by other 
international organizations'. Campaigner and writer Patrick Bond (2000a) meanwhile 
writes at moments of the Bank's needing to be 'delegitimized, de-funded and 
decommissioned', talking resolutely of the dangers of reform wasting time and lending 
legitimacy to neoliberal practices (Bond 2000a, 2000b); and at other moments 
emphasises that what is most needed is 'truly democratic policy-making', indicating 
that the organisational context within which this happens is less important than the 
governance and representation structures put in place (Bond 2001b: 27). The World 
Bank Bonds Boycott (WBBB) and Fifty Years Is Enough (50 Years) are two prominent 
examples of campaigning actor-networks coordinating groups whose perspectives 
transgress the reform/abolish 'divide P231 . 
Whilst the achievement of these campaigns' 
stated objectives (such as ending structural adjustment and cancelling debts owed) 
would turn the Bank into something radically different from the form in which it is 
230 Invoking the analogy of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, Walden Bello (2000a) has argued that we need to 
stop tinkering at the edges of the machine and instead cut clean from the Bank and seek simpler, more 
effective solutions. The Bank, Bello says, resembles 'a dinosaur that is slowly sinking in a bog of its 
own making' but which highlights its renewals and partnership programmes in order to detract attention 
from its own identity crisis. 
231 Whilst Patrick Bond (2000a) frames his interest in the WBB13 campaign as seeing it as wanting to 
'keep [the Bank and the IMF] running, until they drop of exhaustion' (Bond 2000a), the WBBB (2000, 
my emphasis) lists itself as'building moral, political, and financial pressure' on the Bank when it 
encourages others to avoid holding Bank bonds (issued on financial markets to raise capital). The 50 
Years (2002) coalition is meanwhile billed in some of its literature as demanding 'the immediate 
suspension' of the Bank's 'policies and practices' (50 Years 2002), whilst elsewhere on its site it is 
billed as representing both reformist and abolitionist-minded critics and calling for a 'profound or 
fundamental "transformation"' of the organisation (Ambrose 2002b). 
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defined by its currently dominant mode of operations, it would not necessarily have to 
be abolished to achieve these goals. 
So as can be seen, there are many different points of overlap between so-called 
'reformers' and 'abolitionists', such that differently-minded SEEJ Critics can frequently 
work together and often also draw upon the support and energies of their outlying 
flanks, the Advocates and the Activists. Devolution, democratisation and the restricted 
mandate put forward by some SEEJ Abolitionists form part of an agenda very closely 
parallel to that of a number of SEEJ Reformers and Advocates, whilst the Activists 
more optimistically but perhaps more consistently demand the same plus. To this 
extent the reform-abolition question constitutes an unproductive distraction (in the 
sense of an interesting question posed at the wrong level). The question relates 
ultimately to how we might alter the current institutions of capital regulation so as to 
more effectively ensure the provision of scarce resources to peoples according to 
their needs, and within that questions of how needs are to be fairly defined. To refuse 
the question of whether the Bank should be abolished or only reformed may seem to 
be sifting on the fence and not critically engaging with the organisation. Yet given the 
different points of overlap between the outlined positions it can be seen that the fence 
is a flimsy discursive construct. The critical community consists of actor-networks 
engaging in a broad field of activities, and whilst some may paint lines upon the grass 
there are no different sides to a fence. To elide the question of reform versus abolition 
is more than just pragmatic realism. A utopian vision similarly drives this view, but it is 
utopia in the open and underdetermined sense of a non-place, an other place, the 
sense that we need to be 'elsewhere'. What is refused is a caricature portrait of where 
we should be. 
Diffusing and Defusing the Bank 
Eliding the question of reform versus abolition is also important insofar as the 
discourse of moderate and radical end-goals and strategies is one the Bank has itself 
adopted and adapted in constructing a moral discourse that defines and divides those 
that it will and will not engage with, in the process adding weight to the claims of 
legitimacy for its own discourse of reform, as has been noted (cf. Nelson 1996). 
These dichotomies can be refused as part of a process of strategic discursive 
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engagement with the Bank aimed at opening up its discursive practices of reform and 
partnership to voices other than those most often and most easily heard, and to the 
complexities of actor-positions that can be considered beyond these reductive 
caricatures. In considering strategies of engagement for generating pressure for 
change and shaping the direction of changes, the discourse of those both within and 
without the boundary-walls indicating the 'World Bank' needs to be opened up to 
become more of a conversation. A non-exhaustive set of four broad strategies can be 
considered as to how critics engage, or do not, with the Bank in seeking to shape the 
outcomes of the discursive shifts considered within this work. We might refer to these 
as jamming, transcending, externalising and partnering. These styles are not 
necessarily exclusive, and importantly their productive potential is context-dependent. 
Productive reinforcement is possible within a form of division of labour between more 
and less radical positions and strategies upon changing the Bank (cf. Taylor 2002: 
345-6, Chiriboga 1999, Desai & Said 2001). In relation to the interest the Bank has 
expressed in decentralisation and partnering in recent years, the latter two means of 
engagement would appear to present greater potentialities for shaping adaptations in 
the discursive practices of the Knowledge Bank, whilst the former two each play a 
role in setting the scene within which this engagement takes place. 
Jamming 
The first option is that of seeking to jam Bank operations, clogging the workings of the 
calculative machine with an abundance of variables or increasing the perceived costs 
of various developmental endeavours. As previously noted, a number of critical 
agencies have criticised what they term the Bank's 'mission creep'- its tendency to 
add on new variables to project calculations, new departments and new projects 
every time it faces criticism (Caufield 1997, Wilks 2001a, Pincus & Winters 2002a, 
2002b, Wade 2001c). In response some have sought to curtail this spread through 
insisting upon the Bank's adopting a clearly defined core mandate or a more strict 
interpretation of its Articles of Agreement. This strategy would in effect invert Wade's 
(2001c) Gulliverian morality tale to view the story from the perspective of the 
Lilliputians, hoping that campaigns could bear down upon the Bank and jam its 
organisational functioning with ever more concerns, targets and conditionalities (cf. 
Bond 2001a). Through a barrage of petitioning from a thousand research and 
campaign groups, each occupied with niche concerns, it would be hoped that the 
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Bank's hands could be tied, adding on more programmes, departments and variables 
so as to weigh the calculative regime down with an abundance of considerations to 
be defined, measured, translated, accounted and incorporated within the 
math ematica I-econo mic models that drive so much of its large-scale development 
work232. 
However hopes of actually jamming the organisation seem unrealistic. Whilst it has 
been noted that it is not efficient at goal-streaming to maximise effectiveness and 
efficiency, this latter hope would require that it is incapable of even the self-regulation 
necessary for ensuring its own survival. Critics such as Moses Nafm (1994: 5) were 
noting the organisation's tendency towards operational 'goal congestion' a decade 
ago, since that time Wolfensohn's presidency has been noted for the acceleration of 
such trends, and still the Bank goes on. Furthermore, as Bruce Rich (2002: 33-4) has 
noted, the internal market matrix structure adopted by the Bank under Wolfensohn's 
Renewal (wherein sector staff have to negotiate work and sell their services to 
country departments) increases the pressure to work to a managerial consensus as a 
matter of ensuring job security. Staff who are hired and produce favourable 
assessment reports that aid the progression of a proposed loan could tend to be re- 
hired more than those who pay critical attention to the details and problems with any 
proposed project. Within such a structure it could be expected that assessment 
programmes inserted into the loan machinery would be smoothed out so as to 
become paperwork formalities more than substantive calculative issues. Alternatively 
jamming could be aimed at raising the perceived organisational costs of continuing 
activities without being seen to try and negotiate seriously with its critics and their 
concerns; as when the International Rivers Network (2000) maintains that the reason 
for the Bank's reduced funding for dam projects since the mid-1990s is due to the 
strength of opposition it faced from affected peoples and 'grassroots activists and 
international groups' in two landmark cases in India and Nepal. The continual 
presence of new claims could raise the perceived cost of self-absorbed economistic 
functioning as new calculative procedures are taken on, however nominally; and 
232 Groups such as the Coalition for World Bank Reform, an association of 27 US-based civil society 
organisations, could be considered as being engaged at this level, however unintentionally. The 
Coalition's (2002) Responsible Reform of the World Bank document consists of seventeen chapters 
each authored by a different organisation, producing a roll call of reforms oriented around 
organisational speciality concerns (debt relief, forest protection, pesticides, gender, HIV and so forth). 
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increase the appeal of less technocratic and more effectively partnered or outsourced 
activities. 
Transcending 
The second option is that of seeking to transcend the Bank through producing viable 
independent alternatives to various proposed and actual projects; marking off the 
Bank's operational terrain and so delimiting perceptions of the legitimate scope of its 
work. Pursuing this approach limits any productive interaction through which groups 
might attempt to directly influence the Bank, but it is hoped that non-engagement will 
illustrate that the Bank's efforts are superfluous to the area of development in which it 
is trying to intervene (as was observed with the establishment of the Choike and 
Africa Pulse web-portals in response to the Bank's Development Gateway in the 
previous chapter). Non-engagement in this fashion can occur as something of a last- 
ditch attempt to throw sand in the wheels of a proj ect- network's functioning, once it 
becomes apparent that any further participation by critical groups will achieve little in 
terms of project redirection, and may simply attract attention to the Bank's work from 
the wider development community. When such strategic non-engagement is 
successful then it can potentially achieve this end of rethinking the Bank's areas of 
involvement, but the danger is that through its extensive list of affiliations and greater 
funding capacity the endeavours of the Bank will always be more widely publicised 
and more glossily presented - and hence perhaps more highly regarded - than 
smaller independent ventures. 
In this way jamming and transcending are both forms of non-engagement that are 
strategically useful when it is felt that all other options have failed, but the struggle of 
ideas at this point devolves into a struggle of financial and political muscle. Anything 
but a very tightly co-ordinated and massive grouping of civil society actors and 
perhaps governmental partners seeking to jam initiatives or present alternatives, 
could expect to be sidelined and coloured by a moral discourse which de-legitimates 
their standpoint in the eyes of the wider community. Furthermore, taking a resolutely 
oppositional stance immediately restricts potential partnerings, undermining the 
chances of productive interaction with all but a very few internal Bank critics. 
Transcendence is more likely to be a felt need and a viable possibility with relation to 
some aspects of the Knowledge Bank agenda, such as encouraging knowledge 
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sharing through providing assistive structures for the use of ICTs. As was noted in 
relation to the Development Gateway (and to some extent also the Global 
Development Network), the Bank entered late into a field where its activities could 
threaten to squeeze out already-existent independent ventures. Supporting and 
demonstrating the strength of these independent alternatives could encourage the 
reconsideration of how the Bank disperses its funding. However such strategic 
disengagement would need to occur on a mass scale in order to detract from the 
legitimacy of Bank projects in the eyes of any other than the community of critics 
pursuing these alternatives. If enough other actor-networks were convinced of a Bank 
project's potentiality and signed up as partners then it could continue, marred by the 
dissent surrounding it but backed by the financial and organisational strength of the 
Bank. In the process such Bank project-networks can engage in reproducing the 
development community upon the basis of which they can be referred to as 
community-based initiatives. 
Externalising 
A third and much more ambitious goal is that of externalisation, seeking to draw the 
organisation out from its Washington hub to make it more effectively a World Bank, 
fostering its support for more autonomous and localised development programmes. 
The organisation could achieve this by restricting core Bank activities to a well- 
monitored and regulated minimum, and emphasising its funding, coordinative and 
assistance roles for endeavours undertaken by external groups. As has been noted, 
the Bank's decentralisation discourse is weak in practise, but these practises might 
be strengthened were continual pressure to be successfully applied for the Bank to 
locate more staff in their country of operations, employing more staff from that country 
and allowing each unit more operational autonomy. This could produce spaces 
wherein local voices become more prominent. Pressure then applied by an 
agglomeration of country civil society groups could hopefully bear greater influence 
over a country office than over the distant Washington complex. We might in this way 
imagine Robert Wade's (2002b) ship and tugboats analogy (which, it was noted, he 
considers a problem for the Bank) as a potential solution for actor-networks working 
across the Bank and civil society engaged in discursive practices of locally-driven 
developments. The tugboats might pull at the Bank to see a collection of smaller 
project-network initiatives emerge from within the hull as it breaks, each more locally- 
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oriented in its operations (and therefore its audience, clientele, and staffing), perhaps 
coordinated through a minimal central satellite. 
Externalisation constitutes a desired horizon more than a short-run objective however 
-a culture shift within the Bank would be necessary before externalisation could 
occur on any significant and effective level. Problems as noted in Chapter Six would 
tend to recur; where external partners are given a controlling role over projects, the 
partners will tend to be very carefully selected for their sharing the same discursive 
frame of reference and economic preoccupations as the Bank. The limits upon 
exclusively pursuing externalisation therefore relate to the institutional context within 
which immediate and outright abolition of the Bank also becomes an unattractive 
prospect; externalising all Bank projects within an unchanged institutional frame 
would hold the greatest prospect of changing little as the same concentrations of 
political and economic power and voice represented by the Bank were reproduced in 
new forms. Yet externalisation could also fit quite well with an understanding of the 
Bank in an advanced stage of its development into a Knowledge Management and 
Networking Bank, becoming increasingly loosely decentred but still performing 
knowledge-sharing duties that enable a variety of development discourses (rather 
than the one dominant neoliberal economic model) to engage in worldwide 
conversations upon development. 
Partnering 
The fourth and final option of partnering is an increasingly common reality amongst 
organisations engaging critically with the Bank and trying to look beyond the 
commonly accepted Bank/non-Bank, insideloutside boundaries. The approach 
accepts that the Bank is a complex multi-headed beast that needs to be engaged with 
in seeking to change both the organisation and its institutional terrain, and realises 
that diversity within the Bank is central to building pressure for change, because 
critical commentaries and discursive practices counter to those which tend to 
hegemonise the organisation are engaged from both outside and inside. Opposing 
the dominant development discourse practised by the Bank and its major government 
contributors, involves using the same discursive tools as recently adopted by the 
Bank (effective knowledge sharing and use of ICTs to communicate strategies, 
resources and requirements), in producing informed, dispersed and loosely- 
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coordinated associations of Bank and non-Bank actors (or what we might term trans- 
Bank networks of resistance). To toy with Nikolas Rose's (1996: 56-7) notion of 
governance at a distance we might consider this deployment of agency through ICTS 
as a form of resistance at a distance, increasing the scale, coordination and 
dispersion of resisting activities through global information networking. Much in the 
vein of those who petition the Bank to apply the discourse of 'good governance' that it 
promotes as best practice for developing countries to itself, in terms of becoming 
more transparent and accountable (World Bank 1998f, Fidler 2001, Wade 2002b, 
Kapur 2002, IFIAC 2000, UNDID 2002), the Bank might be pushed to apply more 
consistently and thoroughly upon itself the discourse of decentralisation and 
partnership that it trumpets within its renewal. The decentralising ethos might be used 
and pushed to its logical extreme, and although externalisation could remain a 
desired end-point, pursuing partnerships could incorporate a number of more evident 
and immediate goals but no determinate end-goal (working on the presumption that 
an abundance of other influential factors will ensure that outcomes remain 
indeterminate). Radical externalisation could be desirable, but multiple more and less 
(temporarily) satisfactory alternative outcomes are also possible. 
This is in effect a gradualist mode of engagement upon the same plane as 
Externalisation, but setting more restricted goals and conceived as a means of 
working alongside all those within the Bank who are also pushing for change. The 
argument is that there are potentialities worth exploring in using the Bank's discourse 
upon itself, focussing strategically upon decentralising project-networks and 
procedures of governance out to the countries in which they are to be implemented, 
and encouraging more deliberative and collaborative processes of problem-definition 
and agenda-setting. Changes at the Bank may often be small in either intention or 
effect, due to pressures from donor country governments and other voting members, 
corporate partners, and the capital markets upon which it places its bonds; the limits 
of the intellectual framework with which it regards the world it occupies; and the 
difficulty of changing an institutional culture from the top-down or from the outside. 
Yet the organisation and its partners are too diverse in their thinking and operations to 
be dismissed as being without the capacity for change, even if such diversity is 
frequently pushed to the margins of the dominant organisational narrative. To adapt a 
notion that Andr6 Gorz (1989: 8) puts forward in his Critique of Economic Reason, 
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those who insist upon the Bank's monolithic presence as an organisation devoted 
entirely to extracting profit from poorer countries, remain somewhat prisoners of their 
utopia, unable to consider the 'potential for liberation offered by the changes 
happening now'. As we have seen through the previous three chapters, shifts in 
thinking and operations are continually occurring at the Bank, with the growing 
strength of presence of discourses on partnership, ownership, decentralisation and 
knowledge amongst the more recent. 
Building Alternative Knowledge Banks for New'Newl Economies 
The agenda within this latter strategy might be wrapped up in the manner discussed 
in Chapter Six through two interlinked strategies of encouraging engagement with 
Externally-Operated Project-networks (EOPs), and fostering more effective 
partnerships within those that retain certain core operations or staffing requirements 
at the Bank. That is, firstly, encouraging a restriction of direct Bank involvement in 
endeavours that can be carried out by more local organisations to a form of financial 
and assistance-oriented engagement, allowing external partners to define their own 
agendas. The Bank's expertise and funding could be used in organising forums to 
identify problems in need of addressing, and if efforts were not already underway then 
it could advertise available funding for such. In the case of the Gateway it could for 
instance be argued that OneWorld and others were already involved in many of the 
endeavours the Gateway was designed for, and others such as the co-ordinators of 
Choike and Africa Pulse were, post facto, enthusiastic to develop and maintain 
regional ly-devoted alternatives to which the Bank could have contributed funding. 
Secondly, pressure could be applied in seeking to turn Bank-Operated Project- 
networks (BOPs) into their Multiple Operator counterparts (MOPs), petitioning to 
create independent governing bodies of partners for such MOPs in pulling project- 
networks away from the Bank's at times domineering control to produce Fostered 
Project- networks (FoPs), and then pushing to make these FoPs more effectively 
fostered and independent. So overall this could be coined as a strategy of dispersal 
pushing BOPs into MOPs and MOPs into FoPs, pulling FoPs further away from the 
Bank and encouraging engagement with EOPs. This would involve greater roles for 
all who partner with the Bank, and so through such a process of decentralisation the 
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boundaries distinguishing Bank and non-Bank would become increasingly blurred - 
as was noted has been occurring through the Bank's own discursive practices in 
Chapter Six - but in this instance importantly with the volition of both the Bank and an 
observing critical community. 
The more the boundaries of the Bank were blurred and its idea-producing core 
diffracted in this way, the more space would be produced to open the organisation up 
to a conversation between various trans-Bank actor-networks. Such conversation 
would include questions upon the nature and desirability of, and paths that can be 
pursued towards, different 'developments', as well as the Bank's role within the field 
and that of other interested parties currently subsumed under the CSO bracket. 
Opening up the Bank to conversation would be an effective means of opening up a 
parallel discourse upon the nature of CSOs and NGOs; questions of who speaks for 
whom and who is accountable to whom. Discursive involvement with the Bank's 
under-defined categories of NGOs and CSOs is necessary to shape the direction of 
the Bank's partnerships with externals, ensuring that this 'opening up' does not 
merely consolidate wider communities of consensus around the Bank's discursive 
practice, but rather opens it up to critical engagement. At the same time, such 
involvement could usefully motivate questions upon the nature of NGO networking 
discourse, and the distribution of voice between locally-based organisations of the 
developmental ly-affected in the South, and international NGOs based in the North (cf. 
Nelson 1996, Chiriboga 1999, Atkinson 2000). 
Such critical actor-networks can productively engage in dialogue with the Bank in 
negotiating programmes of change, remaining reflexively critical of changes affected 
and their failings, on the understanding that it will probably never change so radically 
as to satisfy the demands of all (for many groups this would involve its dissolution). 
The same problems could potentially occur as were noted with the end-goal strategy 
of externalisation; the tendency for the Bank to select partners who share in its 
perspective and methodology and so effect a process of repetition, with the only real 
difference being the lack of the Bank's name headlining the projects that were 
created. Yet it is at this point that the need to refuse the dichotomy between moderate 
and radical critics becomes most apparent, and hence the function of thinking of the 
four outlined strategies as something of a division of labour. Consistent pressure 
could be applied through cost-raising jamming activities and public-relations 
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damaging examples of development actor-networks seeking to transcend the need or 
the Bank's involvement. Such activities would set the scene for increasing the role of 
partners and frequently re-negotiating a balance being between initiatives being too 
internally and too externally coordinated, such that agendas that were significantly (if 
not greatly) different to those dominant within the Bank could benefit from its 
resources, expertise and networking abilities. The aim of this process of engagement 
would be directed at opening up and developing particular heterotopic spaces within 
the Bank233 ; enabling it to speak more clearly and distinctly with more than one voice, 
and so altering the conditions of existence of its 'political, economic, institutional 
regime of the production of truth' (Foucault 1984a: 74). This could, it would be hoped, 
encourage the Bank to become more reflexive to local concerns, producing shifts in 
its prioritisation of concerns and formulation of agendas, and lessening the ease with 
which the narrow economistic mindset that has traditionally dominated the 
organisation could be reproduced unimpeded. 
Conclusion 
In this and previous chapters we have seen that the Knowledge Bank is best 
considered as a new scene in the same act of the development drama, with the 
scenery effectively remaining in place whilst little changes in the main plot and the 
interaction of the key players. The state of renewal at the Bank has been considered 
as a stilted process containing opportunities, but hampered by a variety of restricting 
factors (members' interests, staffing, sources of capital) that perpetuate the 
dominance of a narrowly-defined economic discourse within the organisation. The 
Bank's characterisation of its critics and potential partners was viewed as another 
example of this stilted reform; what could be viewed in one sense as an attempt to 
open up to critical perspectives upon itself and its vision of development was seen as 
producing increasingly inclusive and ambiguous terminology that tended to elide the 
differences between various voices and whom they represent. This in turn lent to the 
production of a simplistic and moral ly-co lou red discourse (upon the moderate- 
reformer and radical-abolitionist actor- positions) that opened up a space within which 
the Bank could prescribe who it should and should not engage with in its discourse of 
233 1 understand heterotopia here as 'those singular spaces to be found in some given social spaces 
whose functions are different or even the opposite of others' (Foucault 1984c7 252). 
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se/f-reform. The division of reformers and abolishers - used by both the Bank and a 
number of Bank-critical actor-networks - was questioned and argued to be an 
unproductive and unnecessary distraction; it was then instead suggested that a broad 
division of labour could be effected between an array of critical actor-networks. 
However it has also been argued in this chapter that such changes in the Bank's 
scripted role (partnership, ownership, networking) indicate opportunities for altering 
aspects within the organisation's performance of development, even if (or perhaps 
because) the organisation is not currently well-rehearsed in their practise. In response 
it has been argued that the opportunities that exist need to be pursued in encouraging 
the organisation to practise more consistently and thoroughly its own discourse of 
renewal, partnership and decentralisation. Several strategies of non/engagement 
have thus been considered, and tentative critical engagement with the Bank's project- 
networks has been argued to present possibilities for enabling their more independent 
development as something other than merely extensions of the Bank. Two strategies 
of non-engagement have meanwhile been argued to have roles to play in setting the 
scene within which the Bank considers the costs and benefits it faces in engaging 
more and less effective partnerships and modes of decentralisation. Through 
partnership initiatives the hope would be that processes of decentralisation might be 
taken out to the degree where the boundaries delineating Bank and non-Bank 
activities could be blurred, morphing the organisation towards a position where it acts 
in an assistance role to externally-directed projects with lesser Bank control. The 
hope would be that as its operations became more territorially and organisationally 
diffused, this might work to diffract the central hub around which its ideas-producing 
machinery operates, and in turn to defuse the towering political-economic might with 
which it currently dominates the development landscape. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has been concerned with discursive practices surrounding the production 
of a 'new` economy, associated 'new' forms of development and governance, and a 
'new' World Bank which has been seeking to reposition itself in relation to these 
concerns. The work has approached this series of changes as relatively new 
variations upon a much older series of struggles over sources and understandings of 
property and wealth, the means by which they are produced, and the means by which 
claims upon them are made. The focus within this approach has been upon the 
tendency towards repetition within the discursive practices of dominant sets of 
interests, but also considering how small opportunities for producing differences can 
often emerge from within such moments of re-production. Although patterns of 
recurrence predominate, the continual presence of small adaptations mean that within 
each moment new and different spaces can potentially be opened up. 
In Part One we saw how a 'new economy' and a 'new society' have been conceived, 
and are now being negotiated and performed, through the discursive practices of 
various actor-networks. The conceptual and terminological soup that discussions over 
this new economy and society represent were shown to face a number of problems in 
terms of conceptualisation and measurement. Stronger and weaker links were firstly 
agreed to exist between various interesting technological developments and changes 
in procedures of production, but the analytic endeavour of bringing these changes 
together as signifying a newly emergent economy was argued to be questionable. 
The observed changes were argued to not necessarily cohere in the attributed 
manner (causal relationships were asserted somewhat too casually), and nor did they 
necessarily represent a rupture with any 'old' economy (the significance of various 
observed changes was often overstated out of context). The knowledge society was 
secondly argued to be even more problematic as an analytical tool than the 
knowledge economy, in terms of its generality and ambiguity. 
Nonetheless, critical understandings of the 'knowledge' economy and society were 
agreed to be interesting and useful insofar as the notions occupy important positions 
within contemporary developmental and governmental discursive practices. The 
knowledge society was argued to function principally as a rhetorical framing device 
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within which fears, hopes, and programmes of action with regards to the knowledge 
economy could be given greater emphasis, through encouraging the impression that 
we speak of a new era and not just a new economic phase. Aspects of the knowledge 
economy, it was argued, are becoming reified through governmental and 
developmental discursive practices, as connections between technological and social 
changes are asserted, and policy changes are implemented, which in turn accelerate 
processes of change in labour organisation, education and technological 
development. 
A number of hopes and fears concerning the knowledge economy were observed to 
be common threads of preoccupation running through much governmental and 
developmental discourse. These concerns centred around the prospects of countries 
advancing to, maintaining or losing their position at the forefront of global economic 
competitiveness; leapfrogging whole stages of economic development or else 
becoming stuck on the losing end of a new international division of knowledge labour. 
The knowledge economy discourse of Northern governmental institutions was argued 
to be dominated by the concern to extend contemporary capital regulation norms to 
newly fictionalised capital forms, standardising procedures of economic and social 
governance globally in extending the provenance of neoliberal discursive practices. 
Such practices would not hold out good prospects for producing greater social and 
economic equality, greater difference over repetition; but at the same time it was 
noted that spaces exist for alternative visions within the reproduction of the 
hegemonically predominant discursive form, and that the eventual outcomes of 
interaction between various understandings of knowledge's social and economic roles 
remain underdetermined. 
Origins and understandings of the concept of development and its means and goals 
were finally also discussed, and it was concluded that a complex and shifting 
assemblage of multiple discursive practices surround the notion. The macro-practice 
of government-level development was argued to be dominated by concerns of 
modernisation, integration and economic growth. The discursive practice of such 
grand-scale development as a whole, and that of the World Bank more specifically, 
were seen to have faced crises induced by the failure of projected hopes. As a 
consequence of this failure, the discursive practises of both development and the 
Bank were noted to have become preoccupied with self-reform, the latest 
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adjustments being to incorporate knowledge economy concerns such as bridging 
various divides, intellectual property rights, and universal basic education. 
Part Two then proceeded to analyse this discourse of self-reform at the World Bank in 
greater detail. The Bank was considered as a complex organisation dominated by a 
series of political, financial and cultural constitutive elements (such as the interests of 
its major Northern government members, its dependence upon capital markets, and 
its drawing staff predominantly from the economics departments of US and UK 
universities). However the organisation's complexity was argued to mean that these 
factors do not overdetermine its every move. This great story-teller of our age is still 
able to spin a tale of its own, however heavily-influenced it may be by these elements 
around and within it. The Wolfensohn Project of Renewal and its Knowledge Bank 
project have been the latest extended chapter in this story of development and 
reform, an attempt that in part deflects criticism by presenting a friendly-faced Bank 
concerned only to produce smiles on the faces of the children affected by its work. 
Two dominant understandings of the Knowledge Bank were noted as representing 
voices which speak within, if not always for, the organisation; the Knowledge for 
Development Bank (K4DB) and the Knowledge Management and Networking Bank 
(KMNB). 
The knowledge economy and development discursive practices of the Bank's major 
government members were noted to prevail within the K4D13 (concerns to extend the 
dominant contemporary mode of capital regulation to information and knowledge, by 
opening economies up and extending and systematising Intellectual Property Rights 
legislation). Yet at the same time, discourses were also seen as existing within the 
organisation upon working with certain kinds of knowledge as public goods, and upon 
establishing legislation to protect indigenous knowledge. These ambiguities within the 
Knowledge Bank agenda were argued to typify the complexities of the Bank as a 
whole. In looking at the KMNB, the Knowledge Bank was argued to be not so much a 
programme as a scenario of renewal, a series of improvisations upon a theme, 
attempting to raise awareness of the organisation's perceived strengths and redefine 
a new and more audience-pleasing ethos, whilst dressing older practices in new 
colours. The project was in this way considered as a re-branding and mainstreaming 
of practices already ongoing within the Bank before the new President's arrival. 
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The Bank's adoption of network-th inking gives the overall impression that some new 
lines have been written into its script but that it is not currently well-practised in how to 
perform the new role. As a result of an organisational conservatism built in through 
the restricting factors mentioned, concerning its major sources of funding and staffing, 
and procedures of governance, there is still too strong a tendency towards behaving 
as though the organisation should speak with one voice upon one valid form of 
development. As such the practise of the discourse of partnership has tended 
towards a nominal dispersal of agency; selecting partners who share the hegemonic 
perspective upon development and international economics expressed by the 
dominant voice of the Bank; and minimising the role of many other partners whilst 
advertising its more decentred approach, producing dispersal with managed control 
(as was noted in the Development Gateway). 
Within the politics of networks surrounding the Bank's renewal as a Knowledge 
Management and Networking Bank therefore lies the possibility of its reproducing the 
development community to whom it appeals in its calls to network through its 
involvement in knowledge management training, and educational endeavours. One 
possible end-result is the Bank's extending its normalising influences upon 
development discourse and responsibilising a variety of developmental and 
governmental actors to govern themselves by (in effect, World Bank) numbers. Such 
outcomes would consolidate the Bank's position and ability to govern at a distance 
from within an assemblage of independent actor-networks, extending the hegemonic 
conditions under which the power of its truths operate. The same problems of 
discursive influence have been argued to hold in the Bank's attempts to define who it 
should and should not listen to and engage with, positing caricatured actor-positions 
of legitimate and illegitimate critics within its discourse (in terms of the end-goals and 
strategies they adopt). 
Yet these new elements within the Bank's discourse are still relatively complex, open 
and underdetermined, and can also be seen as opening up opportunities for taking 
the organisation in new directions through critical engagement. In the manner 
mentioned towards the end of Chapter Five, the knowledge economy and the notion 
of the Knowledge Bank can be viewed as several conversations within the Bank itself, 
each with its own grammar and priorities (cf. Bebbington et al., forthcoming, Leiteritz 
2002). The most clearly heard voice of narrowly-conceived economic discourse may 
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frame knowledge as a form of capital and be concerned with knowledge-maximising 
policies for promoting economic growth. Business models of organisational 
knowledge management and networking may recur in documentation upon improving 
the Bank's performance. Yet other social scientists and broader-minded economists 
within the Bank are at the same time more concerned with the socio-cultural shifts 
involved in thinking about a 'knowledge' economy, asking questions about the 
position of tacit and traditional knowledges and the value and potential losses in 
development terms stemming from translation and standardisation procedures. 
An optimistic perspective upon this situation would thus be that as knowledge 
economy discourse has entered the Bank an economistic perspective may have 
dominated, due to the Bank's culture and structure. Yet the attention that the 
discourse has drawn could now raise awareness of, and provide opportunities to, 
other perspectives concerned to question the organisation's dominant mode of 
operations. Interesting vulnerabilities are implied in the Bank's speaking of ownership 
and partnership and thinking of itself in network terms - the desire and perhaps need 
to forge alliances with a wider assemblage of its critical actor-networks. These 
vulnerabilities suggest opportunities to use the Bank's discourse upon itself, 
demanding its more consistent and thorough application in encouraging greater 
practises of dispersal. This could in turn encourage a rethinking of how the 
organisation is constituted, how it acts in the development field and how it relates to 
other development actors; acknowledging the dispersed nature of agency and voice 
within its operations and so opening up its discursive terrain. Quiet voices of progress 
are present within the discursive changes at the Bank, which can productively be 
worked with and thereby strengthened, in opening it up to conversations running 
across its organisational boundaries. The most productive form of ongoing pressure 
that we see today is based around such an approach, establishing connections 
across boundary-lines delineating 'the Bank', producing spaces wherein a plurality of 
voices can be heard, and in this way encouraging the organisation to at least consider 
alternative approaches to and conceptions of development. 
As we have seen, the Bank still tends to talk mainly with its close friends - those who 
concur in its view of the world and what needs to be done in and to it - and to prefer 
to be the loudest voice in the telling of development stories, such that its views come 
to predominate whenever it chooses to speak. What is needed now is to make the 
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grand storyteller realise how it can productively speak with different voices in the 
telling of different stories, how it can listen to the stories of those other than its closest 
friends, and how it could learn to appreciate the strange beauty that sometimes 
emerges from acts of group storytelling. As a long-term aspirational agenda we might 
hope that, using its own words and encouraging it to be true to them, it can be 
opened up to alternative approaches to knowledge and ways of knowing, and 
development itself and ways of being. To return to the notion of development as a 
drama, the 'audience' of civil society critics have a central role in expressing approval 
and disapproval and calling for change, as well as performing alongside those within 
the Bank also already exploring alternative perspectives. With some good prompting 
and on-stage improvisation from this audience, then we might hope that the Bank can 
be heckled, restrained and encouraged to the point where it presents a more 
convincing performance as a facilitator of a variety of development efforts, more than 
merely an underwriting bank for a series of grand-scale projects in 'Development'. 
This could move the performance of development forwards towards something 
bearing the significance of a new act, if not to even more radically change the nature 
of the performance. Through engagement with the Bank, the grand-scale 
governmental-economic development drama can be tested to see if it can become a 
more open and improvised piece with minimal scripting, adaptable to the localities 
wherein it is performed and allowing greater audience participation. 
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